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Abstract 
Urban regime theory has become one of the dominant theoretical perspectives for the study of 
urban politics during the 1990s. It has also gained currency within the UK as a tool for analysing 
local regeneration partnerships. Regime theory has, however, raised more questions than it has 
answered about whether it adequately explains or characterises different partnership forms. This 
study provides both an exposition and a critique of regime theory, generating a picture of what 
regime governance might look like in the political and institutional landscape of the UK and 
proceeding to identify factors which might explain how regeneration partnerships have come about 
in this country. It draws on four case studies ofregeneration partnerships in Barnsley, Rotherham, 
Hull and North East Lincolnshire, concluding that regime governance has not taken root in local 
collaborative endeavours between local authorities and businesses. As a contribution to the wider 
6 governance' debate it ftuther concludes that central government may be gaining rather than losing 
influence on local political processes, arguing that regeneration initiatives, particularly the SRB, 
are inhibiting the development oflocal governance capacity. In summary, it takes a sceptical view 
ofclaims that we are in or moving toward an era of local governance, defted as autonomous, self- 
organising networks. 
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Introduction 
Local governance has become the dominant paradigm through which local political processes are 
studied in the 1990s. It is a broad concept, encompassing all local governing activities which 
require collaboration by a local authority with other organisations. ' Collaboration takes many 
different forms, from the contract relationship associated with compulsory competitive tendering 
and service delivery, to the 'stakeholder' partnership associated with 'supply-side' activities and 
urban regeneration. This latter element of local governance has generated much intellectual 
curiosity in British political science, engendering debates about the nature of partnerships 
themselves and about the factors which have brought them about. Urban regeneration 
partnerships are not exclusively about the relationship between local authority and business, but 
this relationship has generated great interest in scholarly discussions (Pierre, 1998a). Four main 
reasons can be identified for this interest. First, the collaborative agenda established by the 
Conservatives in the early 1990S was. principally about the pooling of local government and 
business resources in the regeneration effort (Curry,, 3.4.98, personal interview). ' Second, early 
partnership agendas were concerned primarily with economic development and the later emphasis 
in government initiatives on integrated economic and social approaches to regeneration, involving 
a wider cross-section of stakeholders, has developed only slowly. A third reason why the local 
authority-business relationship has proved of interest to scholars is the perception by some that 
local authorities have become 'entrepreneurial' in character, favouring the growth agenda above 
other political objectives. ' Finally, interest in the local authority-business interface has been given 
added momentum by the increasing use of urban regime theory as an explanatory tool. Regime 
I The definition of governance is discussed in more depth in chapter 3. 
2 David Curry MP was Minister for Local Government, Housing and Urban 
Regeneration from July 1994 to May 1997. 
See for example Seyd 0 990), Lawless (1990,1994) and Malpass (1994). 
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theory is concerned with collaborative dynamics and processes, particularly those between local 
government and business (Elkin, 1987a; Stone, 1989). 
These dynamics and processes of local governance have not proved easy to pin down and the use 
of regime theory as a tool through which to examine them has posed more questions than it has 
answered about what kind of governance is represented by public-private partnerships. Regime 
theory has been used in a variety of ways, often far removed from the intentions of its original 
authors, Elkin (1 987a) and Stone (1989). As well as stimulating discussion about what kind of 
partnerships have emerged in the arena of regeneration policy, regime theory has also generated 
debate about the factors driving partnership development and about how far governance by 
partnership and governance by regime are different processes, a key issue explored in this study. ' 
Harding (1998: 7 1) argues that there is a 'blind spot' in the public-partnerships literature about 
how and why partnerships form. Hence, argues Hastings (1996), there remains work to be done 
in 'unravelling' partnership processes both at the analytical and the empirical levels. This study 
takes up her twin-pronged challenge, offering a contribution to the 'governance' debate. 
The research agenda tackled in this study focuses on a single facet of local governance, the 
relationship between the local authority and the business sector in regeneration initiatives, 
analysing those which involve no formal-legal contract or other command relationship between 
ý1_ - 
the parties. In other words, it focuses on the characteristics of non-command, non-statutory 
relationships and the dynamics which have brought them about. This approach eliminated from 
the inquiry many of the interfaces between the local authority and the business sector and all of 
the interfaces between the local authority and other local groups. ' It can bejustified in two ways. 
First, the definition of 'governance' as autonomous, self-governing networks offered by Rhodes 
(1996) itself eliminates contract or command relationships from consideration. Second, as 
4 See for example Stoker and Mossberger (1994), Lawless (1994), Stoker (1995), Ward 
(1996,1997ab) and, Harding (1994,1996ab). 
5 Although the role ofTraining and Enterprise Councils is examined by virtue ofthe role 
of business leaders in these bodies. 
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elaborated above, the dynamic between local government and business leaders is of significant 
interest to scholars of local governance and urban regeneration. This method of limiting the 
research agenda has left open a wide range of questions which this study examines. 
How, then, was the research carried out? A detailed methodology is set out in chapter 1, so the 
summary here is brief The first task was to take a step back and look at the way in which 
partnerships have been theorised in British political science using the framework offered by urban 
regime theory. The diverse treatments and understandings ofregime theory by scholars within and 
outside the UK begs the question of what regime theory is and what it is not. For this reason, an 
exposition of regime theory is developed in chapter 2. This exposition is not unique (see for 
example Stoker, 1995), but it is the most expansive analysis yet undertaken of the conceptual 
origins and theoretical claims deriving from regime theory. Furthermore it is unique in treating 
the combined works of Elkin and Stone as an authoritative statement of regime theory. Thirdly, 
it settles a number of disputes about the scope and applicability ofregime theory. It thus provides 
a solid conceptual foundation for the remainder of the study. 
A discussion is then undertaken in chapter 3 of the diverse and sometimes contradictory ways in 
which regime theory has been used in British political science. This exercise facilitates an 
examination of partnerships from two perspectives. One perspective is to question what kind of 
partnerships are compatible with the notion of regime governance, an original conceptual 
development within the chapter which is drawn from regime theory. The other perspective is to 
question which factors might be capable of combining to produce this type of governance in the 
UK. At the same time, questions are asked from a sceptical perspective as to how far urban 
partnerships are likely to resemble Elkin's and Stone's urban regimes and it is suggested that urban 
partnerships cannot be explained by drawing on the concepts central to regime theory as outlined 
in chapter 2. The existence of regimes is therefore problematized as Ward recommends, while 
abstract conditions for partnership and regime governance in the UK are outlined (Ward, 1997b: 
1494). 
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The main hypothesis drawn from this discussion, therefore, is that regime theory is unlikely to 
explain or to characterise the partnership workings of local governance in the UK. The point of 
this exercise is not to make the obvious point that the institutional landscape in the UK differs 
from that in the US where regime theory originated, but to provide a contrast and a clarification 
of the similarities and differences between local governance in the UK and regime governance in 
the USA. The lesson is drawn that insights can be gained from challenging as well as from 
confirming the propositions of a theoretical perspective. It is in providing a set of parameters 
which underpin the concept ofregime governance and against which partnerships can be evaluated 
that regime theory makes an important contribution. 
The empirical phase of the study is an evaluation of local partnership processes. in Barnsley, 
Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire and of the extra-local processes which produced 
them. The case studies make contributions in three dimensions: the relationship between local and 
extra-local factors; comparison between policy oriented and implementation oriented partnership 
activities; and in analysis of partnership activities in different policy arenas, specifically a 
comparison between different economic development activities and education. They answer 
questions about what partnerships are, about the nature ofthe relationship between local authority 
and business within them, and about how partnership objectives are set and carried out. They also 
provide an original perspective on the process and the anatomy of partnership, showing that 
partnerships were not always established in response to the central government agenda. The. case 
studies explain the trajectory of partnership development, highlighting the heterogeneity of 
partnership approaches within and between cases. The conclusion drawn from the case studies 
is that the goverment exercises an overbearing and inhibiting influence on local partnership 
agendas and practices. Challengepartnerships, in particular, are symbolic in character,, prevented 
by the weight ofbureaucratic requirements from producing genuine local synergy. ' Contributions 
to partnership working by a handful of local businessmen are limited and the business sector has 
not really engaged, so far, with the partnership agenda. Finally, partnership working is 
6 Those partnerships responsible for bidding and for management of Single 
Regeneration Budget funds, which are procured by competition between local partnerships. 
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heterogeneous in character. Those partnerships which are not involved in the challenge process 
tend to be stronger, productive of more added value and generative of a higher level of business 
interest. There is some evidence of regime governance in these activities, but at present it exists 
only in isolated initiatives. 
These studies provide a powerfW empirical case that regime governance is, for its advocates, a 
pipe dream. Partnership is not driven by the interdependence of local authority and business sector 
resources. Rather, it is driven ideologically and through the allocation of 'selective incentives' and 
penalties by central government. In looking at the anatomy of collaboration through the lens of 
urban regime theory, it is concluded that regime governance has not developed and, indeed, that 
in important arenas it is inhibited by central government initiatives. Rather, it is argued, a process 
of partnership governance is developing. Partnership governance is not necessarily a half-way 
house between 'government' and 'regime governance' because in some respects they counteract 
processes which would be necessary for governance to develop. In suggesting that regime theory 
does not capture the substance of partnership activities, the study is also a rallying call to scholars 
who might wish to join under the label 'governance sceptics'. It therefore contributes to a range 
of empirical and theoretical debates. It is novel in its characterisation of regime theory and it adds 
a significant body of new empirical material, while suggesting potential avenues of inquiry for 
future studies. The perspective that central goverranent, is very powerful in relation to local 
govemment is, of course, old hat and in confuming this fact the study says little which is new., But 
in claiming that partnership governance represent an enhancement of central state influence over 
local political processes and a means by which the state gains added influence with non-state 
actors, the conclusions presented here offer a different perspective on the governance debate and 
a counterblast to the notion that central goverment is losing its capacities or its ability to 
influence local politics. 
The study is primarily a contribution to scholarly debate. It may be of interest to a number of 
academic sub-disciplines including urban theory, comparative politics and public administration. 
It is also being fed into the IPPR Commission on Public-Private Partnerships as a contribution to 
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practitioner discussions about the efficacy ofcollaborative endeavour and its future direction. The 
study is organised into ten chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study and a methodological exposition. 
Chapter 2 sets out the core concepts and key claims of regime theory, drawing on a critical 
analysis of the works of Stephen Elkin and Clarence Stone. 
Chapter 3 comprises a critical review of applications of regime theory in British political science, 
identifying the core characteristics of regime governance as they might be expressed in local 
partnerships and the factors which might be capable of producing regime governance in the UK 
setting. 
Chapter 4 commences the empirical phase of the study, providing a contextual outline of the 
extra-local factors and initiatives which influenced the local partnerships identified in the case 
studies. 
Chapterý 5 to 8 report the findings from research undertaken in Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and 
North East Lincolnshire. 
Chapter 9 provides a comparative analysis of the case study findings, drawing out key themes: 
the influence of central government, the symbolism of challenge partnerships, the poverty of 
business activism and the potential for greater governance capacity to develop in partnerships 
which are removed from the bureaucratic influence of challenge fund schemes. 
Chapter 10 concludes the study, showing the limits of regime theory as a cross-national 
explanation for local governance and arguing that central government has maintained and 
augmented its capacity to influence local politics through key local regeneration partnerships. 
6 
Chapter 1. Methodology 
Introduction 
This study is essentially a deductive analysis of processes involved in the establishment and 
maintenance of partnerships between local authorities and local business sectors. The project is 
not concerned with methodological innovation and the research design follows from the literature 
with which it engages and from the questions it seeks to address. In this sense, it is not self- 
consciously methodological and has much in common, says Ragin, with most case oriented 
research (1987: 34). The approach taken in this study has been described and re-described in the 
literature. ' It corresponds with what Yin recommends as the 'linear analytic' model, in which a 
problem is identified, a literature review undertaken, methods stipulated, the case study findings 
presented and finally conclusions drawn from case study findings (Yin, 1994: 13 8). It also follows 
Bailey's study of partnership agencies in British Goverment in building up a narrative on the 
origins, development and activities of each case based on interviews with key actors and on use 
of other primary and secondary sources (Bailey et al, 1995: 3). ' The study begins in chapters 2 
and 3 with a critical review of the concepts associated with urban regime theory in its British and 
American guises, developing from this review a set of variables both to categorise and explain 
local authority-business sector partnerships. The four case studies set out in chapters 5 to 8, 
Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire, are structured with a view to evaluating 
the issues discussed in the literature reviews. They follow a broadly similar format, where 
possible, to facilitate the comparisons undertaken in the analysis of the findings. In chapter 9, the 
empirical material is analysed and the similarities and differences within and between the case 
studies are evaluated. Chapter 10 returns to the conceptual issues raised at the beginning of the 
See Holt and Turner (1970), Ragin (1987), May (1997), and Yin (1994). 
Yin suggests that this format is the most advantageous for a student facing a thesis 
committeeN 
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study, discussing the nature of partnership phenomena, the efficacy of urban regime theory in 
explaining them and, inductively, the kind of theoretical explanation best suited to accounting for 
them. 
This chapter sets out the methodological rationale for the research project. It proceeds 
sequentially, examining the issues encountered at each stage of the study. Hence, it begins with 
an explanation of the structure of the thesis, proceeding to examine the methodological issues 
associated with carrying out the four case studies of Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East 
Lincolnshire and the ensuing analysis. The chapter is organised into four sections. First, an 
overview is given of the rationale for the study. A discussion of the case study method follows, 
incorporating a discussion of issues in comparative research. The third section examines issues 
in data collection. The fourth section explains how the case study findings were assembled and 
reported, finally addressing methods and epistemological assumptions involved in drawing causal 
inferences and in explanation building. 
The Nature of the Study - An Overview 
As noted above, this study evaluates the efficacy of urban regime theory as an explanation for local 
government-business sector partnerships. As it is theory driven, the research is necessarily 
deductive in character (May, 1997: 3 1). However, it is also inductive in that it offers a 
constructed characterisation oflocal partnership phenomena and a constructed theoretical analysis 
based on the research findings, which contrast with the propositions in regime theory and with 
some of the hypotheses arising from the critical review of it in chapter 3. This approach is 
highlighted by Ragin (1987: 45-6) with exemplar studies which are deductive by virtue of their 
initial theoretical assumptions, and inductive in terms of the final re-conceptualization of initial 
theoretical ideas. 
The deductive approach to this study derives from the researcher's primary interest in theoretical 
issues. It is recognised, however, that an inductive approach to the project could also have 
provided an assessment of the relationship between the phenomenon of local governance and the 
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explanation provided by urban regime theory, unencumbered by reflexive assumptions deriving 
from the theory in question. For example, it would have been possible to undertake a series of 
case studies guided by a loose conceptualization of public-private partnerships (see, for example, 
Corry et al, 1997). Such a study could have revealed much about the nature of local government- 
business sector relationships and the findings could have either been presented as a descriptive 
case (Lijphart, 1971) or conceptualized in accordance with the principles of grounded theory 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Either way, the case study built inductively could, through a 
theoretically oriented secondary analysis (Lijphart, 1971: 691), have been compared with the 
claims generated in urban regime theory. The intrinsic difficulty is that this approach could 
engender an explanation focussing on phenomena which are irrelevant to the claims of regime 
theory. As chapter 3 shows, a broad definition of public-private partnerships could incorporate 
an analysis of purchaser (local authority)/provider (business) relationships which necessarily 
involve a command structure in the form of contracts between the parties. Evaluation of these 
phenomena, interesting though they may be, would not in itself reveal anything about the 
applicability of regime theory which rests on the existence of non-command relationships and on 
the supposed necessity of inter-agency collaboration for the production of local governance (Elkin, 
1987a; Stone, 1989). ' As Mackenzie argues of good case studies, they control the material they 
present in relation to criteria of relevance. A good case study is, he says, orderly and ruthlessly 
selective. An inductive case study, subsequently used in an evaluation of regime theory, would 
have been unlikely to confon-n to these strictures (Mackenzie, 1975: 143). 
Furthermore, this study is, in part, the follow up to a pilot study (Davies, 1996) which itself sought 
to evaluate regime theory. Given the level of 'conceptual pollution' within the mind of the 
researcher, it would have been extremely difficult to construct a research design which was not 
influenced by regime theory. As Yin argues, when designing case studies, the processes involved 
3 The term 'governance' is used in this study to denote an output ofpartnership activity 
between different agencies, public and private, active in the locality. 'Governance' is achieved 
when these agencies collaborate to produce an output which, otherwise, could not have been 
achieved. These outputs may, in Stone's view, be material, financial, administrative or intellectual 
(Stone, 1993: 11). 
9 
should 'force' a researcher to develop theory of some kind in order to inform the choice of cases 
s/he makes (1994: 27). He goes so far as to reject outright the grounded approach to research, 
arguing that theory is crucial to the design of a case, whether the purpose is to develop or to test 
theory. Both Mackenzie (1975: 142) and Lijphart (1971: 69 1) reinforce this position in arguing 
that any narrative of events is necessarily deductive in character. However rigorous a researcher 
may be in attempting to filter out personal views, it is likely that a case will be guided by some 
'vague theoretical notions and anecdotal knowledge of other cases' (Lijphart, 1971: 691). As 
Hastings puts it in her analysis of power relationships in partnerships, the 'inference of a pre- 
supposition' is necessary for the argument to make sense (1999: 97). As well as following 
logically and naturally from the research concerns, a deductive approach was therefore crucial to 
transparency in this study. 
The Case Study Method 
The empirical component of the study consists of four case studies defmed in relation to the local 
authority areas of Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire. ' The issue of 'what 
is a case' is strongly contested and the term 'case' has many, some ambiguous, meanings (Stake, 
1994, Ragin and Becker, 1992). The studies undertaken in this project are viewed, principally, 
as 6 real' empirical units, rather than as theoretical or discursive constructs (Ragin, 1992a: 9-10), 
or as objects, which may be subjected to one or more methods of empirical study (Stake, 1994: 
236). Nevertheless, much of the evidence presented in the cases is based on the perception of the 
participants and it is discursive in character. Although this study involves the analysis of 
narratives, it is not a narrative, or anti-foundational analysis (Rhodes, 1999b). It proved possible, 
in most instances, to make sense of differing, or contradictory views. For example, in Rotherham, 
the Chief Executive stated that the Council had always been involved in partnerships, whereas the 
Leader stated that partnerships had. only recently developed. It was possible, through careful 
4 Given that cases occur within a seamless fabric of social interactioný it is hard to say 
where they begin and where they end (Ragin, 1992b: 220). This is true not only with the 
designation of case boundaries, but also in terms of the phenomenon under investigation, in this 
study partnership,, which may in principle exist within a matrix of types some of which are more 
visible than others. The matrix would incorporate four axes based on a continuum: 
visible/intentional, visible/unconscioUS, invisible/intentional, invisible/unconscious. 
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examination of each interview, to establish that this contradiction arose through different 
understandings of the term 'partnership'. Both parties agreed that the Council had been involved 
in longstanding co-operative arrangements with the business sector, but unlike the Chief 
Executive, the Leader applied the term partnership only to institutionalised forms of co-operation. 
This issue, however, suggested that shared vocabularies may develop only over time and that 
partnerships operate within very different organisational cultures (Skelcher et al, 1996: 39). 
The case study is viewed by Ragin (1992b) and by Stake (1994) as providing a link between 
theoretical and empirical concerns; both a process and a product of learning. Stake distinguishes 
between case studies which are designed to provide insight into theoretical problems, which he 
defines as 'instrumental' cases and those in which the subject matter of the case is itself the focus 
of inquiry, which he defines as 'intrinsic' cases (Yin, 1994: 237). Case studies may, therefore, 
be used in either deductive or inductive research, but they are viewed by Yin as particularly suited 
to the task of answering 'how' and 'why' questions of the kind addressed in this 'instrumental' 
study (Yin, 1994: 1) 
Alternative Research Strategies? 
The case study, while not the only possible method of research, was an obvious choice. It 
corresponds with the practice in much of the preceding literature using and evaluating regime 
theory and partnerships more broadly. ' As this is not a self-consciously methodological study, it 
adds to a body of case study material, rather than seeking to question the integrity of the methods 
used in previous case study research and it facilitates a comparative perspective (Lijphart, 1975: 
159). The case study approach can be defended on the grounds that it is particularly suited to the 
kind of questions dealt with in this study; questions of 'how' and 'why', requiring detailed 
detective work to identify processes of partnership activity in the case study areas. It seeks to 
evaluate explanatory links in social situations which are too complex for survey or for 
experimental techniques (Yin, 1994: 15). Ragin, while rejecting what he sees as a tendency in 
See Lawless (1994), John and Cole (1998), Orr and Stoker (1994), Bailey et al 
(1995). 
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social research to counterpose small-N, case-oriented strategies with large-N variable-oriented 
strategies is nonetheless a strong defender of the case study in comparative research (Ragin, 199 1: 
7). ' Elsewhere, he argues that the comparative method is a case based method, inherently 
unsuited to statistically based variable analysis (Ragin, 1981: 117). 7 While a variable analysis 
could have enabled a greater degree of generalization about particular causal factors, the case 
study method enabled a more nuanced approach to be taken to the subject matter, addressing the 
problem of multiple-causation. ' While the orientation of this study was deductive, it was flexible 
in seeking to identify variables and relationships between them which could not necessarily be 
anticipated in the literature reviews and which would not have been revealed in a variable analysis. 
It 
As Stone argues of the study of urban development, given that causation is manifold and 
cumulative, inquiry that attempts to isolate the universal importance of specific structures or 
variables is unlikely to be fruitful (1987c: 294). 
The Case Study and Comparative Research 
Where, then, does this study, as a multiple case study, stand in relation to the 'comparative 
method' and what is the specific rationale for this particular comparison between Barnsley, 
Rotherhmn, Hull and North East Lincolnshire? It is not proposed to discuss issues and debates 
concerning'the comparative method'. Comparison in the case studies is more a heuristic device, 
stimulating hypotheses in relation to theoretical concerns, than it is a means of evaluating precise 
similarities and differences, or 'proofs' (Lijphart, 1975: 159/60). However, there are issues 
concerning the nature of comparison which are worthy of brief discussion. This study is 
comparative in three dimensions. It is inherently comparative in the contrast it provides between 
the empirical data presented here and the accounts of regime governance in the USA discussed 
6 Basically, this distinction points toward the fact that in studying cases, large numbers 
of variables mean that only limited numbers of Ns (cases) can be analysed. If, on the other hand, 
the focus is on a variable, or a few variables, say for example the effect ofthe Single Regeneration 
Budget in levering matching project capital from business sector sources, N (subjects rather than 
cases) can be much greater. 
This point of view is contentious. See for example Sartori (1994: 23). 
Where more than one variable accounts for a dependent phenomenon. 
12 
in chapter 2. It is intentionally comparative both in the analysis of the four case studies and in its 
attempt to view partnership as a historical process. It is in these second and third dimensions that 
a discussion of issues encountered in designing and carrying out the research is relevant. 
The Nature of Intra-National Comparison 
Marsh and Mackie (1995: 173) note that the boundary of the comparative method is problematic, 
but that its conventional usage is in relation to cross-national research, rather than intra-national 
research ofthe kind proposed here. The literature tends to minimise the distinction between intra- 
national comparisons and cross-national comparisons (Daland, 1969, Holt and Turner, 1970, 
Lijphart, 1975, Marsh and Mackie, 1995, Yin, 1994), the latter described by Marsh simply as a 
necessary extension of the former (Marsh, 1970: 165). Yin makes no methodological distinction 
between single and multiple case studies, intra-national or cross-national, arguing that multiple 
cases are simply variants of single case designs (1994: 14). Instead, he treats multiple studies as 
one study with several facets within the same methodological framework (1994: 45). Holt and 
Turner treat the issue -with greater sensitivity (1970: 6): 
In principle, there is no difference between comparative cross-cultural research and research 
conducted within a single society. The differences lie, rather, in the magnitude of certain 
types of problems which have to be faced. 
For example, dialects within a country may pose problems for research, but this problem would 
not be as difficult as that of dealing with different languages. However, Daland (1969: 17) points 
out that aspects of politics can vary more within nations than between them. He had in mind 
examples like the USA, whose government is organised on a federal basis and he claimed that 
techniques developed for comparison within the USA had proved useful in cross-national studies 
(1969: 33). In determining which cases to compare and how to compare them, the issues 
highlighted by cross-national comparativists are heeded in this intra-national study. 
Choosing the Cases - Most Similar Systems Design or Most Different Systems Design? 
There is a continuum in comparative research between 'The Most Similar Systems Design' 
(MSSD) and the 'Most Different Systems Design' (MDSD) (Faure, 1994: 3 10). The MSSD is 
well suited to intra-national comparisons. The cases chosen in this study are all located within a 
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single region of England, Yorkshire and Humberside. In the first instance, every local authority 
Chief Executive and Leader in Yorkshire and Humberside was contacted to determine access 
levels and the potential range of cases to be studied. 9 Based on the responses received, it was 
decided to proceed on the basis of similarity, rather than difference, with the effect of 
6neutralizing' certain differences, such as that of local party political composition, to permit a 
better analysis of other differences, such as the impact of central government on the development 
ofpartnership processes (Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 178). Furthermore, the emphasis of the study, 
though not exclusively, was on the phenomenon of partnership, rather than non-partnership. It 
made sense, therefore, to opt for those cases where initial inquiries showed visible partnership 
activity, in other words those cases from which most could be learned about the phenomenon 
under consideration (Stake, 1994: 243). The objective was not, however, to maximise similarity 
in view of the potential problem of 'over-determination', where the cases are so alike that they 
automatically eliminate the possibility of other explanations, a problem more likely to afflict intra- 
national comparisons than cross-national studies (Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 178/9). '0 Rather, 
Ragin's caution was heeded that objects must be similar enough and different enough to permit 
treating them as comparable instances ofthe same general phenomenon (Ragin, 1992a: 1). In this 
sense, the case studies represent something of a'middle way', erring on the side of similarity. The 
level of detail at which institutions and partnership practices are explored in these cases in itself 
limits the problem ofover-determination. Differing meanings attributed to the word 'partnership', 
as noted above, highlight Foddy's (1993: 3 9) point that the meanings of ordinary words are not 
necessarily shared even by those socialised within a single cultural framework. 
The eventual choice of Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire made comparison 
possible at various levels, for example: between Rotherharn and Barnsley as coal and steel areas 
9A study of cases within Yorkshire and Humberside was feasible, given the need for 
extensive travel to and from locations up to an hour and a half by car from York. 
10 It would, for example, have been possible to minimize difference further by limiting 
the study to Doncaster, Rotherham and Barnsley in South Yorkshire, eliminating both economic 
and geographical differences which subsequently proved to be important variables in the case 
studies. 
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on one hand and Hull and North East Lincolnshire as port areas; between the two coal and steel 
areas and between the two port areas ; and between Hull, a city and Barnsley, Rotherharn and 
North East Lincolnshire as relatively small towns. Studies of smaller, lower-profile towns and 
cities are few. It is Elkin's claim that regime theory is applicable to smaller cities and towns of 
over 50,000, as well as to major cities (1987a: 8). This claim coincides with Daland's view that 
urban areas are defined by functions associated with populations of over 50,000 people (Daland, 
1969: 21). " The population centres in the four cases ranged from around 325,000 (Hull) to 
90,000 (Grimsby), permitting an evaluation of the extent to which size affects the nature and 
quality of partnership activities and the extent to which size might affect tendencies to local 
goverriance by regime. 
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Choosing the Cases - Why a Multiple Study? 
There were two elements in the decision to undertake four case studies: why more than one and 
why not more than four? In relation to the former element, Yin argues that multiple cases 
enhance the 'external validity' of a study, enabling some generalizations about typicality (1994: 
36). 13 There is a limited body of case study material addressing problems posed by the application 
of regime theory to the study of local goVernance in the UK. As chapter 3 illustrates, existing 
empirical studies differ both in the conceptual frameworks they use and in the phenomena they 
evaluate. An, evaluation ofregime theory based on secondary comparisons with these cases would 
be an imprecise exercise. The production of one more case, based on a different understanding 
of regime theory and on different hypotheses would, furthermore, compound the problem of 
e precision inherent in the diversity of the existing literature. ' Yin cautions against comparisons of 
this nature for exactly these reasons (Yin, 1994: 36). This study is the first using urban regime 
11 John and Cole, however, argue that regimes are likely to form and stay in place in 
large metropolitan contexts (1998-. 388). 
12 This choice of cases limits potential generalizablity to smaller and middle size urban 
settlements, in the same Way as comparative urban studies of London, Tokyo and New York limit 
potential generalizability to 'global' cities (Fainstein and Harloe, 1992). 
13 If two or more cases support the same theory, 'replication' may be claimed (Yin, 
1994: 31). 
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theory in British political science to generate multiple cases based on comparable assumptions and 
on a comparable methodology. 
Conversely, undertaking more than four cases would limit the subtlety and the reliability of 
inferences made in each case. It is characteristic of the case study method that in multiple studies, 
only small case numbers can be undertaken (Yin, 1994; Lijphart, 1975; Ragin, 1987) if any depth 
of analysis is to be achieved. King et al (1994: 87) argue that to make sense of multiple causation, 
one should use a methodology with many explanatory variables and few 'observations', that is, 
a small number of cases subject to the effects of a large number of variables. Put simply, studies 
of multiple causation have to sacrifice breadth for depth. It was judged that another case in a 
'study of this scale would have either significantly reduced the credibility of the findings or have 
resulted in an overly large and unwieldy study, given the stipulated limits on word-length. The 
material in these four cases is sufficiently detailed to represent a credible account of the dynamics 
and relationships within each area. Without this detail, much of the nuance in the analysis would 
have been lost. The analysis of the case studies in chapters 9 and 10 highlights those issues in 
relation to which evidence is weak or conflicting and where claims need to be qualified. " 
Comparison and Control Variables in thefour Cases 
The choice of Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire as relatively similar case 
studies provided for a number of 'controls', some of which are evident in the contextual sections 
of each case. A control variable is a background factor to multiple cases, considered identical in 
each, which cannot therefore produce different phenomena (Holt and Turner,, 1970: 12). in this 
study, control variables coMMon to all cases, which are not treated as relevant in the explanation 
14 The case studies are necessarily partial in character, sacrificing depth for breadth in 
relation to some issues and breadth for depth in relation to others. Moreover, much relevant 
evidence is liable to concealment. The 'Donnygate' scandal in Doncaster, referred to in the case 
of Rotherham, chapter 6, illustrates the problem in relation to a potential case. Processes which 
may be described, loosely, as 'partnership'or as 'networking' have, for example, allegedly resulted 
in corrupt land deals and planning fraud by the Chairman of the Council's Planning Committee 
(The Observer, 8.8.99). Activities of this kind, clearly relevant to research into partnerships and 
networking, however a-typical they may be, would not have been revealed in course of normal 
academic study, certainly not by the parties involved. 
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of difference include, for example, the statutory and financial frameworks of local government in 
England, the party political composition of each local authority, all strongly Labour until May 
1999, the respective influence of local authority members and officers and the means by which the 
diffusion of ideas and practices takes place between local authority areas. " 
Regeneration was the major theme across the four case studies. It was used as a guide to this 
study to provide limits. to the subject of inquiry and to facilitate, at a level of generality, 
comparisons with existing case study material oriented on partnership and economic 
development. " However, the term regeneration is now associated withjoined up'thinking and 
with integrated approaches to economic decline and social exclusion. It is held by Europe, central 
government, think-tanks, local government associations and local authorities alike to be a very 
broad concept. Following the DETR discussion docurnent'Regeneration Programmes: The Way 
Forward' (DETR, 1997) and the LGA, regeneration is here held to meanpromotion ofthe social, 
economic and environmental well-being of an area' (LGA, 2 April 1998). As the Governrnent 
Office for Yorkshire and the Humber (hereafter GOYH) suggested in its response to 
Regeneration Programmes: The Way Forward' (GOYH, January 1998), many local authorities 
view regeneration 'as an integralpart of wider urban/rural policy and governance'. This was 
certainly true ofthe cases in this study. The focus on partnership in regeneration activities did not, 
therefore, limit this study to the traditional concern with economic development. Instead, a range 
of partnership activities were examined, principally in the spheres of school education and 
economic development, but also, in the spheres of image building, promotions and place 
marketing. Despite the benefits of similarity between the case study areas, comparison with 
air) roaches to partnership in areas which differ in political, economic and social complexion would ic p 
also need to be undertaken, were the findings in this study to be further generalized. For example, 
15 Although, as the differing views expressed in the case studies show, Labour cannot 
be viewed as unidimensional. 
16 See Lawless (1990,1994), Di Gaetano and Klemanski, (1993) Judd and Parkinson, 
(1990), Malpass (1994) Oatley (1998) Bailey et al (1995) 
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in what ways is an orientation towards alleviating economic and social deprivation relevant in 
determining local authority approaches to partnership with the private sector? 
The method for including and excluding certain variables from an analysis is necessarily imprecise 
(Lijphart, 1975: 164). Criteria of relevance in case studies will almost certainly be too complex 
for a full explanation ofthe facts (Mackenzie, 1975: 143). Control variables in social research are 
likely to have some, even minimal, influence. To the extent that this is true, knowledge is 
approximate, or imperfect (Stake, 1994: 240). A good illustration ofthe problem in relation to this 
case is the treatment of the Local Government Association as a control variable. Central 
government is shown within the cases to be a key influence in relation to certain partnership 
practices, suggesting that local authorities might be viewed as subordinate in a command 
relationship. The study doesn't allow for the possibility that local government as a totality, 
through its representative body, the LGA, may exert substantial influence over central 
government, as recent initiatives such as New Commitment to Regeneration (LGA, 2 April 1998) 
suggest is a reasonable hypothesis (see also John, 1997: 269). 17 This problem of 'endogeneity' 
is discussed by King et al, who question how far we can be certain that an independent variable 
is not in some sense caused by the dependent variable (1994: 94). " In other words, insofar as 
central government policy is viewed as a dominant influence, this is only true to the extent that it 
is not articulating the wishes of local authorities, expressed via the LGA through a forum such 
as the Central-Local Partnership, established in July 1997 to consider major local government 
issues (see for example, LGA, undated). '9 This problem is inevitable in a study whose intention 
17 New Commitment to Regeneration is a programme, being piloted in 22 local authority 
areas, which experiments with the potential for 'contracts' between central government and local 
partnerships. The objective of the 'contracts' is to ensure that central government programmes 
are better co-ordinated and more flexible in their delivery at the local scale. Each partner, central 
and local, commits resources over a period of years. The initiative was inspired by the French 
programme, 'Contrat de Ville' (LGA, 2.4.98). 
18 A similar point is made by Stone who argues that it is not always possible to 
distinguish independent variables from dependent variables because regime governance influences 
policy development, just as policy development influences regime governance (1989: 164). 
19 Although, for this ideal-typical scenario to be true, the views expressed within the four 
cases would have to be exceptional -a factor which itself would require explanation. 
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is to examine the way in which particular variables operate on and within the locality. It merely 
points to the limitations of the study and to the need for further studies which examine other 
variables. It does not necessarily undermine claims about the relationship between endogenous 
and exogenous variables, but rather suggests that the anatomy of the exogenous variables would 
be of interest in building a more generalized explanation of different influences on the processes 
examined here. 
Comparison and Historical Factors 
Hay (1997: 7) highlights an important issue in the analysis of processes: 
[t]he pervasive tendency has been to extrapolate from evidence gathered and gleaned at a 
particular instant; a methodologically prescribed propensity to frame and fix what is, 
essentially, a moving target -a contingently unfolding reality. 
Hence, as Fainstein and Harloe argue (1992: 17), attempts to draw inferences regarding dynamic 
processes can only justly be made through longitudinal study. These cases aim to provide a 
comparative historical context for the development of partnership processes in each of the cases, 
based on documentary evidence and on personal recollection. " VAiile recollection ofthe past and 
documentary records reveal many things about the trajectory of partnership in the case study 
authorities, these are patchy in depth and in quality. Research into the history of partnership 
working was limited by the recall of participants, the relevant parties were sometimes retired or 
even dead, and by the availability of documentation, especially archive material (Foddy, 1993; 
May,, 1997), both of which proved to be of variable quality. Though there were in each case 
individuals who were familiar with events going back up to thirty years, the case studies are 
weakest in the temporal dimension. The subject here would also favour Riture longitudinal 
analysis. As David Curry, fonner Minister for Local Government, Housing and Urban 
Regeneration suggested of the Single Regeneration Budget, its effectiveness in terms of the 
govemment's objective to establish rooted and self-sustaining local partnerships cannot be fully 
evaluated when many of the first round projects are no more than half-way through. He believed 
20 As chapter 4 explains in relation to education, research in each case was undertaken 
at different times. In a fast moving policy arena, this approach can limit comparability. 
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that full evaluation would only be possible after a period of 10 years (Curry, 3.4.98, personal 
interview). 
The Data Sources 
According to Yin, the Case Study Method necessitates the use of multiple sources of evidence 
(Yin, 1994: 13). The 'triangulation' of resources is recognised as an important way of 
strengthening and corroborating research conclusions (Silvennan, 1993: 145, Yin, 1994: 9 1). This 
study makes use of a variety of sources, principally documentation and interview material. Within 
the category of documentation are included various archive materials. A third source of 
information was the Internet, from which important material, particularly from on-line newspaper 
archives,, was gleaned. " Documentary sources were evaluated in terms oftheir authenticity, their 
representativeness and their credibility (May, 1997: 169/70). 
A total of 85 elite interviews, listed in Appendix 1, were undertaken in the course ofthe study with 
Government ministers and former government ministers, regional officials, local government 
members and officers, TEC directors and officers and representatives from the business sector, 
both individually and representatively through chambers of commerce. " Access, once granted, 
was by and large excellent, a process made easier by the researcher's background in local 
government. " The emphasis on elite interviews was dictated by the focus of research on 
identifying and evaluating the key relationships between local authorities and the business sector 
in partnership settings. 
21 Some internet references were reproductions of hard copy documents. Others are 
considered acceptable from the point ofview of data collection but not for the citation of scholarly 
arguments. Without overstating the degree of editorial or scholarly control over many 
publications, internet articles often do not go through even the minimum of preparation common 
among publishers (Wilson, 1997). Unlike hard copy, internet sources are not necessarily 
permanent. Where possible, facts discovered on the internet were corroborated by interview or 
documentary material. ' 
22 Ward notes that regime theorists proceed by interviewing local elites to establish how 
public and private interests are mediated locally (I 997b: 1494). 
23 Jonathan Davies, Policy Advisor, London Borough of Merton, 1990-1996. 
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A strategy was adopted of using semi-structured interviews. The research process required 
constant delving beneath the initial answer for clarification and elaboration. The semi-structured 
interview, a sample ofwhich is included in Appendix 2, provided the necessary flexibility to meet 
this need, while providing sufficient structure for comparability between interviews (May, 1997: 
111). The strengths of interview research identified by Yin are respondent insights, the causal 
claims that respondents themselves make or imply, and the corroboration they can provide for 
other sources of information (Yin, 1994: 80-84). There are weaknesses in the interview approach, 
those arising from poor research design and those arising from various response biases and poor 
memory (Yin, 1994: 80-84). Foddy (1993) considers a range of problems associated with 
interview research. The most salient problem encountered in this project concerned respondent 
bias (Foddy, 1993: 2). For example, in one or two cases, more than one respondent claimed 
ownership of a particular part of the 'game', suggesting a reluctance by some parties to recognise 
influences on them by others. It was in relation to flagship initiatives that organisations were most 
territorial in claiming ownership and it was not always possible to evaluate between accounts. 
However, as in the case of the meaning of 'partnership' (see pages 10 and 11), apparent 
differences of opinion could sometimes be synthesised. 
A number of steps were taken to maximise the credibility and the comparability ofthe interviews. 
Insofar as was feasible, the same questions were put to individuals in analogous positions across 
the four cases. Following Foddy's advice to limit the potential response range and to facilitate 
understanding, a brief overview of the research and research purposes was provided to all 
respondents (Foddy, 1993: 89). This was done either by letter, or orally. Every effort was made 
to ensure that questions were addressed to the appropriate people. For example, political 
questions were posed to local authority members rather than officers and technical issues were 
addressed to officers rather than members. " Where potentially difficult questions were asked, 
those requiring research by the respondent, advance copies of the questionnaire were provided 
24 The case studies often refer to a view as that of 'the Council'. Where this tenn is 
used, it denotes either the official position of the local authority, or a consensus within the 
authority about an event or an issue. 
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(Foddy, 1993: 9 1). Foddy identifies a tendency among respondents to answer questions they are 
not qualified to give. Respondents were therefore encouraged to say if they did not know an 
answer and to identify an alternative source who might be able to help, a process described as 
'filtering' (Foddy, 1993: 110/111). 
May highlights the problem of values, which, he says, enter the research process at all stages 
(May, 1997: 46). This problem of reflexivity cannot be eliminated but it can be minimized if the 
researcher is conscious of it (Foddy, 1993: 192). In this study, the main problem ofreflexivity was 
the prior conceptualization of the subject matter, the need on occasion to lead the respondent, and 
the personal pre-disposition ofthe researcher against the further ingratiation ofthe business sector 
with local government. But reflexivity is not only a constraint on research, it can be beneficial. 
As Foddy says, it is inherent in human communication (1993: 189). Reflexivity between 
researcher and respondent doesn't simply invalidate or contarninate an interview account. A better 
understanding of an event may be achieved by the respondent in an interview situation than s/he 
may ever have otherwise achieved. Just as some respondents claimed that partnership, a reflexive 
situation, produces synergy, so reflexive discussions in social research can also generate 'synergy' 
in new and better conceptions of a situation or an event, hitherto unrealised either by researcher 
or respondent. In this case, the experience of the researcher as a local government officer clearly 
proved beneficial, facilitating trust and enabling the exploration of nuance which otherwise may 
have been missed. Even though the research was oriented towards people with an interest in 
partnership success, the informed approach to the questions by the researcher as a former local 
government officer, perhaps combined with personal scepticism, was successful at getting beneath 
the official 'partnership is good' theme with most respondents. " VAiile the negative aspects of 
reflexivity were taken into account and minimized, they were nonetheless presumed to have had 
25 The focus on participation in partnership, rather than on non-participation, may have 
resulted in an overly positive account of partnership, partly because, although thoughtftd, and 
often critical of partnership processes, the local authority respondents, not to mention 
representatives of government, had a clear interest in showing partnership activity in a positive 
light (Stoker, 1999: 6). For this reason, business participants may have been more objective about 
partnership achievements than their public sector counterparts, but these views too may be 
unrepresentative in relation to those of the wider business sector, given the very small numbers 
involved. 
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an impact on the outcomes of the research. Hence, as is explored further below in relation to 
evaluation, the credibility of inferences and generalizations is limited and those which are made 
are viewed not as proven, but as probabalistic in nature. 
Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Some interviews had to be carried out over 
the telephone. These were transcribed as they were taking place. The approach taken to data 
collection was first to seek general information about approaches and attitudes to partnership and 
its meaning. This approach enabled an assessment to be made, for example, of the relative 
importance of informal networking and more visible partnership mechanisms, from the standpoint 
of the participants. This information provided signposting to specific aspects of partnership 
activity. Initial interviews, unsurprisingly, revealed that partnership initiatives differ from place 
to place, depending on the natural and inherited characteristics of the area. As far as possible, 
attention was restricted to comparable partnership activities in each case. The direction of the 
research was, in this sense, participant led. 
Neither interviews, nor documents were subjected to a forensic textual analysis of the kind 
designed to establish discursive nuance in attitudes to partnership (see for example Atkinson, 1999 
and Hastings, 1999). For this reason, the transcripts approximate to the discussion, often missing, 
for example, pronouns to save time. The analysis of interviews was based more on listening to 
the discussion than on the text, which was used as an aid to memory. Interpretive notes were 
added to the text in bold as the interviews were transcribed. The analysis of the interviews 
involved a form of 'coding' (May, 1997: 125) which comprised: listening to and reading the 
interviews, identifying common themes, building up a picture in note form, then writing it up as 
a narrative. This process was facilitated by the semi-structured nature of the interviews and by 
the theoretical questions from which they derived. 
Rep orting and Evaluating the Case Study Findings 
The cases are presented in four separate chapters, followed by two chapters covering the cross- 
case analysis (Yin, 1994: 134). A short chapter, prior to the four case studies contextualises the 
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case studies, identifying extra-local factors relevant to local events and processes. Each of the 
cases follows the same general format, providing sections on: context; the process of partnership 
development; business attitudes to the concept of partnership; flagship partnerships and 
regeneration strategies; and 'mini-cases', three in each case, which examine implementation 
26 oriented partnership activities beyond the flagship partnership. Chapter 9 involves a comparison 
ofthe four case study reports, identifying both common and singular themes, piecing the elements 
together to create what May describes as tendencies, sequences, patterns and orders (May, 1997: 
173). Chapter 10 returns to an evaluation of the hypotheses set out in the first part of the study, 
answering the questions: what kind of phenomena are we dealing with, what kind of explanation 
provides for them and how does this explanation relate to urban regime theory? 
By what criteria are the empirical and theoretical claims of the study made? It is necessary, as 
Mackenzie says, to define the standards of 'proof applied in the analysis (Mackenzie, 1975: 13 9). 
Holt and Turner argue that research involves assumptions about the relationship between what 
people say they'll do and what they actually do -a rule of interpretation which assumes that their 
responses are valid (1970: 2). The rule of interpretation used in this study is that responses may 
be valid, provided that they are corroborated. The strength of the claims made in the analysis is 
partly determined by the extent to which parties representing different institutions and interests 
agree on a particular issue. Hence, comment on an aspect of a relationship between local authority 
and business sector requires an agreed view from both. Corroboration, however, is not sufficient 
on its own. The evidence has to be plausible and plausibility is here gauged in relation to -the 
foregoing literature reviews, the pilot study undertaken in 1995 (Davies, 1996) and personal 
intuition. 
26 Challenge partnerships, those responsible for bidding and managing challenge funds 
are also designated as 'flagship' partnerships if they are also responsible for establishing policy 
go als in the form of an area strategy or a vision statement. The distinction between flagship and 
implementation partnerships made in this study is based on Skelcher"s distinction between 
mechanisms responsible mainly for establishing regeneration goals and mechanisms responsible 
mainly for carrying out programme activity (Skelcher et al, 1996: 5). 
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Within this framework of analysis, it is recognised, for all the cautionary reasons set out in the 
foregoing sections, that the knowledge claims which can be made are limited. There are different 
views about how case studies should be used in generating knowledge claims. Mackenzie (1975: 
142) argues that the point of a case is to establish facts and let them speak for themselves, so that 
the reader may evaluate them as she wishes. Yin argues that the objective is to produce 
compelling conclusions which rule out alternative interpretations (Yin, 1994: 103). In relation to 
the system of 'coding', noted above, qualitative judgement is made in this study, based on the 
plausibility of interpretation of evidence presented and that known to have been omitted. King 
et al argue that causal inferences should be provided where they seem appropriate with a best 
estimate of the uncertainty in that inference (King et al, 1994: 76): 
We need not provide evidence for all implications of the theory in order to state it, so long 
as we provide a reasonable estimate of uncertainty that goes along with it (King et al, 
1994: 113). 
Yin agrees with this perspective, urging the researcher to be bold about her knowledge claims 
(Yin, 1994: 152). The analytical chapters seek to make bold claims, while avoiding abstracted 
empirical analysis. 
In deciding to be bold in making causal inferences, the researcher must be sensitive to the Humean 
question of how to separate cause from sequence. The information gained in this study is not 
precise enough to make strong, generalizable, claims about whether the value of a particular 
dependent variable changes in a regular way when the measure ofan independent variable changes, 
a method viewed by Becker as one way of overcoming this problem (Becker, 1992: 205-6). 
However, the problem of differentiating between cause and sequence is reduced when a human 
agent is recognised as part of the process of causation. If a respondent is able to identify 
influences on her actions, then it is arguable that causation can be identified in a way that it cannot, 
for example, in the effect of one billiard ball striking a second, causing the second to move. 
Stone's concept of mediation is helpful in illustrating this point (Stone, 1998a: 250). Urban 
regime theory, he says, posits that the impact of the global economy on the local economy is 
mediated through local governing structures. Stone shows how early psychologists analysed their 
subjects through a stimulus/response (S>R) framework, where 'S' can be characterised as 
- -1 
UNIVE'l 2-, 5T)" 
YORK 
structure', and 'R' as 'agency'. This approach was found to be flawed and another stage 
organism I was added to the analytical framework, giving stimulus/organism/response (S>O>R), 
where '0' mediates the impact of S on R. In regime theory, '0' is the process of regime 
governance. In relation to Hume's problem, '0' is a conscious, articulate part of the causation 
process, a mediating factor ofwhich scientists studying the interaction of billiard balls do not have 
the benefit. Hence, if a respondent states that her action was caused by a particular factor, or a 
number of factors, that statement can be taken as evidence of causation, provided that the capacity 
of agents for knowledge is allowed. 
Finally, the form of explanation building set out above results in the specification of causal links 
which are difficult to measure in any precise manner. As Yin cautions, case study narratives 
cannot be precise, so they have to reflect theoretically significant propositions (Yin, 1994: 
110/111). There is room for due scepticism in the analysis without recourse to anti- 
foundationalism. The epistemological position taken here is akin to that of critical realism 
(Bhaskar, 1989) in the sense that there is perceived to be a correspondence between interpretation 
and reality, but not an identity and not an unbridgeable dualism either. Hence, Lieberson's (1992: 
106) and Becker's (1992: 206) position is endorsed that causal claims are likely to be probabalistic 
given imperfect measurement, given that we cannot determine all the influences in a case study and 
given that the influence of independent variables may counteract one another in conditions of 
multiple-causation, which the case studies attempt to reveal. The cases show, as King et al argue, 
that the same, or similar outcomes, can result from differing combinations of causal variables 
(1994: 87). It is these variables, and the relationship between them which the study seeks to 
explore. Chapter 2 now turns to an exposition of urban regime theory. 
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Chapter 2. The Conceptual Origins and Central Claims 
of Urban Regime Theory 
Introduction 
Urban politics have, according to Imbroscio, witnessed an 'explosion' of studies using urban 
regime theory as a lens through which the political dynamics in cities might be understood. 
Regime theory has, he says, become the dominant theory for the study oflocal politics (Imbroscio, 
1998a: 233/4). With its focus on the economic and political interaction between agents and 
organisations regime theory has, without doubt, become a key tool for evaluating urban politics 
in and between liberal democratic nations including New Zealand (Brown, 1999), the UK, I the 
nations of Europe, 2 and the United States, the country of its origin? Just as diverse is the range 
of critiques, sympathetic and otherwise, with which regime theory is associated. It has been 
accused of lacking an overall theoretical framework (Feldman, 1997) and of being empiricist, 
localist and inductive (Ward, 1997ab), determinist (Ward, 1997a, b; Di Gaetano, 1997) and 
intentionalist (Painter, 1997). It is regarded as normative and it is criticised at the same time for 
operating at the meso level of analysis (Imbroscio, 1997,1998ab) while it is viewed as adaptable 
to rdgulationist (Harding, 1996; Lauria, 1997) and post structuralist (Brown, 1999) perspectives. 
Its central claims have been denied (Nichols Clark and Goetz, 1993) and it has been dismissed as 
inapplicable to the analysis of urban politics in the UK (Lawless, 1994). In short, regime theory 
has been used and abused in a decade in almost as many ways as has Marxism over 150 years. 
I See DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993), Di Gaetano (1997), Harding (I 994,1996ab, 
1997), Stoker and Mossberger (1994), Lawless, (1994) and Ward (1 997ab). 
See Levine (1994), Harding(l 996ab, 1997) John and Cole (1998) and Strom (1996). 
See Elkin (I 987a), Stone (1989),, De Leon (1992), Imbroscio (1997) and Sites (1997). 
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In light ofthese diverse perspectives, consideration is needed as to what regime theory is and what 
it is not. To this end, this chapter undertakes an examination of regime theory based, principally, 
on the works of Stephen Elkin and Clarence Stone. 4 Others, such as Fainstein et al (1983,1986) 
have been instrumental in developing regime theory and the concepts it deals with are not novel 
as Elkin (1987a: 18) highlights. But Elkin and Stone have proved to be the most influential 
scholars in the contemporary development of this strand of thought (Imbroscio, 1998a: 236) and 
it is they who authored what can be described as the paradigm theoretical and empirical statements 
of regime theory, Dallas (Elkin, 1987a) and Atlanta (Stone, 1989). The work of Stone has been 
the most influential of the two scholars and with few exceptions (see for example Brown, 1999), 
it has provided the starting point for the range of theoretical and empirical approaches to which 
regime theory has given birth. ' But whatever the merits of Stone's work, it is not possible to 
achieve a rich understanding of regime theory without consideration of the contribution made by 
Elkin. It is quite clear, as the following exposition will show, that regime theory is a mutual 
endeavour (Elkin, 1985b: 207). The approach taken here, therefore, is unique in treating regime 
theory as a'canon' of work, authored by Elkin and Stone, and in providing a full exposition ofthis 
work. The purpose of the exposition is to generate a full understanding of regime theory, 
addressing some of the claims and counterclaims found in the secondary literature. 
VAiile primarily exposition, the chapter has a critical edge. The critical element suggests that at 
least some ofthese secondary approaches are, as Stone (I 998a: 250) complains, based on a partial 
or mistaken understanding of regime theory. It is further argued, however, that regime theory can 
legitimately be criticised for not possessing the empirical-theoretical tools to support its normative 
prescriptions. The chapter also provides a conceptual foundation for chapter 3, which considers 
in more depth the ways in which regime theory has been employed in British political science. 
The virtue of this approach is twofold. The literature currently lacks an exploration of regime 
4 See Elkin (1985ab, c, d, 1986,1987ab, 1993ab, 1994,1996ab) and Stone (1980, 
1987a, b, c, 1988,1989,1990,1991,1993,1997,1998ab, c, ). 
5 These approaches are hereafter characterised as secondary approaches. This 
designation is purely for convenience and is not evaluative. 
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theory which examines in breadth and in depth the work of both of the scholars central to its 
development; and it provides for a more refined basis upon which to evaluate the relevance of 
regime theoretical concepts for examining partnerships in the four case studies, Barnsley, 
Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire. 
The chapter is organised into six main sections. It begins by examining the theoretical conditions 
for regime formation identified by Elkin and by Stone. It proceeds secondly to explore the 
empirical conditions in which regime governance is produced; and thirdly to review the processes 
involved in regime governance. The fourth section evaluates the empirical scope ofregime theory; 
and the fifth considers its explanatory limits. In light of these discussions, the final section 
elaborates and evaluates the nonnativeý tasks of regime theory. 
Theoretical Conditions for Regime Formation - Systemic and Pre-emptive 
Power 
ILR%Xegirne theory represents a revival of the critical pluralist 'community power' tradition of the 
1950s and 1960s (Hunter 1953, Dahl,, 1958,, 1961) and it belongs broadly in the neo-pluralist 
tradition (Lindblom, 1977). Lindblom recognised that governments in capitalist countries require 
economic growth and that in a market system, decisions are taken by business in which 
government plays no role. These decisions affect everyone, but they are not subj ect to democratic 
control. 
Any government official who understands the requirements of his position and the 
responsibilities that market oriented systems throw on businessmen will therefore grant them 
a privileged position. He does not have to be bribed, duped or pressured to do so. Nor 
does he have to be an uncritical admirer of businessmen to do so. He simply understands, 
as is plain to see, that public affairs in market oriented systems are in the hands oftwo group 
leaders, government and business, who must collaborate and that to make the system work 
government leadership must often defer to business leadership (Lindblom, 1977: 175). 
Thus, the unrefined pluralist notion that groups have equal access to the decision making process 
is perceived to be flawýd. This neo-pluralist perspective underpins the works of Elkin and Stone, 
who both subscribe to the notion of a division of labour between state and market in which 
ownership ofproductive assets rests largely in the hands ofthe private sector, while the machinery 
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of government, on the other hand, is subject to popular control (Elkin, 1987a: 18; Stone, 1989: 
9). Both Elkin and Stone are concerned with the articulation between the public and private 
sectors and, as Stone puts it, the regime is the 6 organism' which mediates the relationship between 
popular control ofthe political process and private control of the economy (1993: 2; 1998a: 250). 
This concept of the regime, as mediating between extra-local structures and political outcomes, 
is central to regime theory as a theory of structure and agency, a theme explored further. below. 
It is the core claim about the relationship between state and market which gives rise to the 
conception of 'systemic' power, developed by Stone in 1980. He categorises four types of power 
relationship between groups. Situational power is contrasted with intentional power and direct 
power to indirect power (Stone, 1980: 98 1): Intentional and direct power is a 'decisional' 
relationship based on an 'orthodox' first dimensional view of power. Here, the superordinate 
party consciously makes the subordinate undertake an act of her choosing. This is a form of 
command power, in which A exercises domination over B. Situational and directpower is an 
4' anticipated reaction' relationship where the subordinate party seeks to interpret the wishes ofthe 
superordinate. The subordinate therefore recognises the position of the superordinate party, 
whether or not this position is recognised by the superordinate. Intentional and indirect power 
is exercised when the superordinate party purposively exercises influence over the decision making 
context, resulting in'non decisions' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). The subordinate party need not 
recognise her position as such. Situational and indirect power is systemic power, the kind of 
power underpinning regime governance. Here, the superordinate party influences the decision 
making context, but not purposively. She has influence whether cognizant ofthe fact or not. The 
subordinate party is also influenefd, whether she recognises this fact or not. This form of power 
is reflected concretely in the division of labour between state and market. Systemic power is 
defined by Stone as: 
that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system (the 
situational element) confer advantages and disadvantages on groups (the intergroup 
element) in ways predisposing public officials to favour some interests at the expense of 
others (the indirect element) ... Because its operation is completely impersonal and deeply 
embedded in the social structure, this form ofpower can appropriately be termed 'systemic' 
(Stone, 1980: 980/1). 
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Systemic power - control by business over substantial productive resources upon which public 
officials depend - is articulated at the urban scale in the USA. 
It should be noted that local governments are especially dependent on property taxes and 
they show a particularly strong concern with revenue production because of their place in 
the federal system. The strategic dependence of local officials on business is thus partly a 
matter of a market economy and partly a matter of the federal system (Stone, 1980: 982). 
For Stone, systemic power results in an indirect conflict between favoured and disfavoured groups 
with the former frequently concerned with economic growth, the latter with redistribution. Due 
to its control of productive resources, business is more likely than not to have a privileged 
influence on the urban policy agenda. Public officials at the urban scale are the bearers of these 
structural constraints and community power relationships manifest themselves in the behaviour 
of these officials' ( Stone, 1980: 982). 
Systemic power is not overt or direct in the way it is exercised, it lies in the imperatives of the 
situation. The concept of systemic power is used by Stone to show how business interests tend 
to prevail in the domain of economic development policy because it is in the interests of public 
officials io respond to business concerns and they tend to respond to economic pressures before 
conflicting electoral demands (Stone, 1980: 987). Systemic power therefore derives from a 
combination of structural resource privilege and an economic-rational perspective on official 
behaviour which purports to explain how officials come to be the bearers of systemic structures. 
For these reasons, liberalism and democracy will always stand in dynamic contradiction to each 
other, a contradiction which Elkin perceives to be at the heart of the bourgeois state (19'85b: 
2 10). ' The state and its agents embody these contradictions which become the subject of political 
mediation and actiVity. 7 
Elkin believes that these contradictions provide the very dynarnic in capitalist 
economies (1993b: 126). 
7 Elkin's and Stone's view of the contradictions between liberalism and democracy as 
embodied in the public official resembles Poulantzas's (1978) notion of the state reflecting the 
(condensate of class forces'. Yet it differs significantly from Poulantzas. Though both views 
accord the state a 'superstructural', role in the sense that it is neutral with respect to contending 
forces, for Elkin and Stone, the forces 'condensed' in their view of the state are not those of class 
but of liberalism and democracy. See below for a broader discussion on regime theory and 
Marxism. 
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While this perspective undoubtedly owes much to Lindblom's formulation, Stone traces it back 
to Hunter's classical (1953) work Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. 
Stone attributes to Hunter, through a sympathetic reading, the development of an approach to 
power not dissimilar to that of regime theory, which he terms 'pre-emptive power', defined as 'a 
capacity to occupy, hold, and make use of a strategic position' (Stone, 1988: 83). Pre-emptive 
power is a derivative of systemic power in the sense that the state/market division identified in 
regime theory will tend to endow business, rather than any other group, with the capacity for pre- 
emption, that is the capacity to occupy a strategic position. Systemic power creates the conditions 
in which pre-emption occurs, but pre-emption itself is dependent on the exercise of those 
capacities. It is, therefore, an 'intentional and active' form of power (Stoker, 1995: 64/5). 
These two concepts, systemic and pre-emptive power, represent the key to understanding regime 
theory. If systemic power is understood as a tendency within liberal-democratic societies for 
politicians to accord a privileged role to controllers of productive assets (business) (Elkin, 1994: 
124), then the realisation of this tendency is dependent on the exercise of pre-emptive power by 
the controllers ofproductive assets. As pre-emptive power is intentional, the possibility of revolt 
by 'dissatisfied publics' is not ruled out (Stone, 1988: 89). Regime theory is, therefore tendential. 
in character, a theory based on Stone's understanding of 'structuring' (1989: 10), which he draws 
8 from the work of sociologists Abrams (1982). and Giddens (1979). 
Politics must not be romanticized as a sphere of free agency. While not tightly controlled 
by deterministic laws, there are recurring tendencies in political behavior that must be 
reckoned with (Stone, 1990: 230). 
Agents are not, therefore, objectively subordinate to structures, they act on and change them. The 
concrete processes of regime governance, outlined by Elkin and Stone in their paradigm studies 
of Dallas (Elkin, 1987a) and Atlanta (Stone, 1989) follow from these propositions. 
Regime theory as an approach to structure and agency is discussed finther below. 
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The Empirical Conditions for Regime Governance 
Elkin's work on Dallas draws on and develops Stone's concept of systemic power (Elkin, 1985ab; 
1987a). His account ofregime governance in Dallas depicts systematic governmental bias toward 
business interests. The bias he identifies does not arise as a consequence of immutable economic 
determinants, but rather through political and institutional structures which privilege the business 
sector. Elkin thus seeks to avoid what he describes as 'reductionism' in public choice theory and 
'determinism' in Marxism (1987a: 8). However, like Stone, he acknowledges the necessity of 
studying urban phenomena in the context of broader political economy. In a pre-cursor to regime 
theory, he concludes apocalyptically that: 
If the principal participants in the discussion of the nature of the urban question turn out to 
be those devoid of any sense of the larger political economy and Marxism, then intellectual 
ruin is likely to exceed all expectations (Elkin, 1979: 30). 
Because the dispersal of political power in Dallas is a consequence of the 'division of labour 
between state and market that is manifcst in cities' (Elkin, 1987a: 18), control of economic 
performance at the local level does not lie within the purview of public officials. The city 
government can, indeed must, 'induce'but laOt'commarid'economic activity. Elkin demonstrates 
that the system is skewed against the emergence of local policies addressing broader social issues 
and that city government is predisposed to work on behalf of business. This situation represents 
a failure of popular control in Dallas. Elkin's central proposition, that the policies of city 
government in the US are biased toward business interests as a consequence of institutionally 
mediated structures, is manifest in three principal ways. 
Local Government Dependence on Local Capital 
City Government in the USA is highly dependent for its revenue on tax raised locally and on bonds 
which it issues to private buyers in order to fund capital projects. King, for example, notes that 
in 1983, locally generated revenue in the USA accounted for 74.2% of all city government 
revenues (1988: 93). It follows that elected officials need to convince the business community of 
their fiscal prudence and of their commitment to stimulating economic growth. In a healthy 
economic environment, city bonds are more attractive to investors and property values will rise, 
improving the city's fiscal position. It is argued that land use policies can generate a highbond 
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rating', since development increases land value, which is a sign of underlying economic strength 
and ofthe correct'attitude'among public officials (Elkin, 198 7a: 3 8). Locally dependent business 
and local authority, therefore, have ajoint interest in collaboration. The local authority seeks to 
mobilise business resources, while owners of fixed capital, local land owners in particular, have 
an interest in working with local government to secure new investments to strengthen their 
position. The city government therefore has a direct interest in prioritising growth to fund services 
and capital projects. Antipathy to business is an invitation to 'fiscal trouble' (Elkin, 1987a3O/31). 
Economic Growth and the Mobility of Capital 
According to Elkin, much business in the US is footloose, much more so than it is in the UK 
(Elkin, 1987a: 32). Thus, if a firm does not like the policy of a particular city administration, it 
can re-locate (Elkin, 1987a: 33). Elkin draws a distinction between mobile capital and fixed, 
locally dependent capital. The latter type consists of enterprises whose success is closely 
associated with the economic vitality ofthe city. These enterprises include banks, developers, real 
estate agencies, large stores and property management firms (1987a: 32-42). Their behaviour, 
says Elkin, is 'best understood as an effort to enhance the value of their fixed assets by attracting 
mobile capital to the city. Many fixed assets, that is non-mobile capital, are parcels of land. 
Businesses controlling these assets thus favour land use schemes to increase their value (19 8 7a: 
41). Local authorities favour these schemes to improve their fiscal base. 
Among other things, local politicians are tied to preserving the value of local landuses 
because both are deeply concerned to hold and attract mobile capital. Those who hold fixed 
capital in land need to attract high-intensity use to maintain and enhance its value. And local 
politicians wish to have the political benefits that a vibrant local economy will send their way 
(Elkin, 1994: 137). 
So, for Elkin, the policy arena around which growth alliances most commonly form is that of land 
use. This proposition is based upon the assumption that land and property values are key 
indicators of economic health and thus of the ability of city government to obtain credit. 9 
9 In this regard, Elkin appears to have drawn inspiration from Molotch (1976). In his 
growth machine approach, land owners are the key business interests. See chapter 3 for a brief 
discussion of this literature. 
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The Role of Local Officials in Regime Governance 
The third feature Elkin identifies is a pre-disposition of local officials, elected and unelected, 
toward the business agenda. Politicians depend upon privately backed electoral coalitions. 
'Reputation' is the key to political success, which is dependent on the support of the business 
sector (Elkin, 1987a: 37). Elkin shows just how important business can be to a political 
campaign, highlighting the difference on one occasion between a business backed incumbent 
whose campaign fund totalled $400,000 and a challenger without business backing who managed 
to raise $20,000 (Elkin, 1987a: 77). Dallas is run by aTity Manager', a professional civil servant. 
Senior officials, like politicians, tend to have an interest in maintaining business support for 
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instrumental reasons associated with career opportunities, and Elkin shows how City Managers 
in Dallas had intimate connections with the business leadership of the City. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the professionalisation of Dallas's local government effectively routinises, or excludes 
from politics, decisions which could become controversial were they to be handled by elected 
politicians (Elkin, 1987a: 70). Issues of importance to the wider community are thereby excluded 
from the agenda, placed instead within the remit of professional bureaucrats who are better 
insulated than politicians from popular demand (1987a: 85-8). The predispositions of public 
officials for Elkin are structured by the regime itself which in this context takes on the status of 
an explanatory variable, a set of relations in which the agent is embedded. Hence: 
Any story that interprets the rise of positive welfare-oriented states as the means by which 
either capitalists solved their problems or the working class dealt with theirs overlooks that 
it is more nearly a case of liberal democratic politicians solving theirs (Elkin, 1985b: 197). 
Elkin endorses Stone's explanation for the way public officials tend to prioritise economic 
performance, suggesting that the 'reach' of popular control is limited in terms of its ability to 
change the way performance is enhanced (1985b: 190-193). The democratic aspect of liberal 
democracy is thus limited by necessity and were it not, the regime would either collapse or become 
qualitatively different, prospects which Elkin believes to be neither desirable nor feasible (I 985b: 
19 1). Because officials are instrumentally rational, liberal-democracies cannot sustain too much 
popular control since this would tend to result in officials undermining the growth agenda which 
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sustains the system (Stone, 1980: 987). 10 Given these conditions, and the emphasis on 
intentionality in the concept of pre-emptive power, how is regime governance carried out? 
The Process of Regime Governance 
Stone's account of regime politics in Atlanta (1989) builds on his own account of systemic power. 
: ** the question that systemic power 
directs us toward, but does not itself answer, is how, 
in the face of complex and sometimes divisive forces, an effective and durable capacity to 
govern can be created (1989: xi). 
Stone's study of Atlanta therefore develops a stronger emphasis than Elkin on the internal 
dynamics of regime governance. " Stone's objective is to break what he sees as the impasse 
between pluralists and elitists in the earlier community power debate (Stone, 1988). He takes a 
sociological view of group dynamics which begins from the perspective that all groups have an 
interest in production. It follows that governance is only possible given cooperation between 
governmental and other interests. In Atlanta, the production of governance is dependent upon 
business resources and so developmental interests prevail in public policy (Stone, 1989: 219-23 3). 
A governing regime is thus comprised of those institutions or actors with the resources necessary 
for governance. Resources are broadly defined to include the material, the financial, the 
administrative and the intellectual (Stone, 1993: 11). Access to a governing regime is dependent 
both on the possession of resources necessary for governance and the will/capacity to combine 
them with other resources (Stone, 1989: 4). Stone's account of Atlanta is the study of who 
participates in urban regimes and how they come together to produce governance. Regime 
governance is thus about the capacity to act, the actors who act and the relationship between these 
actors. Stone provides a succinct definition of the urban regime: 
An urban regime may thus be defined as the informal arrangements by whichpublic bodies 
andprivate interestsfUnction together in order to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions (1989: 6). 
10 This Perspective resembles the argument advanced by Samuel Brittan (1975), who 
believed that democratic overload in the form of union power had led to untenable demands by 
the populace on the British state. 
11 Perhaps it is for this reason that Stone has proved the more influential of the two 
scholars for those who are concerned with the analysis of local politics. 
36 
By informal arrangements, Stone means that the legal authority of a local government is 
insufficient to furnish the capacity necessary for local governance to occur. He argues that if 
agents are not 'unified under the formal authority of government to command compliance, then 
the mechanism of coordination must be informal'. Informality does not in itself preclude visible 
coalition arrangements, it simply denotes the absence of a legal command structure (1989: 180). " 
Both Elkin's and Stone's accounts show business organisation to be both formalised and highly 
effective. " On the other hand, the interface between business and local officials is infornial but 
well organised (Elkin, 1987a: 66; Stone, 1988: 89). The story of the building of the Atlanta 
Stadium illustrates the informal nature of regime governance. The Mayor of Atlanta wanted to 
pursue this prestige project, but did not possess the necessary resources to do so. However, he 
persuaded a powerful local banker that the stadium was a good idea. According to the Mayor's 
account, the banker responded to his plea: 
You've got it ... Tell you what. If you'll recreate the old Stadium Authority and appoint the 
people I recommend, and make Arthur Montgomery Chairman and me treasurer, I'll pledge 
the full credit of C&S Bank to build it (Stone, 1989: 63). " 
This account shows that Atlanta was governed by a tight, highly integrated elite based around key 
business leaders and the Mayor in pursuit of a common agenda. How, then, can these 
arrangements be produced? 
Power as Social Production 
Perhaps Stone's key contribution to regime theory is his conceptualization of power as social 
production, which derives from his conceptualizations of systemic and pre-emptive power. He 
challenges'ideological hegemony'as an explanation for regime characteristics, which he describes 
as the 'social control paradigm' (1989: 222). In its place, he proposes a model of 'social 
12 The distinction between formal and informal partnerships is considered ftirther in 
Chapter 3. 
13 Businesses concerned with development organise independently. This activity appears 
to be less about pre-empting other sectors than about pre-empting anti-development elements 
within the business sector and it highlights the heterogeneity of business interests and objectives 
within the broad constraint of the accumulation process. 
14 Arthur Montgomery was an executive of Coca Cola. 
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production', or 'power to', in which public officials need to 'get things done' and seek suitable 
allies for that task. 
Stone suggests that urban power in the USA bears a 'class' imprint which cannot be predicted by 
pluralist theory, but that this comes about in ways requiring no ruling elite or command forms of 
domination which he associates with Marxism (1980: 979). His approach is based on a critique 
ofthe Marxist argument that differences in opinion about how to do things are insignificant within 
a pro-market capitalist society. 
As long as the community embraces capitalism, this broad commitment overrides positions 
on lesser issues. Hence, they would argue, business prevails on policy matters as long as 
it can maintain the legitimacy of a capitalist political economy (Stone, 1989: 221). 
While acknowledging the power of this argument, Stone nevertheless offers an alternative view, 
that change comes about not through the alteration of basic commitments, but through the 
piecemeal evolution ofpractices of cooperation. This detail is important because power lies in the 
evolution of new practices. Thus, the deed precedes the thought and key developments take place 
not in ideology but in the specifics of how people organise (Stone, 1989: 22 1). The way people 
organise in Stone's analysis is in pursuit of 'small opportunities', comprising selective incentives, 
small purposes and accomplishments. Most of the time, actors pursue immediate opportunities 
and respond to immediate threats (1989: 229-23 5). If power is about the capacity to get things 
done, then getting things done is about small opportunities. Stone shares not only aspects of 
Lindblom's neo-pluralism, but also his view of incremental policy development (Lindblom, 1077, 
1979) (Stone, 1980: 987). 
Stone (1989) therefore focuses on the role of the agent in agenda setting, for whom the way 
problems are perceived defines the solutions which are chosen (Rocheford & Cobb, 1994: 1-3). 
He presents a'Tillian'model of low social coherence in which a chaotic picture of group relations 
emerges, where no single group can dominate ideologically. For Stone, 'governance" is not 
dependent on control, it is about bringing together elements in a fragmented world (Stone 1989: 
226-227, Tilly, 1984: 26-3 3). Business control in Atlanta is not command power, it is indirect and 
limited. Attitudes are not controlled directly, but anti-business views are not able to gain a 
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purchase, given that the role of business is central to the activities of governance (1989: 220). 
D- 
Regime formation for Stone is partly dependent on an actor's evaluation of the benefits of 
compliance ornon-compliance in a coalition (1989: 8-9). The 'free rider' problem associated with 
rational choice thinking is addressed with the allocation by key players in the regime of 'selective 
incentives' to induce and coerce compliance through privilege and discipline respectively (198 9: 
186/242). In Atlanta, it is business which holds the key with substantial 'slack' resources which 
are used as selective incentives to purchase compliance (1989: 244). For regime change to occur, 
opposing groups have both to raise the 'cost of compliance' and, pro-actively, to generate a 
governing coalition to supercede the entrenched interest of the developer (Stone, 1988: 90). 
Notwithstanding his emphasis on 'power to' in the process of regime building, Stone recognises 
that different types of power are interwoven. 'Power to' is a particular type of power which he 
regards as crucial to regime building. However, other kinds ofpower are also evident in the social 
production model itself. He argues that 'power to', in the sense of constructing regime 
governance, 'spills over into a kind of domination' (Stone, 1989: 229). Further, he argues that 
the '"power to" of the social production model translates into a form of "power over... (Stone, 
1993: 9). Stone shows how 'power to' can, in fact generate indirect conflictual relationships, 
given that the exercise of pre-emption by party A, to influence the policy agenda of B, precludes 
party C from gaining access to the policy process (Stone, 1980: 980). If A, by using her superior 
resources consciously or unconsciously prevents C from access to the policy process, whether or 
not C is aware of her exclusion, 'power over' has been exercised in an indirect fashion. "Power 
to"), then, is not simply about cooperation, it is also about causal factors which predict certain 
kinds of cooperation. We are back at the starting point in regime theory, that the forms of co- 
operation we observe in society can be predicted by the division of labour between state and 
market. This analysis has implications, not only for the theoretical relationship between social 
production and social control, but also for Stone's explanation of preference formation and for 
rational choice interpretations of regime theory (Painter, 1997). 
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Factors in Human Motivation 
Stone's account of behavioural motivation begins with the assumption that people respond to what 
is familiar, immediate and concrete -a notion which, he says, underlies March and Simon's (1965) 
concept of 'satisficing'. This behavioural tendency is articulated as 'narrow cognition', where 
individual preferences derive in a dynamic fashion from one's place in society (Stone, 1993: 9/10). 
This concept starts in a similar position to Marx's view of alienation (Meszaros, 1975), whereby 
consciousness is not simply a product of purposive ideological domination, but of the way in 
which the concrete processes and tendencies ofthe market are normally, but not always, obscured 
by day to day relationships and the place of the subject within them (Marx and Engels, 1973). In 
Stone's analysis, like Marx's, the big picture is not nonnally visible to the individual. However, 
he identifies no objective processes, akin to the laws of motion of capital, which are obscured until 
crisis tendencies are realised, and so he speaks of bounded rationality not false consciousness. 
Within this context exist 'elementary principles ofmotivation' in human behaviour (Stone, 1993: 
10). At one pole can be found the economic rational tendency and at the other, the desire to be 
associated with something larger than one's own individual concerns, a social-purposive tendency. 
This duality affects preference fonnation: 
Vision can be expanded by discussion and interaction, leadership, exposure to a social 
movement, participation in a set of activities that point beyond the immediate and much 
more (1993: 10). 
As this quotation implies, preferences maybe'fluid'and Stone asks whatexplains the differential 
appeal of causes. Here, the notion of 'feasibility' is important. 
There is circularity in the relationship between commitment to a cause and its feasibility. 
The more people support a cause, the greater its feasibility (Stone, 1993: 11). 
It may be deduced from this account how perceptions of feasibility are constructed. Feasibility 
cannot be reduced to the question of support for a cause ie that if we all want to do something, 
wecandoit. Stone's 'narrow cognition' provides a ftu-ther basis for relating support for a project 
to feasibility. If people express both economic rational and social-purposive motivation, then the 
extent to which one or the other is realised depends on a person's perception of their immediate 
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position in relation to others. People's interactions shape their preferences and their understanding 
of feasibility. Narrow cognition regulates ambition. 
In short, the ready availability of means rather than the will of dominant actors may explain 
what is pursued and why. Hence, hegemony in a capitalist order may be more a matter of 
ease of cooperation around profit-oriented activities than the unchallenged ascendency of 
core ideas (1993: 12). 
Yet feasibility is also the subject of struggle over conviction (1993: 11) and this is where social 
production can become social control. The implication is that those with resources are most likely 
to be able to convince others -a forra of 'power over' because they hold the key to opportunity 
and thus to preference formation. The imbalance created by uneven resource distribution then 
itself represents a mode of social control, whether or not the imbalance is sought by the dominant 
agents. For Stone, it is easier to be pro capitalist in a capitalist world than it is to be otherwise. 
This rather mundane observation predicts a 'pragmatic' view of purpose. Pragmatic behaviour 
is itself a product of 'narrow cognition' and may, therefore, in the context of unbounded 
rationality, prove to be flawed. This is not false consciousness in the Marxian sense, but Stone 
clearly accepts that pragmatism is influenced by systemic power. 
If people are purposive, but purposive in wanting to be involved in achievable goals, and-if 
some goals are more readily achievable than others, then people will tend toward those goals 
that are achievable (1993: 12). 
Pragmatism is thus connected to an imbalance in resource distribution, while preference formation 
is linked to pragmatism, to the limited opportunities for change afforded by governance and to the 
narrow cognition of agents. Preference formation is endogenous to the power relationship. Stone 
develops the argurnent by emphasising that individual preferences do not fonn in isolation, but also 
through social bonds. Coalitions are formed through the exchange of information and because of 
perceived interdependence (1993: 13). Preferences can then change if understanding changes. 
Understanding changes by virtue of purposive interaction (1993: 14). Finally, 
Contrary to the assumptions of some analysts, cooperation is not an unnatural act that 
people have to be coerced or bribed to perform. To be sure, the centrifugal force of 
individual interest and immediately achievable purpose have to be reckoned with, but there 
is also the possibility of tapping the human yearning for larger social purpose (1993: 25). 
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Humans, then, are not crude instrumentalists. Being purposive is a fundamental part of human 
nature, it is just that most of the time, people are drawn to small purposes (Stone, 1998a: 255). 
This complex of ideas purports to explain why local governance is more usually associated with 
development oriented regimes, rather than those oriented on enhancing lower class opportunities. 
Ultimately, those with control over resources have the power to influence perceptions of interest 
and, therefore, preferences. This perspective is an enhancement of Stone's 1989 account, but it 
lacks an elaboration ofthe kind of events or dynamics which might lead people swing between the 
polarities of economic rational and social purposive action. The role of systemic power in 
influencing human behaviour is recognised throughout, but this is not a fully developed, or grand 
narrative theory of structure and agency since the way systemic power causes people to oscillate 
between polarities is under t. heorised. For Stone, change occurs at the margins of enduring 
relationships. Ifenduring relationships, such as urban regimes, are conceived ofas structures, then 
Stone's account of Atlanta shows that events occur which have an impact on such structures and 
help to reshape them (1989: 10). There is reciprocity between structure (regime) and agency 
(regime actors). However, this limited reciprocity seems to occur within an invariant set of 
socioeconomic rules, those expressed in the relationship between liberalism and democracy. For 
Stone to argue convincingly that local agents can influence and change structures incrementally, 
he would need to show not only that agents influence regime activities, given that here the regime 
is a 'mediating' variable (or a meso level structure) (1993: 2), but also that the very factors which 
facilitate business privilege can be changed by regime/agent activity. " He shows only that the 
conditions he refers to allow for a range of outcomes which can be influenced by urban regimes 
as a mediating force (1993: 2). So, the regime influences the outcomes, but not the structural 
forces which constitute it, an interpretation supported by Imbroscio's (1998ab) critique of the 
'static' formulation in regime theory of the division of labour between state and market. 
1? 'C. c Re iprocity occurs between regime and agent, but not between regime and agent and systemic 
context. 
15 Note Stone's characterisation of the regime as mediating organism between stimulus 
and response (S>O>R) described in Chapter I (I 998a: 250). 
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The most important feature of Stone's later account for regime analysis is the exposition of a 
social purposive dimension to human behaviour. This perspective is inconsistent with a pure 
rational choice perspective and it is suggestive of a development in Stone's thinking between 1989 
and 1993. If Stone can be labelled a rational choice theorist in 1989 (Painter, 1997), something 
he denies (Stone, 1998a: 250), this is by no means true in 1993.16 There is now a more flexible 
basis for understanding the behaviour of local officials, which may have less to do with self interest 
than with pragmatism, which may reflect instrumental and social-purposive thinking. 
It is arguable that this elaboration of a social-purposive dimension to behavioural characteristics 
widens the scope for choice by state actors. In 1980, Stone suggests that local officials are bearers 
of community power relationships, implying that decisions are based on the relative pressures of 
democracy and economic performance embodied in the official (1980: 982). Self interest will be 
deten-nined by whichever pressure is stronger and will predict a limited range of choices consistent 
with it. A social purposive motivation, however, opens the possibility for flexible interpretation 
of the relative pressures of democracy and economic performance by allowing that on occasion, 
the balance of these pressures may be represented less than precisely in the ensuing decision. The 
scope for 'choice' is thus greater. In this perspective, the public official is more than a conduit for 
the struggle between competing forces. Politics matter in two ways, both in the mediation of 
competing pressures, and in a greater capacity for local officials to evaluate these pressures. 
The Empirical Scope of Regime Theory 
The foregoing exposition provides a basis upon which to examine the empirical scope and the 
explanatory limits ofregime theory. This section focuses on the empirical scope ofregime theory, 
engaging critical debates about the arenas to which regime theory can be applied. It first considers 
the range of phenomena, or 'types' which regime theory encompasses. It proceeds to explore the 
related question of whether regime formation is considered inevitable in the work of Elkin and 
16 See discussion of regime theory and the question of structure and agency below 
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Stone. The discussion of scope concludes with an evaluation of how far regime theory can be 
applied to different policy and geo-political arenas. 
The Evolution and Differentiation of Regime Types 
The urban regime, as a set of governing relationships, is not static and Stone argues that it must 
be studied over time (1989: 9). There was significant change over forty years in Atlanta, notably 
an increase in the influence of the black middle class (1989). The story of the Atlanta regime is 
a story of continuity and change, a story of changing dynamics which serves both to re-enforce 
the dictum that 'politics matter' and as a reminder that the down-town business elite has exercised 
continuing, if variable, levels of pre-eminence in Atlanta's politics throughout much of the 20' 
century. The same is true of Dallas, as illustrated in Elkin's account of the transition from a pure 
entrepreneurial economy to a complex entrepreneurial political economy, characterised by the 
loosening of ties between the business elite and the city, weaker business power and greater 
autonomy for the city official (Elkin, 1987a: 74; 1987b: 27). 
Elkin emphasises that the structures predicted by regime theory are institutionally mediated and 
that greater popular control of decision making at the urban scale might be achieved through 
institutional restructuring (Elkin, 1987a: 103). 17 Federal policies, such as the Urban Development 
Action Grant (see Wolman, 1992) can assist in making regimes more inclusive by encouraging the 
mobilisation of not-for-profit organisations (Stone, 1989: 242). The extent to which political 
'resistance'to the demands of business may be possible is therefore related to the extent of federal 
aid, a higher level of which it is argued will give officials greater autonomy, making them 'bolder' 
with business. It is axiomatic to regime theory that while the business sector enjoys strategic 
advantage, this advantage can be challenged by other group interests, including anti-growth 
coalitions, although these are hindered by the constraints of a biased playing field (Elkin, 1987a: 
44). Neither Elkin nor Stone believes that business driven governance will always emerge, or 
17 Regime theory clearly falls within the institutionalist tradition, which contends that 
institutional choice can shape people's ideas, attitudes and preferences (Hall, 1986, Thelen & 
Steinmo, 1992: 27). 
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succeed in its developmental objectives. Politicians are subject to pressure from the citizenry to 
ensure a certain level of public satisfaction if they wish to be re-elected. Forces are therefore 
balanced between the need for politicians to respond to their constituents, producing resistance 
to 'fiscal constraint'and, on the other hand, an inability to resist business pressures because of the 
city's need for credit (Elkin, 1987a: 5 1). Nonetheless, regime transformation is difficult. Stone's 
representation of four regime types, presented in order of perceived feasibility, serves as an 
example. 
Maintenance regimes are concerned with routine service delivery. They are not 'active' in any 
developmental sense and require less in terms of resources to achieve governance (Stone, 1993: 
18). They are easiest of all to constitute. Development regimes require coordination of 
institutional elites to achieve growth objectives. These, as regime theory implies, exist given the 
unequal allocation of resources in society (1993: 18/19). Middle class progressive regimes 
involve a compromise with the development agenda. An active, resource rich, middle class 
electorate interested in environmental protection, affordable housing and other 'social' purposes 
is necessary for these regimes which require continued economic development in order to gain 
(exactions' (1993: 19/20). " The fourth. type is the lower class opportunity expansion regime. 
For Stone, this type is a hypothetical regime form. These regimes would require the social 
purposive dimension of human behaviour at the fore together with a strong lower class motivated 
to grasp the opportunities afforded by investments in human capital. The efforts required to 
coordinate and maintain such a regime would, says Stone, be immense (1993: 21/2). 
This latter regime type, nevertheless, illustrates the contingency of business pre-eminence in 
regime theory, showing that power can be pre-empted by groups other than business, given 
favourable conditions,. At the same time, it showsjust how difficult it is for some g. roups to drive 
up compliance costs for business while, at the same time, constituting alternative governing 
18 This regime type describes the conditions identified by Nichols Clark and Goetz in 
Boulder and Boca Raton in their attempt, described below, to rebut the central claims of regime 
theory. (Nichols Clark and Goetz, 1993). 
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arrangements (Stone, 1988: 90). It is theoretically possible to transform regime governance and 
render it amenable to greater popular control. But beyond the possibility of different regime types, 
how far is the existence of regime governance taken for granted by Elkin and Stone? 
The Contingency of Regime Governance 
Elkin points out that regimes need to be maintained, that they may decline and that they may be 
replaced by 'a different regime or by an interregnum in which no stable patterns are established' 
(Elkin, 1985c: 14). He notes that in some areas businesses and politicians cannot find ways of 
advancing common interests which are politically feasible (I 985c: 18). The politics of Boston in 
the 1930s, for example, are described as 'an erratic and unorganized politics moving from crisis 
to speeches to crisis again' (1985c: 21). Stone also acknowledges that regime building and 
maintenance is a costly business. The problem of collective action is not one that is easily resolved 
and, he argues, it would be very difficult, if not impossible to build a new regime from scratch 
(1989: 23 6). Compliance costs cannot always be met and the resources necessary to pursue a 
common agenda cannot always be raised. Furthermore, Stone makes a distinction between a 
growth coalition and a governing coalition, emphasising that one should not be mistaken for the 
other (1991: 293). This account is supported by John and Cole (1998), Stoker (1997a) and 
Stoker and Orr (1994), whose study of Detroit argues that 'Detroit is a study of failed regime 
building' (1994: 65): 
The essence of the regime approach to power is not to identify an elite partnership of 
governmental and nongovernmental actors but, rather, to explore the conditions for such 
a partnership to be created and maintained. Our analysis has suggested that in Detroit, the 
conditions for a cohesive partnership were not met (Stoker and Orr, 1994: 66). 
It is strange, then, that it has been argued that work in the US takes the existence of urban regimes 
for granted (Ward, 1997a: 43 0; 1997b: 1494). Di Gaetano (1997: 847) argues that Stone fails to 
recognise the possibility that conflict, rather than co-operation may prevail and that regimes may 
be the exception, rather than the rule. This criticism illustrates one of the misunderstandings of 
regime theory complained of by Stone (I 998a: 250). The criticism may hold water in relation to 
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elements of the secondary literature, discussed in greater depth in chapter 3, but it is misplaced 
in relation to Elkin and Stone. '9 
Regime Governance and Policy Arena 
Just as regime governance is not inevitable, pro-development alliances do not dominate every 
arena of governance. Whereas a growth alliance may dominate land-use policies, growth politics 
are not considered to be as strong in other investment related policy areas, which include city 
budgets, education and taxation, where open domination by business would antagonise 
professional bureaucrats and lead to public charges of corruption (Elkin, 1987a: 49). Elkin argues 
that the principal manifestation of business-state relationships occurs in those domains where 
economic performance is most visibly at stake (Elkin, 1994: 118). But, he argues, the separation 
of domains is arbitrary and since political realities can sometimes join what has been separated, 
political struggles in the non-economic domain can quickly turn into contests where it is asked 
what effect the various options will have on promoting business performance (Elkin, 1994: 118). 
Stone's work on education develops this point. He argues that international economic challenges 
have brought to the fore the need to improve workforce skills, giving business an incentive to 
become involved in seeking to improve schools (Stone, 1998a: 254). He shows that business 
plays a prominent role in public education in the USA (I 998b: x). Despite the fact that school 
districts are, strictly speaking, legal creatures of the State, local autonomy in education is deeply 
rooted in the USA (Stone, 1998b: 2). 20 Stone views education policy as an arena of regime 
politics. He identifies two regime types in this arena: employment regimes which are exclusive 
regimes concerned with the protection of insider pre-requisites and which favour the privileged 
classes; and performance regimes, the normative objective of his study, which would, could they 
be created, be oriented on improving the academic performance of lower class children to enhance 
19 It is also recognised in management literature that collaborative endeavour is not 
straightforward. It needs special attention and resources and it is difficult to achieve (Huxham, 
1996: 177). 
20 The fact of local autonomy in education policy does not necessarily indicate a strong 
role for local government in the policy process. 
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their post-educational opportunities (Stone, 1998b: 9). The performance regime is viewed by 
Stone as a social purposive regime (I 998b: 12). Development politics can be pursued, says Stone, 
by a narrow coalition of elites. Education, though, is different. It involves a policy task in which 
the participation of professional educators and parents is indispensable. Business, therefore, has 
more limited leverage in inducing educational change than it does in inducing economic 
performance (Stone, 1998c: 262). This perspective shows that regime governance can be diffuse 
and heterogeneous and that the state-market division has reduced causal impact in arenas beyond 
those concerned with economic performance. 
On this issue, the secondary literature is relatively faithful to Elkin and Stone (Di Gaetano, 1997; 
Orr and Stoker, 1994; Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998; Brown, 1999). Di Gaetano, for example, 
identifies competing coalitions within Bristol, centred on competing Council departments, a pro- 
growth alliance (economic development) and a growth management alliance (planning) (1997: 
855). Stoker's and Orr's account of regime governance in Detroit at the beginning of the 1990s 
identifies two competing regimes, one based around physical renewal, the other concerned with 
human capital (1994: 65). Regime theory is not, therefore, based on an assumption about the 
uniformity of governance across policy arenas, or on an assumption that it is applicable only to 
economic development, though the key proposition concerning the state-market division has 
reduced causal force in other policy arenas. 
If any element of regime theory can be criticised as 'bottom up' or 'localist' (Ward, 1997ab), it 
is Stone's treatment of education. While it is noted by Elkin (1987a) that policy arenas are 
interrelated and the state-market division has a continual, ifvariable, influence across these arenas, 
consideration is not given, beyond the local dynamics involved, to the question of why 
performance regimes dominate in education. If the state-market variable is, in general, weaker in 
the sphere of education, then which other extra-local variables, if any, have prime causal efficacy? 
Nonetheless, Stone's concern with education provides an important element in the rationale for 
basing the empirical element of this study around the theme of regeneration, focussing on both 
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economic development and education to evaluate similarities and differences in patterns of local 
governance across different policy arenas. 21 
The Geographical Scope of Regime Theory 
Regime theory can be applied across different policy arenas, but is it applicable at different geo- 
political levels? For Elkin, the public task of Promoting business confidence is not the preserve 
of local politics only, but ofany geographical level of government (Elkin, 1985b: 188). This point 
illuminates a key dimension of Elkin's and Stone's regime theory. It is not a theory of urban 
politics as such, it is a theory of state action and is part of the state debate (Elkin, 1994: 118). 
According to Stone, the conditions for the intertwining of politics and economics are negotiable 
at local, state, national and international levels (1990: 29 1). This fact makes sense ofElkin's claim 
that (empirical) regime theory is, in principle, applicable to all liberal democratic societies, though 
the USA is his principal empirical referent (I 985b: 18 1). The task of regime theory as a theory 
of liberal democracy is to identify (and also to prescribe) the interface between market and popular 
control. If it occurs at national government level, then that level is a relevant focus for regime 
analysis. If it also occurs at the local scale, as it does in the USA, then that scale too is an 
appropriate focus of analysis. The urban focus of regime theory is thus contingent on the sites of 
interface between state and market - an empirical question. Elkin and Stone analyse the urban 
arena because a tension between market and popular control is evident at this level of governance 
in the USA. " This interpretation is supported by Elkin's and Stone's references to Krasner (1983) 
whose concern with international regimes they re-interpret at the urban scale in the USA. 
This interpretation has implications for critics and adaptors of regime theory in British political 
science. Urban regime theory, strictly interpreted, is applicable only to the extent that the division 
between state and market is evident at the local scale. Regime theory does not direct research to 
21 Regeneration is defined as a broad concept in Chapter 1. 
22 They also analyse urban politics because local governance is a key element in the good 
society (Elkin, 1993,1996). 
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the local level in the first instance, but to a search for the level at which the division between 
economic development and popular control is most strongly articulated. " 
The Explanatory Limits of Regime Theory 
Before moving on to consider the way in which the normative tasks of regime theory fit in with 
its empirical analysis, limits to its explanatory capacity need to be specified. This section explores 
the strengths and weaknesses of regime theory, drawing on critical perspectives and on the 
limitations prescribed by Elkin and Stone themselves. First, the relationships identified in regime 
theory between land use, economic growth and coalition building are discussed from a critical 
perspective. Second, consideration is given to the question of how far regime theory can be 
viewed as a theory of structure and agency. Finally, the limits inherent in taking the profit 
economy as given are explored (Stone, 1991: 294). 
Regime Theory and the Dynamics of Economic Growth 
Elkin argues that land and property values constitute a key indicator of economic growth and that 
locally dependent alliances are driven by competition for mobile capital (1987a). 24 These 
perspectives are vulnerable to criticism in at least two ways. It is questionable just how mobile 
productive capital is and physical development may not correspond with business objectives. 
Stone, for example, agrees with Elkin in acknowledging the way in which local banks have 
extensive local investment interests leading them to have a direct concern with redevelopment and 
tax policy (1993: 8) but he downplays capital mobility, emphasising that businesses with 
substantial capital investments in an area cannotjust move away (1988: 99). Some investments 
are inherently immobile and the movement of others will incur costs (Stone, 1991: 290). To this 
extent,, Stone's perspective is commensurable with that of Cox and Mair (198 8,1989), who offer 
23 Stone (1998a: 250) views regime theory as a second level theory in that it is not a 
grand narrative project like Marxism. But as a -second level theory, regime theory is much more 
expansive in its claims, normative and empirical, than meso-level approaches such as Policy 
Network Analysis, which makes few a-priori empirical-theoretical claims and in which no explicit 
normative assumptions are embedded (Rhodes, 1990). 
24 See pages 33 and 34. 
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a broader concept of local dependence than that which identifies land and property based elites 
as the key business interests in local alliances (see Molotch, 1976; Elklin, 1987a: 32-42). 25 
Furthermore, while higher land and property values may generate revenue for local authorities, 
they may also conflict with the ob ective of generating and maintaining inward investment by 
mobile capital, which has to bear the higher costs demanded by rentiers. Nor, on the other hand, 
should it be assumed that physical development necessarily increases the value of land or property. 
Molotch, in his seminal article 'The City as Growth Machine' makes the point that different land 
uses maybe 'noxious' to one another (1976: 311). On the other hand, as Cochrane argues, local 
property values can rise because of tight growth controls (1999: 118). 
Nichols Clark and Goetz (1993) use quantitative analysis to rebut regime theory (1993: 105-145), 
arguing that there is strong evidence of growth-limits and anti-growth strategies in cities (1993: 
107). There is no evidence, they claim, that the presence of powerful business groups in an area 
leads automatically to pro-develoPment programmes or to actual growth. On the contrary, they 
say, business leaders tend to adopt the dominant local preferences. Political mobilisation by 
organised groups is seen to be the key factor in government decision-making (1993: 135). 
However, neither Elkin, nor Stone, deny the possibility of 'anti-growth' coalitions and Stone 
himselfnotes that active redevelopment and infrastructure expenditure can add to 'fiscal distress', 
making an area less attractive for investment and creating hardship for small, local, property 
owners (Stone, 1987b: 279). But to measure the impact of explicitly stated business preferences 
on the public agenda misses the point in regime theory that decisions are routinised, or arrived at 
by exclusion (Elkin, 1987a: 87) . 
2' This critique uses a perspective based on the first dimension 
of power to criticise a perspective based on the second and third dimensions (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970, Lukes, 1974). Two of the empirical examples used by Nichols Clark and Goetz 
refer to the successful mobilisation of anti-growth coalitions in Boulder and Boca Raton (1993: 
113). The social basis of these coalitions included: a largely professional or well-to-do adult 
25 However, Cox and Mair criticise regime theory from a Marxist perspective. See also 
Stone's response to Cox and Mair (Stone, 1991). 
26 See discussion of the role of local officials above. 
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Population; striking physical surroundings; and high-tec business parks. However, an earlier study 
by Rosenbaum calls this account into doubt in two ways, showing both that the city governments 
of Boca Raton and Boulder were reluctant to support the anti-growth movements (1978: 45-49) 
and that the cities were not dependent upon new development for economic growth (1978: 54- 
55). In these cases at least, growth led to increased costs for business. Anti-growth coalitions 
may therefore act in the interests of local business and local business may support growth control. 
In summary, if rising land values are not necessarily good indicators of business interest and if, on 
the other hand, land values can rise without growth, they must comprise a weaker dynamic to 
regime formation than Elkin anticipates. Conversely, if business is sometimes inclined to limit 
growth, regime building around anti-growth aims could be easier than Elkin or Stone suppose. " 
Regime Theory as a Theory of Structure and Agency 
D- 
Regime theory has been viewed as a corrective to what Stoker (1998b: 122) describes as the 
overemphasis on constraining forces in Marxist approaches to urban politics. In this sense, while 
it moves beyond the pluralism-elitism debate characteristic ofthe community power studies, it has 
re-invigorated the structure and agency debate. Perhaps the most serious criticism levelled at 
regime theory is that it is incapable of relating local and extra-local factors, and it stands accused 
of localism and empiricism (Ward, 1996,1997a, b; Di Gaetano, 1997, Cochrane et al, 1996). Says 
Stoker 'Regime theory must escape from the localist trap' (1995: 67). How valid are these 
perspectives and how far should regime theory be understood as a theory of structure and agency? 
There is disagreement within the secondary literature on this question. Ward views regime theory 
as a bottom up approach, which is empiricist in character (Ward, 1997ab). He further claims that 
regimes appear to be bottom up because that is the way they have been studied, an epistemological 
weakness in the framework (Ward, 1996: 432). DiGaetano (1997: 849) argues that regime 
theorists overemphasize the importance of local factors in setting urban governing agendas, while 
27 More fundamental weaknesses in the way regime theory characterises the Profit 
economy are discussed further below. 
52 
neglecting national and international economic and political factors. Stone, he says, neglects to 
specify how external forces shape processes and structures of urban governance (1997: 865). 
Cochrane et al further argue that the focus in regime theory on the way power is distributed 
locally may disguise the fact that power has shifted away from local actors (1996: 1328). Some 
scholars disagree with this localist evaluation of regime theory (Lauria, 1997: 234). Brownviews 
regime theorý as recognising both local capacity for action and the structural constraints of 
capitalism and liberal democracy (1999: 70), while Strom sees regime theorists as having 
embraced an understanding of interest articulation and coalition building without abandoning their 
understanding of the structural constraints within which city politics unfold (1996: 457). Other 
approaches plough the middle ground. Sites views regime theory as a useful corrective to 
economic reductionism, but he believes that it has led analysts to err too far in their focus on the 
activities of local agents (1997: 551). Similarly, for Kantor et al, (1997: 349), regime theorists 
concede the importance of contextual factors, but they focus on internal decision making, leaving 
the socioeconomic environment as a factor to which regimes respond. 
So, where then does regime theory actually stand? Is it possible to ad udicate between these 
differing perspectives? Stone states: 
Regime theory adopts the central tenet of political economy - that economic forces play a 
strong role in slia-ping urban outcomes - but appreciates that 'politics [also] matters' in 
shaping these outcomes (1987a: 17). 
He further argues that just because he takes the profit economy as given, it doesn't mean that he 
separates agent from structure (1991: 294). He denies that regime theory is localistic and, he 
argues, it provides a way of relating extra-local forces (1998a: 250). For Stone, capitalism is 
viewed as a major source ofpolicy challenges, perceived as a key extra-local factor generating the 
interests and activities of the business community (I 998a: 25 1). His own objections suggest that 
these critiques, at least, misinterpret regime theory. The foregoing exposition of regime theory 
further suggests that criticisms of localism are unfair, given the abstract nature of the 
generalizations made about the nature of liberal democratic societies and the way in which Elkin 
identifies concrete independent variables operating in urban politics which derive from this abstract 
generalization. Furthermore, the debate between Stone (I 998a) and Imbroscio (I 998ab), noted 
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"-bove, is precisely about the abstract pre-conditions for regime fon-nation which Ward urges on 
scholars of regime theory (I 997a, b). " 
This issue raises the question of how we formulate questions in political science and of which 
phenomena are appropriate for study. Wendt argues that what is primitive in one research 
endeavour must be problematic in another. But, he says, scientific practice has to start somewhere 
(Wendt: 1987: 349). Obviously, we cannot possibly study everything at once. In an 'intemal' 
explanation of the kind offered by Stone in Atlanta, external factors exist, but serve as 
'background' variables. Stone's approach is based on the view that the test of a theory is not its 
ability to account for everything that happens, but its ability to pinpoint the most important factors 
(1979: 187). The point of empirical research, then, is to identify the most important variables 
governing the characteristics of a social phenomenon. Max Weber, an influence on Stone, once 
cautioned: 
Consider the historical and cultural sciences ... they give us no answer to the question, 
whether the existence ofthese cultural phenomena have been and are worthwhile. And they 
do not answer the ftirther question, whether it is worth the effort required to know them 
(Gerth and Wright Mills, 1948: 145). 
Are local political processes worth the effort of knowing them? In regime theory, the study of 
local processes is justified by the a priori claim that politics matter. This position is qualified, 
theoretically, by the claim that structural factors will tend to produce local outcomes favouring 
the business sector and it is qualified empirically by Elkin's study of Dallas. In this sense, regime 
theory can be viewed as progressive because it links the question of structure and agency 
theoretically and empirically. " In addressing the question of how far local politics can have an 
impact in mediating structural tendencies, it is arguable that it produces facts which are worth 
knowing, provided that the respective efficacy of structures and agents are evaluated in explaining 
social phenomena. Stoker, (I 997a: 1) points out that the study of urban politics has been subject 
28 Of course, this debate was published after Ward. 
29 While regime theory is here viewed as a step forward from the structure or agency 
debate, the following discussion of regime theory and Marxism suggests that it is nonetheless 
limited as a theory of structure and agency. 
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to cycles and trends, like the wider field of political science. Given that regime theory is a 
response to 'structuralism', those who have argued that it falls into the trap of 'localism' run the 
risk of perpetuating a futile debate, swinging pendulum-like between explanations which 
emphasise structure and those which emphasise agency. The whole point of regime theory is that 
it moves beyond this debate downplaying neither local nor extra-local explanatory factors. 
However, regime theory does not identify reciprocity between all variables. The point has been 
made in relation to Stone's discussion of human motivation, that regime theory identifies 
'structuring' between regime (organism) and policy orientation (response), but not between 
regime and policy outcome on the one hand and the division of labour (stimulus) on the other. 
Reciprocity occurs between regime and agent, but not between regime and agent and systemic 
context. Stone (I 998a) recognises that systemic power can be mediated by other variables, that 
it can have differential impact across different policy arenas and that its realisation is contingent 
on pre-emption. But in itself, systemic power can only be manipulated through extra-local (for 
example, State or Federal) action. It is contingent in relation to higher levels of government, but 
it is reified in relation to local regime governance. Regime theory is not, therefore, a complete 
theory of structuring, if structuring is taken to mean a dynamic inteffelation between all variables 
having an impact on local politics. 'O 
There are two qualifications to be made to this defence of regime theory against localist 
interpretations. VAiile these criticisms of 'localism' or'empiricism' are unfair in relation to Elkin 
and Stone, they have greater substance in relation to the secondary literature some of which, as 
chapter 3 shows, tends to be oriented on case studies and on the presumption that regimes exist. 
To the extent that the secondary literature does this, without either incorporating an analysis of 
structures, or stating a priori assumptions about structural factors, they can be criticised for 
localism (Horan, 1997: 151/2). Secondly, it is arguable that in moving away from Marxism and 
downplaying economic theory, regime theory fails adequately to explain the reasons why, in liberal 
30 This point is an observation, rather than a criticism, since the limits of structuring 
constitute an empirical as well as a theoretical question. 
55 
democracy, there has to be a constant tension between business objectives and those of the wider 
citizenry. The following section addresses this question by considering further the position taken 
by Elkin and Stone on the workings of the capitalist economy. 
Regime Theory and the Profit Economy 
It has already been shown how the legacy of structural Marxism is visible; firstly in Elkin's and 
Stone's early characterisation of the way in which societal contradictions are embodied in public 
officials; and secondly in Stone's analysis of the imperatives governing human behaviour. 
Recognition of the structural position of capitalism is not, however, accompanied by an analysis 
of the dynamics within it. So, when Stone says that redevelopment policies are a response to 
economic restructuring, we do not know whether this restructuring is a cause or an effect of 
preference formation or both (1993: 15). This deficit is recognised by Stone, who simply 
acknowledges the point, noting that he does not explain how systemic power came into being, but 
only how it is maintained in the system of governance (1980: 989). 
Why then is Marxism rejected? Stone believes, as was noted above, that society is only loosely 
co-ordinated and his 'Tillian' view of society rejects the economy centred view of the world on 
which Marxism is dependent (Stone, 1989: 226-227). Elkin objects to class analyses of the state 
on the basis that public officials are not 'instructed' by a dominant capitalist class. They exhibit 
a level of discretion which Marxism cannot, he says, explain. Elkin believes that the Marxian 
ruling Class thesis requires the dominant class to exercise an 'implausible' degree ofrationality and 
planning (1985b: 184). Validation of the Marxist thesis, according to Elkin, requires that the 
ruling class be shown as capable of identifying decisions crucial to its interests and of calculating 
and carrying out a course of action to realise them. Elkin follows Lindblom's (1977) approach 
in which the central building blocks of societies are not classes, or modes of production, but 
(control systems' (Elkin, 1985a: 7). 31 Popular control and market economics therefore represent 
different control systems. In his critique of Castells' volume The Urban Question (1977) Elkin 
31 Elkin doesn't use this concept in a way which contradicts Stone's social production 
model. 
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(1979) argues that Castells and other Marxist scholars fail to integrate their accounts of structural 
contradictions with an adequate analysis of political processes. 32 
In moving beyond Marxism, it is assumed that within the bounds of the profit perspective, the 
tenns of co-operation between govenunent and business are negotiable (Stone, 1991: 290). The 
business objective of growth is embodied in the activities and capacities of local officials (Elkin, 
1985a: 7). This, then, is the terrain of agency and it is the choices of state officials which explain 
economic fluctuation. Whatever the merits ofthis return to politics, Elkin views capitalist societies 
pessimistically. In language more reminiscent ofMarxism, he speaks of a'decline' in both liberal 
and democratic practices and a crisis of liberal democracy represented as a decline in state 
legitimacy. The implication is that economic crisis has been caused by an excess of democracy, 
or perhaps an over-articulation of democratic demands by state officials. 
The state may be able to survive problems of declining productivity and capital 
accumulation, fiscal undernourishment... overloading ... and disaggregation... These all cut deep, but because they are probably imbalances within existing arrangements, profits can be 
raised, interest aggregation can be increased, and citizen mobilization can be reduced and 
a crisis thus averted (Elkin, 1985b: 205). 
But at the same time: 
If a liberal democratic state is to survive, the political community or public must be seen as 
a source of evaluation. Just how this is to be done is less clear (1985b: 206). 
It is arguable that the problem this perspective poses for regime theory lies in its retreat from 
economics (Imbroscio, 1998b: 263). In rejecting Marxism, Elkin and Stone have effectively 
dispensed with economic theory, despite the critical question within the regime perspective bei g 
'whether a regime dedicated to both popular control and a property-based market system can 
thrive' (Elkin, 1987a: 17). In this sense, regime theory depends on the long-term sustainability 
of the market economy, but it does not explain or account for the fact that market economies 
fluctuate and it does not address the possibility that the conditions for this fluctuation are built into 
Al- - 
the social practices ofaccumulation and competition, rather than into the performance ofbusiness 
32 This criticism of Marxism is unfair. In a longer exposition, it would be possible to 
show that Marx's conceptions of class and domination invoke a concept of systemic power which 
does not necessarily require command power or domination. 
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leaders and public officials. Neither does it consider the implications for the accumulation process, 
were the state to limit its capacity for profit as regime theory prescribes. 
Given the absence of economic prescriptions to enhance the sustainability of the market, a 
contradiction emerges between the need for public evaluation and the problem of democratic 
overload, expressed as poor economic performance, which too much democracy tends to produce 
(Elkin, 1985b: 206). There is a tension here between the normative and the empirical dimensions 
in regime theory. If it is true that the decline in liberal democracy, in the first instance at least, 
requires a moderation ofcitizen demands, then how can easing business pre-eminence, by reducing 
material inequality and by increasing popular control, be feasible? In light of Elkin's analysis, the 
liberal element of regime theory appears to stand not in a dynamic, reciprocal relationship with the 
democratic element, but in a position where liberalism tends to undermine democracy and vice 
versa. This perspective is lent weight both by Elkin's view of capitalism and in the pessimism 
which proceeds from the normative element of regime theory, to which the exposition now turns. 
The Normative Tasks of Regime Theory 
Both Elkin and Stone share a normative commitment to the ideals of liberal democracy. In 
practice, this means a commitment to greater political equality and popular control and to the 
amelioration of business pre-eminence in politics. Stone's contribution to this 'constructive' 
element of regime theory is much more limited (Imbroscio, 1998b: 264), though he urges fellow 
scholars to take a normative approach to the future study of the politics of urban development 
(1987c: 297) . 
33 His non-native concerns are visible, however, in his edited collection of essays, 
in which he and his collaborators consider the feasibility of bringing about greater equality and 
popular control in the education system. However, it is Elkin whose work fully elaborates the idea 
of a commercial republic. " 
33 Wohnan and Goldsmith also criticise rigid distinction between normative and empirical 
theory (1992: 7). 
34 See Elkin (I 985d, 1986,1987a, 1993ab, 1994,1996ab). 
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Elkin argues that American society, broadly, aspires to the idea of a commercial republic. Such 
a society has two organising principles: it must be subject to political decision, (democracy), but 
it mustn't arrange the daily lives of individuals (liberalism): 
A liberal democratic regime is the successful accommodation of these two impulses - one 
popular, the other private and individualistic. Its appeal lies in its contradictions - and so 
do its difficulties (19987a: 200). 
Given that the market economy is a good thing, says Elkin, the controllers of productive assets 
not only will, but must and ought to have substantial discretion over how these assets are to be 
employed. In liberal democracies, this imperative means that businessmen must and ought to 
continue to have a special place in government counsels (1994: 122). But, at present, this place 
is viewed as excessively pre-eminent. " 
Elkin's approach, inspired by Aristotle, is a constitutional, or constitutive, approach to the design 
of institutions. He argues that political institutions cannot simply be viewed as generative of good 
outcomes, such as freedom and equality, but that good institutions have freedom and equality 
embedded within them (I 985d: 262). Political institutions arejust as much ends in themselves as 
the outcomes they are intended to produce. The most important thing about a political institution 
is, therefore, not only what it does, but also what it is (1985d: 262). Elkin proposes the 
reconstitution ofthose institutions which facilitate business pre-emption ofthe local policy agenda 
with measures, for example, enhancing the constitutional status of local government and reducing 
the mobility of capital. Throughout this normative discussion runs a strong thread of pessimism, 
visible not only in Elkin's view of capitalism, but in the reformist blueprints put forward by both 
Elkin and Stone. At no point does either scholar make a positive or confident statement about 
how the objectives of liberal democracy can be achieved. According to Elkin, the system itself 
undermines serious efforts at reform. 
Regardless of their merits, the prospects of such reforms occurring are slim, not least 
because the very workings of the political economy that serve to prompt the concern for 
reform will substantially impede it (Elkin, 1987a: 18 1). 
35 The fact that Elkin's normative project is so clearly oriented on the USA may be 
another reason why British political scientists have been influenced more by Stone. 
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Even if the reforms advocated occur and institutions are designed in the way recommendedl, they 
may, as suggested above, be consumed by the strains of the larger political economy (Elkin, 
1987a: 188). Elkin further asks, but does not answer, the question of whether it is possible for 
mutual respect to flourish between individuals and groups in conditions where there is a division 
between owner and worker. Even ifthere were material equality, he wonders whether the very fact 
of an owner-worker relationship would create insurmountable barriers to mutual respect (I 996a: 
139) : 36 
Any pleasure that we may derive from noting that there are no compelling alternatives at the 
moment to a commercial republican regime, for Americans at least, must be tempered by the 
extreme difficulty of realizing such a regime (Elkin, 1994: 137). 
Even in education, where the grip of the development agenda is weaker, the prospects for 
establishing performance regimes enhancing the opportunities for lower class children, are viewed 
with pessimism (Stone, 1998c: 11/18).. 
The limit of regime theory, then, is that while it views the economic dimension as critical, the 
anatomy of that dimension is not adequately theorised. Regime theory fails, for all its strengths, 
because it offers neither description, nor prescription for capitalism itself (Lauria, 1997), except 
to say that the market economy is a key element in the good society (Elkin, 1994). This point 
matters because the normative dimensions ofregime theory, particularly in Elkin, require both that 
the market economy be sustainable and that levels of democratic participation be increased. 
However, the real world situation means that the needs of the market economy will often require 
the further limitation rather than the expansion of democratic demands. It is arguable, therefore, 
based on the evaluations of Elkin and Stone themselves, that the empirical-theoretical elements 
of regime theory do not support its prescriptions. As a second level empirical theory, it is 
inadequate to the normative tasks it sets itself 
M Mutual respect, says Elkin is vital to the success of the commercial republic. He 
believes that some unspecified, but greater, level of material equality is necessary to generate this 
mutual respect (I 996a: 143). 
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Conclusion 
In summary, this exposition treats the work of Elkin and Stone as an authoritative, coherent, 
statement of regime theory. It shows the strengths and the weakness in an approach which is not 
a" grand narrative', but which nonetheless generates explanatory variables at a range of levels from 
the structural foundations of liberal democratic society to the elementary motivations of human 
behaviour. Regime theory is rich with possibilities and in many respects, its critics are unjust. If 
it fails to realise its normative objectives (and it recognises the likelihood of such failure), it is 
nonetheless a powerful and refined contribution to the concept of structure and agency as applied 
to local politics. It is a theory of liberal democracy, whose empirical and normative claims direct 
it to the study of local goveniment. Regime theory therefore bears the characteristics of a multi- 
level theory in which the interorganisational and micro levels of analysis can be seen to depend on 
core assumptions made about the macro, or state, level of analysis. Box I illustrates this point, 
and Box 2 summarises the main propositions in regime theory identified in this exposition. 
Macro Meso Micro 
(Second level theory) (Inter-organisational) 
Liberal democratic state based on Urban politics based on fiscal 
division of labour between market structures which make city 
and popular control governments dependent on 
I business resources 
(Decisional Level) 
Various strategies for governance 
based on recognition by officials 
that they cannot govern without 
co-operation with business. 
Decisions are based on bounded 
rationality and on an 
instrumental/purposive 
continuum in human motivation 
Box 1: The Analytical Levels of Urban Regime Theory 
Based on the foregoing perspective, the remainder of this study, accepting that local politics 
matter, asks the question just how much do they matter? Chapter 3 will now consider the way in 
which regime theory has been used in the study of urban politics in the UK and explore the factors 
which might govern the establishment of local regeneration partnerships. It examines adaptive and 
critical approaches to regime theory, drawn mainly from British political science, with a view to 
identifying and inter-relating variables which may have caused urban partnerships to emerge; it 
compares these variables with those posited in regime theory; and it examines the range of 
phenomena which this complex ofvariables might produce, considering which ofthese phenomena 
are commensurable with the notion of regime governance. 
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Chapter 3. Urban Regime Theory in Critical Perspective: 
Theorising Urban Partnerships in the UK 
Introduction 
Comparative studies of urban regime theory have focussed on defining regimes by typology 
(Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Di Gaetano and Klemanski, 1993), examining potential reasons 
for local coalition formation in the UK (Harding, 1991,1994; 1996ab, 1998; Ward, 1997) and 
on examining the local processes by which regime formation might occur and be sustained (Stoker 
and Mossberger, 1994). This chapter links these debates, considering how far regime theory is 
able to explain and to characterise urban partnerships in the UK. It develops a distinction between 
different types of partnership, of which regime governance is viewed as a specific case, and it 
considers the conditions necessary for the establishment ofpartnerships and ofregime governance 
in the UK. At present, critics and adaptors of regime theory lack a common conceptual 
framework against which to evaluate and compare developing partnerships in the UK or to 
evaluate these partnerships in comparison with those described by Elkin and Stone. These issues 
are recognised as important, but they have not been fully addressed in adaptive literatures to date 
(Stoker, 1995; Painter, 1997; Ward, 1997). Mindful of criticisms by Stoker (1995) and Ward 
(1997) of inductive approaches to theory building, the objective here is to establish plausible 
'abstract preconditions' for partnership and/or regime governance in the UK and to generate 
hypotheses about the kind of phenomena which might be produced from the realisation, or 
empirical instantiation, of these conditions. 
The chapter does not attempt to demonstrate the obvious, that many of the propositions and 
characteristics which Elkin and Stone identify are inapplicable to British local governance (Stoker 
and Mossberger, 1994; Lawless, 1994). Rather, the objective is to assess whether regime theory 
represents a useful tool in building explanations for public-private partnerships in the UK. In other 
63 
words, following Elkin and Stone, can we identify variables in the UK which: predispose public 
and private sector groups/actors to cooperate in order to achieve governance; predisposes this 
cooperation to occur on terms favouring the business sector and economic development policies 
to the exclusion of other sectors and goals; and which result in phenomena commensurable with 
regime governance? The objective, therefore, is not so much to test urban regime theory as it is 
to explain and identify forms of co-operation between local government and the business sector, 
evaluating the contribution which regime theory makes in building those explanations. The 
analysis moves from a contrast between partnerships and regime governance, to an assessment of 
the abstract pre-conditions necessary for regime formation in the UK avoiding, as Ward (1 997a, b) 
and Andrew and Goldsmith (1998) caution, the 'trap' of localism and the presumption that 
partnerships should necessarily be perceived as regimes (Bailey et al, 1995: 26). The new concept 
ofregime governance developed here is concerned with the interface between local authorities and 
the business sector and in what ways this interface resembles that in the USA. It is, however, 
recognised that regime governance may involve other groups or even exclude the business sector. 
These forms of governance lie beyond the scope ofthis study, whose concern is one potential facet 
ofregime governance, the interface between local government andbusiness, the core relationship 
identified by Elkin and by Stone. ' 
The chapter begins by considering why it is that regime theory has gained such currency in the UK 
during the 1990s. It then establishes criteria for the ensuing discussion by clarifying the definitions 
attributed to the terms partnership, governance, network and regime. It proceeds to identify the 
properties of regime governance, through the lens of empirical studies involving British cases, 
arguing that to broaden the concepts in regime theory too far is to reduce it to description and 
classification of any governing phenomenon (Stoker, 1995). Moving on to the theoretical 
dimensions of regime theory, two different adaptations, those of Harding and Stoker and 
Mossberger are evaluated, examining issues they highlight in relation to procedures oftheoretical 
I Regime governance, as used in this study, hereafter refers to the relationship between 
local government and the business sector, without prejudice to the potential for regime governance 
in other interorganisational relationships. 
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mtegration and convergence. Finally, hypotheses are generated concerning those variables capable 
of explaining partnership/regime formation and it is considered how far these variables are 
commensurable with those identified in regime theory. 
Why Urban Regime Theory? 
Chapter 2 began by showingjust how influential urban regime theory has become during the 1990s 
(Imbroscio, 1998a). This growth in influence coincides with a wider debate, concerning the 
process of transition from local government to local governance (Harding, 199 1; Stoker, 199 1). 
This transition denotes that we have entered an era of local governance in which local government 
is no longer able to carry out its responsibilities alone. Consequently, it has had to engage in new 
relationships with a range of other organisations, private, quasi-public and voluntary, to meet its 
objectives? It is questionable just how new 'local governance' is. Hall and Hubbard (1996: 155) 
argue that many commentators take for granted that local governance prior to the early 1970s was 
dominated by managerial politics, thereby masking the question of whether the shift to 
4 entrepreneurial' modes oflocal governance actually supplants, or merely supplements, traditional 
approaches. Stanyer reminds readers that there has 'long been a complex relationship between 
public and private organisations in the delivery of public services' (1999: 237). Continuityneeds 
to be explained as well as change (Shaw, 1993: 258; John and Cole, 1998: 385). However, while 
this study provides a limited examination of the history of partnership working, it does not offer 
a comparative analysis of evidence over decades or centuries, thereby seeking to differentiate one 
era from another (Stanyer, 1999: 237). Its most important contribution is in identifying the nature 
and characteristics of partnership working in the present day and possible trends that may be 
developing. 
While local governance may, or may not, be a recent phenomenon, it has ftu-ther been argued that 
since the 1980s, there has been a growing exchange of initiatives between the USA and the UK, 
many ofwhich have influenced the process of local govemment-business partnership development 
2 The meaning of 'governance' is considered further below. 
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(Atkinson, 1995: 8). These initiatives include the Enterprise Zone, the Training and Enterprise 
Council system, the Urban Development Corporation and the Urban Development Grant 
(Atkinson, 1995; Wolman, 1992). As Ward observes: 
The 1980s witnessed attempts to import to the UK an 'American' philosophy, culture and 
ideology that actively seeks to incorporate the business sector into urban regeneration' 
(Ward, 1996: 427). 
An often cited example of urban policy transfer (see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) is that of the 
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG), originally developed in the USA and implemented 
as the Urban Development Grant (UDG) in the UK (Boyle, 1985; Wolman 1992; Wolman and 
Goldsmith, 1992; Atkinson and Moon, 1994). Wolman's study (1992) demonstrates how the 
UDG was inspired by UDAG and he shows how the Department of the Environment undertook 
research in the USA during 1981 examining potentially adaptable policies for inner city 
regeneration in the UK. According to Wolman, officials and ministers who visited the US were 
impressed by UDAG. In 1980, the Department of the Environment began to develop a version 
ofUDAG based upon American principles ofprivate-public partnerships and leveraging concepts 
which were compatible with the ideas of the new Conservative Government. 
Initiatives ofthis nature have led to claims that there may be a process ofinstitutional convergence 
occurring between British and US local governance (Bennett,, 1991 a., b). This study is not 
concerned with providing an empirically based comparison between the institutional arrangements 
in the UK and the USA, but the suggestion throws up the possibility that regime theory may 
increasingly be able to provide insights into the way in which partnerships are developing. Hence, 
the question of whether regime theory may be growing in explanatory potential due to policy 
converg ence. 
3 niis study doesn't address the influence of policy transfer on central government and 
local governance. See, for example Davies and Evans, (1997) and Evans and Davies, (1999). 
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Partnership, Network, Governance and Regime 
The term 'governance' can have many meanings (Rhodes, 1996: 653). ' Stoker (1998b: 19), 
however, defines governance simply, as a 'complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn 
from but also beyond government'. Local governance at its simplest means that local government 
has been transformed from the dominant legitimate public institution to being one body among 
many which participates in a complex framework of governing (John, 1997: 253). For Rhodes, 
governance is accorded a more specific meaning, referring to 'self-organizing, interorganizational. 
networks' (Rhodes, 1996: 660). ' It is the product of processes which Rhodes characterises as 'the 
hollowing out of the state' (1990: 661). ' According to this definition, governance is a specific 
network type (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 25 1), characterised by Rhodes according to four factors: 
interdependence between organisations; continuing interactions between network members caused 
by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes; game-like interactions rooted 
in trust and regulated by the rules of the game as negotiated by participants; and a significant 
degree of autonomy from the state, which, while no longer in a sovereign position, can steer 
indirectly and imperfectly (1996: 660). ' For Rhodes, trust is the central co-ordinating mechanism 
in networks in the same way that command and competition are the key mechanisms in hierarchies 
and markets. Networks are viewed as high trust mechanisms and contracts as low trust 
mechanisms (I 999a: xx). These characteristics ofnetworks as governance are close in kind to the 
4 Rhodes identifies six meanings of the term 'govemance': the minimal state, as 
corporate govemance, as the new public management, as good govemance, as a socio-cybemetic 
system and as self-organizing networks (Rhodes, 1996: 653). 
5 Stoker (I 998a) makes five propositions characterizing governance which are viewed 
as complementary, one ofwhich is that governance is about autonomous self-governing networks 
of actors (I 998a: 23). 
6 The 'hollowing out of the state' refers to: privatization and limiting the scope and 
forms of public intervention; loss of functions by central and local government departments to 
alternative delivery systems, the loss of functions by Britain to the European Union; and limits to 
the discretion of public servants through the new public management with its emphasis on 
accountability and clearer political control through a distinction between politics and 
administration (Rhodes, 1996: 661). 
7 This perspective seems to be a departure from the Marsh and Rhodes continuum in 
which an issue network can be characterised by conflict and mistrust (1992: 25 1). 
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interactions described in regime theory. For regime theorists, however, the process of building 
regime governance is crucial to its success and it is perceived to be difficult. The literature on 
policy networks, on the other hand, tends to take networks, particularly policy communities, for 
granted. This is a difference in focus, however, rather than a theoretical disagreement. The terms 
6 governance', 'self-organising interorganizational network' and'governing regime' are, therefore, 
interchangeable according to this understanding. But as a theory of networking, regime theory 
is specialized, generating claims about why and how interdependence occurs, particularly between 
local government and elements of the business sector in liberal democratic societies. These 
perspectives underpin the discussion below of Stoker's and Mossberger's (1994) treatment of 
regime theory and policy network analysis. Where, then, does the concept of partnership stand 
in relation to those of network, governance and regime? 
The terms 'partnership' and'network' have beenused in imprecise ways inthe literature (McCabe 
et al, 1997: 10; Atkinson, 1999: 63). For Skelcher et al, networks constitute a basis upon which 
more formal partnerships can develop -(1996: 2). Alternatively, Stoker views self-governing 
networks to be the 'ultimate partnership activity' (I 998a: 23). Lowndes and Skelcher choose to 
distinguish between Partnerships as organisational forms and networks as modes of social co- 
ordination, or governance. Importantly, they argue that the existence of partnerships does not 
imply that relations are conducted on the basis of mutual benefit, trust and reciprocity, the 
characteristics of governance as self organizing networks (1998: 3 14). Formal arrangements do 
not guarantee meaningful relationships and formality can limit the capacity of partnerships for 
flexibility and innovation (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 324). In fact, argue Lowndes and 
Skelcher, the process of formalisation tends to re-enforce hierarchical tendencies in the 
partnership, rather than networking dynamics, with different groups becoming marginal or 
dominant. Either way, they caution that the co-operation and mutuality implied by the ideal- 
typical network mode of governance can too easily be read into existing partnership organisations 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 33 1). Similarly, the following discussion shows that there has been 
a tendency in the literature to apply regime theory to many kinds of partnership. 
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In summary, regime governance is a specialized form of networking, a highly developed 
partnership arrangement which does not require formal structures to sustain it. The remainder of 
the chapter is, therefore, based on the perspective that partnership working cannot necessarily be 
characterised as regime governance, unless it exhibits the features set out in Box 3 below. Regime 
theory is not a theory of public-private partnerships, insofar as these partnerships do not 
correspond with Rhodes' definition of governance. Examination of the processes within formal 
partnership bodies provides for an evaluation of whether these bodies are generating the 
tendencies associated with regime governance or whether they are inhibiting the kind of 
networking arrangements described as 'governance' above. Given this approach, what kind of 
phenomena have been held to denote urban regimes in British political science? 
Conceptualizing Regime Governance in British Political Science 
As was argued in chapter 2, the phenomena described as 'urban regimes' in the secondary 
literature vary to a wide extent. Recent writers have been critical of this tendency among adaptors 
of regime theory (Stoker, 1995; John and Cole, 1998; Painter, 1997). The following sections 
consider different governing arrangements which have been characterised as regimes, identifying 
features whose presence could denote processes ofregime governance, the key concept developed 
in this section. 
The Distinctive Properties of Regime Governance - Interorganisational Working'and 
Partnership Longevity 
Stoker is particularly critical of what he believes to be misapplications of regime theory. He 
criticises Savitch and Thomas (199 1) for using the term 'regime' as a: 
convenient descriptive label for any political system whereas in Stone's analysis a regime is 
a particular type of long-term stable relationship between governmental and non- 
governmental partners (Stoker, 1995: 62/3). 
Stoker might also have been referring to Di Gaetano and Klemanski, whose analysis produces a 
description of 'regime' which corresponds neither in explanation, in process, nor in type, with the 
work of Elkin and Stone. They redefine Stone's notion of the regime to encompass I formal and 
informal arrangements for policy making and implementation, both across public and private 
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domains and within the public domain' (1993: 58). This application reconceptualizes urban regime 
theory to the extent that it can describe any governing arrangement, regardless of whether business 
or any other sector is involved. Di Gaetano and Klemanski broaden regime theory to encompass 
all modes of govenu-nent and governance in the UK. The 'regime' they analyse consists of 
members and officers who are split by department and interest concerning the merits of 
growth/anti-growth strategies (1993: 73/4). This condition of internecine warfare between 
departments ofthe Council is described as a'mixed pro-growth/management' regime (1993: 78). ' 
The situation described here deals neither with governance capacity building, nor imperatives to 
co-operation between state and market actors. It breaks the association between regime theory 
and the notion of 'governance' since a regime may comprise only 'government' for Di Gaetano 
and Klemanski. The cross-cutting of different concepts, government and governance, complicates 
the task of elaborating theoretical conditions for regime governance. 'Local governance' is 
commonly treated as a historically specific phenomenon stemming from the decline of the 
Keynesian Welfare State (Stoker, 1991), an era of 'local government'. 9 A conception of 
governing regimes spanning these periods would need to be based on a set of conditions other 
than, or in addition to the dynamics of organisational interdependence. The idea of a regime 
outlined by Di Gaetano and Klemanski is incommensurable with regime theory, to the extent that 
regime theory is based on analysing interdependence between organisations. " 
Peter John and Alistair Cole make a similar point in a more sophisticated account, commenting 
that attempts to broaden the range of phenomena counting as regimes have moved well beyond 
the original formulation (John and Cole, 1998: 3 86). They further comment that the involvement 
8 The situation described by Di Gaetano and Klemanski suggests the continuation of 
professionalised policy networks and the absence of strategic management (Bassett, 1996). 
It is not assumed here that such a characterisation is valid. 
10 Di Gaetano's later (1997) work on Bristol is more sensitive to the traditional 
conceptualization of regime theory and instead of characterizing the local authority as a mixed 
regime, he identifies two regimes, pro-growth and growth management, which are centred around 
different local authority departments, but also incorporate influences from outside the local 
authority. See chapter 2. 
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of business in urban politics does not, alone, amount to regime governance (1998: 3 99), but detect 
signs of an 'incipient' regime in Leeds. The main example of partnership offered is that of the 
'Leeds Initiative', formed in 1990. The Leeds Initiative consisted of an alliance between the 
Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the Training and Enterprise Council and, until it was wound 
up, the Urban Development Corporation. This initiative is described as an accommodation 
between city and business based on shared objectives (1998: 392). It is then explained that other 
public sector players also take key decisions in Leeds and suggested that the 'governing coalition' 
consists of the Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) 
and the Government Office, which was not identified as part of the Leeds Initiative. " Policy is 
said to be determined by the relations between these four groups which 'usually are in intense 
conflict' (1998: 393). This account is not clear about the importance it attached to the Leeds 
Initiative in the incipient regime. Furthermore, the series of relationships described as the 
6governing coalition' are antagonistic, not the pattern associated with regime governance, and it 
does not fit in with their own list of favourable conditions for regime formation which include 
'trust', or with the conclusion that a regime is about co-operation and exchange (John and Cole, 
1998: 388/9). Moreover, it contrasts with their description of shared objectives in the Leeds 
Initiative. We are left unclear about which actors participate in the regime, about the significance 
of business involvement and about whether the incipient regime is constituted in the formal 
partnership (the Leeds Initiative) or through wider networking processes. While the city's politics 
are said to exhibit 'regime like' politics, this conclusion is qualified by the central role identified 
for the council and for the other public sector organisations (John and Cole, 1998: 394). 
These issues highlight the need for methodological clarity. Are we seeking an explanation for 
urban partnerships as we find them in the UK and considering how far regime theory represents 
a useful conceptual standpoint for this purpose, are we considering whether urban regimes as 
conceptualised and explained in urban regime theory exist in the UK, or are we attempting to find 
ways of designating public-private partnerships as regime governance? This chapter considers 
11 As the regional adjudicator on the Single Regeneration Budget, the Government office 
stands in a hierarchical relationship with the partnership (Rhodes, 1999a: xviii). 
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first whether it is possible to identify urban partnerships which are comparable with Elkin's and 
Stone's urban regimes, and second to what extent these phenomena can be explained by drawing 
on the concepts central to regime theory. It therefore problematizes the existence of regimes, as 
Ward recommends, while speculatively outlining the abstract conditions for partnership/regime 
governance in the UK (Ward, 1997b: 1494). Based on the preceding discussion, and on that in 
chapter 2, one necessary feature of regime governance is cooperation between local government 
and other sectors, for the purposes of this study, the business sector. A second feature is strength 
and longevity in cooperative arrangements based on trust and reciprocity. These criteria are 
necessary indicators of regime governance but they are not sufficient. The next step, following 
the conceptual links made between partnership, network, governance and regime, is to consider 
the relationship between regime governance and different aspects of partnership working. 
The Distinctive Properties of Regime Governance - Formality and Informality in 
Partnership Arrangements 
Stoker (I 998b), identifies three types of partnership. He distinguishes between principal-agent 
relations, inter-organisational negotiation and systemic co-ordination. The first category involves 
purchaser-provider relationships. The second category involves negotiation andjoint project work 
between parties through the blending of capacities, which arrangement might correspond with a 
4'challenge partnership' (Oatley and Lambert, 1998). The third category goes ftuther, establishing 
a level of 'mutual understanding and embeddedness' to the extent that organisations develop a 
shared vision and joint working capacity which leads to the establishment of self-governing 
networks. It involves local autonomy, games about rules, rather than games under rules, the 
games played within challenge partnerships (Stoker, 1998a: 22). This kind ofpartnership can, as 
suggested above, be equated with governance and networking. John and Cole (1998: 3 84) point 
out on the other hand that central state inspired public-private partnerships cannot be equated with 
autonomous and localist regimes, mirroring Stone's view that a growth coalition is not the same 
thing as a governing coalition (1991: 293). 
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Competitive Tendering 
A good example of a purchaser-provider 'partnership', distinguished from the networking 
arrangements associated with regime governance, is compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
(Stoker, 1991; Clark and Stewart, 1990; Butler, 1985). The arrangements made under 
competitive tendering legislation are legally binding, formal in the sense used by Stone (1989: 
180). 12 Cooperation is induced directly through government legislation and applied coercively, 
where local arrangements are not deemed satisfactory. This relationship, then, is a combination 
of market and hierarchy, but not network (Rhodes, 1999a: xviii). If we return to Stone's fourfold 
categorisation of power (1980: 981), this is 'intentional' and 'direct' power, a decisional 
relationship associated with the first dimension of power (Dahl, 1957). In regime theory, 
cooperation is not established through command structures but through the mediation of systemic 
power, the division of labour between state and market. In this kind of partnership, the business 
sector is not a party to agenda setting, but to implementation. " The local authority is a client of 
the company delivering the service and it draws up the contract specifications based on whatever 
principles it likes, subject to statutory limitations. In regime theory, the interests of the private 
sector are articulated at the level of policy and project fon-nulation. Finally, in contract 
. arrangements, service delivery does not require the interdependence of public and private 
resources and nor does it generate governance outcomes hitherto unobtainable by other means. 
CCT is about subjecting local authority services to competition, not about generating governing 
capacity. " 
12 The rules for competitive tendering have been changed since May 1997. Local 
authorities are now under an obligation to provide 'best value'. This concept marginally weakens 
the pre-disposition in the previous legislation requiring local authorities to award contracts to the 
lowest bidder (DETR, 30.7.98). 
13 This is not to deny the role of 'street level bureaucrats, in policy development. 
However, regime analysis prescribes a necessary role for the private sector in influencing policy. 
14 Unless 'efficiency savings' are construed as governance capacity. 
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The Challenge Partnership 
The question of regeneration partnerships is less straightforward (Malpass, 1994; Stewart, 1994). 
Stoker (I 998a) characterises the relationships in these bodies as interorganisational. negotiation. 
Are there conditions under which such partnerships, formal in character, could indicate regime 
governance? A partnership organisation which exists solely as a response to challenge ftmd 
opportunities, even if it does not indicate command power between agents, cannot be said to 
exhibit the characteristics ofregime governance. It must demonstrate a concern with other issues, 
with sharing local resources to achieve local objectives which are not subject to a contract 
arrangement with central government or other funding body, like the European Union. In other 
words, it must exhibit autonomy from higher governmental authorities and it must show evidence 
of local governance capacity (DoE, February, 1995, April 1995; DETR, 10.9.98). " In challenge 
fund partnerships, there may be no such dependence properly so-called, but rather a paper 
commitment to work together to obtain the resources provided by central government (Davies, 
1996). 16 The concept of leverage is a useful illustration of this point. As Berger and Foster show, 
the USA and the UK apply different definitions to the concept of leverage. 
The concept of leverage in the United States goes much further than in the UK. In the US 
the first level is the leveraging of the pool of loan capital or seed money with which to 
initiate the redevelopment activity in a given area. The second level of leverage is the 
project investment stimulated by the availability of the seed capital. The final level is the 
spin-off and the ancillary development or what the Americans call the "critical mass of 
revitalisation" in the area (1982: 40). 
Private sector investment,, as a response to seed capital or infrastructural investment, is the key 
measurement of leverage applied by Government in its economic regeneration programmes (DoE, 
13.6.95; Davies, 1996). This aspect of leverage is not governance capacity ofthe kind anticipated 
in regime theory. Regime governance generates business resources not only in the form of 
reactive inward investment, but also in the form of pro-active 'seed money' necessary for the 
project to proceed in the first place, for example, a Bond issue. This kind of investment would 
be indicative of resource dependence between agents and of local governance capacity. 
15 This question is pursued further in defining 'added value" in chapter 4. 
16 - r- - See below for a discussion of how interfaces in a challenge ftind partnership may be 
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Harding poses the question of whether networks are more important than, or determine the 
success of, partnership institutions (1996c: 3). In examining the extent to which partnerships 
correspond with the characteristics of regime governance in the case studies, sight is not lost of 
the fact that formal institutions may generate, or be underpinned and sustained by, networks. This 
perspective leaves open to empirical analysis whether regime governance exists only in informal 
networks, or also in institutionalised partnerships. It is here assumed both that governance by 
network and governance through formal partnerships may, provided that the latter form exhibits 
the properties indicated in Box 3, indicate regime governance. Further, the visibility of 
institutionalised partnerships, whether or not these partnerships indicate the characteristics of 
regime governance, does not exclude the possibility that influential networking, characterised by 
'invisible factors' such as 'trust' and 'reciprocity' (Morgan et al, 1999: 193) may represent the 
key to processes of local governance. To identify a regime, then, is not just to identify the 
properties in a partnership but to identify regularity in the influence of key groups or individuals 
across a period of time. It is, as John and Cole say, to identify a form of decision making which 
extends way beyond particular initiatives and which may extend beyond particular policy arenas. 
Regime governance can be summan , sed as 'interorganisational, sustained, coordinative and 
empowering' (John and Cole, 1998: 387). The properties set out in Box 3 incorporate these 
principles and serve at the same time as a reminder of the main characteristics of the governing 
regime characterised by Elkin and Stone. These properties are treated as indicative of a process 
of governance, which may emerge in certain conditions (John and Cole, 199 8: 3 87), not just as 
a set of institutional arrangements. The. contra-indicators column provides a representation of 
governing arrangements which do not exhibit any of the properties associated with regime 
governance. The properties discussed above may, of course, be exhibited to a greater or lesser 
extent in a range ofpartnership activities. They represent a useful point ofdeparture against which 
the resemblance of particular partnerships to regime governance can be assessed and, where 
appropriate,, counterposed. This, then, is a question for empirical analysis. 
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The Theoretical Contribution of Adapted Urban Regime Theories 
While it is important to be clear about the characteristics of regime governance, a broader 
objective of this chapter is to determine how far urban regime theory constitutes a useful 
conceptual framework for understanding the exogenous and endogenous dynamics which explain 
urban partnerships. Regime theory, while it does not preclude command relationships in 
partnerships, cannot explain them. Conversely, it is possible that regime governance is produced 
by different explanatory variables to those identified in regime theory. Regime type governance 
may not, in itself, indicate a tension between liberalism and democracy as its explanation. This 
section, therefore, examines theoretical issues arising from the process of adapting regime theory 
to the different political and institutional context represented by the UK. The final section 
considers potential explanatory variables which might account for various partnership types, 
including regime governance. 
Comparing and Integrating Theoretical Approaches 
Pickvance draws on Galtung's (1967) work concerning the co-existence of theories, arguing that 
it is sometimes necessary to choose between them (Pickvance, 1995: 273). Theoretical 
inconsistency can, he says, only be avoided if theories which address different levels of analysis 
nest' inside each other. This approach necessitates a distinction between levels of analysis in the 
development of multi-theoretical models. The idea, for example, of a policy transfer network 
illustrates this distinction insofar as the existence of the network is explained by the transfer 
process (Evans and Davies, 1999). The logical corollary of this position is that to the extent any 
two theories which operate at the same level of analysis differ in accounting for the phenomena 
they seek to explain, they are incommensurable. A necessary starting point for integrating policy 
network analysis and policy transfer analysis is that agreement can be achieved as to which 
"causes' which. With respect to these two particular approaches, there are no mivanant factors 
which preclude either proposition. In part, ofcourse, the question is empirical. But insofar as one 
is making theoretical generalizations about events which draw on both approaches, a causal 
relationship, indeterminate or otherwise, should be stipulated. Purposive theoretical integration 
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can be justified analytically through exposition of this kind. It may be described as integration 
without convergence. 
David Marsh (I 995b) shows how three major paradigms of twentieth century political science; 
Pluralism, Marxism and elite theory have converged, he argues, toward the territory occupied by 
elite theory. He demonstrates that this process has occurred through a series of intellectual 
compromises in which the foundational propositions in each theory have been qualified. Hence, 
for example, he shows that Marxists from the time of Gramsci have sought to break Marxism from 
the 'grip' of economism and class reductionism and that in doing so they remove many of the 
suppositions which differentiated it fundamentally from other perspectives. While it cannot be said 
that pluralism, Marxism and elitism are now indistinguishable, Marsh believes that they now differ 
less in essentials than in emphasis. So 'pluralists' emPhasise agency and 'Marxists' emphasise 
structure (Marsh, 1995b: 28 1) but neither tradition tends to take a determinate position on the 
relationship between the two. The consequence of this change is that choices between them need 
not be based on foundational positions. 
This debate is relevant to comparative adaptations of regime theory and the discussions which 
follow counterpose theoretical convergence and theoretical integration, suggesting that integration 
permits greater clarity of perspective, facilitating comparison between distinctive theoretical 
positions. The objective is to show that where different theories are treated as commensurable 
without indicating, as Pickvance puts it, where choices have to be made, or have been made 
between them, explanatory power is weakened. The following discussions consider the 
relationship between the growth machine model and urban regime theory and between urban 
regime theory and policy network anslysis. 
Growth Machines and Urban Regimes 
Space does not permit full account to be taken of the growth machine model developed by Logan 
and Molotch (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987,1996). It has been the subject of fewer 
comparative studies than regime theory (but see for example, Lloyd and Newlands, 1988), possibly 
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because it is seen by some as deterministic, whereas regime formation is tendential or contingent, 
lending the framework additional flexibility (Lawless, 1994: 1318). Wood (1996: 1283), on the 
other hand criticises the growth machine literature as 'voluntaristic'. He views it as being about 
the way in which elite material interests are realised by economic agents, while, in comparison, he 
says, regime theory is about the way coalitions produce and re-produce governing capacity. 17 
Unlike regime theory, growth machine analysis is therefore based on an individualistic account of 
elite action. For Logan and Molotch, the activism of entrepreneurs is the critical force shaping 
the urban system, explaining the 'rise' and 'fall' ofparticular urban systems and the dominance of 
entrepreneurial politics (1996: 293). '[G]rowth is the result of the usurpation of political control 
by unrepresentative land based local elites and is the source of their continuing coherence as a 
power bloc' (Molotch, 1976: 349). Molotch's perspective is, furthermore, much closer to that 
of Marxism than regime theory and he cites the work of Marxist geographer David Harvey (1973) 
favourably. Thus, a form of command power is invoked in contrast to the conceptualization of 
systemic and pre-emptive power developed by Stone (1980,1988,1989). Molotch's work on 
growth machines predates and, to an extent inspired regime theory (Stone, 1989: 175). But Stone 
himself views Logan and Molotch as elite theorists in their emphasis on the part played by private 
elites involved in land use decisions (Stone, 1990: 224). Regime theory can, therefore, be 
regarded as a reconceptualization ofthis approach, as part ofthe neo-pluralist reaction to Marxism 
and as an attempt to sensitise it to the perceived centrality of interorganisational co-operation in 
achieving governance outputs. 
Alan Harding's work has been especially concerned with the applicability of these literatures for 
the analysis of urban coalitions. " He acknowledges the conceptual foundations of growth 
machine analysis in elite theory and of regime theory in neo-pluralism. (Harding, 1995,1996; 
1995). However, he tends, on occasion, to use the terms interchangeably. Referring to perceived 
weaknesses in Logan and Molotch, Harding argues: 
17 The literature is viewed as 'deterministic" in its prediction of outcomes and 
f- voluntaristic" in its dePendence on elite activity. 
18 See Harding (1991,1994,1995,1996ab, 1997). 
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Regime theory offers a way around these apparent contradictions by allowing for the fact 
that the growth machine model ... 
is only one form of regime amongst others (1996: 12). 
Thus, the growth machine may be treated as a type of regime governance. Logan and Molotch 
identify similar phenomena to those in Elkin and Stone, business domination ofurban policy based 
on the ob ective of raising land values (1996: 292). The entrepreneurial urban regime and the 
growth machine are commensurable as governance outcomes. 19 Yet to draw this conclusion says 
nothing about the explanatory value of either approach, in particular the role of collaboration and 
pre-emption in regime theory and that of elite activism and domination in growth machine analysis. 
To treat the growth machine as a type of regime is a form of convergence, rather than integration 
by synthesis, since these basic causal propositions, as stated, are incommensurable and no means 
of bridging this incommensurability is offered. 
It would be unreasonable to generate a critique of Harding on this basis, given his 
acknowledgement of the conceptual differences between the two approaches and given that 
theoretical precision is not critical to his project. Nevertheless, the example is illustrative of a 
problem in comparing, integrating and adapting different theoretical approaches. Harding, 
however, points toward a potential solution to this problem. He draws neither on elitism nor neo- 
pluralism for his hypotheses, but on a model of globalization derived from regulation theory. " 
Recent scholars have asked (Ward, 1996) and attempted to answer (Lauria, 1997, Painter, 1997), 
the question of whether regime theory is commensurable with, and might fi-uitfidly be integrated 
with, regulation theory. Regulation theory expresses the interdependence between the regime of 
accumulation and the mode of regulation, necessary in the regulationist approach, through the 
claim that the technological innovations enabling the globalization of production processes have 
led to a high level of dependence at the national level on international trade flows, rendering 
19 Although it is recognised that regime theory allows for greater flexibility in type - 
witness Elkin's and Stone's typologies. 
20 Regulation theory derives, in part, from Althusserian Marxism (Althusser, 1979). See 
Aglietta (1979). Boyer (1990), Jessop (1990) Mayer (1994). 
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nationally based interventionist economic strategies ineffective (Harding, 1996b: 649). 2' The 
effects ofthis globalization have been two-fold: economic aggregation in the form ofthe European 
Union at the supranational level; and delegation ofpowers and responsibilities for economic policy 
to the sub-national level (Harding, 1994: 370). Together with the abandonment of Keynesianism 
and the squeeze on local authority finance, increased responsibility for economic development has 
led to 'a pronounced tendency toward coalition formation between local actors and agencies in 
this field in order to compete with other urban areas for globally mobile capital investment' 
(Harding, 1996b: 649-50). Globalization and economic restructuring have, therefore, resulted in 
a global-local 'dialectic' in which, to a greater or a lesser extent, the national state is becoming 
marginal (Harding and Le Gales, 1995). 22 
It is plausible that as a theory according relative autonomy to economic and ideological variables, 
regulation theory could be used to synthesize the different emphases in regime theory and in the 
growth machine approach, which boils down to the question ofhow far political processes matter. 
To achieve this synthesis, however, a theoretical exposition would be required. The relationship 
between regime theory and regulation theory has been discussed in a volume edited by Mickey 
Lauria (1997). Contributions to this debate have found little favour with Stone (1998a), who 
regards himself as influenced more by Weber than by the regulation school. This is unsurprising 
since regime theory is a critical departure from the kind of Marxism which generated regulation 
theory. To integrate the two approaches would require a reconceptualization of the dynamics 
driving the process of local governance. For regulation theorists, each mode of regulation can be 
effective only for a limited period, before it is undermined by its own crisis tendencies (Boyer, 
1990; Painter, 1996: 2). Thus, however much it mitigates the crisis tendencies identified by Marx 
(Boyer, 1990), regulation theory contains an inherent concept of crisis which cannot simply be 
fused with regime theory, whose normative claims depend on the sustainability of the market 
21 Simply put, production processes are the regime ofaccumulation, while governmental 
strategies are the mode of social regulation. 
22 This claim is a hypothesis in Harding's work, which his later empirical work tends to 
undermine. See chapter I 
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economy. The main difference between regime theory and regulation theory lies not in the rational 
choice basis of the former, (Elster, 1989; Painter, 1997), but in its conceptualizations of the state- 
market division and governance as social production, and in its commitment to the market 
economy at the centre of a Commercial Republic. 
This discussion demonstrates the need for both distinction and linkage between the appearance 
of regime governance and regime theory. On one hand, emphasis is placed on distinguishing 
partnership formations of which only particular kinds can legitimately be referred to as regimes. 
Yet at the same time, to observe an entrepreneurial urban regime can also be to observe a growth 
machine. It is therefore the explanation for the phenomenon which lends regime theory its 
distinctiveness, as much as its focus on process and outcome. Theories which predict similar 
phenomena are not necessarily commensurable at the explanatory level. The next section draws 
on the work of Stoker and Mossberger (1994), who have reconceptualized regime theory, arguing 
that it can throw light on processes of local governance in the UK. 
Urban Regime Theory and Policy Network Analysis 
At the beginning of this chapter, the concepts of partnership, network, governance and regime 
were compared. Partnership, as discussed above, is a concept which describes a wide range of 
public-private interfaces, whereas governance by network, as described by Rhodes (1996), is a 
specific form of partnership working. Regime governance of the kind discussed in Dallas and 
Atlanta conforms closely in kind to this concept of networking. How, then, does regime theory 
relate to Policy network analysis as developed by Marsh and by Rhodes (1992)? Stoker and 
Mossberger (1994) provide a basis for the discussion ofthis issue, considering how regime theory 
can be used to generate an adapted model of local governance in the UK. They seek to overcome 
ethnocentricity in regime theory, developing a typology of urban regimes: organic, instrumental 
and symbolic to categorise local governance (1994: 199-200). Five explanatory elements are 
identified affecting the process of regime building: purpose, motivation of participants, sense of 
common purpose, quality of coalition, and the local relationship with the wider political 
environment (1994: 200-208). The character of the regime arises from the combination of these 
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elements. An organic regime is defined by uniformity of interest, conservatism and exclusivity. 
Instrumental regimes, most commonly established for developmental purposes, are practical in 
nature, characterised by an orientation toward project realisation . 
2' The symbolic regime may 
consist of actors with a low congruence of interest and it may be characterised by the presence of 
conflict. Common purpose in the symbolic regime is based on the perceived need for a new image 
in cities wishing to change direction. The objective of economic growth is mediated by a sense 
of 'value' based upon the chosen identity of the city. The principles to underpin future economic 
growth strategies are drawn from this'image'of the city (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994: 200-20 1). 
Stoker argues that the utility of regime theory lies in its contribution to understanding the variety 
of responses to urban change (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994: 196-199). He also recognises 
similarities between regime theory and policy network analysis. Benson describes a policy 
network as: 
a cluster of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and 
distinguished from other clusters of complexes by breaks in the structure of resource 
dependencies (Benson, cited in Rhodes, 1990: 304). 
Stoker (1995: 59) invests regime theory and network theory with the same basic proposition 
concerning capacity building: 
The network approach, like regime analysis, sees effective action as flowing from the 
cooperative efforts of different interests and organizations. Cooperation is obtained, and 
subsequently sustained, through the establishment of relations promised on solidarity, 
loyalty, trust and mutual support rather than through hierarchy or bargaining. 
The link is also apparent at the level of typology. The Rhodes and Marsh concept of a tight-knit 
policy community resembles the exclusive and homogenous organic regime. The issue network 
on the other hand, with its inclusive and diverse range of interests resembles the symbolic regime 
(Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 25 1). Stoker compares 'competitive agreement' within a symbolic 
regime with differing priorities within an 'issue network' (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994: 206). 
Both the issue network and the symbolic regime are characterised by an absence of common 
understanding and the presence ofconflict. This regime typology is, therefore, broadly analogous 
23 Stoker and Mossberger identify this type as the regime described by Stone in Atlanta. 
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with the continuum in policy network analysis. In explanatory terms, interdependence is the 
underlying dynamic, driving different elements in the locality to co-operate in the production of 
governance. As in Elkin and Stone, politics matter in mediating this interdependence, producing 
the variety of responses set out in the typology. 
What is the thinking behind this approach? First, it is argued that the contribution of regime 
theory lies at the meso level of analysis, again like that of network theory (Stoker and Mossberger, 
1994: 199). It is also argued that cross-national variation necessitates a framework abstract 
enough to encompass many cases (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994: 200). That is, it requires the 
conceptual amelioration of difference. With regard to the first point, the exposition of regime 
theory in chapter 2 shows that the scope of regime theory, while it is not a grand narrative, has 
r- 
- 
far greater explanatory and normative commitment than network analysis. They are not strictly 
comparable in this regard. In relation to the second point, as an endeavour which seeks to 
highlight arenas of similarity, the approach isjust as valid as that undertaken here, to consider how 
far regime theory can categorise and explain local government-business sector partnerships. The 
issue at stake here is whether, in compromising theoretical specificity, divesting regime theory of 
its ethnocentricity, Stoker and Mossberger retain distinctive elements from within regime theory. 
The remainder of this section considers this question. 
Stoker and Mossberger (1994: 207) acknowledge the point made by Stoker and Orr (1994) that 
tensions may be so great that no sustainable regime can emerge . 
2' The 'discovery' of regime 
governance is not, says Stoker, the point of regime analysis (Stoker, 1995: 66). However, the 
breadth of the typology, sacrificing specificity for comparability, encourages the classification of 
a wide range of governing arrangements as regimes, rather than encouraging consideration, first 
24 One possible distinguishing feature is that the typology is not oriented on Policy 
arenas. The typology could incorporate the argument put by Bassett (1996: 552), that regime 
theory is about the analysis of continuous, horizontal links between policy arenas, where the 
organic regime would represent harmony and the symbolic regime conflict, between different 
policy networks. 
25 See chapter 2. 
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and foremost, of whether regime governance exists in the UK. It was argued in the first part of 
this chapter that the specificity of regime theory as a theory of networking lies in the nature of the 
explanations it provides. The explanatory potential of regime theory lies in the variables which 
distinguish it from the broad assumption in network theory concerning the interdependence of 
resources. The emphasis on the production of different governance types in Stoker's and 
Mossberger's typology of regime construction, therefore, underplays the issue of who benefits 
from this kind of governance and why. A key normative and theoretical component of regime 
theory for Harding (1994: 363), this question is not addressed by Stoker and Mossberger in 
developing their typology. 
Policy network analysis therefore differs from Elkin's and Stone's regime theory in two important 
respects. It predicts a wide range of phenomena, the issue network being incompatible with the 
process normally recognised as regime governance. Second, the networks described in regime 
theory are produced by a range of extra-local variables based on a neo-pluralist analysis of liberal 
democratic society. Regime theory, like policy network analysis, is a theory of interorganisational 
governance, of mutual resource dependence. To this extent, they are closely related. However, 
regime theory is a specialised aspect of network theory, making specific explanatory claims, 
predicting not only interactions between local government and other groups, but patterns in those 
interactions which tend to favour business and economic development over other groups and 
objectives. The purpose here is not to criticise the endeavour of adapting regime theory to explain 
public-private partnerships, but the absence, as Ward puts it, of analogous pre-conditions for 
regime formation (Ward, 1997b: 1494) beyond the all encompassing concept of interdependence. 
Elkin and Stone identify a set of variables which account both for the interdependence of 
organisations and for the characteristics of the relationship between organisations. Stoker and 
Mossberger do not undertake this task and, while there is nothing inherently wrong in not doing 
so, it is noteworthy that their endeavour places them in closer alliance with policy network analysis 
than with urban regime theory. It is arguable that in highlighting interdependence as the core 
variable in British and American local governance processes, those aspects ofregime theory which 
distinguish it from network analysis have been obscured. 
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The foregoing discussion is not, therefore, addressed in any pejorative sense to the value of the 
Stoker and Mossberger typology, or to the factors to which outcomes are attributed. Rather, it 
is claimed that elements of the typology are incompatible with the concept of regime governance, 
as it is understood in chapter 2, and that it is not underpinned by explanatory variables 
corresponding with those set out by Elkin and Stone . 
2' Richer explanations for the range of 
partnerships indicated in the typology may not be commensurable with regime theory, but that 
prospect makes the comparison of causal mechanisms all the more interesting and begs the 
question ofwhether similar network types in different countries can be explained using a common 
explanatory framework which goes beyond the general claims made in policy network analysis. 
In summary, Stoker and Mossberger ask: given the necessity of interorganisational collaboration 
for local governance to occur in different political systems, what kind of governing regimes do we 
see, exhibiting which internal dynamics? In this study, it is asked first; what factors might generate 
collaboration between local government and the business sector; second,, to the extent that such 
collaboration occurs, what kind ofpartnership arrangements have developed with which dynamics; 
and third, can the answers to these questions be aligned with the concept of regime governance, 
based on the characterisation developed by Elkin and Stone? The following sections proceed to 
examine the variables which could, potentially, generate interdependence between local 
government and the business sector in the UK. Consideration is given to the question of how far 
these variables, set out in Box 4 at the end of the chapter, are commensurable with those set out 
in regime theory. 
Conditions for Partnership and Regime Governance in the UK 
The following sections examine a range of potential explanations for the emergence of 
partnerships in the UK and for the potential emergence of regime governance, as outlined above. 
Both exogenous and endogenous variables are considered in relation to the question of why 
partnership working has become common. It is suggested that while exogenous variables have 
26 Such an explanation might, in principle, claim that extra-local variables do not affect 
partnership working. 
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undoubtedly proved to be powerful in influence, regime governance can only emerge from 
partnerships if strong endogenous variables drive the process. 
Comparing Systemic Factors: The UK and the USA 
Chapter 2 shows that a division of labour between state and market lies at the core of regime 
theory. There is nothing immediately ethnocentric in this analysis, which Elkin argues is 
characteristic of liberal democracies (I 985b: 18 1). The UK, like the USA, is a liberal democracy 
in which substantial resources are concentrated in the hands of the private sector. It is clear, 
however, that the interface between state and market differs in the UK. Critics and adaptors of 
regime theory correctly point out that local government resources in the UK are constituted 
differently from those in the USA. The unitary system of government in the UK and the federal 
system in the US create very different intergovernmental contexts for urban governance (Di 
Gaetano, 1997: 849; Kantor et al, 1997: 35 1). Central govenunent grants of one kind and another 
continue to account for a much higher percentage of local government expenditure than revenue 
raised directly from the business community or from the Council Tax (Harding, 1994: 365). Local 
government in the UK cannot be said in any direct sense to be dependent on private sector 
resources to fund its core activities. John shows how total recurrent local authority spending is 
made up almost entirely of government grant and council tax revenues (1997: 25 8). It is thus far 
more insulated- from the direct material pressures which regulate the city-business interface in 
American urban politics. Systemic power is not, therefore, reflected at the urban scale in the way 
it is in the USA through fiscal dependence. If this form of systemic power is realised in the UK, 
it is at a different spatiality of governance. If, on the other hand, interdependence between local 
authority and business, and/or bias in favour of a growth agenda, can be detected in processes of 
local governance, these factors must be attributable to different causes. The state-market division 
is not a useful concept to explain such interdependence as occurs between public and private 
sectors at the local level in the UK. 
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Local Government Finance 
Lawless (1991: 15) argues that governments elected since 1979 have tended, in real terms, to 
reduce the scale of central government support to local government, while restricting the ability 
of local authorities to acquire funds from elsewhere. Is it plausible that reductions in local 
government expenditure through cuts in grant, together with community charge/council tax 
capping, may have pushed local authorities, who wish to maintain service levels into seeking 
partnerships with business in order to ameliorate resource reductions. Pickvance (1991: 56), 
however, shows how the Labour Government between 1976 and 1979 succeeded in reversing the 
growth of local government expenditure to a much greater extent than did the first term of the 
Thatcher administration. Cuts in local authority resources were, it is arguable, greater in the late 
1970s than throughout the 1980s or the 1990s so far. Why, then, did local authorities not adopt 
partnership strategies in response to earlier financial cutbacks? Or did they, as approaches 
emphasising continuity suggest they might have (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, Shaw, 1993, Stanyer, 
1999)? It is equally plausible that there is no direct link between the level of local authority 
resources and partnership formation. This claim would tend to be supported by analyses which 
see the growth of public-private partnership mainly as a phenomenon of the 1980s (Barnekov et 
al. 1989; Bassett, 1996; Hastings, 1996) stimulated by various central government policy 
initiatives associated with 'Thatcherism'. Harding's study of five EuroPean cities, including 
Manchester, concludes that in no cases have coalitions been triggered by the fact that there would 
otherwise be a detrimental effect on the core business of local government (1996c: 5). He is 
supported by Levine, who argues of France, that the competitive pressures for development derive 
more from a concern about the preservation ofjobs and for a healthy economy than from concern 
for budget integrity (1994: 406). 
Conversely, why would business be pre-disposed to provide or finance local authority services, 
save through the contractual mechanisms associated with tendering? It is feasible that in policy 
areas where business perceives that it has a direct interest in the maintenance of a service, cut 
backs could stimulate a willingness to pay, through local taxation, more toward infrastructural 
costs associated with policy arenas such as transportation. In part, this is the debate occurring 
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around the question of the local business rate and the duty upon local authorities to consult 
business on supplementary levies (DETR, 30.7.98). In the pilot study for this project, the CBI 
expressed a lukewarm interest in the idea of a hypothecated business levy, involving ringfenced 
business contributions to local authorities which could only be spent on infrastructural projects 
of benefit to private enterprise (CBI, 21.8.95). Ultimately, business rate payers will not be allowed 
to block the setting of a rate. Thus, while arrangements of this kind could go some way to 
establishing local coalitions rooted in trust, in themselves, they would be indicative of command 
power, notwithstanding the duty of the local authority to consult. Finally, research on what real 
benefits business representatives bring to partnerships is limited (Bailey et al, 1995: 10). Even 
given a broad definition of 'resources', it is questionable whether businesses are able or willing to 
deliver sufficient goods to ameliorate reductions in local authority services. 
Global Economic Forces and the Locality 
In Elkin and Stone, the potential for state intervention in the market place is not discussed in great 
detail, given the normative commitment in regime theory to a market economy. 27 However, the 
twin notions ofcapital mobility and spatial capital dependence are recognised, particularly by Elkin 
(1987a: 32-42). Both elements constitute important dynamics to regime formation for local 
authority and locally dependent business alike. Cox and Mair(1989,1991) go further, arguingthat 
local dependence, the contradictions between mobile and immobile capital, should be invoked as 
. LI_ - uac key explanatory tool for coalition formation, rather than the state-market analogy. These 
elements are important dimensions of the globalization debate (see Cerny, 1996). Cox, for 
example, identifies a 'struggle of territorially organised populations' competing for inward 
investment by mobile capital (1995: 216). Thus, spatial identity, rather than class, status, gender 
or race represents the primary cleavage in globalizing society. Mayer argues that: 
[Local political systems, with their skills in negotiating with supraregional and multinational 
capital, in the effectiveness with which they tailor the particular set of local conditions of 
production, have become decisive factors in shaping a city's profile as well as its place in 
the international urban hierarchy (1994: 3 17). 
27 One or two means of ameliorating business pre-eminence are identified, but the 
implications of these measures for the market economy are not discussed. 
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From an even more extreme perspective, Reich argues that in the era of globalization, national 
economy will have no meaning other than as short hand for the collective power of various sub- 
national production processes in the world market (Reich, 1991 cited in Harding and Le Gales, 
1997: 182). 
Alan Harding's analysis of globalization and urban coalition formation which develops these 
themes has already been discussed above. Harding's basic contention is that developments in the 
global economy have resulted directly in the emergence of phenomena which he describes as 
growth coalitions. In other words, economic forces have had a direct impact on local authorities 
and businesses, pre-disposing them to co-operate in the quest for mobile capital investment. At 
least two hypotheses can be derived from Harding's work. The first is that coalitions may be 
6caused' by government programmes imported from the US as a response to global pressures on 
the national state. " The second hypothesis is that these global pressures act directly on the 
locality 'causing' the emergence of urban coalitions. Characterised as such, global economic 
pressures may be identified as an explanatory variable. This variable would be realised at the local 
scale in terms of capital mobility/dependence on a particular area and the degree to which this 
factor pressures the local authority into partnership working with the private sector and vice versa. 
Central, then, to globalization orthodoxy is the notion that markets are increasingly powerftd in 
relation to states by virtue of globalizing production/capital and that the urban partnership/regime 
can be argued to be a competitive territorial response to such empowerment. If local governments 
are empowered by national governments to undertake economic development functions, they may 
be dis-empowered, as democratic institutions, by virtue of having to exercise these functions in 
cooperation with and on behalf of business interests. 
28 It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that 'policy transfer' has been claimed as 
an important explanation for changes in urban policy during the 1980s and 1990s. The relevance 
of government programmes to partnership formation is discussed further below. However, the 
sources from which such programmes may have been inspired is beyond the scope of this study 
which examines the impact of variables on the locality, rather than on the national state. 
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Harding's empirical work casts doubt on the extreme elements in this perspective, which he 
considers too general and unsuited to the analysis of European cities. The nature of the link 
posited between economic globalization and cities is questioned (Harding, 1996b, 1997; Harding 
and Le Gales, 1998). Given this scepticism, it is worth considering how the business sector and 
the local authority respectively might be driven directly by the pressures of globalization into 
partnership activity with the other. 
Business and Globalization 
The 'global-localization' hypothesis suggests that amorphous macroeconomic and macro technical 
developments result in an unspecified fashion in pressure toward urban partnership formation. 
One can see from Elkin and Stone why locally dependent businesses might respond to increased 
capital mobility through forming territorial alliances with local authorities and other local agents. 
Businesses in a market economy necessarily face whatever competitive pressures are generated 
by economic globalization. Continued inward investment may be vital to their prosperity, though 
local capital institutions, such as banks, are not place dependent in the UK as they are in the US 
(Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). It is also plausible that residual local capital may seek to reverse 
the effects of economic decline and the collapse of markets through collaboration with their local 
authorities. To the extent that local businesses can be said to benefit from new inward investment, 
they may have an interest in collaborating with place marketing Projects aimed at stimulating local 
growth. " However, the idea of local interdependence generated through the impact of global 
economic forces is plausible and it is compatible with the variable identified by Elkin. It may thus 
represent a dynamic to regime governance, a bottom-up response to systemic (situational and 
indirect) pressures. The extent to which certain businesses may rely on partnership with local 
government to improve their competitive position is therefore treated as an empirical question. 
29 However, as in the USA (Molotch, 1976),, inward investment may also be catastrophic 
for local businesses. The impact of hypermarkets, on small retailers in Cardiff is indicative ofthis 
point (Imrie et al, 1995). See chapter 2. 
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LocalAuthority and Globalization 
It is less obvious, however, why local authorities might respond directly to economic globalization 
either by partnership building or in a more passive sense by adopting a growth agenda, unless in 
response to a perceived effect of globalization, relative economic decline. 30 It is one thing to 
suggest, like Harding (1994,1996b) and others quoted above, that globalization ofproduction and 
capital is causing economic aggregation at the sUPranational level and a delegation ofpowers and 
responsibilities for economic development policy from the national to the subnational level 
(Harding, 1994a: 370). It is another to argue that this delegation empowers the local authority 
or necessitates its participation in partnerships with business around growth objectives. There is 
no direct material incentive for the local authority to do so, of the kind evident in regime theory. 
The power to undertake economic development projects is not the same thing as the compulsion, 
and, moreover, to do so on terms favoured by local business. Is it possible to observe the direct 
impact of economic globalization on local authority attitudes to partnership? The literature which 
presupposes such an impact does not identify mediating mechanisms, economic, political or 
ideological, to demonstrate and account for it. It is not clear, for example, which economic 
factors or institutional arrangements might render local authorities in Britain materially sensitive 
to global economic factors, given that local authority activities do not depend for sustenance on 
the economic capacities within their geographical areas. 
Harding recognises this difficulty, emphasizing the need to hypothesize precisely how the 
formation ofeconomic development coalitions might have been encouraged by globalizing factors: 
What needs to be assessed is the way these factors affect the motivation of local 
governments to be sensitive to the relative buoyancy oftheir local economy and to compete 
with other authorities for new economic activities and whatever supports them (1996: 16). 
Harding's conclusion about Manchester, one of five European cities studied, is that networks and 
institutions concerned with economic development lack the 'gravitas' of the classical growth 
machine and urban regime. 
30 It is possible to distinguish in regime theory between intentional collaboration in the 
form of regime governance and the tendency of local officials to 'prefer' developmental agendas. 
The latter does not require the former, although the former may be encompassed. 
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It is not, however, assumed here that in the absence of material stimulus, local authorities will 
display indifference to the state ofthe economy. It is feasible and, indeed, likely that they will seek 
in whatever way they feel able to ameliorate dereliction and poverty, factors which weigh heavily 
in a negative sense on local authority budgets. Given the move toward economic development 
activities, place marketing for inward investment is one way this might be achieved and global 
economic factors might, conceivably, require local authorities to engage in 'competitive' 
behaviour, in collaboration with local business, to obtain it, given a decline in the influence of 
national states. Hall and Hubbard (1996) argue that the ideology of globalization may be more 
important to local elites than the fact. They suggest that political actors are becoming aware of 
competition with other places for mobile capital, but argue that it is the belief in this trend which 
makes it true. They further argue that globalization theorists seriously overgeneralize the mobility 
of capital at different scales. It is the possibility, therefore, not the actuality of 'hypermobile' 
capital investment which is, they say, providing the impetus to 'entrepreneurial' local government 
(1996,159/60). In this scenario it cannot be argued that globalization has a direct material impact 
on the local authority. Rather, it might perceive a decline in inward investment and in economic 
and social vitality, responding in ways. determined by local political and ideological views about 
globalization. 
In summary, the question asked here is whether, directly or indirectly, economic globalization 
affects local authority sensitivities, at the same time predisposing it to try and build alliances with 
business groups to ameliorate economic problems. A project on this scale cannot undertake an 
exhaustive study of the ways in which globalization has a direct and an indirect impact on local 
political practices. Rather, consideration is limited to the question of how far local partnerships 
are engaged in competition for inward investment and on how important the interface between 
locality and global corporation proves to be in decisions concerning inward investment. The 
question tackled is not, therefore, how important is globalization, but rather the more manageable 
issue ofwhether there is evidence of a global-local dialectic in the procurement of mobile capital. 
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Urban Policy as a Stimulus to Partnership 
There is a sizable literature, highlighted above, discussing the way in which urban policy has 
promoted multi-sectoral partnerships (Lawless, 1981,1991; Robson et al, 1994; Bailey et al, 
1995; Hastings, 1996; Oatley, 1998). This section focuses on the potential causal effects of 
government policy on the development of regeneration partnerships. A more detailed exposition 
of government approaches to urban policy, insofar as it relates to the partnerships under study, 
is given in chapter 4. This section focusses on the debate as seen through the eyes of those 
utilising regime theory. 
Using the language of regulation theory, Ward suggests that regimes in Britain represent a locally 
mediated, nationally prescribed response to the 'fordist institutional crisis' (I 997a: 18 8).. Regimes 
result, he argues, from the top-down policies of privatism associated with the conservative 
government's neo liberal agenda. National programmes, such as the Single Regeneration Budget 
(Stewart, 1994) and a variety ofEU programmes, provide the context in which regime governance 
can emerge. " This idea accords with the view expressed by Harding (1991,1994,19951,1996b), 
that the borrowing of urban programmes by the British government from the US may have 
stimulated coalition building. Rather than direct interdependence between public and private 
sectors, we have dependence on funding from government programmes, requiring local 
government to seek cooperation with business groups, a perspective suggestive not of growth 
coalitions, but of 'grant' coalitions (Cochrane, 1999: 119). Government action is, in turn, a 
response to the pressures ofeconomic globalization. It is thus a bridging, or intermediate variable. 
Ward questions whether the stimulus of intergovernmental funding is sufficient to ensure 'real' 
regime formation (I 997b: 1495). In this sense, the characterization ofthe partnership phenomena 
produced in response to these funding mechanisms is problematised, leading to the question of 
whether partnerships are likely to occur'naturally', without this or other external stimulus. Either 
way, it is arguable that the process of bidding was significant in shifting recalcitrant political 
attitudes to the central government imposed agenda of partnership (Oatley and Lambert, 1998: 
122). This question is considered in the empirical part of the study. 
31 Discussed ftuther in chapter 4. 
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Does the urban programme provide an incentive for business to participate in grant oriented 
partnerships? If it is true that locally dependent businesses are inclined to participate in 
collaborative endeavours, the prospect that extra money can bring extra business is an obvious 
incentive for, at the least, symbolic involvement. 32 Stoker and Mossberger (1994), for example, 
identify 'tangible' results alongside local dependence as key motivations for organisations 
participating in partnerships. The procurement of selective incentives from government can be 
construed as one tangible output of partnership. 13 Hence, according to John and Cole (1998: 
3 87), it is the capitalists who have most to gain from public sector investment who are most likely 
to get involved in urban coalitions. 
There is clearly a co-ercive element to these schemes. Di Gaetano (1997) and Malpass (1994) 
show how Bristol City Council moved toward partnership only because it believed it could not 
otherwise obtain governmental funds. The main Bristol partnership was established for this 
purpose. For both local authority and business sector, partnerships which are driven by external 
funding or by other forms of coercion may not be permanent, nor indicative of local governance 
capacity: 
Limited local autonomy for both public and for private sector actors in Britain engenders 
symbolic politics. To secure external resources, local regimes attempt to build bridges 
outward, while at the same time fostering a sense of community (Stoker and Mossberger, 
1994: 210). 
As well as producing symbolic politics, central policies and programmes may induce 
(provocation', leading to antagonism and loss of co-operation (Stoker, 1999: 11). Urban policy 
may thus limit, as well as facilitate, the emergence of regime governance and it should not be 
assumed that central government policy makers always get what they want (Stoker, 1999). 
Morgan et al (1999: 194) show how the Welsh Office, by virtue of its power and resources, 
fostered vertical networks which had the effect of impeding bottom-up collective action. 
32 Businesses represented on partnership boards are not entitled to benefit directly from 
grants that they are involved with managing. 
33 Though chapter 4 makes a distinction between extra-local inputs and local governance 
outputs as 'added value'. 
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Challenge funds, ftu-thermore, comprise a very limited proportion of local authority expenditure 
as a whole (Lawless, 1991) and they are by definition selective. Government challenge funds 
result in a few winners and many losers. " In those areas which have not succeeded in winning 
challenge funds, the process could result in demoralization (Bailey et al, 1995, Oatley, 1998; 
Stoker, 1999). " If Government programmes can, nevertheless, produce partnerships, can they 
produce regime governance? 
It is useful, finally, to recall that in Elkin and Stone, fiscal dependence is a representation of 
systemic power, a power which is situational rather than decisional, indirect rather than direct 
(Stone, 1980). The power invested in the economic programme acts both as carrot and as stick. 
It is intentional, whether direct (stick), as it might be in the case of the local authority, or indirect, 
as in the case of business (carrot). Moreover, systemic power, while it is only realised 
contingently, is by definition universal in liberal democratic societies. Urban policy and urban 
programmes are not systemic since they are not universal in application, and they are often 
spatially oriented. Government programmes also tend to be transitory, as the changes in policy 
between 1982 and 1994 show (Lawless, 1994; Davies, 1996). The difference between fiscal 
dependence, the empirical realization of systemic power, and the urban programme is that the 
former generates a bottom up dynamic to collaboration, the latter a top-down dynamic. However, 
while the urban programme is in some senses a command variable, like fiscal dependence, it need 
not generate a command relationship within the partnerships it produces. In this sense, it is 
analogous to fiscal dependence as a meso-level variable, but alone, it is likely to produce different 
partnership effects. It is unlikely, therefore, that urban programmes represent a sufficient stimulus 
to regime governance of the kind predicted by Elkin and Stone. For this reason, the urban 
programme is best conceived as a stimulus to partnership formation but, as an insufficient 
condition for regime governance. However, as the following sections suggest, a partnership 
34 SRB I saw 464 bids of which 201 were successful. Round 2 saw 326 bids of which 
172 were successful, suggesting a high demoralization rate (Tyler, March 1998: 25). 
35 For those authorities which do not seek partnership dependent funds, this variable is, 
of course, irrelevant to processes of partnership building. 
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mechanism established in response to bottom-up pressure, may take on a life of its own if local 
actors develop commitment to it. How might partnerships, established to bid for partnership 
dependent grants, develop the characteristics of regime governance? 
The Role of Ideology in the Development of Partnerships 
Changes in the global economy may have led to significant restructuring at the national and the 
local levels, but the literature discussed above does not show clearly how restructuring has 
produced the conditions for regime governance locally. Local authorities may, of course, be 
ideologically pre-disposed to intervene in their local economies to facilitate market led growth, 
regardless of political composition and regardless of any compulsion on them to do so. This is 
certainly the implication in the work of Hall and Hubbard (1996) and Shaw (1993) who suggest 
that entrepreneurial strategies are not really new. Elements in the business sector may also be 
predisposed to collaboration, particularly locally dependent businesses, or businesses with roots 
in an area. The process of accumulation and competition does not preclude a sense of civic 
responsibility (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994: 203), or a simple wish to become involved in 
community affairs for personal reasons (Harding, 1998: 84). This perspective is supported by 
documents such as the CBI's 'Initiatives Beyond Charity' (198 8) which argues that local business 
communities are capable of providing leadership in the sphere of development and regeneration, 
which politicians are not. For example, during the period when Bristol City Council was turning 
toward a partnership approach, business overtures were led by a 'self-confessed Christian 
socialist', who spearheaded the Bristol Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Morgan et al, 1999: 
189). 
One of the reasons for importing American approaches to urban policy is the ideology of 
'privatism', a component of resurgent neo-liberalism in the UK, which has turned British policy 
makers toward exemplar public-private partnership initiatives overseas (Barnekov et al, 1989). 
Judd and Parkinson (1990: 19), for example, identify a hegemonic project by UK government to 
create an enterprise culture in the locality. Thus, the battle against the so-called urban left in the 
1980s was not only a battle over spending, it was a battle over political ideas. The outcome of 
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this battle is illustrated vividly in accounts of the dramatic political shift from 'socialist', or 
redistributive policies to 'entrepreneurial ism' in Sheffield City Council (Lawless, 1990; 1994; 
Seyd, 1990). In much the same vein as Stewart (1994) and Malpass (1994), Judd and Parkinson 
(1990: 19) perceive the UDC and the systematic exclusion of local government as part of a 
hegemonic project by the Government to create an enterprise culture in the locality. During the 
political conflicts of the 1980s, local government was often excluded from urban policy 
experiments. It is only from 1989 that central government felt comfortable enough with the 'new 
pragmatism' in Labour local authorities to begin delegating them a limited role in economic 
development (Harding and Garside, 1995: 170; Atkinson, 1995: 13). The partnership based 
challenge funds of today were the Conservative Government's response to this new pragmatism, 
the advancement of its hegemonic project for control of local governance (Stoker, 1990: 167). 
This study is not directly concerned with the reasons for change within the Labour Party, but 
change is clearly linked to the resurgence of free market ideologies and practices and the 
corresponding 'modernisation' of the Labour Party from 1983 under Neil Kinnock's leadership 
and to the defeat of the urban left in the 1980s (Seyd, 1990; Lawless, 1990; 1994; Di Gaetano, 
1997). These ideologies have been summarised by Tony Blair: 
I think that one of the great changes that has happened in the whole Labour culture is to 
recognised that we need entrepreneurs and people who are going to go out and be wealth 
creators and who are going to become wealthy by their own efforts. I support that, I want 
that, a successftd economy needs that (Blair quoted in Driver and Martell, 1998: 29). 
Atkinson argues that government advice on local capacity building in regeneration partnerships 
may also have played an important role by incorporating partnership activistists into the 'linguistic 
market and products which dominate urban regeneration, creating an appreciation of what is 
appropriate and likely to be valued' (Atkinson, 1999: 67). In short, discourses of partnership are 
not neutral, they limit interpretation through'performative utterances'. Therefore, domination and 
the inculcation of centrally determined values may be achieved unconsciously (Atkinson, 1999: 
70). It is difficult, though, to imagine that Atkinson's linguistic market would have this effect 
unless participants were first amenable to the key concepts it conveys, thus this discursive analysis 
is suggestive of ideological domination. However, once collaboration with the private sector has 
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been accepted as inevitable, this discursive manipulation, whether intentional or not, could serve 
to strengthen and further legitimise the activity of partnership in the minds of those so persuaded. 
Government guidelines for bids to the SRB certainly imply a much broader agenda for partnerships 
than grant chasing. The funding criteria emphasise the importance of qualitative elements in 
partnership building (DoE, April 1995; DETR, 10.9.98). The SRB is, perhaps, best thought of 
as a pump-priming mechanism, intended not only to deliver inward investment by the private 
sector to targeted areas, but also to stimulate the creation of more permanent partnerships 
between the public and private sectors (DoE, 13.6.95). Here, the enterprise culture may be 
interpreted as a culture of cooperation. Underpinned by a culture ofpolitical 'pragmatism' among 
Labour authorities, government inspired partnerships may help in stimulating regime governance. 
According to John, part of central govenunent's objective is to ensure that 'implementing actors 
come to believe in its overall philosophy of market-driven economic development' ( 1997: 26 1). 
Much of the literature on urban partnership suggests that whether new or not, 'civic 
entrepreneurialism' now dominates political approaches to urban regeneration policy and 
partnership building in the UK (Hill, 1995, Malpass, 1994). 
An entrepreneurial philosophy is consistent with and necessary to regime governance, as 
elaborated by Elkin and Stone. But entrepreneurialism in itself is not indicative of regime 
governance, nor of local business influence, since growth oriented ideologies and practices within 
local authorities may derive from different sources. An orientation on market led economic 
development may, however, predispose a local authority to collaborate with the business sector 
and vice versa. There may also be multiple ideologies of 'partnership' in the locality around 
different political agendas, engendered from different sources. An alternative 'value system' 
(Bosso, 1994: 184) influencing the political strategy of local authorities in the 1990s is the concept 
of 'sustainable development' (Lafferty, 1995: 223). A comprehensive international policy 
statement on sustainable development, Agenda 2 1, was produced at the 1992 Earth Summit held 
in Rio. This statement defines a key role for local authorities in devising and implementing 
sustainable development policies. Chapter 28 of this document, has become known as Local 
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Agenda 21 (UN, 1992: 233). Section III of Agenda 21 identifies key 'stakeholders' who play a 
decisive role in the process of sustainable development. Among these stakeholders are the 
business community and industry (UN, 1992: 23 7). Sustainable development is a vague concept, 
which has been accorded different, sometimes contradictory meanings (Pearce, 1989, Redclift 
1989). While it is plausible that the ideology of partnership may represent an important stimulus 
to regime governance, it need not, given the contested definition of 'sustainable development', 
generate a growth oriented agenda (Davies, 1996). 
Thus, different ideologies of partnership may result from conflicts between central and local 
government, from international sources and from the mechanics of putting together project bids 
and carrying out project objectives. They can be driven both exogenously and endogenously as 
necessity becomes a virtue both for business and for local authority. The foregoing perspective 
suggests that while much partnership activity may be top-down in character, extra-local incentives 
and penalties may not always drive the process (Ward, 1997a: 188). However, while the 
phenomena generated through a dual ideological commitment to partnerships may resemble regime 
governance, as an explanatory framework ideological commitment would more closely resemble 
the structures proposed in advocacy coalition frameworks which are centred on shared belief 
systems, rather than on material interdependence (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 
1993). Ideology is not commensurable with the resource dependence identified in regime theory, 
unless belief itself is accorded the status of a governance resource. 
Evolution in Partnership Governance 
The arguments set out above suggest that regime governance should be treated as a specialised 
aspect of partnership governance and as a specialised form of networking. Given these 
distinctions, can the process of partnership building in pursuit of governmental funds itself 
generate local interdependence between local authority and business sector of a sustainable kind? 
There is no reason why partnerships established for this purpose cannot evolve into networks 
(Skelcher et al, 1996: 2). Just as necessity can become virtue, so symbolic co-operation can 
become necessary (Cochrane, 1999: 113-114). This perspective is analogous to Stone's notion 
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Of 'Structuring' (Stone, 1989: 10) and to Hay's idea of a 'dialectical' relationship between 
structure and agency (1995). More concretely, the process of developing and implementing a 
challenge fund project through a formal top-down public-private sector partnership may lead to 
a variety of spin-off projects which become 'necessary' to both parties and which require the 
linkage of resources. The concept of need is, therefore, dynamic rather than static. Byextension, 
the form of cooperation between the agents may become more sophisticated as each discovers 
what the other can offer. Partnership, or networking, may later be taken for granted. There is 
implicit support for this position in literature which argues that government promotion of 
partnership is not only about 'leverage', but also about facilitating a dynamic interaction between 
the partners within the arrangements it is funding (Hastings, 1996; Lawless, 199 1; Bailey et al, 
1995; John, 1997). The question of dynamics internal to partnership is ofparticular interest given 
Stone's caution about the difficulties in urban regime creation: 
The creation of a regime from scratch is imaginable but not likely. The cost of coordination 
would be enormous - hence the strong relevance of the problem of collective action to 
regime formation (1989: 236). 
While Stone is writing about the US, this view serves as a caution that regime governance is built 
only with difficulty. If he is right, regime governance could be a long term outcome of many 
different partnership building exercises, driven exogenously and endogenously, some ofwhich may 
fashion long term networking arrangements, while others do not. 
Conclusion 
It remains to summarise the claims made in this chapter. Box 4 identifies variables considered 
likely to explain partnership formation in the UK and potentially to predict the development of 
regime governance, the concept developed in Box 3. The three main exogenous, variables 
identified here are: economic globalization and capital mobility; entrepreneurial and partnership 
ideologies; and government policy. These variables may combine to create significant pressures 
for local collaboration, but it is unlikely that they will result in regime governance. Additional 
endogenous factors, such as the enhancement of local partnership ideologies and the development 
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of material interdependence, could also be crucial in partnership development. It is also 
recognised that other variables, which have not been highlighted in this review, may play a greater 
or a lesser role in the processes under consideration. This exposition is not, therefore, presented 
as an exclusive explanation. It does not, ftnthermore, seek to inter-relate the explanatory variables 
it has identified, what Wendt (1987: 368) describes as the 'structure-structure' problem of 
attributing causal priority between independent variables. In chapter 10, however, priority is 
attributed to the explanatory variables identified in the case studies, where the material allows. 
The speculative nature of the framework is also recognised with the posing of contra-indicators. 
The contra-indicators acknowledge the possibility of unanticipated effects arising from those 
variables which have been identified here, from variables which have not been identified, and from 
the process of partnership working itself. Box 4 sets out variables which, if realised, could 
represent stimuli toward both regime governance and'anti-regime' or'anti-govemance' in the UK 
(De Leon, 1992). The hypothesis which is derived from this review is that in Labour authority 
areas, exogenous factors are likely to have generated the material and the ideological grounds for 
partnership formation. However, regime governance requires the pre-existence, or the emergence, 
of a local commitment to partnership on the part of local authorities and within elements of the 
local business sector. It also requires a common agenda between local authorities and businesses, 
the realisation of which depends on the combination of resources from both parties. 
The insights which one can draw from urban regime theory in explaining urban partnerships in the 
UK are likely to be limited, based on this perspective. The conceptual distinction drawn between 
regime governance and regime theory is illustrative of this point. Regime theory is unlikely to 
explain the development of urban partnerships in the UK. Moreover, to the extent that these 
partnerships exhibit the distinctive characteristics of regime governance, these characteristics are 
unlikely to be explained by urban regime theory. It is in blurring the distinctive aspects of regime 
theory and in treating an overly broad range of partnership phenomena as 'regimes' that adaptive 
approaches reduce its explanatory power. More important, the explanatory tools used in regime 
theom, based as they are on a schematic split between state and market at the urban scale, seem 
inadequate to the task of explaining UK style urban partnerships. The search for an explanatory 
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regime theory in the UK is therefore considered to be mistaken. As noted above, Ward (1 997b) 
argues for the development of a series of abstractions capable of explaining regime formation in 
the UK. A different approach is taken here. Rather, a series of abstractions are deemed necessary, 
capable of explaining urban partnerships regardless of the extent to which these resemble regime 
governance. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to move away from an approach which seeks 
to make regime theory fit. The cognitive task of policy science is to create patterns that make 
sense of the phenomena subject to explanation. Regime theory does not itself provide such a 
pattern, beyond the limited explanatory notion of interdependence. Instead, it is better to ask in 
what ways, if any, resource dependence between local authority and business is a relevant factor 
in developing an explanation for partnerships in the UK. The framework developed in the last part 
ofthe chapter seeks to answer this question schematically. The empirical component ofthe study 
which follows attempts to answer it empirically. Chapter 4 now sets the context for the material 
reported in the case studies. 
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Chapter 4. The Case Studies in Context 
Introduction 
This chapter paints a basic contextual picture, highlighting factors which relate to the key themes 
set out in the case studies. The objective is not to present a comprehensive empirical account of 
non-local forces which may have influenced partnerships, but to highlight policies and processes 
which were identified at the local level as influential in determining partnership approaches. A 
discussion of this nature could describe every initiative at every supra-local level of governance, 
leading to a lengthy list of influences on local partnership processes which are not supported by 
corresponding empirical material within the case studies. Instead, a brief resume is provided of 
issues and initiatives relevant to the material covered therein. Much ofthe material which follows 
is secondary in character, but interviews were undertaken with personnel involved in urban policy 
at the regional and the national levels of government. The focus ofthe chapter is on developments 
in urban policy since the 1970s. Comparisons are drawn between different periods during 18 years 
of Conservative Government and recent developments under 'New Labour'. It is suggested that 
lAbour is following a similarpolicy trajectory, though there are important differences in emphasis, 
particularly the changed climate for central-local relations and a more 'holistic' approach to local 
regeneration im i ives. 
The chapter is organised into two main parts. The first part outlines the key issues in the 
development of urban policy and partnerships since the 1970s, highlighting their relevance to the 
case studies. The second part considers the definition and evaluation ofadded value, an important 
empirical task in the case studies. 
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Partnership from the 1970s to the Present Day 
This part of the chapter is organised into four main sections around four phases in urban policy 
since 1970: public-public partnerships, privatism, public-private partnerships under the 
Conservatives, and 'joined up' partnership strategies under New Labour. Thisla tter section also 
outlines tentative steps taken by New Labour toward English regionalism and considers the 
developing framework for partnerships in the arena of education, both ofwhich form an important 
backdrop to the material presented in the case studies. 
Public-Public Partnership in the 1970s 
The Local Government Grants ( Social Need) Act 1969 introduced urban assistance in the form 
of grants. Under the Act, government gave out grants to local authorities on the basis of 'special 
social need' in urban areas. This act introduced the Urban Programme which was designed to 
encourage investment through land and building improvements, to provide business training and 
to support revenue costs for social projects. The Urban Programme survived as a key tool in 
urban policy until it was finally phased out in 1994, replaced first by City Challenge, and then by 
the SRB, discussed further below (Parkinson and Wilks, 1986). 
Bailey etal (1995: 43-48) attribute the origins of urban partnerships to the 1970s. Followinga 
review of urban policy in 1976, funding to the Urban Programme was increased from E30 million 
to E125 million and allocated to several designated 'partnership' areas, including Liverpool, 
Lambeth and London Docklands. The Inner Urban Areas Act, passed in 1978, divided the urban 
programme into three categories of urban deprivation, and the worst seven were allocated 
'Partnership' status. The seven Inner City Partnerships (ICPs) which resulted encapsulate the 
partnership approach of the Labour Government in the late 1970s which was driven by the 
perceived failure of the Urban Programme (Parkinson and Wilks, 1986: 291). This failure was, 
in part, believed to have arisen from an absence of co-ordination between central government 
departments on one hand and between centre and locality on the other: 
Partnership was an innovative, ambitious attempt to close the political and administrative 
gap between the two worlds of central and local government and help reconcile the diverse 
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and conflicting goals of local autonomy and national purposes within an increasingly 
complex set of welfare state policies and institutions (Parkinson and Wilks, 1986: 291). 
The original intention for the Inner City Partnerships was that they should involve a closer 
collaboration between government and private sector. However, they failed in this objective, 
failing instead under the control of Whitehall, government ministers and local government officials 
(Bailey et al, 1995: 45). According to Barnekov et al (1989: 15 7): 
Neither the central nor local government officials had direct experience with promoting local 
industry or commerce; business and trade unions were not invited to be formal members of 
the partnerships; and representatives of the private sector had only peripheral involvement 
in the new economic programmes. 
Hence, the ICPs proved to be public-public and central-local partnerships driven by collaboration 
within and between different levels of govenunent. Indeed, a key reason for establishing them was 
to try and overcome the problem of co-ordination between departments and levels of government 
which had impeded efforts to tackle urban deprivation (Lawless, 1981: 93). But the ICPs were 
perceived as having failed in this regard too. Co-ordination proved impossible to achieve, marked 
by an unwillingness within central and local government departments to behave more flexibly or 
to act in a spirit of partnership (Lawless, 1991: 19). Crucial to the partnership process was the 
objective of 'bending' government programmes to meet the specific needs of inner cities. 
According to Parkinson and Wilks (1986: 294/5): 
The concept of 'bending' was simple, easily understood, potentially very effective and in 
practice impossible to deliver ... At the local level a similar process of departmental imperialism and conflict similarly limited the reorientation of mainstream programmes. 
The partnerships were undermined by one other crucial factor: the election of the Conservative 
Govenu-nentinl979. By 198 1, the new govenunent was being criticised for the lack ofresources 
injected into the Urban Programme and the Inner City Partnerships. It had anew agenda for urban 
policy and the ICPs withered on the vine. 
The Era of Privatism - 1980 to 1990 
The new Conservative Govenunent was greeted by serious urban riots in 198 1, notably in Brixton, 
Toxteth and Handsworth (Bailey et al, 1995: 46/7). The riots ushered mi a period which Barnekov 
et al have described as an era of 'privatism' when British politicians and civil servants looked 
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overseas, particularly to the United States, for policy initiatives involving and driven by the 
business sector. The first major initiative ofthe 1980s was the Urban Development Grant (UDG). 
As was highlighted in chapter 3, Wolman's (1992) study shows how the how the UDG was 
inspired by the American Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG). In 198 1, Michael Heseltine, 
in his first spell as Secretary of State for the Environment, set up the Financial Institution's Group 
(FIG), consisting of representatives of major financial institutions. The Group was charged with 
examining potential policies for inner city regeneration in the aftermath of the riots. It undertook 
a study tour of the US in autumnl 981 accompanied by civil servants, seeking ways of involving 
the private sector in urban regeneration. It recommended the adoption of a British version of 
UDAG which the Gover m-nent brought into being as U`DG in 1982 (Wolman, 1992: 31-32). The 
objective of the UDG, like UDAG, was to lever private sector funds into inner cities by means of 
government grant (Boyle, 1985). 
Throughout the 1980s, the role of business groups in urban policy was enhanced and that of the 
local authority diminished. The Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was the'flagship'urban 
policy during this period (Burton and O'Toole, 1994: 162). UDCs were noteworthy for their 
dominance by private sector interests, for the exclusion of local authorities from participation, and 
for the curtailment of local authority planning powers within the UDC area (Batley, 1989, Wilson 
and Game, 1994; Harding, 1998). The absence of a role for local government in urban 
regeneration was confirmed by omission in the Government's statement on urban policy Action 
for Cities (HMSO, 1988). Lawless identifies this statement as the'high tide of anti-collectivism 
towards the cities' (1994: 13 04). 
By 1990, in its review of Actionfor Cities, the Government had changed its position, calling for 
a 'spirit of co-operation, of partnership between all of those involved in central and local 
government, including local business' (DoE cited in Lawless, 1994: 1304). A notable, if 
exaggerated, feature of central-local relations in the mid 1980s had been conflict between certain 
Labour authorities and the Conservative government. By 1990, however, 'municipal socialism' 
as conceived by the'urban left'during that period (Boddy and Fudge, 1984; Cliff and Gluckstein, 
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1988) was exhausted. As chapter 3 argued, this struggle was ideological and political, a battle 
for hegemonic control of urban governance (Stoker, 1990: 167). 
VVhile government policy by 1990 was based partly on a new confidence in the compliance of local 
authorities, the exclusive approach to urban policy had also been subjected to criticism from at 
least three different sources. The Audit Commission considered urban regeneration programmes 
to be poorly co-ordinated. Business leaders involved in Business in the Community, on the other 
hand, were committed to working in active partnership with the public sector, therefore opposing 
exclusive approaches to regeneration. Thirdly, the Government's own supporters in the Carlton 
Club criticised it for a lack of co-ordination and for excessive bureaucracy (Le Gales and Mawson, 
1994: 84). By 199 1, the exclusive approach to regeneration was perceived to be failing (Le Gales 
and Mawson, 1995: 222). 
Public-Private Partnerships from 1991-1997 
The establishment of City Challenge in May 1991 can therefore be regarded as something of a 
watershed in terms of government policy, marking both a shift in attitude and the development of 
initiatives in which local authorities were encouraged to establish partnerships to compete for 
targeted regeneration funds (Oatley and Lambert, 1998: 111): 
The City Challenge initiative is underpinned by the proposition that substantial and lasting 
urban regeneration requires efficient, entrepreneurial delivery mechanisms that promote 
effective collaborative relationships between all the key players (DoE, 1992: 3). - 
City Challenge placed local authorities back at the centre of urban policy initiatives. It had an 
important effect in changing the attitude of local authorities toward partnership. For David Curry, 
funding streams of this kind were important stimuli to partnership development processes, 
particularly within Labour authorities. He pointed to political change inside the Labour'Party and 
to a raft of local government reforms, including CCT, performance indicators and Value for 
Money which had forced local authorities into a change of culture compatible with the competitive 
realities in the outside world and, therefore, compatible with a partnership approach to 
governance. As partnerships developed, 
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people in local government who were Labour discovered that people who worked in the 
Private sector may just have been born on the same planet and didn't eat children raw for 
breakfast. And people in the private sector discovered that there were intelligent people in 
local government who were capable of thinking in terms of outputs and value for money ... You now find civic leaders and local businesses hand in glove (Curry, 3.4.98). 1 
For the Conservative Government, then, local partnerships were a response to economic 
'realities'. While he thought it too early to judge the effectiveness of partnerships in delivering 
regeneration outcomes, Curry believed that partnerships are now embedded in the local political 
culture (Curry, 3.4.98). 
Perhaps the key urban policy initiative under the Conservatives was the Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB). The SRB was established in April 1994 combining twenty programmes, including 
City Challenge (Stewart, 1994). David Curry saw his main activity, under the guidance of Michael 
Heseltine now in his second term at the DoE, as the development of the SRB, the new 'flagship' 
regeneration programme. Government thinking behind the SRB had three strands: partnership, 
integration of economic and social issues, and competition. It thus represented a move away from 
the City Challenge approach which was concerned primarily with generating market investment, 
and a move toward a recognition that economic and social ills had to be tackled in tandem. SRB 
rounds I to 3 were conducted under the Conservative Government. Up until this point, the 
guidelines and objectives for the SRB had remained broadly stable, concerned with generating 
local partnerships to address economic and social difficulties (Curry, 3.4-98). Labour was elected 
in May 1997 in the middle of round 4. 
New Labour and 'Joined Up Thinking' 
Supplementary national guidance to SRB round 4 was issued following the general election in May 
1997 asking for a stronger emphasis to be placed in bids on social 'need' based on criteria defined 
in the Index of Local Conditions (DETR, 2.6-98) or on special local circumstances. The 
supplementary guidance stated that the government will give higher priority to bids which express 
I The reference (Curry, 3.4.98) denotes a personal interview with David Curry MP, 
former Minister with responsibility for Local Government, Housing and Regeneration, held on 3 
April 1998. 
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need in this way. It also demanded a greater emphasis on tackling 'needs of communities in the 
most deprived areas' and greater collaboration between bidding partnerships and regional offices 
(GOYH, July 1997). Subsequent guidelines for SRI35 went further, demanding a 'strategic' or 
a 'comprehensive' approach to addressing regeneration needs, calling on bids to address a range 
of issues identified in the findings of the Government's new Social Exclusion Unit (DETR, 
3.2.99). 
This approach to the SRB is centred on a wider government agenda based on the idea that 
regeneration activity is enhanced When'regeneration problems are tackled in a comprehensive and 
cross-cutting way'(DETR, 6.5 . 99). 
2 Regional guidance for SRB Round 5 enhanced the new 
emphasis on 'extensive and multiple deprivation', with a formal commitment to allocate 80% of 
resources to those areas falling within the worst 50 local authorities in the 1998 Index of Local 
Deprivation (DETR, 2.6.98; DETR, 3.2.99), a development which arguably begins to undermine 
3 the challenge element of partnership funding. The discussion below shows how important 
education is within this expansive approach to regeneration and that it fonns Part of the 
goveniment's urban policy agenda, interpreted in its broadest sense (LGA, 21.1.99). 
The goveniment inherited a number of problems associated with the SRB. The four case studies 
which follow this chapter amply demonstrate the view that the SRB has been restrictive, an 
example of the deleterious effects of strong governmental control. It is too early to evaluate 
whether new Government policies, particularly the establishment of Regional Development 
Agencies discussed ftirther below, will make any difference to this evaluation. Both Richard 
Caborn and Alan Meale, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the DETF, recognised the 
problem faced by local partnerships in having to match partnership outputs to governmental 
criteria such as those set out in SRB guidelines. Mr Cabom conceded that govenunent might have 
2 The reference (DETR, 6.5-99) denotes the date of a written 'response to questions by 
Alan Meale MP, Parliamentary Undersecretary of State at the DETR. 
The production of regional guidance for the SRB is an initiative of the Labour 
Goverment 
ill 
used local partnerships as implementation agencies for central policy. He perceived a need for 
balance between flexibility and decentralisation on one hand and for monitoring and management 
of public money on the other (DETF, 7.7 . 99). 
4 Alan Meale also emphasised that Ministers are 
keen to ensure, while maintaining accountability, that bureaucratic processes do not impede 
regeneration schemes and wide community activity within them (DETR, 6.5.99). 
From the Government's perspective, two main problems with partnership working were identified. 
First, a lack of community capacity was highlighted. There are not enough 'quality' people 
engaging in the partnership process at present. To alleviate this problem, 10% of the SRB has 
been top-sliced to local capacity building initiatives (DETR, 7.7.99). Richard Caborn accepted 
that it is difficult in some areas to get businesses 'fully committed and involved', though he 
suggested that some business leaders have recognised the value to themselves in partnership 
processes (DETR, 6.5.99). Second, he felt that the focus on local initiatives had, in the past, led 
to an absence of strategic thinking, contributing to uneven economic performance between the 
regions. One reason for establishing Regional Development Agencies was, he said, to try and 
ensure a greater degree of evenness in economic performance (DETF, 7.7.99). 
How committed is New Labour to the empowerment of local authorities and partnerships in the 
urban regeneration process? A common thread in government initiatives is the signalling of a new 
central-local partnership and the end of what Cabom described as the adversarial policy of the 
Conservative years (DETR, 7.7.99). The theme ofa central-local partnership has been highlighted 
by Hilary Armstrong, Minister for Local Government and Regions who commented: 'it is vital that 
we lose the skills of battle and find the skills and organisation of partnership" (cited in Stoker, 
1999: 17). ' 
4 The reference (DETR, 7.7.99) denotes a personal interview with Richard Caborn MP, 
Minister of State for the Regions, Regeneration and Planning, held on 7 July 1999. 
As chapterl comments, a formal Central-Local partnership was established in July 
1997. 
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The LGA's New Commitment to Regeneration initiative is indicative of this approach. In 
symbolic terms at least, it is important evidence of a new willingness on the part of government 
to experiment with policy initiatives developed within local government (LGA, 2 April 1998). 
New Commitment is the product of research undertaken on behalf of the Local Government 
Management Board by Le Gales and Mawson (1994). Le Gales and Mawson believed that Britain 
could learn something from the French experience of urban policy which is organised around 
contracts, known as the 'Contrat de Ville', between different levels and departments of 
government. This initiative has been adapted by the LGA in the form of New Commitment and 
shortly after its election, the new Labour government agreed to participate in a pilot scheme 
involving 22 local partnerships. The objective of the scheme is to explore different ways of 
improving partnerships between actors at the local level but more importantly between central and 
local governments. It is innovative in proposing time limited agreements between partners, each 
ofWhom are required to stipulate what they will bring to the partnership. Central government will 
be a key signatory to these agreements. 
In some ways, the New Commitment proposals resemble the old ICPs with their emphasis on 
improving co-ordination between government departments and between centre and locality. There 
are two main differences. First, the private and other sectors are expected to be involved in local 
partnerships; and second, each local partnership is expected to be driven by a comprehensive 
vision statement, addressing the diverse economic and social elements ofurban regeneration. The 
test ofNew Commitment will be whether it can succeed where ICPs failed in involving the private 
sector in local partnerships and in achieving better co-ordination between central departments and 
the central and local tiers of government. New Commitment to Regeneration can be interpreted 
as a commitment by central government to work more closely with local authorities. Initiatives 
like the Beacon Council Scheme also offer rewards in the form of greater powers for authorities 
which meet stipulated targets (DETR, 12.2-99). 
However, it is not yet clear whether New Labour can be characterised as a decentralizing 
government. For example, the VAlite Paper Modern Local Government: In Touch With the 
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People proposed even stronger powers for Government in the event ofperceived failure, including 
the right to enforce outsourcing (DETR, 30.7.98). Doubts can also be expressed about the 
degree of commitment by central government to decentralization in relation to local authority 
involvement in companies. Two ofthe case studies, Barnsley and Rotherham, examine partnership 
inj oint venture companies. One (Barnsley) is concerned with commercial property development, 
the other (Rotherham) with the building of affordable housing. The role of these companies, in 
which local authority and developer both take shares and profit, has proved complex in both cases 
due to restrictive regulations introduced by the Conservatives. The last government set out its 
framework for classifying local authorities' interest in companies in the Local Government and 
HousingAct 1989 (HMSO, 1990). The arrangements were clarified in the Local Authorities 
(Companies) Order 1995, which distinguished between different degrees of local authority control 
and influence (DoE, February 1997). The objective of the Order was to regulate venture 
companies to ensure that local authorities were not using them to finance capital activities which 
would otherwise fall outside agreed expenditure levels. Hence, it distinguished between those 
companies which are public sector influenced and those which are private sector influenced. 
Transactions in public sector influenced companies have the same implications for a local 
authority's resources as ifundertaken by the authority itself. Private sector influenced companies 
are not subjected to the same controls, thereby encouraging the private sector to carry the majority 
ofthe equity risks and to control the majority ofvoting rights in a company (DoE, February 1997). 
A Coopers and Lybrand report suggests that around 40% of all local authorities are now involved 
in venture companies, just under half of which fall under private sector influence or control 
(Coopers and Lybrand, 1997). The new Government issued guidance on the Private Finance 
Initiative (DETR, 11.9.98) and stated in Modernising Local Government that it would examine 
the regulations controlling local authority interests in companies (DETF, 30.7.98). As yet, 
however, apart from a relaxation ofthe controls over borrowing and investment by local authority 
airport companies, no changes have occurred, loosening tight central controls over local authority 
capital expenditure. 
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It is questionable, therefore, how far the measures being taken in Modern Local Government 
represent decentralization, even of comparatively minor powers and, as the case studies show, it 
is arguable that such measures as are being introduced empower only those authorities which are 
wholly in step with government thinking. Future studies could usefully consider how far New 
Labour initiatives eventually result in the decentralization of power from centre to locality. 
Some of the measures proposed in Modern Local Government (DETR, 30.7.98), such as cabinet 
government, elected mayors and supplementary business rating, were beginning to come on line 
just as the empirical phase of the project came to an end. ' Appendix 3 lists central government 
initiatives currently affecting local regeneration activities (DETR, 19.8.99). Other relevant 
government papers include: Cross-cutting Issues Affecting Local Government (DETR, 8.2.99); 
the Report of the Urban Taskforce (DETR, 29.6.99); Local Leadership, Local Choice (DETP,, 
25.3.99); and the Urban Exchange Initiative (DETP, 24.7.98). It will be some time before the 
impact of these papers feed through into policy and their eventual impact on government and on 
local partnership processes cannot be evaluated at present. 
Regeneration and the English Regions 
Another important strand of government regeneration policy which emerged during the 1990s was 
a new role for the English regions. A system of integrated government offices was established 
in April 1994 bringing together under one roofthe regional offices of Employment, Environment, 
Transport and Trade and Industry (Riley, 1999). ' The rationale for establishing government 
offices was, according to David Curry, that of efficiency and effectiveness, creating a 'one stop 
shop' to deal with regional issues (Curry, 3.4-98). The Government Office for Yorkshire and 
Humberside (GOYH) covers a diverse area, from the coal areas of South Yorkshire, to the ports 
6 Mixed views were expressed about the likely impact of a local business rate. Some 
parties felt that it would bind the local authority more closely to the business sector, while others 
felt that it would re-ignite old rows about the annual rating process. As views were mixed and 
speculative in nature , and space was at a premium, the question of the 
business rate was not 
included in the final editions of the case studies. 
The parent departments are now the DETR, the DTI and WEE (DETF, 1.4.99). 
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of Grimsby and Hull and the rural expanses of North Yorkshire. The main role GOYH identified 
for itself in relation to the case study areas was the adjudication of SRB bids and project 
management (GOYH, 2.4.98). 
As was noted above, Caborn took the view that regeneration policy has been overly localist in 
character, thereby undermining strategic thinking. He described regionalism as 'the key' to 
regeneration policy, the means by which strategic thinking could be put on the policy agenda 
(DETR, 7.7.99). In line with this perspective, the White Paper Building Partnerships for 
Prosperity sought to place regions at the centre of the Government's regeneration project 
(DETR, 3.12.97). Eight Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were established in England 
on I April 1999 in the English regions outside London! The establishment of RDAs is seen by 
the Government as part of a process of decentralisation in which central government recognises 
limits in its ability to direct local action. RDAs will be Non Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) 
accountable to ministers. They are business-led, comprising Boards of 12 appointed members 
incorporating a presence from the public sector and a fixed representation of four members from 
local authorities. The objective in creating RDAs is to: 
promote sustainable economic development and social and physical regeneration and to co- 
ordinate the work of regional and local partners in areas such as training, investment, 
regeneration and business support (DETR, 3.12.97: 1.1). 
The Government has placed no statutory limits on the functions which will eventually be 
transferred to RDAs, but initially, they will take over responsibility from government offices for 
administration of the SRB, later taking over English Partnerships' responsibility for promoting 
physical regeneration, and the regional development functions of the Rural Development 
Commission. 
RDAs are effec tively part ofthe devolution process which is a key aspect ofNew Labour's agenda 
for constitutional reform, but their future is dependent on how far the agenda for constitutional 
reform goes in years to come, something which is by no means certain (Evans, 1999). The 
8 There are plans to establish a ninth RDA for London in 2000 (DETR, 1.4.99). The 
Yorkshire and Humberside RDA has been named 'Yorkshire Forward' (GET, 2.4.99). 
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agencies have initially been given responsibility for preparing regional economic strategies 
(YHRDA, 22-1.99). Core functions are: to foster regional capability; to attract inward investment; 
and to market the region. Yorkshire and Humberside is not presently viewed as successful in its 
pursuit of inward investment, attracting the lowest share of Foreign Direct Investment in the UK 
and this is a key task for 'Yorkshire Forward' (CityVision, April 1997: 14; YHRDA, 13.1.99). 
Partnership is a key theme for RDAs. As well as attracting private funds for partnership projects, 
they will be charged with responsibility for promoting public-private partnership more widely 
(DETR, 3.12.97: 4.25). 
Caborn also viewed regional policy as a key tool for enhancing competitiveness in the global 
market place. ' A key objective in regional policy is to bring local resources into harness, 
preventing wasteful duplication and competition between areas and organisations. Regionalism 
can, in theory, prevent localities 'competing with public subsidy' (Curry, 3.4.98) and prevent 
nugatory effort through the process of co-ordination which GOYH and the RDA will, in theory, 
provide (GOYH, 2.4.98). " The RDA is seen as a form of rationalisation which should, according 
to the TUC, result in elimination of regional 'clutter' removing 'unnecessary duplication and 
competition' (TUC cited in DETR, 3.12.97: 5.14) and it will constitute a one-stop-shop for the 
handling of 'significant internationally-mobile investment projects' (DETF, 3.12.97: 5.9; GOYH, 
2.4.98). The regional level of governance was viewed by regional actors as a key interface for 
mobile capital from overseas, the evidence showing that firms from abroad look not to the. local 
scale, but to the regional or national level for information and for the co-ordination ofaid (GOYH, 
9 VAiile the Government is keen on economic regionalism, its commitment to elected 
regionalism is weaker. Le Gales and John warn that any delay in implementing 'elected 
regionalism' could compromise legitimacy and stymie the further development of regional 
governance processes (1997: 58). This view was shared by the Chief Executive of North East 
Lincolnshire Council, who viewed Government policy as mistaken. He believed that partial 
regionalism would result in a perception that regionalism had failed, when, in fact, it had not gone 
far enough (NELC, 12.6-98b). 
10 A 'concordat' between the RDA and the Regional Chamber, pledging the RDA to 
'consult' the Chamber on its Regional Economic Strategy has been agreed (YHRDA, 13.1.99). 
The Regional Chamber, the first in the country, was launched in March 1998 (GOYH, 27.3.98). 
117 
2.4.98; YHDA, 15.12.98). " This issue is considered in the case studies from the perspective of 
whether localities and local partnerships have influenced global investment/non-investment 
decisions. Ultimately, it is questionable whether localities are being forced to compete through 
partnerships for globally mobile investment if it is the region or the national level to which the 
potential investor looks in the first instance for support. 
D- 
Regional partnerships are a pre-requisite for access to European Regional Development Funds 
(Morgan et al, 1999: 182). All the case study areas benefit from ERDF money and South 
Yorkshire has recently been designated an Objective I area. Prior to this designation, all four 
cases fell within Objective 2 areas. 12 Regional partnerships comprise a key emphasis in social fund 
regulations and Yorkshire and Humberside's Objective 2 Single Programming Document is 
administered by a regional partnership, the Programme Monitoring Committee (GOYH, 7.5.97). " 
This committee is a 'partnership' consisting of a representative from the European Commission 
and representatives from regional and local bodies, including local authorities, and it is responsible 
for the distribution of funds (GOYH, 7.5.97). 
This brief sketch of developments in the regional regeneration policy agenda is necessary in order 
to understand why the EU does not appear as a key variable driving partnerships at the local level. 
The main impact ofthe EU appears to be at the regional level in relation to partnership. This point 
is implicitly recognised by the EU itself New structural fund regulations highlight a need to 
expand partnerships 'beyond national and regional authorities to include, in a real and meaningful 
way, local authorities and social and economic partners on the ground' (EU, undated). If Europe 
has influenced local partnership processes, it is in ways which have not been perceived by local 
11 The Yorkshire and Humberside Development Agency has been incorporated within 
Yorkshire Forward as its inward investment arm (YHDA, 15.12.98). 
12 Objective I status is awarded to regions whose development is lagging behind, 
normally those whose per capita GDP falls beneath 75% of the EU. Objective 2 status goes to 
restructuring regions which have been seriously affected by industrial decline (EU, undated). 
13 Objective 2 funding was worth f 173 million to Yorkshire and Humberside in 1994- 
1996 (GOYH, 2.4.98). 
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actors who did not attribute local responses to European influence and who, as the case studies 
show, view national government as the main extra-local influence. The relationship between local 
authority and the European Union is mediated through the regional level of governance and it is 
at this level that partnership operates in relation to policy formation and resource allocation 
(Harding, 1998: 77). Regional partnerships could form another interesting study from the 
perspective of evaluating regime theory, but a regional analysis lay beyond the scope of this study 
(see Coulson, 1997, Le Gales and John, 1997). However, while the case studies do not evaluate 
regional partnerships, they provide a view of whether preparations for 'Yorkshire Forward' have 
influenced local approaches to partnership. 
Education and Business 
It was noted above that education is an important plank in the government's regeneration policy 
agenda. As in the sphere ofeconomic development, partnerships between education and business 
have become an important tool in the implementation ofthis agenda. The first Education Business 
Partnerships (EBPs) were established in 1990 with Department of Employment funds, drawing 
together a range of school and industry projects in a single umbrella organisation (BiTC, 2.7.99; 
National EBP Network, 5.7.99). EBPs differ widely in terms of formal status, leadership and local 
commitment, but they have in common a range of goals relating to the enhancement of work 
readiness for young people. The most prevalent activities are work experience placements, 
support for GNVQ, pupil mentoring, curriculum support, and teacher/business employee 
secondments. Research by the Institute of Employment Studies suggests that around one third 
of employers are involved, at some level, in education business links, with around 25% of this 
group taking a 'pro-active' approach to partnership activity with a formal policy and, in some 
cases, a budget for partnership activity (Hillage et al, 1995). The National EBP network is 
concerned about the sustainability of local EBPs, due to variable levels of local commitment, to 
local turf wars and to the absence of a reliable national funding stream. It argued that government 
funding could be vital in sustaining EBP activities in future (National EBP Network, 5.7.99). 
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On 26 November 1998, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment announced plans 
for the creation of strategic lifelong learning partnerships for post- 16 education, as a contribution 
to the Government's agenda for regeneration and for social inclusion: 'In a world of increasing 
global competition, education and training are the best economic policy we have'. Learning is 'an 
essential part of regenerating our communities and bringing a social justice for all our people' 
(DffiEj, 4.1-99). A National Partnership Protocol was drawn up in November 1998 to assist in 
establishing a national framework for partnership, thereby creating the conditions in which local 
partnerships can develop effectively. The protocol identified the establishment of RDAs, together 
with the establishment of a National Skills Task Force as a 'timely opportunity' to strengthen 
partnership working (DfEE, November 1998). " 
The broad objectives for learning partnerships' are to 'widen participation in learning, increase 
attainment, improve standards and meet the skills challenge'. It is claimed that they will not 
'impose' another layer ofpartnership locally, but rather'subsume' existing arrangements, building 
on what is already in place. Local authorities and colleges will be responsible for developing a 
framework, within partnerships, to administer student support arrangements, to ensure co- 
ordinated transport for post- 16 learners, to play a key role in regenerating learning in communities, 
to increase participation in learning and to drive forward work on targets. Core membership of 
the partnerships will include FE colleges, local authority, schools, Careers Service and TEC, with 
local discretion to determine membership beyond this. It was not envisaged that partnership 
boundaries will correspond to, those of local authorities, but to a range of criteria including 
patterns of education and training provision, travel to work patterns and local labour markets. 
Arrangements are to be agreed in consultation with Government Offices. The partnerships will 
be supported by a WEE partnership fund totalling f. 25 million over three years to help promote 
collaboration (DfEE, 4.1.99). 
14 The protocol was signed up to by: WEE, the Association of Colleges, the Association 
of Principals of Colleges, the Further Education Development Agency, The Further Education 
Funding Council, the Local Government Association and the TEC National Council (WEE, 
November 1998). 
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Complicating this picture is the publication of the Government's White Paper, Learning to 
Succee& A New Frameworkfor Post- 16 Learning (DfEE, June 1999). The White Paperproposes 
the establishment of a Learning and Skills Council for England, to be supported by up to 50 local 
councils. These councils will, among other responsibilities, plan and co-ordinate post-16 
education, assume responsibility for further education funding, take over funding modem 
apPrenticeships and national traineeships (from TECs) and ensure that an effective EBP network 
exists to support work related learning for the pre- 16 age group. A key role is envisaged for 
employers both on the national and the local councils, with business to comprise the biggest single 
group on the national body. The White Paper argues that local learning partnerships will 
complement the local councils. The local councils will be expected to consult with local learning 
partnerships, avoiding duplication and providing a mechanism for local accountability. The 
proposed relationship appears analogous to that envisaged between RDA and Regional Chamber, 
footnoted above (DETR, 27.3.98). The local councils, as arms of the national council, will be 
appointed by the national council, with each 'local' chair selected by the Secretary of State. They 
will be managed by appointed chief executives. 
This complex background is of relevance to the material presented in the case studies, but the 
timing of the research meant that in Barnsley and in Rotherham, while the concept of lifelong 
learning had been built into local regeneration strategies, plans had not been made to 
accommodate this tranche of initiatives during empirical work. The pace of policy development, 
in this arena particularly, made the comparison between cases imprecise, even though the research 
was undertaken over a relatively short time frame. Hence, the discussion of EBPs is relevant 
throughout the four cases, but Lifelong Learning is discussed only in relation to Hull and North 
East Lincolnshire. 
Partnership and Added Value 
An important objective of the case studies is to try to evaluate what kind of achievements 
partnerships have delivered. The final part of this chapter considers issues associated with 
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evaluating partnership effects and provides a background to the way added value is treated in the 
case studies and the following analysis in chapters 9 and 10. 
A recent evaluation of the SRB, based on a sample of successful bids in rounds I and 2, reported 
that participants regarded the partnership approach as enabling a more holistic and strategic 
air) roach to tackling problems, to which end City Challenge had acted as an important stimulus - -KP 
(Tyler, March 1998). Benefits from the partnership approach included pooling of expertise and 
resources, enhanced networking, better co-ordination and avoidance of duplication, and a more 
4 strategic' approach to regeneration. A range of negative factors were also identified, including 
the level of government bureaucracy associated with challenge funding discussed above, the 
problem ofcompetition with public subsidy, including conflicting initiatives in the same area (see 
also David Curry, 3.4.98) and questionable 'additionality' (Tyler, March 1998). Stewart (1998: 
79) notes that empirical evaluations ofpartnership have been few, while the DETR recognises that 
it is difficult to measure the impact of SRB funding. Scepticism has been expressed concerning 
the impact of targeted funds on tackling social exclusion and in empowering local communities 
(DETR, 1997: 4.7). These concerns stand in contrast to the claim made by David Curry (3.4.98) 
that the SRB has 'mobilised thousands across the country into partnership' and'mobilised a whole 
generation of people into Civic activism'. Le Gales and Mawson (January 1994: 112) note that 
it is difficult to produce quantifiable output measures for'political outputs such as 'solidarity', co- 
ordination, cohesiveness'. These words are 'motherhood and apple pie' outputs which 
partnerships are supposed to engender. 'Inclusiveness', for example, which is generally seen to 
be a positive indicator in partnerships, may generate costs in terms of effective co-ordination and 
project capacity. If David Curry (3.4.98) is correct, the inclusion of voluntary sector 
representatives in strategic partnerships represents an impediment to effective project delivery by 
what he viewed as the key local actors - the local authority and the business sector. 
The process of evaluating the added value of partnership was not aided in this study by the 
absence of systematic thinking among participants about this issue or about the possibility that in 
some arenas, local government may be better than local governance. Notwithstanding these 
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difficulties, the study attempts a qualitative evaluation ofpartnership activity. Stoker (I 997a: 19) 
argues that it is necessary to consider not only the 'doing' of governance (inputs), but also the 
impact of governance,, its achievement of social purpose (outputs). For Cropper, the very survival 
of alliances depends on their ability both to command and create value (1996: 82). He 
distinguishes between 'constitutive' value, an input related concept reflected in the nature of 
collaborative effort, articulated as expressions ofpurpose and capacities; and consequential value, 
reflected in claims about the efficiency, productiveness and legitimacy of collaboration (1996: 
83/4). However, it is also acknowledged that organizations, in this case partnerships, can be 
valued for what they are and what they represent, for 'direct personal gratification and for group 
integrity and perpetuation, rather than for what, instrumentally, they can do' (Cropper, 1996: 90). 
In this sense, added value is intangible and unquantifiable (Huxham, 1996: 177). Values need not, 
therefore, be evaluated against material outputs. Hastings distinguishes between resource synergy 
as a materialistic concept and policy synergy, indicative of a process by which new insights or 
solutions are produced from differing perspectives (1996: 259). Partnership may thus be 
conceived as added value in three ways: as resource gain ('hard' or 'soft', 'input' or 'output'), as 
strategic capacity through policy negotiation, and as a thing in itself, a belief that co-operation is 
inherently good. In the case studies, inputs are often perceived by partners as added value in 
themselves and it often proved difficult for them to identify outputs corresponding with 
partnership inputs like 'synergy'. 
For these reasons, local governance capacity is judged in this study mainly against partnership 
objectives and against an evaluation, necessarily speculative in character, of whether these 
objectives could be achieved by the local authority or by the private sector alone, were extra-local 
resources allocated instead to one party or the other (see for example Harding, 1998: 71). This 
definition of added value is commensurate with the notion of 'power to' in urban regime theory 
(Stone, 1989), which is about governance capacity generated internally through local partnership 
activities. It also distinguishes between influence by business on local authority views and 
activities (policy synergy), and added value in partnership outputs (resource synergy) (Hastings, 
1996: 259). 
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It remains to note that any definition of added value is inherently normative. Business input to 
partnerships may generate different, or new, regeneration approaches and projects, but these 
approaches and projects cannot automatically be described as 'added value', given that choices 
have to be made between objectives. Criteria for the evaluation of the more tangible elements of 
added value, strategic capacity and resource gain, are value laden, because that which constitutes 
an added value output is dependent on political perspective and 'accomplishment' is not neutral 
(Grimshaw, 1996: 23 8). By simply acknowledging this point and focussing on local perceptions, 
rather than making a positive normative claim about added value, this study circumvents the 
normative element of the debate about added value. It should be noted, though, that this author, 
disbelieving the 'trickle down theory' of distribution, is strongly pre-disposed against the pursuit 
of profit-oriented projects, such as flagship tourist attractions, built at the expense of social 
projects, such as new housing development. " 
Conclusion 
If it shows nothing else, this brief sketch of urban policy initiatives illustrates how active central 
government has been in this sphere over a period of 30 years (Mossberger and Stoker, 1997). 
Local Government has been subjected to a continuous raft of initiatives in recent years designed 
to sustain partnership working. The policy ofNew Labour represents both continuity and change. 
It was the Conservatives who made the first move toward promoting local public-private 
partnerships in the early 1990s and it was they who began the process of encouraging inclusive 
social and economic regeneration strategies through the medium of the SRB. It is also arguable 
that they began the latest series of efforts to enhance co-ordination between departments and 
levels of government by establishing regional government offices. 
The initiatives now pursued by Labour are, in many ways, compatible with and advance this 
previous agenda. It remains to be seen where Labour is going but the most remarkable difference 
thus far visible between the present period and that before 1997 is the willingness by central 
15 The case studies highlight instances where 'social' objectives have been sacrificed for 
4economic' ones. 
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government at least to consider taking on board a regeneration policy agenda developed locally 
in the shape OfNew Commitment. The central-local partnership, noted in chapter 1, may represent 
the beginning ofa new era of collaboration between different tiers of government. But while local 
government is now better able to gain the ear of government, it is also clear from this top-down 
perspective that the rhetoric of decentralization has not been matched by deeds. As yet, there has 
been no delegation of the powers and resources necessary for localities to find their own way in 
partnership . But as implementation theory teaches us, street level bureaucrats have a habit of 
. r__ - iTustrating the objectives of legislators (Sabatier, 1986a, b). " The case studies therefore examine 
the influence of extra-local and local factors respectively in determining partnership directions. 
Whoever and whatever drives local partnership processes and objectives, the over-riding objective 
of both central and local government must be to derive added value from partnership working. 
Alliances are, quite logically, driven by the search for added value outcomes. If at the end of the 
day partnerships do not deliver positive outputs, it is questionable whether they have a future in 
local regeneration projects (Cropper, 1996). What kind ofpartnerships, then, have been generated 
in the locality, how have they been generated and what kind of added value can they be said to 
have produced? 
The four case studies presented in chapters 5 to 8 now explore these issues. The reasons for the 
choice of case study areas were discussed in chapter 1. The case studies, insofar as the material 
permits, follow the same basic format and deal with the same issues. They first introduce the local 
political and economic context, which is vital for understanding the development of partnership 
in each. They then provide a historical overview of partnership working from the standpoint of 
the local authority and of the business sector, exploring the factors which influenced each party 
in deciding whether to become involved. Based on the distinction between policy and 
implementation partnerships made in chapter 1, each case examines the partnership responsible 
for setting the local policy agenda for regeneration, though North East Lincolnshire is exceptional 
in that its challenge partnership does not fidfil this function. Three 'mini-cases' follow, exploring 
16 Street level bureaucrats are, in this context, local actors. 
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the way regeneration objectives are translated into practice through partnerships. The third mini- 
case in each instance examines partnerships involving business and education. The review of 
regime theory undertaken in chapter 2 shows that public-private collaboration exists across 
different policy arenas, including education. Much of the literature on partnerships in British 
political science neglects this area, which provides the rationale for incorporating a discussion of 
education partnerships into the cases. Education partnerships were found to be an interesting and 
relevant comparator with economic development in all four case studies. Chapter 5 proceeds to 
report the case of Bamsley. 
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Chapter 5. Barnsley -A Coal Town 
The Economic and Political Context for Partnership 
Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council (BMBC), a unitary authority, was created in 1974 when 
14 smaller authorities were amalgamated. The Council is dominated by Labour, which holds 63 
out of 66 council seats. It is the biggest employer in Barnsley, employing 10,900 people. Next 
in size is the local hospital with 2,000 employees (www. barnsley. gov. uk). Barnsley suffered badly 
from the decline ofthe coal industry and dependant industries, with a net loss of 20,000 jobs since 
the late 1970s. Mining employment stood at 15,000 jobs in the early 1980s with the last pit 
closing in 1994 (BRF, 1996). The figures for GDP growth in the period 1982-1997 for Barnsley 
(9%), for South Yorkshire (19%), for Yorkshire and Humberside (3 9%) and for the UK (44%) 
indicate the scale of relative decline. Ernst and Young, in a report on Barnsley's economic future, 
predicts that the economic gap between Barnsley, Yorkshire and Humberside, and the UK will 
widen due to continued low growth in the localeconomy (Ernst and Young, November 1997: 3). 
The relative economic and social decline in the coalfields is such that the South Yorkshire sub- 
region is now eligible for EU Objective I funding! - Nearly L400 million obtained from UK and 
European regeneration programmes since 1979 has not succeeded in stimulating regeneration in 
Barnsley, if the replacement of the 20,000 lost jobs and improvement in the town's relative 
economic position are indicators of success (13MBC, 5.8-99). Barnsley was perceived, ifanydiing, 
to be in a position of absolute economic decline. Of the four case studies, Barnsley's economic 
I To be eligible for Objective I assistance, a region must fall below 75% of the EU 
average for per capita GDP. GDP in Barnsley stood at 65% of the UK average -in 1996, falling 
to 59% by 1999 (BRF, 1996; Ernst and Young, November 1997; BMBC, 5.8.99). GDP in South 
Yorkshire is 73% of the EU average. Objective I money could be worth up to f. 90 million per 
year in South Yorkshire. 
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position is by far the worst and the Chief Executive doubted whether the town could ever recover 
its economic position of 20 years ago (BMBC, 5.8 . 
99). 2 
The decline of traditional employment in Barnsley revealed structural weaknesses in the local 
economy. A gap exists between available skills and the developing requirements of employers. 
The proposed remedy for these economic difficulties is radically to change the profile ofthe local 
economy away from traditional manufacturing industries. Ernst and Young (November 1997) 
argued that inward investment, above all else, has the potential to create a 'step change' in the 
economic fortunes of Barnsley. ' Envisaging alternative 'New Industrial' and 'Post Industrial' 
futures for Barnsley, they identified the latter strategy as most likely to succeed in regenerating 
the area (November, 1997: 36). Diversification was perceived to be necessary if the problems of 
over-dependence on a single declining industry is to be prevented in future (BRF, 1996: 14). 
Barnsley is concerned to attract investment from new high-tech industries, many of which will 
come from abroad. The borough has enjoyed limited success in changing its profile although its 
overall inward investment record has not improved in recent years (Ernst and Young, November 
1997: 19). In the year to September 1995, of nine new companies investing in Barnsley, four were 
foreign owned (BRF, 1996: 16). Three recent overseas investors,, Mion Electronics (400 
employees), Kostal UK Ltd (550 employees) and Koyo Bearings (245 employees) are now among 
the twenty biggest employers in Barnsley (www. barnsley. gov. uk). 
Globalization and Economic Regeneration 
The collapse of the coal industry was not attributed by the Council solely to global economic 
pressures, but also to political vindictiveness by the Conservative government and to an energy 
policy which promoted gas to the exclusion of coal (BMBC, 10.6-98b). The weak economic 
position of the UK and of Yorkshire and Humberside in the face of an ever more competitive 
49% of Barnsley's population is economically active, compared with 68% in 
Rotherham (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
3 By which Ernst and Young mean eliminating the disparities between the performance 
of Barnsley and the wider Yorkshire and Humberside Region by 2008. 
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global economy represents aI challenge' for Barnsley (BRF, 1996: 2), but economic 'globalization' 
was also seen as an opportunity for regeneration. It was argued that Barnsley has 'a good story 
to tell' footloose companies wishing to locate in the UK (BMBC, 6.5.98; BBEP, 26.10.98a). 
The Process of Inward Investment 
Ernst and Young (November, 1997: 18) argued that because Barnsley is comparatively small, 
enquiries are better handled at the sub-regional, or the regional levels. Barnsley was perceived to 
have limited capacity to achieve regeneration 'from within' (November 1997: 29) and 'South 
Yorkshire was considered to be a stronger brand than Barnsley' (November 1997: 5 1). Ernst and 
Young suggested that foreign investors focus in the first instance on large geographical areas with 
suitable characteristics and that therefore, in the first instance, neither Barnsley, Rotherham, nor 
any other place within South Yorkshire was likely to figure in their deliberations (November 1997: 
48). They therefore recommended the continuing development of the South Yorkshire Forum 
(SYF), as a 'strategic' or 'visionary' body with respect to regeneration and inward investment. ' 
A further incentive for pursuing a strategic partnership at the sub-regional level was the prospect 
of Objective I funds. BMBC feared that unless sub-regional administrative arrangements were 
put in place to the satisfaction ofthe European Commission, effective control of Objective I funds 
would fall to GOYH, or to the Regional Development Agency (BMBC, 6.5.98). The regional 
level was central in the process of attracting overseas inward investment to Barnsley. Half of new 
inward investment in Barnsley comes from overseas (BMBC, 15.9.98) and the Yorkshire. and 
Humberside Development Association (YHDA) handled the majority of overseas investment 
inquiries. The YHDA was part ofthe Invest in Britain Bureau (IIB) (www. dti. gov. uk/ibb) funded 
by the Govenunent, (60%), local authority contributions (20%) and private contributions (20%) 
(BMBC, 15.9.98). ' 
The discussion of the Barnsley Development Agency below shows why this 
recommendation was not carried out. 
As was noted in chapter 4, YHDA is now the inward investment arm of 'Yorkshire 
Forward'. 
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A recent investment by a US company, H&w Computer Systems, which develops, markets, and 
supports system and application software products for mainframe and PC platforms, showed 
typically how overseas investment proceeds. H&W were introduced to Yorkshire and 
Humberside through the IIB network after indicating a preference for a central site within 
England. The YHDA invited those authorities it deemed appropriate to provide site specifications, 
which were passed back to H&W who narrowed their choice to one site in Barnsley and one in 
the Dearne Valley. Both sites offered major financial packages including Development Area 
status, tax allowances on building, training packages and a business rate waiver until 2005 
(BMBC, 15.9.98). There was a competitor site in Germany seeking to win the investment 
contract, but this was rejected by H&W in favour of an English speaking country. This criterion 
was the most important factor in choosing England and local factors were not important at this 
first stage of consideration (H&W Systems, 20.7.99). H&W exports much of its product 
through the Port of Hull, lending weight to the impression that, as an American company, it is not 
overly concerned with location, given good transportation links. Local financial incentives and 
other elements like the sub-regional labour market only figured in the second 'trawl'. H&W felt 
that the YHDA had been instrumental in courting them, finding its approach to business to be 
more impressive than the East Midlands Region, which it said had tried to 'sell you on what they 
had available', rather than offering a made-to-measure site. The company was sufficiently 
impressed with the support it had received to become involved in 'championing' the area to three 
other companies considering locations in the Dearne Valley (H &. W, 20.7 . 99). 
6 
Inward investment and local dependence 
Global corporations, including Kostal UK and Koyo Bearings are expanding rapidly (BMBC, 
6.5.98; Kostal, undated, 22.10.98, Koyo, undated, 4.9.98). 7 Koyo, Bearings, for example, 
established in Barnsley in 1990, plans further expansion until it reaches an 'optimum' size in 
aro und 2003 (Koyo, 4.9.98). However, 'out-sourcing' is also a problem for Barnsley and it was 
6 The Dearne Valley Partnership is discussed ftuther below. 
7 Koyo Bearings is a precision engineering company. Kostal produces electronic 
controls for the automotive industry. 
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feared that a decision by Dunlop Slazenger to locate the production of tennis balls in the 
Philippines would result in local job losses (BMBC, 15.9.98). The productive capital of 
companies like Kostal, which rely on skilled labour, on just-in-time production and on the 
development of business networks, was considered to be less mobile than that of labour intensive 
industries. Stockpiling to meet 'just-in-time' demand, which outsourcing would require, is not 
an option in high tech industries where innovation proceeds rapidly and where team building takes 
time and resources. Outsourcing is not considered to be an immediate or medium term threat in 
such operations (Koyo, 4.9.98; Kostal, 22.10.98). Subject to market fluctuations, multi-national 
productive capital appears secure, although it remains to be seen what will happen when various 
financial incentives are withdrawn (BMBC, 15.9.98). However, the level of dependence on the 
town by these companies seemed to be weak. Kostal, for example, obtained its supplies (raw 
materials) from the parent company in Germany. Its main market, as a supplier, was the UK 
automotive industry, particularly Japanese companies. Its skilled labour had to be drawn from 
other parts of the UK (Kostal, 22.10.98). Koyo, on the other hand, perceived the old industrial 
culture of shift patterns to be an advantage in choosing to invest in the coalfield area. Like Kostal, 
Koyo obtains supplies from abroad and it supplies a national and international market (Koyo, 
4.9.98). Neither company is strongly dependent on Barnsley, though they both appear to be 
secure investments in the medium term. 
The Development of Partnerships in Barnsley 
Partnership in Bamsley was perceived to be a comparatively recent phenomenon, driven by the 
economic difficulties discussed above, combined with a response reflecting political change within 
the Labour Party locally and nationally. The Council recalled an ideological division where in the 
past, 'never the twain shall meet' and the only interface shared by the council and local business 
was discussion of the business rate (BMBC, 10.6.98ab). A change in attitude was identified over 
the past 10- 15 years, stemming from the period after the defeat of the 1984-5 miners strike and 
the subsequent realization that public institutions could not tackle the ensuing economic and social 
problems alone (BMBC, 5.8.99). A study undertaken by Sheffield University (September 1988), 
which recommended the establishment of an economic regenemtion partnership in Barnsley on the 
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Sheffield model (see Lawless, 1990,1994), suggests that 1988 was a time of flux in the attitudes 
of the public and private sectors. A survey of twenty six leading public officials and private sector 
directors indicated agnosticism with five expressing a preference for partnership working, five a 
preference against, with ten non-committal (Sheffield University, September 1988: 15). By 1990, 
Coopers and Lybrand detected a 'spirit of partnership in the area' (July 1990). The earliest 
example given of the Council seeking business involvement in economic development was an 
invitation by the Council Leader in 1985 to the then President of Barnsley Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (BCCI) to sit on the Council's Financial Assistance to Industry Panel (BBEP, 
22.10.98) which allocated grants to assist local business (BBEP, 22.10.98). Once economic 
development became the main priority for Barnsley, the Council's leadership decided that the 
business community, as wealth creators, needed to be mobilised if regeneration efforts were to 
succeed (BMBC, 10.6.98b). Economic development initiatives were pursued by BMBC with the 
private sector during the late 1980s in relation to the development and marketing of sites on the 
M 1, and through the establishment of an Economic Development Committee and its corollary, the 
Barnsley Development Office (BMBC, 21.9.88,7.2.89). 
BMBC's analysis of the Barnsley Partnership Ltd, its first venture company, illustrates the 
reasoning for partnership approaches! The partnership between BMIBC and Costain (a large 
development company), was established in 1990 (BMBC, 24.5.90) to 'get development moving 
in Barnsley', while retaining a 'degree of control' for the Council over the kind and quality of 
developments taking place (BMBC 23.6.97). The Council perceived itselfas, the initiator ofa new 
relationship with business, driven by local economic imperatives and by the related desire 'to 
demonstrate to the Government the Council's ability to work in partnership with the private 
sector' (BMBC, 23.6.97) as a means of procuring central government funds. In this respect, the 
partnership was successful, credited as a significant reason why Barnsley was able to win City 
Challenge (BMBC, 23.6.97: 1). Barnsley's initiative was in part a response to the perceived threat 
Now the Barnsley Miller Partnership Ltd. See discussion below. 
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of the Urban Development Corporations. 9 The Council recognised that it could either work in 
partnership or face having its economic development functions, including planning, transferred 
(BMBC, 10.6.98b). Apart from confrontation with government, collaboration with business was 
the only option open to BMBC. The Council recognised that it could not govern alone and, 
notwithstanding the generally gloomy prognosis for regeneration in Barnsley, it argued that if 
everyone pulls together, teamwork can make a difference (BMBC, 10.6.98b). Initial contacts with 
the business sector brought the Council into a relationship with the Chamber, enhancing informal 
links with business. It was also felt that the establishment of the local TEC brought the Council 
into contact with business leaders who had more local clout than those hitherto willing to become 
active, and provided a structured basis for the interface to occur (BMBC, 5.8.99). BCCI was 
identified by business leaders as an important medium for the involvement of business in 
partnership (Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98; BBEP, 26.10.98a; BCCI, 21.7.99). These links were 
both perceived as having provided a basis for relationships to improve (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
Business in Partnership 
Business leaders who were active in Barnsley in the 1980s shared a similar perspective to the 
Council in respect ofthe timing and the reasons for the emergence ofpartnership. They attributed 
change to the impact of unemployment and to overtures by the then Council Leader, Hedley Salt 
(Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98, BBEP, 26.10.98a). The explanation, mirroring that ofthe Council, 
was that all organisations have to 'pull in the same direction' if regeneration is to be achieved' 
(Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98). 
Koyo Bearings became involved in partnership working because its Managing Director was invited 
to join the Board of the TEC, opening up influence over a key government funding stream (Koyo, 
4.9.98). Membership ofthe TEC led him into activity in other partnerships, including the Barnsley 
Regeneration Forum (BRF) and, now, the Barnsley Development Agency (BDA). 10 Partnership 
9 See brief discussion in chapter four. 
10 The BDA is discussed further below. 
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was also considered necessary in order to 'get the best for Barnsley from diminishing resources' 
(Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98). Business involvement was perceived as a duty and business 
dynamism was viewed to be essential at all level of partnership for the success of regeneration 
projects (BBEP, 26.10.98a; BMBC, 5.8.99). While partnership was often perceived to be about 
economic development, rather than about local governance, corporate positions varied. Koyo 
prided itself on a moral ethic, the 'good neighbour syndrome' (Koyo, 4.9.98). The Managing 
Director of Koyo, the senior English speaking executive in Barnsley, has managerial discretion to 
decide company's policy toward local partnership activity. Partnership was not one of his 
objectives, but his decision to become involved has been encouraged by his Japanese bosses 
(Koyo, 4.9.98; undated). Similarly, the Managing Director of Kostal had no brief for or against 
partnership and it was his decision not to become involved, not that of his HQ (Kostal, 22.10.98). 
The view of business leaders who were raised locally and who worked locally was different from 
those who were not from Barnsley (BBEP, 26.10.98a; Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98). A strong 
view was expressed that not only was business input into the community a moral duty, it was also 
necessary across a range of policy arenas including education, if regeneration is to be achieved. 
Moreover, provided that common objectives are shared, it was suggested that business in Barnsley 
can provide 'checks and balances' to the domination of Labour in the Council, which the electoral 
system cannot (BBEP, 26.10.98a). One of Ernst and Young's conclusions was that more 
'business leaders' should be brought into partnership directly from Barnsley's private sector rather 
than through representative fora, the Chamber and the TEC (Ernst and Young, November 1997: 
98). This objective was also a priority for BMBC, which, along with private sector activists, 
pointed out that the same half dozen private sector actors tend to appear in all the main 
partnership activities in the Borough (BMBC, 6.5.98,10.6.98b; BBEP, 26.10.98a). " Barnsley's 
weak economic base meant that there were few potential business partners and no 'captains of 
industry', unlike Leeds, for example, which is much bigger and more prosperous (BMBC, 
11 When asked howthe commitment to 'holism' in Barnsley's IRS was sustainable in an 
apparently fragmented series of implementation networks, the Leader responded that they were 
all the same people (BMBC, 10.6.98b). 
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10.6-98b, 5.8.99). Conversely, the small number of activists within the private sector had enabled 
the Council to get to know key individuals from the private sector well and to form good personal 
relationships (BMBC, 10.6.98b; Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98), a factor believed to have provided 
extra 'glue' to partnership working. Good personal relationships were viewed as an important 
factor in stimulating partnership working and the residual ethos of collectivism associated with the 
coal industry has, it was felt, been retained in the partnership process, articulated as a sense of 
community (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
Meetings take up time and time was cited by business leaders as the most important constraint 
governing private sector participation in partnerships (BDTEC, 29.9.98, BBEP, 26.10.98a). 
Clearly, business people cannotbecome involved inpartnerships unless they have 'capacity' above 
and beyond that required to run their business. A problem for Barnsley in bringing new private 
sector actors into partnership was felt to be the small number ofbusinesses with sufficient capacity 
to become involved. More businesses could be encouraged, it was felt, if they had a clearer 
perception of what is required of them in partnerships and a sense that their input is valued and 
acted upon (BCCI, 21.7.99). 
There was also evidence of cynicism about the partnership process within the business sector. 
Kostal, with 550 employees and a turnover of E35 million per year did not see partnership as a 
priority (Kostal, 22.10.98). It believed that any commercial benefit from partnership would 
require a disproportionate effort and long term input. Kostal, described as 'insular', refused 
invitations to become involved in the TEC (BDTEC, 29.9.98; Kostal, 22.10.98). As noted above, 
V- 
Kostal has no particular 'dependence' on Barnsley and many of its employees, including the 
Managing Director, lived elsewhere. Barnsley, its economy and its people were not considered 
sufficiently instrumental to Kostal to justify a contribution to community activities. But even 
business leaders who perceived a moral duty to become involved in partnership recognised that 
economic benefit must be the 'bottom line' (BBEP, 26.10.98a). 
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It was suggested by the Council that the small active base within the private sector serves to keep 
private sector partners 'on board'. Inevitably, it was argued, in specific projects, there are 
compromises where one organisation loses out at the expense of another. 12 However, given that 
each party is involved throughout the web of partnerships, the potential for loss to be balanced by 
gain elsewhere prevented each partnership from fragmenting due to tensions ofthe kind discussed 
below (BMBC, 22.7.98). 
The Development of the Barnsley Regeneration Forum 
The first institutionalised partnership involving BMBC, together with Rotherham and Doncaster 
councils, was the Deame Valley Partnership, which provided a blueprint for subsequent 
partnership working in Barnsley (BMBC, 22.7.98; DVP, 9.6.98). The Dearne Valley Partnership 
is an autonomous sub-regional partnership involving Rotherham, Barnsley and Doncaster councils. 
It was formally established in April 1991 (DVP, 9.6.98) originating from the recommendations in 
ajoint report (November 1988) which established the 'Dearne Initiative' as a plan for regeneration 
of the Dearne Valley. A later report recommended the establishment of a formalised partnership 
based on the government's vision for private sector involvement set out in Action for Cities 
(HMSO, 1988) and on what it saw as existing models of good practice in Birmingham and in 
Sheffield (see Lawless, 1990,1994). 13 The Dearne Valley Partnership is responsible for managing 
the Deame Valley's City Challenge project and the Deame Valley Enterprise Zone. It viewed its 
prime responsibility as attracting inward investment and jobs (DVP, 9.6.98). " 
City Challenge and, subsequently, the SRB, played an important role in determining the direction 
I 
of both the Dearne Valley Partnership and Barnsley's local partnerships (DVP, 9.6.98). If 
12 See the discussion of the Barnsley Miller Partnership (BMP) below. 
13 According to Census figures, the Dearne Valley has a population of 76,601 or 10% 
of the three boroughs' populations. The base line indicator for unemployment at the beginning 
of City Challenge noted 96 vacancies in the area and 4279 unemployed (WMEB, November 
1993). 
14 The Chief Executive of BMBC was awarded an OBE for his role in getting 
partnerships started across South Yorkshire (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
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partnership was a 'necessary' response to economic collapse , the way it has developed was 
strongly influenced by central government funding regimes (BCCI, 21.7.99): 'What cemented the 
partnership was the opportunity to go for funds and our success in doing that' (BMBC, 
10.6.98a). " Thus, City Challenge represented an opportunity to institutionalise co-operation in 
the shape of the Barnsley Regeneration Forum (BMBC, 10.6.98b). 
The Barnsley Regeneration Forum (BRF) was set up in 1993 'to bring together the major players 
working for the regeneration of the Borough' (BRF, 1996: 3). It was believed within BMBC that 
the Forum would be instrumental in the process of obtaining further external funds. More 
generally, it had become clear that a good working relationship with the private sector was 
necessary if the Council wanted 'the ear of government' (BMBC, 22.7-98; BCCI, 21.7.99). 
Originally, the Forum was a tri-partite partnership, established at the initiative of the Council, 
consisting ofthe Council, Barnsley and Doncaster TEC, and the Barnsley Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. Its objective was to build a more competitive economy in Bamsley and to this end, 
its initial focus was purely on economic development. Subsequently, Barnsley College, Voluntary 
Action Barnsley, Barnsley Health Authority, the South Yorkshire Police, the Employment Service 
and English Partnerships joined the Forum, with GOYH sitting as an observer (BRF undated). 
The remit ofthe Forum was broadened in recognition that. economic development strategies alone 
were not working and it was felt that the SRB has Placed a greater onus on inclusiveness in 
partnership than did City Challenge (BMBC, 6.5.98; 10.6.98ab). 
VAiile the Barnsley Regeneration Forum is an institutionalised partnership, including 
representatives of local elites, it is not an independent company, instead being administered within 
the Chief Executive's Department of BMBC and chaired by the Council Leader. The Council's 
leadership of the Forum was viewed as ensuring its democratic legitimacy as a stakeholder 
partnership. Moreover, the Council, with its tradition of strong civic leaders and its large relative 
n 15 City Challenge was the Conservative government's irst major challenge fu d 
initiative, introduced in 1991. See chapter 4. 
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size, was perceived to be the dominant institutional actor in the area (BMBC, 10.6.98a, 22.7.98; 
Koyo, 4.9.98; BDTEC, 29.9-98). 
The Forum is responsible for determining strategies and priorities for bids into regeneration 
programmes, and for the management of regeneration projects. The Council remains the 
accountable body for the expenditure of SRB funds (BRF, undated). The Forum has two sub- 
groups, one for SRB projects and one to administer Objective 2 monies. There was little obvious 
disagreement as to the general path which Barnsley needs to follow. Barnsley's Integrated 
Regeneration Strategy (IRS) contains four 'strategic goals': wealth creation, social cohesion, 
lifelong learning and quality of life (BRF, 1996: 4). This document comprises the vision statement 
for the Borough and the principal policy statement of the Forum. All partners are committed to 
the revival of the area through wealth creation and each partner agreed that the role of the others 
is vital to that task. Relationships between the parties on the Forum were viewed as good 
(BMBC, 10.6.98b; BDTEC, 29.9,98, BBEP, 26.10.98a; BCCI, 21.7.99). 
It is difficult to say just by looking at the IRS which agency has the greatest influence on it and 
with what effect. It was written within the Council, but BCCI claimed to have suggested the idea 
of a common strategy (BCCI, 21.7.99). The President of BCCI, Vice-Chair of the Forum, 
described his role as putting forward a commercial position but he did not quantify his influence 
on the IRS in any way (BCCI, 21.7.99). There were mixed views about whether the partnership 
has influenced the Council's approach to regeneration issues. The Chief Executive felt that the 
Council have always been'municipal entrepreneurs', but was unsure whether the development of 
a more business like approach to local government had resulted from partnership (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
The Forum was perceived by the Council officer managing it to have stimulated a change in policy 
orientation, where the objective ofj ob creation for those with an 'employee mentality' had been 
supplemented by that of facilitating wealth creation and business growth through individual 
entrepreneurialism (BMBC, 10.6.98a). " Despite this uncertainty as to influence, the approach 
16 This point is discussed in more detail below in relation to the Barnsley Miller 
Partnership Ltd. 
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adopted in the Barnsley Integrated Regeneration Strategy (IRS) toward social regeneration issues 
is indicative of a widespread, if not deeply held, commitment to market led growth. Social 
regeneration was perceived within the IRS, in part, as the need to generate a community through 
enhanced personal competitiveness (BRF, 1996: 35; BDTEC, 29.9.98). 17 
The Forum is viewed as an overarching 'holistic' partnership, with responsibility for setting the 
parameters in relation to which partner agencies act as implementation agents for specific elements 
of the strategy (BMBC, 10.6.98b; BRF, 1996: 2). It was described by Ernst and Young as the 
emerging 'pre-eminent local body' (November 1997: 29). The full range of local regeneration 
activities are, in theory, governed by the strategic objectives established by the Forum in the shape 
of the IRS (BRF, 1996). " But neither the TEC nor business leaders viewed the Forum in this 
way. The Vice President of Koyo Bearings, for example, when asked which partnerships he was 
involved with, failed to recall that he was on the Forum's Board until prompted. He perceived the 
Barnsley Development Agency (BDA) as the centre of the partnership network (Koyo, 4.9.98). 
The Chairman of Yorkshire Traction also perceived the BDA to be the key local partnership in 
terms of power and influence (Yorkshire Traction, 22.10.98). Barnsley and Doncaster TEC 
suggested that the Forum has had no significant role in strategic developments in Barnsley but 
rather that it stitches together different bodies and different elements to provide a broad appeal 
(BDTEC, 29.9.98). VAiile these elements do not conflict, they were not viewed as 'strategic' in 
the sense of being generated through common thinking. This attitude was reflected among some 
senior officers within BMBC. The Form was viewed, for example, as a body in which people 
pursue their own 'pet interests and self interests' (BMBC, 15.9.98). If the partners on the Forum 
share a common agenda, it was questioned whether this agenda has yet to permeate beneath the 
elites. 'The common agenda exists at the highest level, but not beneath that in constituent 
organisations' (BCCI, 21.7.99). The Chief Executive, for example, recognised that BMBC 
17 This objective is discussed further below in relation to Barnsley Business Education 
Partnership (BBEP). 
18 The IRS is discussed below. All Council services are directly or indirectly concerned 
with regeneration in its broadest sense. 
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remains a heterogeneous organisation, elements in which could discourage wider participation in 
partnerships; 'you don't always get the smiling face of John Edwards! ' he said (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
The tenuous nature of the common agenda was articulated by BCCI, which felt that the Council 
still pursues anti-competitive priorities, arguing for spending on deprived communities, when 
redevelopment of the town centre holds the key to regeneration (BCCI, 21.7.99). 
It was also argued that rather than focussing on the four strategic objectives in the IRS, Forum 
meetings are bogged down in SRB procedures, rather than concentrating on strategic thinking. 
According to BDTEC (29.9.98), 'the Forum evolved on the back of the programmes, so it reports 
back on them ... 
it is a rubber stamping mechanism which the Government Office approves of. 
BCCI argued that 'there is work to be done to regenerate the Regeneration Forum 
Government systems inhibit it because they are labourious' (BCCI, 21.7.99). BMBC's Chief 
Executive acknowledged that the partnership is encumbered by SRB bureaucracy, but he felt that 
the Council absorbs much of it, so that it doesn't impinge on partnership activities. There is a 
tension, he argued, between the flexibility of infonnal. partnerships and the need to maintain. 'audit 
trails' thereby ensuring openness and accountability. He further believed that a partnership 
structure is an essential means ofkeeping partnership going, due to a comparatively high turn over 
of personnel which could impede networking. He felt that the structure gives newcomers a focus 
to relate to (BMBC, 5.8.99). Institutional partnership structures were, therefore viewed as very 
important and it was felt that most ofthe key interfaces between local authority and business occur 
through the formal media ofpartnership bodies such as the Barnsley Regeneration Forum (BCCI, 
21.7.99). 
Added Value and the Barnsley Regeneration Forum 
Discussions of added value were characterised by an inability to pin down concrete achievements 
for partnership. Perceptions of added value were, generally, abstract. Said the Council Leader, 
'Simply having better relationships is good for the town' (BMBC,, 10.6.98b). The Chief 
Executive's view concerning added value was 'we must believe it, or we wouldn't do it' (BMBC, 
5.8.99). According to the manager of the Forum, without partnership, the likelihood is 'that our 
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programmes and strategies would have been less relevant to the needs of the area' (BMBC, 
10.6.98a). Common aims and objectives in a competitive world 'help Barnsley in relation to 
competing with other towns and cities' (BMBC, 10.6.98b) and add to the credibility of a 
community seen to be pulling together (BMBC, 5.8.99). '9 The most obvious sign of competitive 
success for the Forum continues to be external funding in the form of City Challenge and the SRB, 
which could not have been obtained without an institutionalised partnership. " This perception 
was shared by businesses which identified the SRB as the main indicator of partnership success 
(Koyo, 4.9.98; Yorkshire Traction 22.10.98). The President of BCCI, however, considered that 
while the Forum was positive as a body representing community opinion and stimulating cross- 
sector discussion, it had failed to alleviate Barnsley's problems. A gulf still remains, in his view, 
between the capacities of the Forum and the need for community leadership which, he argued, is 
an essential pre-requisite for progress (BCCI, 21.7 . 
99). 21 
Beneath the Regeneration Forum: Partnership Activity in Barnsley 
If there are grounds for scepticism about the Council's claim that the 'culture' of partnership is 
embedded at the strategic level (BMBC, 5.8.99), it was felt in Barnsley that this culture has not 
been embedded at the practical level (BMBC., 6.5.98,10.6.98a, b; BDTEC, 29.9.98; BBEP, 
26.10.98a). Ernst and Young highlighted continuing differences in 'approach and priorities" 
between Forum partners (November 1997: 29). They argued that implementation ofthe Barnsley 
IRS will require more effective, better co-ordinated institutional structures beneath the level ofthe 
Forum. 'Institutional capacity" at the operational level was seen as critical for successful 
regeneration (Ernst and Young, November 1997: 29). The question of whether new institutional 
19 Duplication of effort is an issue in 'operational' partnerships but not at the strategic 
level which focuses on ideas, mission statements and fund procurement and management. 
20 The Forum is responsible for working up bids and for monitoring their implementation. 
However, BMBC remains the accountable body for central government funds. 
21 By community leadership, he seemed to be expressing a wish for greater willingness 
on the part of the Council to prioritise economic development over social objectives. 
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capacity has emerged is considered in relation to the three 'operational' partnerships discussed 
below. 
Barnsley Development Agency 
The Barnsley Development Agency (BDA), established as a limited company in November 1998,, 
is a Council inspired partnership, first proposed in the Ernst and Young report (November, 1997). 
The BDA is governed by a Board, which includes representatives from each participating agency, 
the Council, BCCI and the TEC. It is managed by an appointed Chief Executive from the private 
sector. " It has brought together the Council's Development Office and Barnsley Business Link, 
which is part of the TEC. The BDA is a response to what was identified above as the need for 
coordination and leadership to drive wealth creation (BMBC, 10.6.98a). It is seen in part as a 
delivery mechanism for the forthcoming Regional Development Agency (RDA) (BMBC, 
10.6.98b), and in part as a means of providing better integration at the operational level of 
economic development locally, an implementation mechanism for the Barnsley Regeneration 
Forum (BCCI, 21.7.99). Like Ernst and Young, BMBC considered that beneath the strategy 
statements of the Forum, there remains too much fragmentation and not enough 'synergy' at the 
operational level (BMBC, 6.5.98; Ernst and Young, November 1997: 29). However, the proposal 
for the BDA was also perceived as a defensive move by the Council in response to proposals from 
Rotherharn Chamber of Commerce Training and Enterprise for a sub-regional inward investment 
body, which would involve local councils ceding control of their inward mivestment offices. 23 
BMBC countered by arguing that while there is scope for South Yorkshire relationships on 
4strategic' economic questions and in relation to Objective 1, inward investment activities are 
better focussed on the local scale than on the sub-region (BMBC, 15.9.98). It was argued above 
that the regional and national levels are important for inward investment, and it isn't possible here 
to assess whether local or sub-regional offices would make any material differences. What was 
22 The Chieffixecutive of BDA is Hector Birdwisa., Deputy Chainnan ofKoyo Bearings 
(Europe) Ltd. 
23 This discussion is elaborated in the Case of Rotherhmn which follows in chapter 6. 
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evident is a conflict in perspective between the TECs which tend to operate on a supra-local basis 
and BMBC which is confined to its local administrative boundaries. 
The establishment of the BDA has also been controversial within Barnsley itself (Koyo, 4.9.98; 
BMBC, 10.6.98a, 15.9.98, BDTEC 29.9.98; BCCI, 21.7.99). Although it involves the Council 
relinquishing at least part of its control over inward investment activities, it has been perceived as 
an attempt by the Council to take control of economic development. The TEC's perception was 
that Business Link already provided a 'one stop shop' which could have served the BDA's 
purpose and that the Council was trying to impose itself, confident of an enhanced role for local 
authorities following Labour's general election win (BDTEC, 29.9.98). The Council insisted that 
this was not true and on the contrary, that it is ceding control of its inward investment arm. It 
argued that the problem lies with the other bodies, particularly the TEC, which, it said, does not 
wish to relinquish control over business link activities (BMBC, 10.6.98a). " This conflict has been 
described as a 'turf war' (Koyo, 4.9.98). The BDA has been established on these lines for an 
interim 18 month period, based on a dual accountability arrangement in which the Barnsley 
Development Office and Business Link will continue to answer to Council and TEC respectively. 
An SRB funded Community Economic Regeneration Team with responsibility for capacity 
building in the community is the only element wholly accountable to BDA Board. There was 
scepticism as to whether these dual lines of accountability can work and about whether they will 
be superseded by genuine integration in due course (BMBC, 15.9.98, BDTEC, 29.9.98). 
Potential Added Value in the BDA 
The question of added value is largely speculative in relation to the Barnsley Development 
Agency. One argument in favour of the BDA was that duplication will be eliminated and 
responsibilities clarified. For example, when a new investment occurs, the Council offers an 
'aftercare service' (BMBC, 15.9.98). The point at which a new investment ceases to involve 
'aftercare' and the point at which it falls within the responsibility of Business Link, the 
24 BCCI could see both points of view in this debate (BCCI, 21.7.99). It felt that the 
situation could be resolved, were both organisations to be less parochial in attitude. 
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Organisation which provides support for local businesses, is a grey area which BMBC and the TEC 
have been arguing about, resulting in duplication of effort (BDTEC, 29.9.98). The BDA should, 
in theory, eliminate this kind of difficulty with both parties working within the same office 
(BDTEC, 29.9.98) and it may facilitate 'understanding', provided 'turf can be agreed (Koyo, 
4.9.98). However, the continuation of dual lines of accountability leaves room for scepticism on 
this point about which only time will tell. The BDA was also considered to be capable of 
delivering a strong voice for Barnsley, necessary to compete with its large neighbour, Sheffield, 
for the ear of the Regional Development Agency (BMBC, 10.6.98ab; Yorkshire Traction, 
22.10.98). Fear of being marginalised by bigger, more powerful places was one of the reasons 
why Barnsley resisted giving up its inward investment function to a sub-regional body and, instead, 
gave it some autonomy within a local partnership. 
Barnsley Miller Partnership Ltd 
The Barnsley Miller Partnership Ltd (BMP) between BMBC and Miller Developments, is a 
. L-I- venture company established, as noted above, to facilitate commercial development over which 
the Council has some influence (BMBC 23.6.97). Miller Developments is the commercial 
development and investment subsidiary of the Miller Group which specialises in providing 
4construction and development services in the public and private sectors throughout the UK' 
(www. eevl. ac. uk). 
The BMP represents the second venture company with which BMBC has been involved. The 
rationale for the first, the 'Barnsley Partnership Ltd' was discussed above (BMBC 23.6.97). 
However, the partnership failed to deliver due to the property recession and related financial 
difficulties, events which made Costain, the developer in the partnership, unwilling to take'normal 
development risks' (BMBC,, 23.6.97). As a result ofthese difficulties, Costain withdrew from the 
partnership and BMBC decided in November 1997 to form a new partnership, based on the view 
that it would help in 'stimulating new investment and job creation in Barnsley' (BMP, 21.10.98; 
BMBC, 23.6.97: 11). Miller Developments also perceived opportunities in Barnsley for 
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21 development and the partnership as a means to that end (BMBC, 23.6.97; BMP, 21.10.98). 
Miller stands to gain profit share from the rent payable by incoming firms in proportion to the 
financial risk incurred in infrastructural investments such as site clearance and road building. 
Unlike the Costain partnership, which set itself the objective of creating 5,000jobs, the Barnsley 
Miller Partnership was not established with particular targets in mind but as a'generic partnership' 
with the long term objective of development throughout the borough (BMP, 9.10.98). The 
essence ofthe partnership is the land, planning expertise and access to grant aid which the Council 
can provide and the private sector funding, expertise and access to development profit which 
Miller brings to the table (BMP, 9.10.98,21.10.98; BMBC, 6.5.98). One special benefit of 
working with Miller perceived by BMBC was that it is a family company, entirely privately funded. 
Unencumbered by remote central banks and the constraints of the City of London, it was felt that 
Miller is able to respond to local opportunities with greater flexibility (BMBC, 5.8.99). 
While this partnership has straightforward development objectives, it raises broader issues in 
relation to partnerships and best value. The Council recognised that one risk of partnership 
working is the problem of 'vested interest'. If a particular business, or business leader is involved 
in partnership, others could perceive, unfairly or not, that this company is being granted 'an inside 
track' with respect to development opportunities or to planning issues (BMBC, 5.8.99), thus 
creating resentment and conflict. This problem has implications not only for Council relationships 
with the wider business community, but for its commitment to 'best value' practices, which 
working with the privatesector is supposed to encourage. While the Miller partnership has limited 
exclusive development rights, there had been a perception, acknowledged by BMBC, that the old 
partnership enjoyed a monopoly position, thus generating hostility from elements within the 
business sector, particularly among developers excluded from development opportunities. Miller 
is effectively an 'in house private sector developer' (BMP, 9.10.98). It was for this reason, and 
due to caution generated by the collapse of the Doncaster 2000 Partnership amid allegations of 
corruption (Doncaster Free Press, 24.12.97) that the new partnership was subjected to lengthy 
scrutiny by BMBC's external auditor, delaying the process by a number of months (BMP, 
25 The partnership manager was seconded from Miller Developments. 
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21.10.98). The partnership tried to counter such perceptions by emphasising publicly the long 
term nature of the partnership and Miller's commitment to it. The partnership agreement runs for 
five years and, in theory, even if it were to achieve all current objectives, Miller would still remain 
committed to it. 
The commitment for Miller involves, at the minimum, financing 2/3 of the partnership overheads 
(BMP, 21.10.98). It was emphasised that long term commitments also mean investing substantial 
resources in projects which could prove fruitless, notably the Oakwell City Challenge project 
(BMP, 21.10.98), to which Costain seconded an employee two days per week and substantial 
resources in terms of time and expertise. This scheme collapsed because of a failed compulsory 
purchase order (CPO), turned down by parliament. The decision was described as 'bizarre' by 
the partnership manager, given that the project had been an integral part of Barnsley's City 
Challenge project. The rejection of the CPO meant that EO. 8 million in public money, together 
26 with Costain's input, went 'down the drain' (BMP, 21.10.98). 
More fundamentally, the Council feared that if schemes do not quickly come to fruition, pressure 
will develop, driven by the profit motive, for Miller to pursue short term high-yield projects which 
comply neither with its re-industrialisation strategy nor with its broader objectives for 
regeneration. A possible conflict between profit andjob creation was recognised where the profit 
objective might result in pressure on the partnership to bring in a lowj ob density scheme quickly, 
rather than waiting for a high density employment opportunity to arrive (BMBC, 23.6.97: 13). 
The partnership manager agreed that within the partnership there was always a tension between 
the Council's objective for labour intensive developments and Miller's profit interest. He offered 
as an example of Miller" s commitment to the partnership, the company's pledge to retain part of 
the Fields End Business Park, a 30 acre Enterprise Zone in the Dearne Valley (BMP, 9.10.98) for 
development as a labour intensive call centre (BMP, 21.10.98). 
26 This is the extent of the challenge faced by New Commitment to Regeneration. 
Barnsley is one of the 22 pathfinder groups in this initiative, chosen in July 1998. 
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Added Value in the Barnsley Miller Partnership 
The partnership manager highlighted a recent development by Kenpak Europe Ltd, an American 
manufacturer of sterile medical packaging, to demonstrate both the commitment by Miller 
Developments to the partnership and the 'added value' it has generated. It is thought that Kenpak 
will deliver more than 100 jobs. The development was perceived to be the result of long term 
negotiation over 18 months which overcame serious problems with land contamination. In the 
view ofthe partnership manager, without the partnership agreement, Miller would not have 'stuck 
with it' in which case the development could have gone elsewhere (BMP, 21.10.98). If the main 
objective ofthis partnership for the Council is job creation, rather than profit share, then the down 
side may be that it has to allow developments which are not labour intensive, like the GEFCO 
distribution centre, a warehouse taking up a lot of space, but offering fewjobs (BMP, 21-10.98). 27 
In short, while specific developments have been facilitated by the partnership it is not possible at 
this stage to quantify the balance of achievement in relation to added value, whether defined as 
job creation or as industrial development more generally. 
The Barnsley Business Education Partnership 
Each of the strategic goals in the IRS, including that for 'Lifelong Learning' are linked to the 
economic development agenda. 
The growth ofa flexible labour market demands that individuals have to commit themselves 
to ensuring that their skills and knowledge are current and are in line with the needs of 
employers. For the individual, personal competitiveness will have a major bearing in 
economic success (BRF: Autumn 1996: 35). 
This position closely mirrors that ofthe TEC, which identifies a'lack of commitment'to, learning 
among local people, serving to 'inhibit the development and personal competitiveness of the 
individuals' thus restricting 'the regeneration of the wider economy' (BDTEC, undated). Thus, 
the objective of 'improved access to learning opportunities' is, to an extent, based on a market 
driven philosophy of education. Ernst and Young shed further light on this thinking, arguing that 
because an '-employee mentality' tends to prevail among the workforce, the 'promotion of 
27 GEFCO is a subsidiary of Peugeot. 
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entrepreneurship' is an important objective (Ernst and Young, November 1997: 2 1). The views 
of Kostal illustrate a business perspective on this issue: 
There is a gap in the attitudes of the local community ... There is a lot of theft, crime, not the 
work ethic there should be. There are high absences and high turnover because there has 
been a lot of unemployment here for generations (Kostal, 22.10.98). 
'Lifelong learning' shows in a practical way how the economic development agenda has affected 
the wider thinking of BMBC. Priorities for schools reflect the entrepreneurial attitudes discussed 
(ati-ove in relation to economic development. However, the LEA suggested that local autonomy 
in determining priorities is strictly limited; 'we put together the education development plan, based 
on a series of options given us by the Government. We just choose one' (BMBC, 13.8.99). It 
is difficult, therefore, to determine whether those elements of local policy oriented on 
competitiveness were developed locally or nationally. Nonetheless, the LEA believed that since 
schools have a responsibility to prepare young people for adult life, and the business community 
is part of adult life, then business should be involved with young people's learning (BMBC, 
3.9.99). The involvement of business in education was viewed as an important element in 
preparing school children for work (BMBC, 13.8.99). The Barnsley Business Education 
Partnership (BBEP) represents a concrete example of this approach. 
BBEP is a registered company comprising four partner organisations, BMIBC, BCCI, the TEC 
and, recently, Barnsley College. The partnership was launched in April 1990 as part of a 
government initiative to improve education and business links nationally (BBEP, undated). - The 
objective of the Partnership is 'to unite business with education and create a coherent thriving 
community where young people can realise their potential in the world of work' (BBEP, April 
1998). Declining educational achievement in Barnsley was attributed to demoralisation and to 
despair arising from economic decline and unemployment. The 5% fall from 77% to 72% in 1995 
among the year eleven cohort remaining within the education and training system provides a stark 
indicator of increasing disillusionment, which, it was suggested, often sets in at the beginning of 
secondary education (BDTEC, undated; BBEP, 26.10.98a). Only 29% Barnsley Pupils obtained 
five or more GCSEs at grades A-C in 1995 compared to 43.5% nationally (BRF, 1996: 7), placing 
Barnsley in the bottom ten LEAs nationally. This figure had risen to 29.8% by 1998, placing 
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Barnsley 12' bottom (The Guardian, 1.12.98). 28 The role of the BBEP is to mobilise the business 
sector in an attempt to reverse this position, making the youth of Barnsley prepared for work 
(BMBC, 3.9-99). In practice, the partnership manages a range of projects designed to facilitate 
bi-lateral links between schools and businesses (BBEP, 26.10.98b). 
While there is no formal co-ordination mechanism at present, and the role of the BBEP was not 
viewed as having a key role in determining the learning needs of people in Barnsley, the BBEP's 
mission statement is compatible with the borough regeneration strategy and with the objectives 
of the Barnsley Regeneration Forum (BBEP, 26.10.98a; BMBC, 3.9.99), seeking to support: 
the economic regeneration of Barnsley, the raising of achievement levels in Barnsley, the 
preparation of young people for the world of work, the development of the work-related 
curriculum, personal and professional development of staff from education and business 
(BBEP, April 1998). 
BBEP is based on a formalised partnership agreement, originally the Barnsley Compact (BCCI and 
BMBC, June 1990). The 'Compact' provided historical background, highlighting that business- 
education partnerships had existed in Barnsley since 1974, normally involving officers from 
Barnsley Local Education Authority (LEA) sitting on BCCI committees such as the Education 
Forum (BCCI and BMBC, June 1990). The Compact stated that it was BCCI which, in August 
1989, approached the LEA with a proposal to establish an 'Industry Education Partnership'. A 
Working Party was established in November 1989 to develop an action plan and a vision statement 
for the partnership (BCCI and BMBC, June 1990). The objective of raising aspirations. and 
preparation for the changing world of work were evident in this document. 
The activities ofthe partnership focus on specific small scale initiatives, including the mentorship 
of students, teacher placements, recruiting business governors and contributing to those aspects 
of the school curriculum associated with 'industty activities'. It is chaired by a semi-retired 
businessman, who was Managing Director of a local company until 1994 (BBEP, 26.10.98a). As 
a former president of BCCI, he was instrumental in establishing closer relations with the Council 
28 The Guardian's figures reveal extreme discrepancies in achievement between schools, 
the lowest success rate being 13% and the highest 64%. 
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during the 1980s, believing that 'businesses can make a real impact at no cost and with minimum 
disruption to the working day' (quoted in BCCI, March 1998). This remark was underpinned by 
a critical attitude to a perceived lack of commitment within the business community to partnership 
work (BBEP, 26.10.98a). The Chairman of BBEP was emphatic that business representation 
through quasi public bodies such as BDTEC is not the answer to partnership problems and that 
g real' business people should be willing to come forward, in their own long term interests and in 
those of the community. Beyond the Chairman, who is paid for his efforts, there is no business 
involvement in the activities of BBEP (BMBC, 3.9.99). The Chairman argued, however, that 
business expertise can play an important role, ensuring a match between what schools are doing 
and what business wants. While the national curriculum is not negotiable at the local scale, it was 
felt that presentation, responsiveness, respect, punctuality and reliability are attributes which 
schools must teach so that pupils understand some of the disciplines of work in advance. The 
projects of BBEP are organised to achieve this end (BBEP, 26.10.98b). 
The overheads of BBEP are funded exclusively by public monies from the SRB, DfEE and 
BDTEC (BBEP, 26.10.98b). The contribution of the private sector, in the person of the 
Chairman, was perceived to be restricted to his time and to expertise (BMBC, 3.9.99). He felt 
that one of the key roles he played as chairman was to mediate tensions over 'turf' between local 
authority and TEC. He said that it had proved very difficult to get businesses, particularly small 
businesses, to give time to activities such as mentoring or governorship, and he argued that public 
funds should be put aside to convince 'big hitters' who have experience, an 'extra dimension' to 
bring to education, to get involved. These problems were attributed partly to the lack of a 
substantial business base in Barnsley, but also to a lack of commitment on the part of the local 
authority (BBEP, 26.10.98a). The concern was that once external funds run out, the EBP will fail 
because private sector support for local projects is otherwise unsustainable. In this sense, there 
was a perception that commitment is 'superficial' both among business and in the Council (BBEP, 
26.10.98a). This perception was lent added weight by the Local Education Authority's 
perspective on the BBEP and the history of education business partnerships more generally. 
Conceived as an important means of bringing private sector influence to bear on public sector 
150 
thinking and management, it argued that 'now there are very few public sector organisations that 
are not run on business principles ... one of the rationales 
for having EBPs has essentially 
disappeared' (BMBC, 3.9.99). 
Partnership Added Value 
Added value arising from the BBEP was perceived entirely in terms of soft, input related factors. 
The main benefit identified was the different perspective which business has brought to education 
matters on the partnership board. Business acumen in relation to project development and fund 
raising was perceived to be vital. The key to partnership added value and to synergy, it was 
suggested by the Chairman, has been the bringing together of differing approaches to an agreed 
agenda, shared by the parties on the BBEP Board (BBEP, 26.10.98a). The LEA was more 
sceptical about added value. Ultimately, it argued, 'all activities could have been achieved by 
other means'. Added value in education business links was perceived to emanate from individual 
prej ect activities and the links which'come naturally from those organisations involved' (BMBC, 
3.9.99). As such, it was suggested, BBEP would be better absorbed into a larger organisation, 
like the LEA or the TEC, which would release money from partnership overheads for education 
business link projects (BMBC, 3.9.99). 
Case Summary 
Barnsley is a small local authority area, which has been decimated by economic decline and social 
fragmentation. If it is to have any chance of success in its regeneration project, Barnsley will have 
to diversify and diversification means attracting high levels of overseas capital to the area. 
Barnsley's partnership strategy was driven by the perception that it had no options in the aftermath 
ofthe pit closures. Its relationships with the private sector have developed incrementally since the 
mid 1980s. The institutionalisation ofpartnerships, however, was driven primarily by the funding 
opportunities associated with City Challenge and the SRB. Relationships are good between 
partners on the Forum, but there are doubts whether commitment to the partnership agenda 
survives beneath corporate elites, especially within the public sector funded organisations, BDTEC 
and BMBC. Furthermore,, the Forum was viewed as overly bureaucratic, a problem attributed to 
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the rigours of government funding, and there was scepticism in Barnsley as to whether the IRS 
is genuinely strategic in character. 
The story of operational partnerships, in one way or another involved in implementing the IRS, 
was very varied. The BDA was born out of turf wars and a concern that Barnsley should be heard 
amid the clamour for RDA resources emanating from more powerful neighbours. The Barnsley 
Miller Partnership illustrates the potential for long term co-operation between developer and local 
authority, at the same time highlighting potential tensions between best value and partnership on 
one hand and profit andjob creation on the other. The Barnsley Business Education Partnership 
appears to be a partnership with little future. Its responsibilities for managing local education 
business link projects are viewed as outdated. Overall, business involvement in the partnerships 
has been very limited, strongest where a direct commercial interest could be identified. The 
explanation for this situation lies partly in motivation and partly in the structural weakness of the 
local business sector. The added value in partnership working was perceived, by and large, to 
reside in the different inputs which business could bring to the table. These inputs were principally 
6soft' in nature, characterised in tenns of expertise, knowledge, synergy and networking 
capabilities. Indeed, concrete examples of added value were few. It was felt that some 
partnership activities would enhance co-ordination, thereby eliminating duplication, but the major 
added value perception of the partnerships, particularly the BRF and the BDA, was the 
procurement of governmental funds. The exception to this rule, the Barnsley Miller Partnership, 
provides a rare example of a convincing claim that partnerships can generate outcomes which 
could not have been achieved without the partnership arrangement. The evaluation of added value 
requires time, but there was little sense of optimism that partnership will play a major role in 
reversing the continuing decline of this stricken mining community. 
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Chapter 6. Rotherham -A Coal and Steel Town 
The Economic and Political Context for Partnership 
Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council (RMBC) became a unitary authority in 1974. Labour 
holds 65 out of 66 seats, with one Conservative councillor. Rotherham too suffered from the 
dramatic decline of the coal industry with just one pit, employing around 400 people, remaining 
in the Borough in 1998 (RiDO, 25.11.98). VAiile it remains a major employer, Rotherharn 
suffered the 'double whammy, of severe cutbacks in the steel industry. The steel industry, the 
second largest employer in Rotherham after the Council employing 4,000 people, continues to 
shed employees at a rate of about 5% per year (BSES, 12.2.99). Between 1970 and 1992, around 
40% of all jobs in Rotherham were lost, with unemployment peaking at 23.5% in 1986. By 
October 1998, unemployment had fallen to 7.6% (RMBC, 25.11.98), compared with a UK rate 
of4.4%. Rotherham's rate ofunemployment declined marginally more rapidly between 1991 and 
1998 than that of the region, but the position worsened relative to that nationally (RMBC, 
25.11.98). In light of these figures, the objective of reducing unemployment in Rotherham to the 
regional average by 2000 appears optimistic (RMBC, June 1995: 26). Unemployment was not 
the only indicator of decline in Rotherham. Average hourly earnings for full time male manual 
employees fell from 6% above the UK average in the 1970s to 2% below the UK average in 1994 
(RTEC, 1995: 11). Rotherham GDP stood at 76.4% of EU Average in 1998 (RMBC, 16.11.98). ' 
However, Rotherham appeared to be stronger than its South Yorkshire counterpart, Barnsley, 
across a range ofeconornic indicators including business survival rates, gross value added per head 
I Barnsley's GDP stands at 59% of the UK average. Unfortunately, figures are not 
available comparing Rotherham's GDP growth over the past 15 years with that of Barnsley. Nor 
are there statistics available for GDP comparable to those of Barnsley. 
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and educational attainment (GOYH, MaY 1997). 2 In the Index of Local Deprivation (DETR, 
2.6.98), Rotherham, lies in 50th place, below Sheffield (25th), Doncaster (39th) and Barnsley 
(42nd). 3 
Rotherham's Economic Strategy 
The decline of traditional employment created a gap between labour skills and employer 
requirements in the Rotherharn economy (RCCTE, April 1998), necessitating a 'structural 
reorganisation ofthe local business sector in order to improve its responsiveness to new economic 
opportunities' (RMBC, 1997: 8). The strategy pursued is one of economic diversification, toward 
the service sector and tourism (RMBC, 1996: 16, REP, 1997a: 13). 
4 Rotherharn has had some 
success inrealising its diversification strategy. Growth has occurred in the service and 'high tech' 
production sectors (RMBC, 1997: 8). Examples include recent investments in two new call 
centres by One 2 One and Ventura at Rotherharn's Manvers Enterprise Zone, creating 2,300 new 
jobs (RiDO, Spring 1998). ' These investments, the largest that Rotherharn has seen in decades, 
are expected to have a marked effect on unemployment in the Borough. Such high profile 
successes enable Rotherharn to put forward a positive message to prospective investors (RMBC, 
31.3.98a; RiDO, Spring 1998). The Rotherharn Industrial Development Office (RiDO) articulated 
this optimism: 
2 Business Survival: Barnsley & Doncaster, 78.6%, Rotherham, 83.1 % after 12 months. 
Gross Value Added Per Head: Barnsley and Doncaster E20,003, Rotherharn E22,317 (GOYH, 
May 1997: 14-15). 
3 The ILD was criticised in Rotherham for not picking up small pockets of deprivation 
in otherwise well off areas (RMBC, 9.6.98). RMBC considered the ILD to be flawed, being 
'skewed' in favour of inner city areas and against traditional coal and steel areas (RMBC, 
25.11.98). 
4 The Magna project, worth E37.5 million, is the major tourism venture in Rotherham 
(Rotherharn Advertiser, 23.12.98). This project, supported by the Millennium Fund, is turning 
the former Templeborough steel works into a major 'leisure and learning' facility, expected to 
attract an estimated 900,000 visitors per year. The project was described as the flagship 
regeneration project and the lynchpin of Rotherham's regeneration strategy, creating substantial 
local and sub-regional economic activity (REP, 17.12.98). 
5A ftu-ther 2,000 jobs have recently been announced by Ventura (RMBC, 23.3.99). 
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it is notjust one of the more attractive parts of the UK... it is also one of the most dynamic 
areas for industrial and commercial growth ... 
There is an excitement within the Rotherham 
economy that has to be experienced to be believed (www. RiDO. org. uk). 
However, the rhetoric of success can be misleading. In 1997 RiDO's publicity claimed that the 
6 120 acre Templeborough site was now 'almost full' (RiDO, Autumn 1997). Yet one year later, 
it was estimated that more than 25% this site remained unoccupied (RiDO, 25.11.98). The 
northern part of the Borough benefited from call centre investments, but the same is not true of 
other areas, especially the west of Rotherharn (RCCTE, 19.1-99). Rotherham Town Centre was 
described as a'ghost town' (BSES, 12.2.99) and the local press views with scepticism claims that 
Rotherham is a 'booming town of the north' (Rotherham Advertiser, 13.2.99). 
Globalization and Economic Regeneration 
The world economy was perceived to present Rotherham with opportunities and threats (REP, 
12.5.98; RMBC, 21.4.98b). For example, LuK UK, a German clutch supplier to Nissan, Ford, 
Vauxhall and Toyota, located in Rotherham because semi-skilled wage rates are E8 per hour, 
rather than f 17 in Germany (www. RiDO. org. uk, RMBC, 21.4.98b). While this wage rate is low 
compared to Germany, it is high for Rotherham and the company was viewed as a good catch 
(RiDO, 25.11.98). On the other hand, RMBC blamed the high level of the pound for recentjob 
losses in the steel industry (www. rotherham. gov. uk). In its bids for government funds, Rotherham. 
emphasises the legacy of decline in coal and steel, highlighting, in SRB I for example, that of 366 
local authority districts, Rotherham. lay 363rd in educational attainment based on 1991 ILD 
figures, 338th for self employment as a proportion of the economically active population and 
356th for long term unemployment (REP, 6.9.94). 7 
6 Templeborough is a former steelworks. 
7 The figure for educational attainment is not consistent with that discussed below at 
GCSE level, where Rotherham, while below the national average, is well above the bottom of the 
league. 
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Inward Investment and Indigenous Growth 
RiDO is responsible for implementing Rotherham's economic development strategy, which seeks 
to generate both new inward investment and indigenous expansion. Given that there is some 
diversity in the local economy, it was argued that growth must also be achieved through expansion 
of the current business base, RiDO suggesting that 50% of businesses expected to expand in the 
financial year 1998/99. ' )&Ule further diversification is a priority, it was recognised that success 
would not be achieved immediately, and that people need jobs now, not in some distant future. 
Hence, Rotherham continues to market its traditional strengths (RiDO, 25.11.98). As of 
November 1998, Rotherharn hosted 70 overseas investors, employing around 5,000 people 
(RiDO, 25.11.98). 9 It was estimated that overseas investment accounts for 7.1% of thejobs in 
Rotherham, but it is difficult to assess the extent to which overseas investment maybe growing in 
importance, as figures were not available over a long time frame. Over a three year period to June 
1998,1,167 newjobs out of 3,619 were created by overseas investors, 32.2% (RiDO, undated). 
The Process of Inward Investment and Local dependence 
Like Barnsley, the majority of overseas inquiries for new inward investment in Rotherham come 
via the Invest in Britain network and the YHDA. The local view was that new overseas 
companies decide on a national location before they choose a locality like Rotherham (RiDO, 
25.11.98, RCCTE, 22.1.99). However, other factors being equal, the location of some overseas 
companies are determined by the market they supply, suggesting a degree of local, or at least 
regional, dependence. Three Korean firms came to Rotherham in 1996 to supply Samsung's plant 
in the North East, creating 184 jobs and making re-location unlikely, provided Samsung remains 
(YHDA, March 1996). " British Steel Engineering Steels, the largest manufacturer in Rotherham 
8 While this figure may look impressive, it would be wrong to draw any inference from 
it without comparison with figures from periods of economic expansion and recession. 
It is not known over what time frame these investments have occurred. The bulk of 
the 650 jobs yet to be created by the One 2 One investment are not included in this figure (RiDO, 
25.11.98). 
10 The three companies were Fine Electromechanics, Sung Kwang Electromechanics and 
Poong Jeon Co. Ltd which, in total, created 156 jobs. Kwang went into receivership in 1998. 
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is also unlikely to relocate. While it had proved vulnerable to global competition, continuing to 
shed jobs, the company is capital intensive and dependent on skilled elements of the local 
workforce for half its labour. The plant was not viewed as mobile, but neither was it considered 
safe from global competition (BSES, 12.2.99). 
As well as overseas capital investment, indigenous expansion and domestic investments were 
considered important in Rotherham. Over the past 3 years, 67.8% of newjobs have been created 
by indigenous companies (RiDO, undated). LuK UK, chose to expand in an investment worth E9 
million, despite competition from Hungary to 'host' the expansion, because of its view that 
Rotherham has produced a 'skilled, hardworking team'. The decision to expand was further 
influenced by an expansion ofNissan's operations in the North East and by the fact that there was 
room for expansion on the site (LuK UK, cited in www. rido. org. uk; RiDO, Spring 1997; YHDA, 
July 1996). " Local factors therefore proved important in relation to attracting a secondary 
investment. Unsurprisingly, new and expanding domestic investors enquire directly to Rotherham, 
knowing the characteristics ofthe area and the availability of incentives, if not in Rotherham, then 
in the South Yorkshire area (RiDO, 25.11.98). Here, the size and quality of available sites has 
proved to be important. Laycast UK, for example, invested in af 13 million expansion, involving 
relocation from Sheffield to Rotherham because the 16 acre site and the infrastructure were 
12 
suitable (Laycast, cited in www. rido. org. uk). RMBC believes that the regional brand is the key 
to inward investment and that 'parochialism' over whether an investment should be on one. side 
of a Council border or the other is destructive. Despite competition for regeneration funds, it was 
argued, Rotherharn has to build on the back of success in Sheffield. 'If Sheffield is doing well, we 
are doing well' (RMBC, 21.4.98a; RCCTE, 22.1.99). 
13 
11 As suggested by RiDO, LuK UK is 'insular' in character refusing, as a matter of 
company policy, to participate in this research (LuK UK, 14.12.98). 
12 This relocation did not involve 'competition' between Sheffield and Rotherham 
because there were no net job losses to Sheffield (RiDO, 25.11.98). 
13 This view was not shared by those who regard Rotherharn town centre as a 'ghost 
town' laid to waste precisely because of developments like the huge Meadowhall shopping centre 
in Sheffield (BSES, 12.2.99; Rotherham. Advertiser, 13.2.99). 
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The Development of Partnership in Rotherham 
There was broad agreement that the Council has been involved in co-operation with industry since 
the early 1970s. Economic co-operation was identified as far back as 1972 with the establishment 
of the Rotherham Area Development Company, the forerunner of RiDO. This was ajoint inward 
investment board, seen as 4very innovative in its day' (RMBC, 21.4.98b). Partnership working 
was seen and continues to be seen as functional to economic development. The Council argued 
that it has always been pro-active in this regard: 
A very simple example, which amazes some people when I've said it over the years is ... we 
will do any deal which will create jobs whether it is selling the land, leasing it or whatever 
(RMBC, 31.3.98a). 
The award of an Enterprise Zone to Rotherharn in 1983 (DoE, 1.2.83), at a time when, it was 
claimed, neighbouring authorities saw it as 'not the right thing to do politically' (RMBC, 
31.3.98a), was cited by the Chief Executive as indicative of this attitude. The Council Leader, 
more cynically, stated that the award of the Enterprise Zone was due to the personal relationship 
between the former Leader, Sir Jack Leyden, and the then Minster for Local Government, Lord 
Bellwin, rather than to any special local fac tors, 'it's the old boy network I'm afraid'. However 
he agreed with RCCTE that RMBC had always been business friendly and that the Council had 
been 'working toward partnership since 1974' (RMBC, 21.4.98a; RCCTE, 22.1.99). So, its 
approach to economic development predispoSed Rotherham, a 'pragmatic' authority, toward co- 
operation with the private sector, and the Enterprise Zone was heralded as vindication of this 
approach (RMBC, 21.4.98b). 14 
There was also a common impression that co-operation was initially founded on a strong sense 
of local community, described as 'close knit' with a common sense of identity and of 'wanting to 
do something for Rotherham' (RMBC, 31.3.98a, Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). Community identity was 
14 The Rotherharn Advertiser stated that employment rose from 531 to 4225 in the 10 
year period of the Enterprise Zone (Rotherharn Advertiser, 5.8.94). The perception of 'success', 
however, was not universal with Rotherham Unemployed Centre arguing that there was no 
genuine added value because jobs came in from other areas without Enterprise Zones. It also 
argued that the cost of supporting a single job in an Enterprise Zone was greater than supporting 
the same job through council spending (RUC, undated, 2). 
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described as a 'glue' to partnership in Rotherham and, latterly, partnership as a 'glue' to 
community identity (Aizlewoods, 6.1-99). VAlile respondents insisted that a positive attitude 
toward the private sector and the economic development agenda is nothing new, a distinction was 
made between informality in the 1980s and structured partnership represented today by the 
Rotherharn Economic Partnership and the Dearne Valley Partnership (RMBC, 31.3.98a, 
21.4.98a, b). Formality was perceived to have been driven politically through the demands of 
government programmes because 'that is what the government said we've got to do' (RMBC, 
31.3.98a). The Council Leader believed the development of formal partnerships to be driven by 
the 'threat' of an imposed Urban Development Corporation. VAiile co-operation with business 
has been long standing, it was political restrictions on the scope and funding of local authority 
activities, including the establishment of Training and Enterprise Councils, which required the 
Council to collaborate with 'quasi public bodies', including RCCTE. In this sense, partnerships 
were considered to have more to do with bringing together the fragmented public sector than with 
building new links with the business sector (RMBC, 21.4.98a). This argument was, in part, 
supported by RCCTE, which claimed that while the Council always enj oyed co-operation with the 
private sector, the relationship was 'paternalistic' in character with consultation viewed by the 
Council as a rubber stamping mechanism. It believed that a 'real' understanding of the private 
sector was only stimulated through the establishment of TEC which has challenged this 
paternalism (RCCTE, 22.1.99). 
Council 'pragmatism' in relation to partnership was not, however, universal. One officer identified 
continuing hostility among politicians to partnership initiatives, perceiving co-operation as 
grudging, rather than willing: 
Some members have been on the Council for 25 years or more. They are retired coal and 
steel workers who take the view that any development mi the borough should be financed 
by the Council. They don't see any merit in sharing costs and opportunities with other 
sectors. Some are still in a position of power (RMBC, 31.3.98b). 
This perception was underlined by a leading councillor, who described himself and other 
colleagues as "pragmatic old labour' in relation to partnerships (RMBC, 22.1.99). The Council 
Leader himself felt that many of his colleagues tolerated partnerships with the private sector only 
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because ofthe financial rewards for doing so (RMBC, 21.4.98a). RCCTE argued in the same vein 
that the Council could not be viewed as homogenous and that the relationship between it, RCCTE 
and the private sector varies between departments and between levels of management (RCCTE, 
22.1.99). 
Business in Partnership 
As in Barnsley, the level of business activity within partnership is low. At a conference of local 
stakeholders organised by the Rotherham Economic Partnership, of 120 people attending, only 
7 attended from the business sector and the Chairman of the Rotherham Economic Partnership 
could identify only 4 key private sector players in the area (REP, 17.12.98). Moreover, as in 
Barnsley, those active in one partnership tend to be active in others. The Chairman of a local 
building materials firm, for example was on the Boards of the REP, the Magna partnership, the 
Dearne Valley Partnership and RCCTE. He had also, in recent years, been President of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the TEC (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). " 
A number ofexplanations were offered as to why partnerships developed and as to why businesses 
participate. A sense of duty was perceived to 'put something back into the community we trade 
in', based on the sense of community 'identity' noted above. This sense of civic duty, described 
as 'Cadburyish' (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99), was related to longstanding local connections among 
private sector actors with most of these actors being local people who trade in companies with a 
strong local base (RMBC, 31.3.98a). Different types of self interest were also offered as 
explanations for participation in partnership. It was suggested that when unemployment in 
Rotherham peaked in the mid 1980s, there had been a danger of social unrest, and that business 
decided to take some action to try and prevent this happening. More importantly, it was 
recognised that companies, to a greater or lesser extent dependent on Rotherham for labour and 
for markets, would benefit from a regenerated economy and might benefit indirectly from the 
15 Rotherham TEC and the Rotherham arm of Sheffield and Rotherham Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry had merged, together with Rotherham Business Links and Rotherham 
Enterprise Agency. 
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procurement of regeneration funds (Aizlewoods, 6.1-99). In this sense, business could only stand 
to benefit from regeneration partnerships and, through mechanisms like the REP, to gain leverage 
over the way money is spent. In order to achieve regeneration, it was argued, business, like the 
Council, requires co-ordinated efforts between public and private sectors. 'Unless you work in 
partnership, you get nothing. Business has as much interest in this as the Council' (REP, 
17.12.98). The perception of good relationships with the Council over a long period was shared 
by much of the business sector, and in this sense, a culture of partnership was identified in 
Rotherham based on the Council's perception that the private sector has an important role to play 
in addressing social deprivation (REP, 17.12.98). 16 However, formal partnerships were considered 
sustainable only insofar as they have control over significant resources. Indeed, were regeneration 
funds to be returned to local authority control, it was felt that the private sector would no longer 
have a stake in the governance of the area and the local authority, while it might consult business, 
would treat the money as its own (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). 
A general reluctance by business to become involved, particularly among SMEs and overseas 
investors, was identified by RMBC, the typical response being 'don't bother me, I'm too busy. 
... But 
if you've got any money to offer, we'll have a look' (RMBC, 31.3.98a). It was suggested 
that part ofthis attitude stems from a continuing beliefthat the Council makes all the decisions and 
that partnership is a waste of time when business is faced with so many competitive pressures 
(REP, 17.12.98). The Council, while recognising a willingness by business to respond to 
consultation, perceived only limited commitment to active participation in partnership (RMBC, 
21.4.98a, b). One Council officer suggested that with the demise of the coal and steel industries, 
the potential to attract industrial leaders to partnership had disappeared. He expressed a 'gut 
feeling that new investors don't have a stake in the area' (RM13C, 31.3.98b). 
The merged Chamber-TEC (RCCTE) was perceived as the 'voice' of business in partnership. 
The merger was viewed as a positive step, creating a stronger business organisation which could 
make better efforts to promote both SME activism and business participation more generally 
16 The Managing Director of British Steel could detect no change (BSES, 12.2.99). 
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(REP, 12.5.98, RMBC, 21.4.98b, Aizlewoods, 6.1.99, RCCTE, 22.1-99). As a consequence of 
the merger, more leading employers had joined and RCCTE claimed to have one of the highest 
membership penetration rates in the UK comprising 25% of employers representing 75% of all 
employees (RCCTE, 22.1.99). Business therefore finds itself on a more equal footing, able to 
engage in meaningful partnerships with the Council through RCCTE. It claimed that the 
establishment of the TEC had brought more senior business players to the table (RCCTE, 
22.1.99). 
The Council and RCCTE were invariably identified as the 'big players' in partnership (REP, 
12.5.98; 17.12.98). Hence, the perception that influence within partnerships is restricted to 'public 
or quasi-public bodies' (RMBC, 21.4.98a; BSES, 12.2.99). It was claimed by the most prolific 
business activist in Rotherharn, that his involvement has cost him a fortune (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99), 
though he didn't regret it. Time was highlighted as the most important constraint on business 
involvement, a problem becoming more acute as competitive pressures grow. It was argued that 
there are few 'big hitters' of the kind which the Borough needs, and only a small business base 
(RMBC, 21.4.98a; REP, 12.5.98). In the absence of a 'Richard Branson' or a 'Christopher 
Haskins' it was felt that business would be more likely to join up in support of a big, confidence 
inducing, 'flagship' project like Manchester's Olympic bid, or a strong regional partnership, like 
the North East Development Agency (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). A bonus of this kind would, it was 
suggested, give the partnership process 'momentum'. " A ftu-ther problem was identified in 
involving companies with Head Offices outside Rotherham, some of whom 'get 100 letters per 
day from partnerships'. The strategy, therefore, was to ask for individual involvement, rather than 
for a 'corporate signature'. It was felt that this approach is helpful in bringing individuals on 
board, but that it doesn't unlock corporate resources (REP, 12.5.98). Those involved in 
partnership reported a positive corporate approach to partnership work,, with local managerial 
autonomy to determine whether to get involved, including limited discretion over resource 
commitments (REP, 17.12.98; BSES, 12.2.99; Keepmoat, 5.8.99). 
17 Lord Haskins is Chainnan of Northern Foods. 
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Business participation in partnership was perceived by some to be symbolic in character 'The 
words are used, but it is difficult to see any tangible output' (BSES, 12.2.99). Business leaders 
were vague about their role, giving responses such as 'I attend committees' or 'I give my time'. 
Those with a clearer idea saw themselves providing specific 'expertise' in the development of 
regeneration projects (REP, 17.12.98). In addition, business representatives regard themselves 
and were regarded by RiDO as 'champions', having an important role to play in convincing 
potential inward investors about the virtues of Rotherham. With respect to 'championing', the 
absence of 'big hitters' was viewed as a problem (REP, 12.5.98; Aizlewoods, 6.1.99; RiDO, 
25.11.98). 
The Rotherham Economic Partnership 
As with the Barnsley Regeneration Forum, the Dearne Valley Partnership (DVP) provided a model 
upon which the future Rotherham. Economic Partnership developed. " The key difference 
perceived between the pro-active relationships with the private sector that preceded the DVP and 
the structured relationships which followed was that the local authority no longer perceived itself 
to be 'pre-eminent' and it did not automatically expect to 'lead' partnership initiatives. The key 
political and ideological change identified by RMBC in the period leading up to the establishment 
ofthe Rotherham. Economic Partnership in 1993 was the recognition, forced upon it by declining 
resources and developments in government policy, that other agencies, especially the TEC, would 
also lead regeneration activities in Rotherhain in future (RMBC, 31.3.98a). The Council Leader, 
however, still views fonnal partnerships as necessity rather than virtue. He insisted that 'we could 
have done it with the correct Rate Support Grant' (RMBC, 21.4.98a). 
As a direct result of the levels of unemployment in Rotherharn in the mid 1980s, the Council 
invited representatives from the business community and the local trade unions to discuss a plan 
of action (RMBC, 21.4-98b). Consequently, the Rotherham Economic Forum, a partnership 
between the Chamber of Commerce, the Council and the trade unions was established to promote 
economic development in Rotherham. This informal body was the precursor to the Rotherham 
18 The history of the DVP was outlined briefly in the Case of Barnsley. 
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Economic Partnership. The failure of Rotherham's bid for City Challenge Round 2 was the 
immediate catalyst for the establishment ofthe Rotherham Economic Partnership after the Forum 
was criticised for being 'too much of a 'talking shop' (RMBC, 21.4.98b) and for its 'lack of 
structure' (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). In addition, there had been political hostility to the newly formed 
Rotherham TEC and it was decided, following the failure of Rotherham's City Challenge bid in 
1992, and in light of continued industrial decline, that the Council and the TEC would work better 
in a partnership situation, where others could 'hold the ring' (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99; RMBC, 
22.1.99; RCCTE, 22.1.99). 
The Rotherham Economic Partnership was launched by David Hunt MP, Secretary of State for 
Employment, in November 1993 (Rotherham Advertiser, 19.11.93). The partnership was 
originally chaired by a 'leading' figure from the private sector, in the person of Sir Gordon Jones, 
then Chairman of Yorkshire Water, who was perceived as a powerful figure in the region (REP, 
17.12.98; Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). The REP is an institutionalised partnership, and like the Barnsley 
Regeneration Forum, it is not a limited company. It is, however, an 'arms length' partnership in 
three senses. Its offices are located independently of the Council and the TEC, it is managed by 
a member of staff seconded from the Department for Education and Employment with a private 
sector background, and it is chaired by a business leader, the Regional Manager of Marks and 
Spencer, successor to Sir Gordon Jones (REP, 12.5.98,17.12.98). '9 
The partnership was, in the first instance, clearly associated with the Government's objectives for 
economic regeneration. 'O Its mission statement was to 'work for the economic well-being of 
Rotherharn, raising its profile and attracting and generating investment'. The partnership 
developed a 'strategic' vision, which set out an optimistic picture of what Rotherharn could look 
like ten years on (REP, 1995a). A key task was to develop a cohesive strategic framework for 
19 That the Chain-nan ofthe Partnership is from outside Rotherham was indicative ofthe 
lack of a business 'big hitter' in Rotherham. Lord Haskins ofNortl; em Foods in Hull was initially 
asked to become Chairman of REP after Sir Gordon Jones retired (RMBC, 21.4.98b). 
20 According to David Hunt MP, 'our aim in proposing partnership is simple: to 
strengthen industrial competitiveness' (cited in REP, 1995a). 
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D- 
Rotherham through which a thriving economy could be built (REP, 1995b). Since 1993, the scope 
of the partnership has widened, with a focus on 'social' issues and a written strategy statement, 
focussed on seven activities, mirrored in the Counci I's economic development plan (RMBC, 1997; 
21 21.4.98b). The 'Regeneration Strategy for Rotherham' comprises a 'ten year mission' to 
'strengthen the Rotherham economy, produce additional jobs, and help make Rotherham a place 
where people feel proud to live and work' (REP, 1997a: 1). As in Barnsley, the social agenda had 
an economic basis, a key principle being 'the need to encourage greater self reliance and ambition 
amongst Rotherharn businesses and citizens if the problems of the past are not to be repeated' 
(REP, 1997a: 2). The SRB and other funding mechanisms were credited with having driven the 
partnership toward dealing with broader issues of social exclusion (REP, 12.5.98; RCCTE: 
22.1.99). 
Influences on and Within the Rotherham Economic Partnership 
One business leader suggested that the partnership had lost its 'helicopter' vision as a consequence 
of the sheer weight of work associated with managing the SRB bid and management process 
(Aizlewoods, 6.1.99), a factor which has generated resentment against the 'mind boggling' 
22 demands ofthe Government Office (RMBC, 21.4.98a). An even stronger view was that bidding 
for'pots ofmoney' specifically discourages strategic thinking in the partnership and that there had 
arisen a tendency to engage in the pursuit of external funds, regardless of local need and the 
burden of work associated with this pursuit (RiDO, 25.11.98: RCCTE, 22.1.99, BSES, 12.2.99). 
Rather than contributing to an emergent 'local governance' the SRB was perceived by some to 
have generated a change from 'local government' to 'local administration' in partnerships 




21 These are business support, inward investment,, technology, tourism, education and 
training, community based regeneration, and the town centre (RMBC, 1997: 1). 
22 As in Barnsley, the accountable body for SRB funds is the Council. 
23 The SRB was not the only'fanding stream' financing REP projects. Others included 
the ERDF and the National Lottery. The SRB was the most significant pot of money over which 
the partnership had control (REP, 12.5.98). 
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The overall objectives of the partnership, set out in A Regeneration Strategyfor Rotherham were 
agreed by the main partners, and there was no evidence of disagreements over 'policy' in this 
broad sense: 
The detail is where tensions exist, there is no conflict over where we see ourselves going. 
We've been through a very bad time, so it was all hands to the pump. Conflict exists in the 
practicality, the detail of how to carve things up. Everyone understands where we are going 
(RMBC, 21.4.98b). 
Notwithstanding numerical domination of the REP Board by business representatives, there was 
a perception that the Council drives policy development. The private sector felt that the Council 
is the 'final arbiter', given its budget, its democratic mandate and given the time which council 
officers in their 'day jobs' are able to put into the process of partnership development (REP, 
1997a; 17.12.98; Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). A stronger view was expressed by the Managing Director 
of British Steel, a Board member, that the partnership is not a major part of the Council's 
thinking' and, despite rhetoric to the contrary, that were it not for external funds, it 'wouldn't 
care' (BSES, 12.2.99). Insofar as there is a dynamic within the partnership, it was perceived to 
be between the Council and RCCTE, described as 'the professional civil service' (B SES, 12.2.99), 
rather than between the Council and the private sector (RMBC, 21.4.98a). But any tensions that 
exist were viewed to be less about policy than about organisation. 
Added Value in the Rotherhant Economic Partnership 
Given that one of the reasons the REP was established was as a means to bring the Council and 
Rotherharn TEC into a pro active relationship, it was felt that the process of partnership had 
rendered the Council less fearful of ceding 'turf to other bodies (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99; RCCTE, 
22.1.99). Nonetheless, there remain tensions over organisational remit in arenas such as inward 
investment and education and training, in relation to which the TEC was described by the Council 
Leader as 'the old training arm of the Council' (RMBC, 21.4.98a). 24 The merger between 
Chamber of Commerce and TEC created 'paranoia' within the local authority that it might be 
24 This relationship is discussed further below with respect to Rotherham Business 
Education Links (RBEL) and to partnership and the inward investment function. 
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marginalised (RMBC, 21.4.98b, 22.1.99). 21 Describing the relationship between the Council and 
RCCTE, the Chairman of the REP drew an analogy with a phenomenon he called 'carpet wars' 
in Marks and Spencer. In these carpet wars, different sections within a store compete for floor 
space, when for example, food lines extend onto territory normally occupied by clothing over the 
Christmas period. These changes cause tensions between retailers of food and clothing, mediated 
by the manager, who is concerned with maximising the performance ofthe whole store. Similarly, 
a constantly changing social and political agenda means that organisational responsibilities are 
changing in Rotherharn, a factor which has lead to interorganisational tensions, mediated by the 
partnership which keeps its eye on the 'big prize' of regeneration. In this respect, the Chairman 
of the'REP saw himself mediating the partnership equivalent of 'carpet wars'. As in the store, 
tensions are aired within the partnership and agreement reached, a perspective supported by the 
Council, which felt that the main problems occur when one organisation cut across the territory 
of another (REP, 17.12.98; RMBC, 21.4.98b). 
However, the most common response to the question about 'partnership effeds' was a pause, 
followed by speculation that the 'end result is greater than the sum of the parts' (RMBC, 
21.4.98b). When pressed about what the REP can do which the private sector and the Council 
cannot achieve separately, it was agreed that the principal benefit to Rotherharn has been in the 
form of regeneration funds from Government sources (RMBC, 31.3.98a, 21.4.98a, REP, 
17.12.98, Aizlewoods, 6.1.99). Beyond this concrete gain, the availability of business expertise 
in support of regeneration projects was viewed as beneficial. It was suggested that the business 
sector provides 'flair and imagination', where councillors and officers may not possess the 
necessary 'business acumen' or, specifically, the 'discipline of the bottom line'. But it was 
recognized that such subjective claims cannot be substantiated (RMBC, 31.3.98a; Aizlewoods, 
6.1.99). Ultimately, in the view of RCCTE, claims for added value rest in the 'huge positive 
synergy' perceived to exist in Rotherham, the benefit of which cannot easily be measured. 
However, 
25 A point re-iterated below in the discussion about education business links. 
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... if you were to ask me how many jobs that had created 
for Rotherham, the answer would 
be none. We can create ambition, can help fund, can perhaps claim that somejobs came to 
Rotherham rather than elsewhere (RCCTE, 22.1.99). 
Others were more cynical. The manager of Rotherham Industrial Development Office, for 
example, questioned the added value generated by the Rotherharn Economic Partnership: 
I don't know what one partnership ... which meets six months per year -I don't know what 
that partnership achieves. I know what I achieve, what we achieve, but not what the 
Rotherham Economic Partnership achieves. They look very nice, but what do they actually 
achieve? (RiDO, 25.11.98). 
He criticized the partnership for symbolism, believing that it has not honestly addressed the 
question of what added value it brings. He regarded the REP as something of which the 
Government Office approved, but as a diversion from the real business of partnership building, 
which, he felt, occurs best informally. This cynical view was shared by the REP Board member 
from British Steel, who viewed the partnership as a 'fashionable' gesture to fimding agencies, 
6 servicing a dogma', while generating no added value. He felt that his presence on the REP Board 
makes no difference and, therefore, he makes little effort to attend meetings (BSES, 12.2.99). 
Beneath the Rotherham Economic Partnership: Partnership in Action 
The debate about the 'strategic' capacity of the REP also relates to the operational level, 
specifically the way in which the implementation side of economic development policy is 
organised. The key to successful partnership, according to the Chairman ofthe REP, is the taking 
and sharing ofresponsibility for projects at the operational level. The following sections examine 
one formal partnership, the Rotherham Housi ng Partnership Ltd (RHPL), and two policy areas 
where co-opeiation occurs, or has occurred, industrial development and education business links. 
Partnership and Industrial Development in Rotherham 
In comparison with Barnsley, with its new Development Agency, inward investment activities are 
'fragmented' within Rotherham. The Rotherham Industrial Development Unit was 're-branded' 
as the Rotherharn Industrial Development Office (RiDO) in 1995 (RiDO, 25.11.95). This exercise 
was perceived as marking a change from a 'reactive' to a 'pro-active' approach to industrial 
development with a stronger emphasis on marketing. At the time of its re-branding, RiDO 
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reported to the REP, and was a partnership body funded jointly by RMBC and the then TEC. 
However, in 1996, RCCTE withdrew support from RiDO perceiving it to be inflexible, and as 
having failed to meet obligations implicit in the restructuring process concerning the linkage 
between training and site assembly: 'We were at best sticking money on the table, rather than 
engaging in the wider process ... it 
is the only time we've given up and gone home' (RCCTE, 
22.1.99). So, RiDO once more became an arm of the Council, reporting to its Economic 
Development Committee, no longer a partnership and no longer having a direct link to the REP 
(RMBC, 21.4.98b). 
The whole process of collaboration in inward investment was perceived to be difficult, described 
by RCCTE as the 'buggeration factor' in partnership building. The economic development arm 
of the Council, which included RiDO, was perceived to be poorly managed and funded and as 
having a poor relationship with RCCTE. The Council was accused of trying to service the whole 
inward investment process itself (RCCTE, 22.1.99). RiDO accepted that the Council may have 
been defensive in attempting to focus inward investment activities at the local level (RiDO, 
25.11.98), but there was also a genuine difference of opinion concerning the respective roles of 
locality and sub-region in the inward investment process. When RCCTE left RiDO, itjoined with 
three other TECs to establish a body called 'Invest in South Yorkshire'. The main reason for this 
initiative was to enhance economy of scale in relation to employer training needs (RCCTE, 
22.1.99). RiDO expressed misgivings about this approach, arguing that a 'South Yorkshire' 
inward investment brand would be a mistake, defeating the message of the region (RiDO, 
25.11.98). RCCTE, however, denied that this was its objective, agreeing that creating a visible 
'Yorkshire and Humberside' image is difficult enough in distant Asian countries without cluttering 
the field. The argument was simply that each of the multiplicity of inward investment activities 
are best organised at a different geographical scale: land assembly at the local level, labour market 
at the sub-regional level and marketing at the regional or the national level. Each body needs to 
recognise its place in the process, it was argued, and collaborate accordingly (RCCTE, 22.1.99). 
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The end of formal organisational links with RCCTE and with REP did not concern RiDO. On the 
contrary, the Manager claimed that there are still close links between RiDO and RCCTE. The 
absence of a formal partnership had not, he said, prevented 'true' co-operation on the ground. 
RiDO's expertise in marketing, identifying potential investors and in site assembly was viewed as 
complementary to RCCTE's expertise in education and training and in providing private sector 
'champions'to assist in promoting Rotherham. The value of informal 'networking', as opposed 
to formal 'Partnership', was perceived to be that it focusses on bringing together resources from 
organisations, as and when they are required. The process of informal links were felt to require 
less bureaucracy, making them more efficient (RiDO, 25.11.98). 26 
If the perceived 'threat' of TECs undermining local authorities at the sub-regional level 
contributed to Barnsley's push for a development agency, it had the opposite effect in Rotherham, 
where it was recognised that institutional partnerships are not always effective. Rotherharn shared 
Barnsley's fears about the potential for the RDA to ignore towns in favour of Leeds and Sheffield 
and agreed that it has to 'respond' accordingly (REP, 12.5.98,17.12.98; RMBC, 31.3.98a). To 
this end, and to take account of the governments social inclusion agenda, discussions are taking 
place to agree changes to the structure of the REP (RMBC, 23.3.99). However, both RCCTE 
and RiDO agreed that creating an autonomous development agency would be a symbolic gesture 
(RiDO, 25.11.98; RCCTE, 22.1.99). 
Added Value in Industrial Development Partnerships? 
The demise of RiDO as a partnership indicates an absence of added value in this particular 
collaboration. Neither party felt that it had lost out through the end of RiDO as a partnership 
organisation. Whether partnership or not, RiDO was not viewed as an unqualified success by all 
participants. The Director of British Steel was critical of what he perceived as a failure to 
promote manufacturing in Rotherham. He regarded manufacturing as the key to successful 
regeneration in Rotherham, as opposed to 'low quality'j obs in call centres (BSES, 12.2.99). This 
26 These views do not accord with RCCTE's opinion, expressed above, that the Council 
has a poor relationship with it in the economic development arena (RCCTE,, 22.1.99). 
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remark highlights the contentious nature of achievement and the difficulty of evaluating 
regeneration outputs, even where these can be attributed with confidence to partnerships. 
Rotherham Housing Partnership Ltd 
The Rotherham Housing Partnership Ltd (RHPL) was established in 1994, when a need for 'low 
cost affordable housing' was identified in Rotherham, emulating the troubled 'Doncaster 2000 
Partnership' (Doncaster Free Press, 24.12.97; RMBC, 7.12.98; Keepmoat, 5.8.99). The 
partnership was established as a consequence of restrictions on the powers of local authorities to 
build houses and because other bodies, such as housing associations, were considered unable to 
make up the deficit. Therefore, the objective of the partnership was to bridge a gap in creating 
housing developments, mainly for first time buyers, which 'without the partnership would either 
not happen at all or would take much longer to come about' (RHPL, 1994: 4-5). The partnership 
was formed with a developer, Keepmoat Holdings p1c. " The company board consisted of one 
Council representative, three representatives of Keepmoat Holdings plc and two others nominated 
by, but not on, the Council. However, the partnership was managed on a day to day basis by a 
Management Liaison Group consisting of council officers (RHPL, 1994: 6-9) which reported to 
the Board on a quarterly basis. The partnership was therefore 'effectively run from the council' 
(RMBC, 7.12.98). The Council provided land and planning permission to the partnership, while 
Keepmoat provided commercial and development skills, human and financial resources 
(Keepmoat, 7.12.98). The concrete objective of the partnership was to build and to sell, 100 
homes per year, a target which was achieved in each of three years until the partnership was 'run 
down' in 1997 (RMBC, 7.12.98). A further achievement claimed for the partnership was the 
creation ofjobs by virtue of the agreement with Keepmoat which specified that the employment 
of local people on development sites would be 'a priority' (RMBC, 1997: 29; RHPL, 1994: 3). 
As in the Barnsley Miller Partnership, a contradiction was perceived between the principles ofbest 
value and partnership. There was argument within the Council about whether the land used for 
27 Keepmoat a local company, based in South Yorkshire was also the developer in the 
Doncaster 2000 Partnership. 
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partnership should be sold on the open market at its maximum value, rather than at the lower rate 
which could be realised through low cost housing projects. Keepmoat were chosen as partners 
on the basis of their perceived track record in partnership with Doncaster. In essence, they were 
given unrestricted rights to build on land designated for affordable housing by the Council without 
facing competition. RMBC was conscious of resentment on the part of local developers, 
'whingers' who 'missed the boat'. One case, which generated local hostility, was a dnegative 
value' site profitably developed by RHPL with a dereliction grant of E168,000 from English 
Partnerships (RMBC, 7.12.98). Instances of this nature helped to foster a local impression that 
Keepmoat enjoyed an'inside track'. Further cynicism ofthis nature arose following the Auditor's 
damning report on Doncaster Council, though no allegations of wrongdoing have been made 
against RHPL (RMBC, 7.12.98). The business view was that, as long as local authorities were 
unable to meet their own housing needs, the conflict between best value and partnership is 
inevitable. Given that the private sector is expected to make a profit and that some kind of 
partnership agreement is necessary as a guarantee against investment of time and expertise in 
projects which might not come to fruition, site by site agreement simply is not in a developer's 
interest (Aizlewoods, 6.1.99; Keepmoat, 5.8.99). However, in response to these criticisms, 
RMBC determined that wherever agreements were reached with developers in future, companies 
will be invited to submit 'expressions of interest' on a competitive basis for medium or long term 
schemes covering more than one site (RMBC, September 1998). Second, it sought to make the 
point publicly that Keepmoat did not get a 'free ride' from development projects and that the 
partnership conferred responsibilities on them. The Council highlighted an SRB2 project, in which 
the partnership was involved, for the regeneration of the Eastwood and Oakhill areas of 
Rotherharn (REP, September 1995), showing that Keepmoat had put time, effort and expertise 
into it without any guarantee that the bid would be successful, or that the development would take 
place (RMBC, 7.12.98). 
Following the legal difficulties experienced by the Doncaster 2000 partnership,, resulting in 
allegations ofcorruption against councillors, RMBC sought legal advice which suggested that the 
company was ultra-vires, the Council having no express power in law to 'establish', as opposed 
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to 'Participate' in, a company (RMBC, 7.12.98; 26.6.97). Consequently, the Council's (former) 
Chief Executive decided to run the company down, though it remains 'on the backburner' 
(RMBC, 7.12.98). This decision did not meet with approval, either from the Council's Director 
of Housing, who considered the former ChiefExecutive too timid, or from Keepmoat, whose own 
legal opinion gave the company'one hundred percent tick' (RMBC,, 7.12.98; Keepmoat, 5.8 . 99). 
28 
Added Value in the Rotherham Housing Partnership Ltd 
In Keepmoat's opinion, the partnership met its objective to make developments happen more 
quickly than they would otherwise have done. It attributed this success to the capacity engendered 
in the partnership to solve problems concerning land assembly more quickly. It also considered 
that housing had been built on one or two estates which could not have happened without the 
partnership. Keepmoat also felt it had won additional business from the partnership, while the 
Council obtained housing and a share of ; E5 00,000 in profit (RMBC, 7.12.98; Keepmoat, 5.8.99). 
However, this profit was not always achieved in line with the original objective to build low cost, 
affordable, housing. The first development was on a 'desirable' site on the edge of the Borough, 
judged 'too good' for 'affordable' housing. Rotherham workers were employed on the project, 
but, according to the Director of Housing, the houses were sold predominantly to people from 
Sheffield. Later developments, he said, particularly those nearer to Rotherhani town centre, were 
sold to people from Rotherham and 78% of occupants on the last three sites developed by the 
partnership, totalling 109 houses, were first time buyers. However, RMBC offered no practical 
definition of 'affordable', conceding that the partnership principle ofbuilding'affordable housing' 
is determined more by the market than by any measurement of 'need', which would not be the 
case, were RMBC able to build and to subsidise its own properties (RMBC, 7.12.98). Since the 
concept of added value cannot be fixed in relation to affordable housing, evaluation from this 
standpoint cannot reliably be made. 
29 In light of the regulations discussed in chapter 4, from a lay-person"s perspective, the 
Counsel's opinion is perplexing, a feeling shared by the Director of Housing (RMBC, 7.12.98). 
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There was one further downside to the partnership, another more practical reason for winding it 
down. The Council's housing analysts found that in facilitating the development of new housing 
for first time buyers, it was 'stagnating' the second hand market. 'You could drive around the 
estates and see former right to buy properties boarded up'. In building new homes which netted 
the Council a profit, an unanticipated problem with the dereliction of older housing in Rotherharn 
arose, which provided an additional incentive for putting the RHPL on the 'back burner' (RMBC, 
7.12.98). Arguably, the partnership was a zero sum game, if the profit element is taken out. 
Rotherham Business Education Links 
The development of an improved skills base in Rotherham was identified by the REP as the single 
most important component of the regeneration strategy (REP, 1997a: 16; 17.12.98). Schools 
were accorded a key role in raising education standards, particularly within the under 16 age 
group, in orderto'strive for an improved and more economically competitive workforce' (RMBC, 
1997: 44). The task facing the Borough was perceived to be ensuring that students leave school 
'job-ready', a project beginning with primary school children (REP, 17.12.98; RMBC, 22.1.99; 
RL%. C%. CTE, 19.1.99). 
Education standards in Rotherham improved between 1992 and 1997 with the proportion of 
students attaining 5 or more GCSEs at A-C grades increasing from 30% to 37.4% 
(www. RiDO. org. uk, RMBC, 1997: 15). This improvement faltered, against the national trend, 
with the pass rate failing to to 3 6.8% in 1998 (The Guardian, 1.12.98). This pass rate is higher 
than in Barnsley (29.8% in 1998), it approximated closely to the regional pass rate, but it falls well 
below the national pass rate of 43.5% in 1996 (BRF, Autumn 1996: 7; GOYH, May 1997: 34). 29 
The mission of Rotherham Business Education Links (RBEL) is to play a part in addressing this 
shortfall in education standards and lack of work readiness. Education was perceived to have a 
key role in the 'social regeneration' of Rotherharn and RBEL seek to influence the process of 
29 The figure also disguises pockets of relative success and failure, with the same pass 
rates varying in Rotherham schools between I I% and 53% (Guardian, 1.12.98). 
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schooling by supplementing the formal academic curriculum with the development of a 'work 
ethic' and a 'culture of citizenship' in schools (RBEL, 7.12.98b). Rotherham Training and 
Enterprise Council established the Rotherham Business Education Partnership (BEP) in 1993 in 
partnership with the then Chamber of Commerce and the Council (RBEL, 7.12.98b). The 
partnership, a registered company, was chaired by a senior executive from the steel industry who 
30 also sat on the TEC Board. Its objectives were to maximise employer investment in formal 
education activity, while ensuring that school students gained the skills and understandings 
necessary for future employment (RTEC, 1994: 89). 
The BEP folded in 1996 when the Council withdrew its financial support (RCCTE, 19.1.99). 
RBEL suggested that a negative attitude by the LEA was behind the collapse of the partnership 
(RBEL, 7.12.98a), which the Council confirmed, arguing that the initiative was 'exhausted' and 
that there was insufficient commitment on the ground to making it work, either among BEP staff 
or among local employers (RMBC, 22.1.99). According to the Local Education Authority, 
business education links are important, but the BEP served little purpose,, people did not know 
what it was and it produced no added value (RMBC, 3.8.99). Comparison was drawn between 
Rotherharn and Barnsley, the latter perceived to be a better entrenched partnership, enhanced by 
a high level of local authority commitment and 'established within the framework of service 
provision to Barnsley's young people'. " The BEP was perceived to have been a partnership 'in 
name only' as a consequence of 'political axes being ground'. RMBC and RCCTE were described 
as 'two dogs with a bone' (RBEL, 7.12.98a). 
Rotherham Business Education Links (RBEL) was established in its curTent form in April 1997, 
32 
after the BEP folded (RBEL, undated). The staff of RBEL are employed directly by RCCTE, 
which provides the bulk of the funding for their activities. Essentially, RBEL pulled together a 
30 Now retired. 
31 This perception was not shared in Barnsley. 
32 RBEL was funded by SRB money, by RCCTE and by WEE. 
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series of initiatives and presented them as a single package, providing for a 'holistic, relationship 
wi schools (RBEL, undated; RCCTE, 19.1.99). The Business Education Advisory Group 
(BEAG) was established to provide a strategic overview of RBEL. BEAG includes 
representatives from RCCTE, the Council, one head teacher employed by Rotherham LEA and 
a local businessman who chairs it (BEAG, 22.7.99). The aim of BEAG is to develop a strategy 
for the achievement ofnational targets for education and training within which education business 
links can be developed (RMBC, 1997: 45). BEAG has no targets or objectives and the main 
difference with the BEP is that it has no budget, nor direct control over project management. 
Rather, it was perceived as a consultative group, liberated from financial concerns, to advise on 
strategic issues related to links between schools and employers (RMBC, 22.1.99,5.8.99). 
The Chairman of BEAG viewed his contribution as giving the partnership agenda a 'business 
edge', a view of the employment world. He became Chairman through his position as a director 
of RCCTE, because of a personal interest in business education links and because he wanted to 
be a 'good corporate citizen'. He said that his partnership activities are also driven by an 
instrumental agenda, to learn things which might help his business, for example, information on 
good sources ofnew employees (BEAG, 22.7.99). For the LEA, business chairmanship ofBEAG 
prevents the private sector from being marginalised (RMBC, 3.8.99). Business involvement in 
business education links, though, had proved difficult to build in Rotherham. This problem was 
perceived to be a consequence partly ofthe lack of capacity within SMEs to participate in projects 
which do not provide instant returns and in part because the few large corporations in Rotherharn 
are not interested. Some larger firms in the Rotherham area suggested to RBEL that since they 
were 'downsizing', they did not have the staff capacity to release for mentoring or for work 
experience supervision and training (RBEL, 7.12.98b). 33 
33 AVESTA is a stainless steel firm. It had pulled out of project Trident on the day of 
the interviews at RBEL. The company has laid off 400 out of 1200 employees, 200 of these at 
its Sheffield plant (Avesta, 28.10.98). 
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Business Participation also proved difficult to maintain in some arenas. For example, an RBEL 
steering group administers some SRB funded education and training projects. Educationalists, 
including staff from RCCTE, were felt to dominate the steering group in a way which alienates 
employer representatives, unfamiliar with the professional discourse of education, resulting in non- 
attendance and a corresponding failure among the steering group to recognise the pressures on 
businesses when making demands for time and resources (RBEL, 7.12.98b). In turn, the 
4professionals' representing the LEA considered that effective control of LEA policy lies in the 
relationship between school governing bodies and the Government. Consequently, the Council 
did not perceive itself to be in any position to exercise significant influence on the direction of 
education business links. (RMBC, 22.1.99). However, outwith the fon-nal setting of BEAG, the 
LEA felt a stronger relationship existed with business leaders who, it said, are interested in 
discussing education and in building bi-lateral links with schools. Business leaders have, it was 
felt, provided an overview of the local economy, likely trends and potential labour market needs 
which can be fed into BEAG discussions (RMBC, 3.8.99). 
Added Value in Education Business Links 
The disaggregation of the strategic and the oPerational elements of education business links, 
makes it easier to comment on added value in both dimensions. After the BEP folded, RCCTE 
effectively took control of project delivery, claiming to provide a 'one-stop-shop' for education 
business links, a situation regarded by both Council and RCCTE as an effective economy of scale 
(RBEL, 7.12.98a, RMBC, 22.1.99). The operational element of partnership has broken down, 
but this situation suits both main parties and relationships were perceived to be good. The BEP 
was a case of partnership fragmentation, a situation in which joint management of education 
business link projects was perceived to have failed. Added value cannot, therefore, be attributed 
to the BEP. Education business links were perceived to have improved without it. 
As far as the Council was concerned, the BEP's successor, BEAG, is a consultative mechanism 
rather than a partnership. As a consultative mechanism, however, BEAG may have had some 
influence. The LEA, being "pragmatic old Labour' (RMBC, 22.1.99) resisted the Government's 
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Education Action Zone (EAZ) initiative, failing to bid in Round 1, to the dismay of RCCTE and 
the BEAG Chairman (RCCTE, 19.1.99, BEAG, 22.7.99). The LEA was subsequently put under 
pressure by DfEE and is moving toward a position in which it will embrace fifture EAZ initiatives 
(RMBC, 22.1.99; RCCTE, 19.1.99). From the point of view of the Chairman, BEAG has been 
instrumental in this change ofmind and he offered the Council's changing perspective as evidence 
of the influence exerted by the partnership in relation to strategic decisions about education 
business link projects (BEAG, 22.7-99). It is conceivable, then, that the EAZ bid is a local 
governance output, though DfEE has exercised some coercive influence (RMBC, 22-1.99). From 
an 'internal' perspective that education business links are good, BEAG was viewed as having 
played an important role in keeping business education links on the policy agenda, particularly with 
the REP (RBEL, 7.12.98a, RMBC, 3.8.99). 
At the level of bi-lateral links between schools and employers, RBEL claimed that it has removed 
the burden ofadministration which would otherwise fall on schools involved in education business 
link projects and that it provides a means by which placement and mentorship schemes are co- 
ordinated and distributed. According to RCCTE, some teachers have reported positive outcomes 
from work experience projects in terms of improved pupil attitudes. Such reports suggest, 
according to RCCTE, that Rotherharn Business Education Links may have begun to meet its 
objective of helping to produce school leavers better equipped to meet the demands of employers 
(RCCTE, 19.1.99). The negative side ofthis evaluation however, was the big picture, the absence 
of any guarantee that learning will generate jobs (RMBC, 3.8.99). 
Case Summary 
Rotherham is a town which, like Barnsley, suffered badly from the demise of its staple industries. 
There was evidence, however, that Rotherham has proved better able to cope with the problems 
it has faced, though claims about economic dynamism seem exaggerated. Rotherham is pursuing 
a mixed growth strategy, seeking to nurture local strengths, while relying on labour intensive 
developments, specifically call centres, from inward investors. Collaboration with the business 
sector was identified in Rotherham from the early 1970s and a good relationship has existed 
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between local govenunent and private sector for many years, though not everyone in Rotherham 
agreed that partnership initiatives have succeeded. 
The institutionalisation of partnerships proceeded as a consequence of funding opportunities, 
stimulated by the failure of Rotherham's bid for City Challenge. From the early 1990s, the 
interface between RMBC and business moved onto a new footing, characterised. more as a 
relationship between equals than before. The partnership structures engendered by onerous 
Government initiatives were perceived, however, to have reduced the Rotherham Economic 
Partnership to a symbolic role in local policy development and notwithstanding a leading role for 
the private sector on the partnership, the local authority is viewed as pre-eminent. Tensions 
between the local authority and RCCTE were identified at all levels ofpartnership, primarily over 
organisational responsibilities. These tensions, articulated in relation to responsibilities for inward 
investment, led to the fragmentation of the partnership which ran RiDO, and its reversion to 
Council control. Collaboration, where necessary, has since been carried out through networking. 
Business, however, is marginal to industrial development activities, as it was when RiDO was a 
partnership between Council and RCCTE. 
The Rotherham Housing Partnership Ltd shows the potential for profitable bi-lateral operations 
in home building, but influenced by legal uncertainties and concern about corrupt practices in a 
similar initiative in Doncaster, the partnership has been suspended with questions being asked 
about whether it succeeded in building affordable homes and whether investment in new housing 
stock is having a deleterious effect on the second hand market. Education business links are 
complex. The BEP, responsible for funding and managing local initiatives, folded due to a 
perceived absence of added value. Despite the ensuing split between strategic and operational 
elements, embodied in BEAG an d RBEL, business involvement has proved difficult to build and 
maintain at both levels. Business activity overall is limited to a handful of organisations, mostly 
those with local roots, whose main input consists of business expertise and acumen. There were 
indications that partnerships may have generated tangible outputs in terms of strategic agreement 
(BEAG), housing developments and profit (RHPL) and employability (RBEL), but the strongest 
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concrete indicator of added value is funding levered from government sources through the REP. 
The fragmentation of institutionalised partnerships, RiDO and the BEP, suggest that added value 
can be generated not only from working in partnership, but also in reducing the frequency and 
intensity of interfaces between organisations which cannot agree or which are pursuing different 
agendas. Partnership in Rotherharn has generated negative value as well as synergy. 
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Chapter 7. Hull: The City of East Yorkshire 
The Economic and Political Context for Partnership 
Kingston upon Hull City Council (KHCC) attained unitary status in April 1996. Previously, Hull 
was administered by the City Council and by Humberside County Council jointly. The city has 
a population of around 268,000 with a periphery bringing the total to 325,000 (HTEC, September 
1998a: 30). Hull is described as the 'regional centre of East Yorkshire' (KHCC, 1997: 9). The 
Council is dominated by the Labour Party which holds 50 of 60 seats (www. hullcc. gov. uk). Hull 
differs from Rotherham and Barnsley in that while serious economic decline has occurred, the City 
has not suffered a major structural failure. The fishing industry declined gradually and 
unemployment within the city itself is comparatively low. However, there has been a prolonged 
period ofjob losses in deep sea fishing and in the port industries. Between 1981 and 1993, the 
number of full time jobs in Hull fell from 84,100 to 75,100, a decline of II%. In December 1997, 
unemployment in Hull stood at 8.6%, 3% above the national average (KHCC, March 1998: 10; 
HTEC, September 1998a: 105). ' 
Hull is characterised by the presence of large scale industries. Out of a workforce of around 
I 10,000,18,000 are employed in the port or in businesses supporting the port operation (KHCC, 
March 1998: 19). Throughput in the Port of Hull increased from 5 to 10 million tonnes between 
1984 and 1997 (ABP undated)? The Council is the second biggest employer, after the combined 
port industries, with 12,550 staff (www. hullcc. gov. uk). The economy of Hull is reasonably broad 
based, with the port, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food and education sectors all employing large 
I Hull and North East Lincolnshire became unitary authorities in 1996. One 
consequence of the previous two-tier system is that some statistics are available for Humberside 
only, rather than for Hull and for North East Lincolnshire. 
2 The Port of Hull is owned, along with 22 other ports including Grimsby and 
Immingham, by Associated British Portg (ABP). 
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numbers (CRSSG, undated 2). However, Hull was perceived to be weak in areas of employment 
such as banking, government offices and information technology (KHCC, 16.4.98). 
Hull's GDP perfon-nance, higher than the UK average in the late 1980s, declined to 96.9% of the 
UK average by 1996 and to 89.97% of the EU average (CityVision, 1997: 17). GDP per head 
continues to grow more slowly than in the rest of the UK (HTEC, September, 1998: 18-19). Hull 
was ranked 3 I't out of 366 local authorities according to the 1991 Index of Local Deprivation, 
(CityVision, 1997: 33), declining to 26 1h in 1998 (DETR, June 1998). Severe pockets of 
deprivation exist on the outskirts of the city, where people do not enjoy access to local jobs or to 
the comparative prosperity ofthe inner city. Hull has a particular problem with peripheral housing 
estates built in the 1960s, up to 7 miles out of the city centre. Unemployment is very high in these 
areas, affecting up to 35% of men, and infrastructure is very poor, creating a 'Chinese wall' 
between the relatively prosperous inner city area and the poverty stricken outer areas (KHCC, 
28.4.98). 3 
Hull's Strategy for Growth 
Inward investment is not the key priority for Hull. The Council's Economic Development 
Strategy focuses on the expansion of local companies because the city economy is tightly bounded 
with finite land resources available for new development. Furthermore, Hull is not perceived by 
government, comparatively, to have huge economic problems and, consequently, it does not enjoy 
4 Enterprise Zone or Development Area status. Following a 'bench marking' exercise, it was 
decided that Hull could not compete for inward investment against area like Wales, Scotland and 
the South Yorkshire coalfields, able to offer substantial financial incentives (KHCC, 28.4.98, 
HCC, undated: 9). The prospect of South Yorkshire gaining Objective 1 status reinforced this 
attitude (HTEC, September 1998a: 77). 
These problems ofperipheral exclusion are blamed partly on planning policies dating 
back to the 1960s. 
Hull qualifies as an Assisted Area, the second tier of Regional Selective Assistance. 
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The City's preferred approach is to develop support packages around companies in Hull. This 
strategy seeks to use local company networks to 'pull in supply chain investment'. It was 
estimated that 75% of newjobs in Hull will come from company expansions, particularly among 
SMEs (KHCC, 24.4.98; KHCC, March 1998: 8). 
The fact that Hull does not depend on attracting major new inward investment was perceived to 
reduce some of the pressures associated with competing with other areas. ' The city has not 
suffered too badly from overseas companies 'parachuting in and out' as financial incentives come 
to an end. ' In fact, 'that has been one of the saving graces of not being at the forefront of inward 
7 investment' (KHCC, 28.4.98). Additionally, the Port of Hull, the core business in the City, 
suggested that despite difficulties experienced by UK exporters, its 'core ports business is resilient' 
(ABP quoted in Hull Daily Mail, 23.2.99). The port performed particularly well in 1998, 
achieving an 18% increase in turnover and a 9% increase in profits, its best result in 34 years (Hull 
Daily Mail, 23.2.99). 
Globalization and Local Dependence 
Humberside TEC identified a high proportion ofbusinesses in all parts ofthe sub-region as having 
a primarily local market and 'a lot of local economic interdependency' (Humberside TEC, 
September 1998: 23). The suggestion, then, is that much of Hull's economic activity is locally 
entrenched. Northern Foods, a firm employing 19,000 people in the UK, has its HQ in Hull. This 
operation employs around 100 people in managerial, professional and IT based occupations. The 
great majority of these people live outside Hull because 'people would rather drive for an hour 
than live in Hull' (Northern Foods, 17.2.99). The Port of Hull is dependent, largely, on labour 
5 YHDA/IIB was accused of failing to pass on inward investment inquires to Hull 
because it lacked capital incentives, thus preventing it from entering the arena of competition in 
the first place (KHCC, 28.4-98). 
6 Citizen, a Japanese Company which located in and left neighbouring Scunthorpe, was 
offered as an example of this kind of behaviour. 
For these reasons, the Hull Inward Investment Partnership is currently inactive and 
it is not discussed further here. 
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from the Hull Travel to Work Area (ABP, 10.3.99). Sumitomo, which took over a local 
engineering plant also commented that the local skills based was satisfactory and that the company 
would not be tempted by subsidies elsewhere in the UK unless it lost labour force flexibility 
(Sumitomo, 22.3.99). Smith & Nephew employ most of its 1200 staff from within Hull, though 
managerial and specialist staff are drawn from further afield. 80% of its Hull based output is 
exported through the Port of Hull (Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). The company thus considered 
itself committed to the area. Birdseye Walls, with factories in Hull and Grimsby, believed that 
4 outsourcing' would not be economical for the company, given proximity to local suppliers and 
to the port facilities (Birdseye, 15.3.99). 
The process of local economic development is not immune from the pressures ofthe global market 
and, because many firms operate on a multi-national basis, the world economy is seen to be 
particularly important (HTEC, September 1998a: 15). A number of 'branch plants' of 
multinationals are located in Hull, but few head offices. Smith & Nephew which originated in 
Hull, now has its HQ in London. A decision to invest E42 million in the company's wound care 
and castings 'centres of excellence' (Hull Daily Mail, 22.10.98), was made, 'without nostalgia and 
sentiment', following bids from Smith & Nephew sites around the world. While the competing 
bids from France and the USA were seen to be superior in other ways, the final decision was based 
on the skills and commitment ofthe local workforce and on the fact that production in the relevant 
areas was already taking place in Hull (Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). 
The main problem for Hull, with its low cost base and easy access to continental Europe, was 
perceived to be not global economic forces, but companies being attracted elsewhere in the UK 
by grant regimes (KHCC, 28.4.98). Nonetheless, in common with other parts ofthe Country, Hull 
has not been immune to the effects of a high pound, or the 'Asian crisis' (KHCC, March 1998: 
8; Northern Foods, 17.2.99). The Port business was described as 'necessarily global'. It relies 
for 20% of its business on BP, whose Hull site had benefited from recent investment which, had 
it gone elsewhere, would have decreased port throughput significantly. The port also faces 
competition with the super ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp on one hand and smaller competition 
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on the east coast of England on the other. If a cargo bound for the UK cannot be handled in Hull 
or Immingharn, it could be I transhipped' at Rotterdam into smaller vessels, which would then use 
smaller ports and wharves at a lower cost and nearer to its destination (ABP, 10.3.99). 
The Development of Partnerships in Hull 
The Leader of KHCC pinpointed the beginning of local government decline to the 1972 Local 
Government Act, which took responsibility for fire, police and health services away from local 
authority control. The creation of a two tier system in 1974 further eroded the power of local 
authorities, creating divisions and tensions between tiers. These developments began to force 
local authorities into co-operation with a range of agencies, perceived by the Council Leader as 
a step on the road to partnership, across the range of local authority responsibilities (KHCC, 
16.4.98). However, there was little evidence of a significant interface between the Council and 
business before the early 1990s and it was perceived that until this time, there was a 'them and us 
attitude, Public versus private', business and local government only meeting at the Council 
Leader's annual address to the Chamber of Commerce and Shipping (ABP, 10.3.99; KHCC, 
16.4.98). Smith & Nephew illustrated this point, complaining of an absence of support within the 
City in the early 1990s, at a time when the company was deciding where to re-invest, contrasting 
this attitude with aggressive place marketing in France and in the USA (Smith & Nephew, 
15.3.99). 
The development of the City Regeneration Strategy (CRS) in 1994 marked a watershed in 
Council-business relations (HERCCS, 22.2.99). The CRS arose from a'loose' partnership called 
'Action 90s', which fronted a bid for City Challenge Round 2 (Davidson, 1998; Smith & Nephew, 
15.3.99). The bid failed because ofperceived 'warring factions' within the county and the district 
which the private sector found unacceptable (KHCC, 16.4.98; Northern Foods, 17.2.99). Hull 
lost millions as a result ofthe corresponding decline in Urban Programme funds. However, it was 
argued that despite the failure of City Challenge, the 'partnerships' formed during the bid process 
had been maintained and developed (CityVision, September 1996: 2). City Challenge'fired people 
up' (KHCC, 6.8.99) and a new partnership was launched in January 1994 to develop the CRS. 
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The City's first bid to the SRB was made by the 'City Regeneration Strategy Steering Group' in 
September that year (CRSSG, September 1994: 8). The Steering Group was originally part of 
the Council's committee structure, operating as a consultative forum (KHCC, 9.5.94,6.6.949, 
4.7.94,23.1.95). The partnership changed its name to CityVision on completion of the CRS and 
was established as a limited company in March 1995 (CityLearning, January 1997: 2; CityVision, 
28.4.98a). Since City Challenge, the Council has perceived itself (KHCC, 16.4.98) and is 
perceived to be (HERCCS, 22.2.99; Northern Foods, 17.2.99) 'pragmatic' and it was felt that 
afterwards, KHCC had driven the partnership building process (KHCC, March 1998: 2; ABP, 
10.3.99). 
There was a perception within KHCC that the Council now benefits from a 'strategic 
understanding' of the importance of private sector wealth creation, 'even among old Labour' 
councillors. Hence, private sector investment is seen no longer to be about generating income 
for the Council through rents and rates, but about creating jobs through private sector initiatives 
(KHCC, 28.4.98). There was almost universal approval for the approach of the Leader, who, it 
was argued, had been instrumental in bringing the Council to the partnership table. Yet, it was 
also felt that he represented something of a lonely figure, unable to win enthusiastic support for 
this strategy from colleagues, who were viewed with 'despair' by Smith & Nephew (15.3.99). 
Smith & Nephew could have been referring to the Chairman of the Council's Economic 
Regeneration Committee, who believed that the Council could better undertake the initiatives 
carried out in CityVision, were it allocated the resource to do so (KHCC, 20.8.99). The 
establishment of CityVision was perceived as a response to government demands to 'get your act 
together' in terms of producing a single set of objectives and a 'vision' for the city (CityVision, 
28.4.98a), and as a response to the priorities of policy makers and funding bodies focussed on the 
development of local regeneration partnerships (CityVision, September 1996: 5). The partnership 
was constituted as an 'organisation with responsibility to prepare, promote, deliver and renew the 
CRS' (CityVision, 19.11.97: 7). It is funded with money from the SRB, from KHCC and from 
Humberside TEC. The partnership manager argued that there needs to be a more 'equal 
partnership' in terms of funding commitments from other partners (CityVision, 19.11.97: 7). 
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Business in Partnership 
A distinction was made between partnerships in which business had a direct commercial interest, 
and those, such as CityVision, in which it participated without direct commercial benefit. 
Unsurprisingly, the private sector was more inclined to participate in profitable ventures than in 
4good cause' activities (HERCCS, 22.2.99). In terms of the latter, KHCC expressed 
'disappointment' that the private sector is not, generally, pro-active and that it has been a struggle 
to get business interested in key projects, such as "Hull 700'. ' The Council Leader complained that 
his idea for a major private sector exhibition in support of the city's 'pioneering' theme had come 
back to him 'like a boomerang' (KHCC, 16.4.98). This view was also reflected within the 
business community and it was acknowledged that there is a low level of business activism in 
partnerships involving, to a greater or a lesser extent, around 30 large and well-established 
medium size firms in joint commercial and not-for-profit initiatives like CityVision (Northern 
Foods, 17.2.99). 
Time was the main reason cited for non-partnership activity (Sumitomo, 22.3.99).. There was no 
evidence of involvement being discouraged by company HQs located elsewhere. ABP and Smith 
& Nephew highlighted a positive corporate approach to community work. However, much ofthe 
involvement by major companies was seen to be dependent on the activism of individuals. 
Notably, the Company Secretary of Northern Foods stated that he had been given a large amount 
of discretion to get involved in CityVision, the Chamber and the TEC, but that he had received 
no official encouragement from his Chairman, a major business player in the national political 
arena, who, he said, displayed 'absolutely no interest in local affairs' (Northern Foods, 17.2.99). ' 
One of his colleagues suggested that to address the problem of remote, disinterested, corporate 
HQs, the Government should seek an agreement with the heads of major companies, committing 
them to local community projects in places where they operate (Northern Foods, 20.8.99). 
The year long festival to celebrate the award of Hull's Royal Charter in 1299. 
The Chairman of Northern Foods is Lord Christopher Haskins, a close ally of 'New 
Labour'. 
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It was felt that most businesses in Hull, together with the wider community, were unaware of 
CityVision or of other partnership activities (CityVision, 5.1.95; HERCCS, 22.1.99). Sumitomo, 
for example, a major overseas investor, displayed no knowledge of the Partnership (Sumitomo, 
22.3.99). Smith & Nephew suggested that efforts to get other local businesses involved in 
regeneration projects had been 'like pushing water up hill', though it perceived the beginnings of 
a change in attitudes (Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). The Council Leader attributed this lack of 
business activity in partnership to a 'dependency culture' based on paternalistic expectations of 
local government. It was suggested by business, however, that excessive local authority influence 
had created a barrier to business participation through the culture of meetings and bureaucracy 
which public officials are used to. Partnership meetings were considered to be overly complicated 
with huge, bureaucratic agendas, resembling those of Council committees (Northern Foods, 
17.2.99; HTEC, 5.3.99; KHCC, 6.8.99) and it was agreed that agendas could usefully be simplified 
for employer consumption (CityVision, 28.4.98a). This issue was related to a more general 
problem of the amount of time required of those involved in CityVision. This aspect of 
partnership, in part blamed on the Council's culture and in part on the SRB, made partnership 
work unattractive for many businesses (HERCCS, 22.2.99). 'Businesses have often been brought 
to the table in good faith and then not got what they were expecting ... 
it is difficult to retain some 
of them over time' (HTEC, 5.3.99). 
The Hull and East Riding Chamber of Commerce and Shipping was acknowledged to be 
comparatively weak with around 12.5% of 8,000 businesses registered (HERCCS, 22.2.99). It 
was felt within the Council and CityVision that it is difficult to get the Chamber, in its 
representative capacity, to 'feed into the process' and that many key business individuals are not 
involved in a way which would bring them into contact with partnerships (KHCC, 16.4.98; 
CityVision, 28.4.98a). As was true elsewhere, SNIE activity was minimal to non-existent. The 
Chamber stated that in the great majority of cases these organisations simply couldn't afford the 
time to become involved with the Chamber's representative work, let alone in the broader network 
of partnerships in the City (HERCCS,, 22.2.99): 
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Its been accepted that large companies have the capacity to do that. We have to engage 
micro companies. We have to overcome perception that all jobs will be provided by big 
companies, whereas 85% of the economy is made up of companies under 25 employees 
(HTEC, 18.3.99). 
In terms of concrete resources, business contributions to the partnership process were described 
as 'pitiful' (KHCC, 16.4.99). Birds Eye Walls was the only company which highlighted its 
financial contribution in a positive way (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). The main contributions by business 
to the work of partnerships were perceived to be acumen, expertise and 'networking' capacity 
(Northern Foods, 17.2.99; Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). Northern Foods was the most visibly 
active company with at least three of its senior staff involved in key partnership bodies. The 
Company's community affairs budget, however, was described as 'tiny' (Northern Foods, 
20.8.99). From the Council's perspective, business brought a rigorous examination of processes, 
offering challenges to the way things were done in the past (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
Notwithstanding these negative views, KHCC's Chief Executive perceived a change of attitude 
toward partnership within the private sector. He felt that some businesses at least had 'grasped' 
the point that regeneration issues are as relevant to the business sector as they are to the Council 
(KHCC, 6.8.99). Among. those businesses which are active in partnership, it was suggested that 
c opportunism' is giving way to 'altruism' because they now feel welcome around the partnership 
A-1- 
table (KHCC, 16.4.98). Northern Foods and Smith & Nephew were perceived as particularly 
good civic citizens, who had provided 'expertise and very senior people' in the partnership process 
(CityVision, 28.4.98b). 'o It was also suggested that companies with a history in Hull were more 
likely to become involved in partnerships than newer, overseas companies (HTEC, 5.3.99, 
Sumitomo, 22.3.99). The evolution ofpartnership, approaches within Smith & Nephew illustrated 
the point made by KHCC about changing company culture. Despite its cynicism about the efficacy 
of partnership work in Hull, Smith & Nephew had developed a positive attitude toward 
community aMirs since the 1980s, which it described as the era of 'selfish society'. This 'turn' 
to 'face the city' was based on a strategic view that ifpeople are impressed by Hull, they will want 
10 The TEC was sceptical about Northern Foods, suggesting that he brought little more 
than his time to the table (HTEC, 5.3-99). 
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to visit again. It believed, for example, that a high profile in schools, selling the notion of 
excellence, would encourage the most talented young people to join the company, rather than a 
competitor (Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). 11 A similar attitude to partnership existed in the Port of 
Hull, which views itself as the 'guts' of the community. It perceived a duty, at an informal level, 
to 'encourage relationships with the Community' notwithstanding its infrequent participation at 
a formal level in partnerships with the Council (ABP, 10.3.99). " 
Influences on and within CityVision 
CityVision was perceived, principally, to articulate central government priorities. It was felt that 
the private sector does not have sufficient organisational strength for direct influence on policy 
and Stakeholding on CityVision was viewed to be about consultation, rather than partnership 
(HERCCS, 22.2.99). 13 The hand oftentral government in CityVision was considered most visible 
in the SRB process. Hull has been relatively successful in winning E52.7 million from the SRB 
and a further E20 million from various EU funds (Hull News, April 1998: 1). The process of 
bidding for the SRB was considered to dominate the activities of CityVision, leading to initiative 
fatigue, particularly among business people (KHCC, 16.4.98,6.8.99; HERCCS, 22.2.99; Northern 
Foods, 20.8.99). Government demands on partnerships bidding for SRB funds were considered 
to impede locally inspired initiatives and to prevent the development of a 'City Vision' at the 
strategic level (KHCC, 16.4.98; Northern Foods, 17.2.99). Complaints had been made to the 
Deputy Prime Minster about the bureaucracy imposed by the SRB on CityVision, which, it was 
argued, despite claims to the contrary, is still a 'grant chasing' organisation. SaidHERCCS, 'the Cp- 
reality is that all we do is bid for money and not always in the priority areas we would choose' 
(HERCCS, 22.2.99). It was claimed that CityVision had put in bids for projects that it did not 
really want because those that it did want wouldn't have been funded (Northern Foods, 17.2.99). 
11 A specific project, the Children's University, is discussed below. 
12 CityPort is a formal partnership of the Council, the Port of Hull and port related 
businesses. It is discussed ftuther below. 
13 For this reason, according to KHCC, the Chamber refused a seat on the CityVision 
Board until recently (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
190 
Essentially, it was felt that the whole CityVision process is driven by the SRB and that the SRB, 
while it has served to bind partners together in a formal organisation, has dis-empowered local 
decision makers. In this sense, the partnership was perceived as 'practical and pragmatic ... 
effective with government office, but not with the people of Hull' (Davidson, 1998: 7/11). The 
Government agenda was seen as responsible for encouraging 'lip service' and tokenism with 
respect to business in partnership (HERCCS, 22.2.99). KHCC's chief executive felt, however9 
that without some kind ofpartnership structure, partnerships tended to 'drift' and lose their focus. 
A balance therefore needed to be struck between overly rigid structures, essentially created for 
the SRB, and loose networking arrangements in which he felt it would be difficult to maintain a 
common direction and focussed activity (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
The top priority for Hull's City Regeneration Strategy (CRS) is the creation of prosperity, a 
process believed to require job creation, image enhancement and improved education, training and 
skills (CRSSG, 1994: 40). There are four 'strategic' objectives in the CRS: economy, lifelong 
learning, people and communities and fabric. Key to these strategies, in the eyes of KHCC, are 
a linked commitment to increasing competitiveness and support for the development of lifetime 
learning (KHCC, March 1998: 1). Economic development objectives inthe CRS drive objectives 
for social regeneration 'Almost all the fabric objectives will have an impact on economic 
prosperity. Economic threads, therefore, permeate the whole strategy' (CRSSG, 1994: 17). 
There was broad assent to the principles set out in the CRS. Council aims and objectives 
(www. hullcc. gov. uk), and the TEC Strategic Plan (HTEC, 1998) were perceived to be in keeping 
with the thrust of the CRS (CityVision, 12.1-98: 10). 
Despite agreement on the CRS, dissension is common. The governance of CityVision has been 
a source of conflict since it was established. Initially, it was intended that the Board should 
function as a managerial body, responsible for project approval, delivery, monitoring and 
evaluation. Policy, including revisions to the CRS, was to be determined by a steering group with 
a much wider membership (CityVision, April 1997: 6). As early as 1995 (CityVision, 5.1.95), it 
was perceived that the 'Steering Group' was not working, that it didn't 'steer', but rather 
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'listened, received and endorsed'. Attendances were poor and different people attended each 
meeting (CityVision, 5.1.95,4.6.97; 19.11.97). Problems with the Steering Group persisted 
(Northern Foods, 17.2.99). Its policy development function was therefore 'usurped' by the 
Board, which has been enlarged from 6 to 12 members, though still elected by the newly 
constituted 'Stakeholder Group' (CityVision, June 1998). The problem, in striking a balance 
between 'efficiency and inclusiveness', was that apart from those on the Board, there were 
insufficient numbers of activists to keep the Stakeholder Group working as intended. One Board 
member described it as 'useless' and 'sterile', arguing for its immediate disbandment (Northern 
Foods, 17.2.99). CityVision itself perceived that there is little 'community' involvement in 
partnership (CityVision, 1997: 36). This lack of community involvement underpins a row, 
6 simmering since day one', in which the Council has, according to KHCC, been accused of using 
CityVision as a front organisation (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
It was agreed to a greater or a lesser extent that the Council exercises a pre-eminent role within 
CityVision, both with respect to policy development and management (CityVision, 28.4.98a; 
KHCC, 16.4.98; ABP, 10.3.99). CityVision has been chaired by the Council Leader from the 
outset and the professional staff share local authority and TEC backgrounds as public employees 
(CityVision, 28.4.98a). The main explanation offered for. this state of affairs was the absence of 
an alternative 'big hitter' available to chair the partnership, due to an absence of commitment 
among high profile business leaders such as Chris (Lord) Haskins of Northern Foods (Northern 
Foods, 17.2.99; KHCC, 6.8.99). The Council was also perceived as having 'a democratic 
mandate and a unique overview of the City's affairs and, as such, an overview of the CRS9 
(HERCCS, 22.2.99). As to whether his company had gained influence over the CRS through the 
CityVision process, a Board member on CityVision, HERCCS and on HTEC stated: 
If I said hand on heart whether I've fashioned the CRS, even though I've been on the Board 
for 5 years, I would have to say no. To the extent that we have a strategy, it will always be 
the Council's ... The Leader would 
deny it and say 'what more could I have done', but the 
agenda is inevitably set by the Council because they have a city overview (Northern Foods, 
17.2.99). 
There was also criticism by businesses of KHCC's role in economic development particularly with 
respect to planning refusals (ABP, 10.3.99; Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). The Council in turn 
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stated that on occasion, businesses seeking planning permission had tried to threaten it overjobs 
(KHCC, 16.4.98). It was also felt within CityVision that there remains a major problem with 
organisational rivalries in the economic regeneration sphere between the Council, Humberside 
TEC and HERCCS. It was suggested, as noted above, that while the Council Leader and Chief 
Executive are sincere and very supportive ofthe partnership approach, lower ranks, both members 
and officers were less than enthusiastic (CityVision, 28.4.98b; Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). 
HERCCS, for example, felt that private sector relationships were good with the Hull Economic 
Development Agency (HEDA), but less so the further away one moved from the local authority 
economic development function (HERCCS, 22.1.99). It was suggested by HTEC that there had 
been tensions between CityVision and KHCC over matters of organisational jurisdiction (HTEC, 
5.3.99). CityVision, for example, argued that HEDA should relinquish some of its powers to 
avoid duplication and disagreement (CityVision, 28.4.98a). The Chairman of the Council's 
Economic Regeneration Committee in turn felt that CityVision had usurped HEDA's role and that 
it wanted to take over all economic development activities in Hull. Rather than producing added 
value, he perceived CityVision as another industry, a grant oriented quango absorbing resources 
which could better be spent on economic development by the Council. A better approach to 
partnership, he felt, would be to invite private sector representatives to sit as advisors on a 
committee within the Council (KHCC, 20.8.99). Relationships between KHCC and HTEC were 
themselves characterised as full of mistrust and jealousy (CityVision, 28.4.98b). The TEC 
recognised that there was a history ofmistrust between it and the Council, but countered that there 
were no disagreements on matters of principle, arguing that relationships are characterised by a 
4pragmatic attitude' and the capacity to 'talk about the issues openly' (HTEC, 15.3.99). HTEC 
was considered to have been 'peripheral' to CityVision until very recently because the Chief 
Executive, described by one party as a 'maverick' (CityLearning, 22.3.99) was unhappy at his 
exclusion from the CityVision Board (Northern Foods, 17.2.99). Diplomatically, HTEC 
suggested that this absence had been down to 'personalities', highlighting that it had been fully 
involved at all levels of CityVision beneath the Board, contributing, for example, f 100,000 to fund 
three policy staff at CityVision (HTEC, 15.3-99). 
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Despite the 'holistic, message emanating from the CRS, it was argued that there remains an 
absence of co-ordination between different ob ectives. One example cited by two Board members 
was that of a planning application by ASDA, to whom the Council had agreed to sell land, 
enabling the development to go ahead. This project, it was argued, will undermine a CityVision 
project on Ferensway, a retail area of the City Centre, which has been earmarked for business 
developments with which ASDA would be in competition (Northern Foods, 17.2.99, Smith & 
Nephew, 15.3.99). Supporters of the ASDA scheme, on the other hand, argue that up to 700jobs 
are at risk if the development does not proceed. Following approval by the Council, however, the 
scheme has been 'called in' by the DETR (Hull Daily Mail, 3.3.99b). The Council, a Ferensway 
Partner itself, urged other partners to the scheme, including Northern Foods and Kingston 
Communications, to drop their opposition to try and avert the DETR inquiry. The Council, 
embroiled on both sides ofthe conflict, has been accused of a conflict of interest (Hull Daily Mail, 
23.3.99). ABP too highlighted an absence of co-ordination within the Council, arguing that the 
introduction of a cabinet system into local government could improve the situation (ABP, 10.3.99; 
DETR, 30.7.98). One such conflict perceived by business to exist within the Council was that 
between HEDA and the Planning Department, the latter department perceived as hostile to 
development (ABP, 10.3.99; Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). Similarly, business was perceived as 
lacking commitment to parts of the CRS seeking to bring long term unemployed people back into 
the labour market. Companies were viewed as eager to 'cherry pick' from schools, but not to re- 
train older people who had been out of full time employment for a number of years (KHCC, 
28.4.98). 
CityVision andAdded Value 
The Manager of CityVision, while upbeat about the partnership, recognised that agreeing priorities 
and actions takes patient effort, that networks take a long time to build and that, while he felt 
CityVision has worked well over 2-3 years, it will be 10 years or more before it is 'truly effective' 
(CityVision, 28.4.98a). This view was also expressed in a recent stakeholder survey, which 
indicated a beliefthat limitations are slowly being overcome (Davidson, 1998: 13). It was argued, 
despite the weight ofcriticism expressed above, that the SRB had 'opened doors' to leverage from 
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the private sector which had not been available previously, though it was felt the partnership 
hadn't been as successful in unlocking private sector money as it would have wished (HTEC, 
5.3.99). Added value, from the Council's perspective, was assessed principally in terms of the 
credibility partnership purchased with the government and consequent success in obtaining grants 
(KHCC, 16.4.98; 6.8.99). One business leader suggested that this was the only 'added value' 
generated and that CityVision had not addressed honestly the question of what it had achieved as 
a partnership (Northern Foods, 17.2.99). This view was also held by ABP, which acknowledged 
that it had not really been engaged in CityVision since it started. The company said that it had 
attended no more than three meetings in 18 months and was 'not up to speed' with many current 
discussions: 
To be honest, a lot of the discussion is old hat. There is nothing new or ground breaking 
from our point of view as an employer ... I can't hand on heart say that it does a lot for us 
... CityVision is self perpetuating. What are its objectives except a wish list? (ABP, 10.3.99). 
The engagement of new actors in the regeneration process was itself perceived as added value 
(HERCCS, 22.2.99; HTEC, 5.3.99; KHCC, 6.8.99) and the opportunity to air differences within 
an umbrella organisation enabled open discussion and facilitated understanding, even where 
agreement could not be reached. For ABP, this process had the knock on effect that informal 
contacts had increased, typified by regular meetings with the Leader and the Chief Executive. 
'The real worth of CityVision is in facilitating connections, networks' (ABP, 10.3.99). More 
concretely, Smith & Nephew assisted the Council, through CityVision, in examining the local 
supply chain to identify new opportunities for local firms to bid for work from the Port (KHCC, 
16.4.98). " Hence, there was evidence, as KHCC's Chief Executive suggested, that once 
stimulated, people had got a taste for different kinds of partnership working, outside the 
CityVision arena (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
This question was addressed in the CityVision Stakeholder Survey, which identified broad 
agreement that the partnership adds value to regeneration in Hull, without agreement about what 
14 Although ABP, dependent on extra-local business activity was against this initiative 
(ABP, 10.3.99). 
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this added value consists of The principal benefits identified were the partnership process itself, 
resulting in greater 'synergy', and the procurement of funding. A small minority of respondents 
believed that the partnership generated added value 'because it achieves things which otherwise 
would not occur' (Davidson, 1998: 15). Davidson suggested that added value was an area where 
'hopes and practice become intertwined'. 
Beneath CityVision: Partnership Activity in Hull 
If there were reservations about the effectiveness of CityVision in Hull, 'partnership vehicles', 
'issue based partnerships' or 'spheres of influence' were considered to play an important role in 
the partnership structures of the City. The following mini-cases examine three implementation 
oriented partnerships. The first mini-case examines partnership issues in relation to economic 
development and the City/Port partnership. The second mini-case examines City1mage, a project 
allied to CityVision. The third mini-case examines the relationship between education and 
business in Hull. 
Partnership and Economic Development 
Hull Economic Development Agency (HEDA) set out its mission statement as follows: 
To help create, through partnership,, a competitive environment in which new and existing 
business can succeed and invest, thereby safeguarding existing jobs and creating good 
quality new jobs for a local workforce whose skills are geared to the needs both of local 
companies and prospective inward investors (www. hullcc. gov. uk). 
HEDA itself, despite the label 'Agency' is a department ofthe Council, viewed by Northern Foods 
as a protected part of the Council's province (Northern Foods, 17.2.99). As noted above 
CityVision considered that HEDA's autonomous approach to economic development was 
unsustainable' in the way it separated itself from the partnership process (CityVision, 28.4.98a). 
Unsurprisingly, given the views of the Chairman of the Council's Economic Regeneration 
Committee, HEDA had no plans to link itself to an autonomous development agency in response 
to the RDA, or to link itself formally with CityVision. He preferred collaboration through council 
structures (KHCC,, 20.8.99). HEDA's newsletter, The Business City Newsletter underlined the 
impression ofa powerfid,, somewhat paternalistic Council-led organisation which nonetheless takes 
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links with the private sector seriously (HEDA, October 1998; December 1997). HEDA has 
initiated 'sector' partnerships encouraging the private sector to take a leading role, with some 
success (KHCC, 28.4.98): 
We tend to start them off resource heavy on the public sector. After a year or so, we 
encourage the private sector to take more ownership. We make a decision to withdraw or 
reduce commitments to certain partnerships in consultation with the partnership. ... As we 
raise activity with one partnership, we lower it with another. 
Thus, if the Council is strongly protective of its economic development functions, it nevertheless 
carries out many activities in partnership. The following section examines the Hull City/Port 
Partnership, held up as a good model of a 'sector' partnership in practice. 
Hull CitylPort Partnership 
Uniquely among the business community, the Port of Hull was described by KHCC as a major 
player in the governance of Hull (KHCC, 16.4.98). The City/Port Partnership, established in 
1995, is a 'sector based initiative', involving ABP and other port related companies, aiming to 
maximise the benefits of the Port of Hull to traders and investors (KHCC, 1997: 13). Like 
CityVision, the Partnership arose out ofthe improvement in relationships engendered by challenge 
funds. The relationship between ABP and the Council was 'complicated' by problems associated 
with industrial militancy in the 1970s and 1980s (KHCC, 16.4.98), but improved thereafter. A 
ftirther complication was the two-tier system of government in Humberside prior to 1996, which, 
in the view of ABP, weakened its competitive position. Humberside County Council began 
promoting the Port, but it also promoted small competitor ports and wharves outside Hull, which 
meant in effect that ABP was assisting its competitors in what it regards as a cut throat business. 
Unitary status meant that partnership could focus on the City and the Port of Hull (ABP, 10.3.99; 
Eimskip, 12.8.99). The port was critical of the way in which Humberside County Council had 
managed City/Port, suggesting it was 'too local government oriented'. After unitary status, the 
City Council decided to 'stand back' (KHCC, 28.4.98). As a consequence, the private sector now 
plays a strong role in the partnership with a shipping agent chairing a small executive body which 
meets to discuss promotional ideas (ABP, 10.3.99; Eimskip, 12.8.99). 
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The partnership is activity based, a marketing consortium, whose commitment is to create new 
wealth for the city and the port by expanding trade, promoting the port within Europe and in 
global markets, making commercial contacts and increasing business for Hull companies. Itsjob 
was to approach potential customers saying 'here is a partnership promoting our city and port. 
The members of the partnership can offer every facility you would need, if you were thinking 
about using the port' (Eimskip, 12.8.99). City-Port is thus presented as a package, each partner 
offering specific services. The partnership is funded by subscriptions whose levels are based on 
company turnover. The subscriptions are matched by HEDA money, the combined total being 
matched by EU funds (ABP, 10.3.99; Eimskip, 12.8.99). The partnership uses this money to put 
on road shows, primarily in Northern Europe, to encourage business use of the port and, to a 
limited extent, inward investment in Hull (ABP, 10.3.99). It was noted above that there is little 
land available for new inward investors in Hull, but the port has some brown field land which it 
wishes to sell for development. The City/Port Partnership seeks to market this land to firms 
interested in port related developments. In relation to promotional activities, the Chairman felt 
that the partnership was best presented as a formal body. Networking with potential customers, 
was viewed as an important follow-up process (Eimskip, 12.8.99). 
While the promotional activities ofthe City/Port partnership were viewed in positive terms by the 
leading partners, there remains conflict over land and development issues between KHCC and 
ABP. On ABP land stands a derelict building which was once the headquarters of a local trawler 
company, 'Lord Line'. This building is an eyesore on the main road into Hull and has been a bone 
of contention between ABP, which wants it demolished and the site redeveloped (ABP, 10.3.99), 
and the Council, which is not willing to allow thi s to happen without an agreeable development 
scheme first being put forward by ABP. " The issue is complicated by a pressure group called 
'STAND' led by the Bishop of Hull, which is campaigning for any new development to restore 
the Lord Line building in order to commemorate the fishing industry in Hull (Hull Daily Mail, 
17.12.98). The issue, which, like Ferensway, is now subject to a DETR led public inquiry, has 
15 The Chief Executive of KHCC confided that he couldn't understand the attachment 
of some members and local people to the building (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
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been the source of acrimony and insult between the Council's Planning Committee and ABP's 
subsidiary development company, the Grosvenor Waterside Group (Hull Daily Mail, 18.1.99). 
The Council was not insistent upon maintaining the building, but it argued that more burger bars 
and bingo halls were not appropriate for such a'prestigious' site (Hull Daily Mail, 23.3.99). The 
Port, with its property development hat on, viewed the Council as obstructive, incapable of taking 
a coherent position from department to department (ABP, 10.3.99). This issue has not been 
brought to the partnership, which, as a promotional organisation, saw this conflict as beyond its 
remit (Eimskip, 12.8-99), but it seemed strange that such a significant issue, which has raised local 
passions, has not been debated in CityVision either. 
Added Value in CitylPort 
The most concrete added value identified in the City/Port Partnership was the funding it had 
generated to support promotional activities through Objective 2. While the partnership was not 
funding driven, it was reliant for much of its work on the public subsidy it obtained (Eimskip, 
12.8.99). Were external funds to dry up, it was felt that the work of the partnership would be 
curtailed, but that City/Port would stand a greater chance of surviving and ofpersuading partners 
to increase their subscriptions than would CityVision (ABP, 10.3.99). There was also a 
perception that the partnership has been effective in generating port business and it was claimed 
that one promotional event had produced 120 newjobs (KHCC, March 1998: 19). It was felt that 
the key to generating concrete outputs from the partnership was the credibility it had engendered 
in presenting Hull as a united front between port businesses and the City Council (Eimskip, 
12.8.99). However, partners in City/Port recognised that it would be very difficult to quantify 
partnership outputs (ABP, 10.3.99; Eimskip, 12.8.99). For example, it could be years after a 
promotional event that a foreign business recalled that ABP could handle its trade. Nonetheless, 
the partnership was compared favourably with CityVision by ABP, of which, as noted above, the 
company held a negative view. Overall, it was felt that resources were better combined in this 
partnership than utilised separately (ABP, 10.3.99). 
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Citylmage 
"From Hull, Hell and Halifax, Good Lord deliver us! " (I 6hCentury Proverb) 
The pressures of competition with UK cities, to attract corporate headquarters, for investment, 
for big events and for tourism, have resulted in attempts to develop an image for Hull. The 
Council Leader expressed bitterness about what he saw as a stereotypical outsider view of Hull 
as a fishing village (KHCC, 16.4.98), but Wolff Olins research concluded that Hull had no image 
at all to speak of (KHCC, 6.8.99). An integral part of the CRS, therefore, is to re-create Hull as 
a 'Top Ten' city (CityVision, 19.11.97: 5; Wolff Olins, June 1997). To this end, CityVision 
established CityImage, an 'Issue Group' charged with responsibility for developing and 
implementing an image strategy for Hull. City1mage has since been re-constituted as a limited 
company with its own Board, but it still reports to the parent body, CityVision (CityImage, 
27.7.99). 
A City1mage report to CityVision was critical of marketing strategies, identifying uniformity of 
presentation as a negative consequence of global competition: 
Every city, it would appear, has the friendliest people, the best-trained workforce, the best 
shopping centres, the best transport routes and the greatest centres of excellence (Wolff 
Olins, June 1997). 
Thus, it was argued, Hull needed to market itself in an'imaginative, accurate and compelling way'. 
The job of promoting Hull was perceived not only to be about marketing Hull to the outside 
world, but also to be about raising the aspirations and self-esteem of people within the'city 
(CityVision, 28.4-98a; KHCC, 16.4.98; Citylmage. 27.7.99). Unitary authority status was 
perceived to have facilitated this project, the Council now representing a single local government 
focus for the city (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
The Image Enhancement Programme was seen as integral to the CRS. This segment of the 
strategy depends for finance directly on the input ofthe private sector. The former Bishop offlull, 
James Jones, together with a representative of Smith & Nephew, championed a'CityVision Bond' 
scheme, where firms buy a stake for between f. 500 and f. 5,000 in the image programme to match 
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SRB ftinding (CityVision, 28.4.98a; Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). " Purchase of the bond buys 
access to 'key decision makers ... a 
hotline to major movers and shakers', for example, breakfast 
meetings at which shareholders are informed of major proposals or developments in the City by 
the Council Leader and Chief Executive (CityVision, 28.4.98a; City1mage, 27.7.99; KHCC, 
6.8.99). 17 The Bond, renewable each year, had generated an annual income of E70,000 as of April 
1998, a sum 'hypothecated' to the image programme, specifically to the appointment of a 
Marketing Director and to the funding of the Wolff Olins report. The money was also used to 
lever in SRB and EU funds worth around E270,000. Donors to the Bond scheme include 
HERCCS, ABP, KHCC, HTEC, Northern Foods and Smith & Nephew, all contributing E5,000 
per annum. The Marketing Director of Citylinage said that he was 'looking for exponential 
growth' from the Bond scheme, 'we are at the tip of the iceberg', he said (City1mage, 27.7.99). 
From the Council's perspective, private sector leadership within City1mage was vital to the 
credibility and the future success ofthe Bond scheme and ofthe image programme more generally. 
It was felt that companies were much more willing to deal with a business-driven organisation than 
the Council when it came to convincing potential donors to join the scheme (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
CityImage has had some impact locally. The Hull Daily Mail enthusiastically adopted the theme 
of 'pioneering' (Hull Daily Mail, 4.2.99b, 19.2.99ab, 25-3.99). The support of the press was 
perceived to be critical in promoting the image project and the paper's editor was in the process 
ofbecoming more directly involved in the partnership (KHCC, 6.8.99). 'The Deep', a millennium 
project, was perceived as central to the image building project (KHCC, 16.4.98). It is not a direct 
output of CityImage, but it was considered to be an indirect output of the new ambition among 
local elites, driven by the image building process (Citylmage, 27.7.99). The Deep, due to open 
in 2001, will be a science attraction and research facility, which it was hoped will attract 300,000 
visitors per year (City1mage, 27.7.99). The local press described it as a flagship project in the 
16 The Rt Rev James Jones, chosen personally by Tony Blair to be Bishop of Liverpool, 
was described in The Independent as 'New Labour's Bishop' (The Independent, 7.11.98). 
17 The Chief Executive of KHCC and the Marketing Director of CityImage both 
emphasised that access to movers and shakers did not mean access to competitive advantage 
(KHCC, 6.8.99, CityImage, 27.7.99). 
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attempt to locate Hull among England's top ten cities (Hull Daily Mail, 4.2.99b). Smith & 
Nephew and Northern Foods both claimed that they had been influential in persuading the Council, 
which had originally designated the project site for housing development, to support The Deep. 
The Council disputed this claim, but agreed that the private sector had been instrumental in 
enhancing its aspirations for the project, expressed in the appointment of a renowned architect to 
design the building (KHCC, 6.8.99). " The project, costing f. 40 million, procured f. 18.6 million 
from the Millennium Commission and was viewed as an example of the ambition needed in Hull 
if it were to improve perceptions of Hull among the local community and further afield (Smith & 
Nephew, 15.3-99). 
Added Value in QyImage 
Leaving aside the concrete added value generated through CityVision Bond, there- were mixed 
feelings about the achievements of City1mage. ABP, in particular, was negative about the whole 
image project, arguing that employing consultants had been a waste of time, that the pioneering 
theme was 'astonishing' in its irrelevance and that the money it had put into the Bond was wasted. 
It claimed that, on presentation to the CityVision stakeholder group, the idea had been received 
in silence by all but one or two in the audience and that it was widely felt to be wrong for Hull. 
ABP described the activities and aspirations of City1mage as 'flights of fancy' (ABP, 10.3.99). 
Smith & Nephew, on the other hand, was positive about the theme of pioneering, which it felt 
captured the essence of its own history and aspirations. The Bond was viewed as 'a commitment 
by us to the City and in theory, it buys us the right to state our view and to challenge or influence 
some of the decision making processes'. Smith & Nephew argued that the appointment of a 
Marketing Director to promote Hull, funded from Bond income, was a good return in itself, a 
view shared by the Council (Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99; KHCC, 6.8.99). The mixed feelings 
however, undermined the claim made by the Marketing Director that partners on CityImage are 
'totally singing from the same hymn sheet' (City1mage, 27.7.99). 19 
18 Both Council and business sector claimed ownership of this particular game. 
19 This remark was made by the Marketing Director of City1mage. Perhaps 
understandably, given his role, his account of city-image was more positive than any other. 
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Education Business Links in Hull 
The Council Leader in his annual 'State of the City Address' to HERCCS, identified education 
as the most pressing problem facing Hull, the biggest task being to create a 'culture of learning' 
(quoted in HERCCS, February 1999). Likewise, Humberside TEC suggested that in the medium 
term, enhanced learning and skills may be 'a greater source of economic competitiveness than 
more grants, sites, industrial estate roads and place marketing for inward investment' (HTEC, 
September 1998a: 3). GCSE results in Hull are the worst in England. 18.7% of pupils obtained 
GCSE grades A to C in 1993, compared to an average of 41% in England (CRS SG, undated: 13). 
The figure stood at 22.8% in 1996,2dbottom among 114 education authorities, but representing 
a marginal relative improvement in relation to England as a whole, whose GCSE pass rate stood 
at 44.5% (CityVision, 1997: 3 1). However, with the same pass rate of 22.8%, Hull's GCSE 
performance was again the worst in England in 1998 (The Guardian 1.12.98). Within Hull itself, 
GCSE pass rates varied from 100% and 82% at the top end to 3%, 5% and 6% at the bottom end, 
(CityVision, 12.1.98: 8). 20 
The CRS argued that'low and outdated skills' prevent Hull businesses from competing effectively. 
The problem was seen to be convincing people at school that 'learning has relevance and a value 
in their lives' (CRSSG, 1994: 19). The negative attitude to learning was perceived to be 
exacerbated by low expectations of what learning can contribute to a young person's life 
(CityVision, 12.1.98: 1). This perception, within Hull, was articulated by the Financial Times: 
One big local employer says that in Hull, at least, there is a cultural reluctance among male 
teenagers to take school-work seriously, an attitude that perhaps has its roots in the 
inherited memories ofeasy access to unskilled work in docks and fisheries. Thosejobs are - 
mostly - gone, but their legacy is an instinctive ... mistrust of the education that these 
days 
is an essential qualification for access to work (Financial Times, 17.4.96). 
Thus, according to the CRS, Hull people are often unable to compete for skilled jobs to which 
people are recruited from elsewhere (CRSSG, 1994: 20). There are a number of interrelated 
20 The figures look particularly bad as a consequence ofthe City boundary, drawn as part 
of the 1996 move to unitary status for KHCC. A wider boundary, encompassing some of the 
more affluent outlying areas where 'middle class' children live, would have made the figures more 
comparable with other cities (HERCCS, 22.2.99; Northern Foods, 20.8.99). 
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partnership strands in Hull's response to these difficulties, including the Humberside Partnership, 
CityLeaming and direct links between the LEA, schools and business through the Business 
Education Foram and the Children's University. The following paragraphs examine these 
elements. 
CityLearning 
CityLeaming was established in 1995 as an infonnal organisation of leaders in the field of 
education in Hull, comprising the LEA, the University of Hull, the University of Humberside, 
Humberside TEC, the Humberside Partnership and a Personnel Executive from Northern Foods. 
The group was established to discuss turning Hull into a'great learning city' (CityLeaming, 1997: 
6). CityLearning was affiliated to CityVision as an Issue Group in 1996, reporting through the 
Stakeholder Group and the Board, and it was charged with responsibility for re-writing the 
Learning Chapter of the CRS (CityVision, 24.7.96). It was felt that the original chapter 
overemphasised the economic agenda, specifically in relation to developing the local labour 
market. This agenda, while valid, was not considered sufficient for a comprehensive learning 
policy. It was therefore re-written with a greater emphasis on social inclusion which'didn't dilute 
the economic argument, but added social inclusion... we want a society of natural learners, which 
is linked to the objective of economic regeneration' (CityLearning, 22.3.99). The new learning 
chapter, based on a 'cradle to grave approach' highlighted the benefits to Hull of a city based 
approach, including references to identity, place, and an enhanced capacity to deliver services 
which had been fragmented under the two-tier system and to integrate service delivery within 
strategic planning (CityLeaming, 1997: 3). 
Together with this re-write, the major achievement claimed by CityLearning was that of 
convincing CityVision to adopt a 'thematic' rather than an 'area based' approach to SRB Round 
4, initially favoured by the LEA. The argument, articulated through CityVision, was based on a 
tension between the new LEA's operational objective to focus on the 5-16 age group and on 
government driven statistical outputs, and CityLearning's 'tendency to strategize'. An 
'impassioned plea' to CityVision by the Chairman of CityLearning, combined with the prospect 
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of extra money for learning convinced the LEA after which it led on the bid 'with enthusiasm'. 
This event was perceived to mark a turning point in the relationship between the LEA and 
CityLearning, which had hitherto been characterised by some suspicion and conflict of objectives 
(CityLearning, 22.3.99; Northern Foods, 22.7.99). The Council now perceived 'good will' in 
CityLearning, the ability to thrash out issues and bury differences (KHCC, 27.7.99a). 
The new Learning Chapter was intended to counterbalance the functional and economically driven 
approach to learning adopted by CityVision earlier (CityLearning, 22.3-99). Yet, in a subtle way, 
the CityVision bid for SRB4 reflects this economic functionalism: 
Disaffected, marginalised or excluded youth is a serious social problem creating individuals 
with no significant stake in society ... The disaffected young make undesirable employees 
and neighbours and damage the image of their neighbourhood, inhibiting economic 
regeneration (CityVision, 12.1.98). 
The 'themes' within the bid back up this interpretation. Theme 2, for example, 'Improving 
Awareness and Attaimnent'. focuses specifically on science, technology and engineering, 
employment priorities in the CRS, with no mention of the arts, drama, history or music 
(CityVision, 12.1.98: 14). 
Northern Foods, representing the business sector in CityLearning, was more cynical about the 
CityVision and CityLeaming partnerships. The process was found to be frustrating, lacking any 
clear sense of what the partnership will have achieved in ten years times. The company 
representative was an infrequent attender at CityLearning meetings, viewing herselfto be outside 
the key education networks in the city, consisting of colleges, schools, LEA and TEC. She felt 
that CityLearning had diminished, rather than gained in capacity since it started, that those now 
attending are of lesser seniority than they were in the early days and that the original strategic 
agenda had narrowed (Northern Foods, 22.7.99). While these views were not corroborated, they 
are indicative of a fairly common private sector perspective on the practice of partnership in Hull 
(Northem Foods, 22.7-99). 
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With the institution ofDfEE's 'Lifelong Learning'partnerships (DfEE, 4.1.99), CityLearning was 
due to undergo dramatic changes. It has been agreed that CityLearning will become Hull's 
lifelong learning partnership. The consequence of this move will be that from being a body 
concerned entirely with strategic matters, it will take on a range ofresponsibilities for government 
targets in the 16-19 age group and also for some post 19 education activities. Indications had 
been received from government sources that a range of other activities will eventually be added 
to these responsibilities, which will be government funded, to avoid creating a raft of different 
partnerships involving the same people. According to the Chairman of CityLearning, this 
development has caused a 'policy maelstrom'. Decisions by Lifelong Learning partnerships in 
relation to the provision of 16-19 year old education will now have a bearing on the fortunes of 
all the further education colleges in Hull, who could find themselves in competition for resources. 
As a consequence, organisations which felt no wish to influence the strategic debate within 
CityLearning were clarnouring to join in order to gain influence and to compete for the one seat 
on the Board available to the FE sector in the forthcoming partnership. Hence, CityLearning 
agreed to changes in its governance, establishing a 'Senate' which any organisation can join 
through a subscription scheme like CityVision Bond. From this body, a steering group will be 
elected. A surge of applications for membership had been received in anticipation of 'Lifelong 
Learning'. According to the Chairman of CityLearning, now that 'money is involved, everyone 
wants to be on board'. He feared, along with Northern Foods, that as a consequence of these 
changes, the partnership could lose its strategic vision, being forced to focus exclusively on 
delivering Government programmes and targets for post-compulsory education (Northern Foods, 
17.2.99; CityLeamingl 22.3.99). This perspective was shared by the Council, which perceived 
central government to be increasingly influential in the sphere of education policy, thereby 
restricting local policy initiatives. Said the Deputy Director of Education: 'We are very much 
centrally driven. There is some leeway, but the general context is centrally set. In many ways, I 
could be working for DfEE -I wouldn't notice the difference really' (KHCC, 27.7.99b). 
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The Humberside Partnership 
A second strand in the network of education partnerships in Hull was the Humberside Partnership. 
As its name suggests, this partnership operated across the four Humberside local authority areas. 
The partnership brought together three separate projects: the Humberside Education Business 
Partnership (EBP) established with government funding in 1993, the Careers Service and 
management of the Humberside Centre for Learning. The partnership evolved from a voluntary 
and informal grouping called the Humber Forum. When TECs and EBPs were established by the 
Government nationally, the Forum became the Humberside Partnership, a formal limited company 
owned by Humberside County Council and Humberside TEC (Northern Foods, 20.8.99). 
Northern Foods viewed the formalization of the Humberside Forum and the creation of EBPs as 
a mistake. The original, voluntary partnership had worked, it said, 
because it was informal ... When 
it was replaced by the EBP, Whitehall became involved 
and there were rules. It wasn't as flexible as it used to be ... Part of the tragedy is that when 
national things take over, they can destroy what we had locally (Northern Foods, 20.8.99). 
It was felt that informality, the capacity for businesses to operate outside the legal rules governing 
local authorities, enabled the private sector to maximise its contribution to partnerships, a 
contribution constrained by the rules of formal partnerships (Northern Foods, 20.8.99). 
The objective of the Humberside Partnership was to develop a 'strategic' approach to the 
development of these services. It was governed by a Board, comprising Humberside County 
Council and Humberside TEC. As a sub-regional body, the partnership was TEC driven (HTEC, 
18.3.99). It was perceived by HTEC to represent part of the infrastructure designed to support 
economic development in the sub-region and by CityLearning to address the linkage between 
learning and economic prosperity (CityLearning, 1997: 7). 
Following the establishment of unitary authorities, the Board of the Humberside Partnership was 
restructured to comprise two representatives from each of the four local councils and eight 
representatives from HTEC (HTEC, 18.3.99). The demise of Humberside County Council saw 
tensions emerging between the 'strategic' objectives of a sub-regional body and the 'operational' 
focus demanded by the new unitary authorities, which, particularly in Hull, were under pressure 
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to deliver higher education standards (HTEC, September 1998b: 52). The business sector argued 
that this problem was, in part, attributable to unitary status. The creation of unitary councils was 
felt to have removed some of the duplication and rivalry between district and county, but KHCC 
now related to a TEC representing Humberside and a Chamber of Commerce and Shipping 
covering Hull and East Riding, which it was suggested, created problems in developing 'clear' and 
locally committed relationships (HERCCS, 22.2.99; Northern Foods, 20.8.99). According to 
Northern Foods, the local authorities lost interest in the EBP because the county based partnership 
had lost touch with the new reality of unitary authority status. The company blamed HTEC for 
failing to understand that Humberside had been an unpopular administrative creation in the first 
place and for thinking regionally and nationally, while missing what was actually happening in local 
schools (Northern Foods, 20.8.99). The TEC, however, viewed the issue as a clash between 
principles of quality and quantity. It argued that the education process needed to be 'driven by 
quality, not by numbers', a process which had not, it said, been facilitated by pressures on unitary 
authorities from the Government. The TEC felt that the EBP had failed to deliver either'synergy' 
between the different components, or value for money in terms of programme delivery because 
of this lack of strategic perspective on the part of the local authorities (HTEC, 18.3.99). As a 
result ofthese difficulties, the EBP folded and education business link programmes were, in future, 
to be managed through contracts between Humberside TEC and the four LEAs (HTEC, 5.3.99). 
This arrangement had not been finalised between Hull LEA and HTEC at the end of the research 
period, but it was anticipated that it would comprise a contract for service delivery, rather than 
a partnership. Said HTEC 'they had a chance at the strategic level and failed' (HTEC, 22.3.99). 
This dispute, rather than a bureaucratic disagreement over organisational territory, was about 
strategic tensions between the imperatives of sub-regionalism and localism. Essentially, the old 
county-wide arrangement became superfluous in the new institutional landscape (KHCC, 6.8.99). 
The collapse of the EBP can be perceived as the new unitary authorities voting with their feet. 
The Chairman of CityLearning felt that as soon as the unitary authorities were established, they 
began undermining the sub-regional partnership with bi-lateral processes (CityLearning, 22.3.99). 
An example of this process is the Hull Education Business Forum, established shortly after Hull 
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became a unitary authority. The Forum is chaired by the Training Manager of Northern Foods 
and the objective is to involve the private sector in developing a curriculum which is relevant to 
children, particularly those who are underperforming and who perceive no benefit in academic 
school learning. It is, therefore, a relatively informal body which develops project ideas oriented 
on work related learning, by matching the work going on in Hull companies to the school 
curriculum. Northern Foods, for example, produced a package on food, using its expertise on 
food technology (Northern Foods, 20.8.99; KHCC, 27.7.99b). The curriculum packages are 
diffused through the local school system by the LEA, according to demand by schools. This 
mechanism was perceived to be much more successful in making use of private sector expertise 
for local purposes than the bureaucratic, locally insensitive EBP. 
The Children's University 
The Children's University is a bi-lateral business education links initiative developed by 
Binningharn City Council, which has now spread to 4 local authority areas, including Hull 
(Birmingham City Council 13.4.99). This initiative was regarded by all parties as an example of 
good practice in partnership (KHCC, 16.4.98; HTEC, 18.3.99; Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99; 
CityVision, 12.1.98). At the first CityLearning conference after unitary status came into effect, 
speakers from outside Hull, including Professor Tim Brighouse, Director of Birmingham LEA, 
and Ann Wood, Director of the Children's University in Birmingham, were invited to share their 
experiences of what could be done, given the parlous state of Hull's pre- 16 education. Shortly 
after, in an unrelated gesture, two local firms, Reckitt & Colman and Smith & Nephew expressed 
a wish to provide money and support to a primary school initiative, prompted by a challenge to 
business from Prince Charles during his visit to a local housing estate. The two companies called 
a meeting to discuss their offer with the LEA, where the Birmingham scheme was put forward by 
representatives of CityLearning and adopted following a visit to Birmingham (Smith & Nephew, 
15.3.99, CityLearning, 22.3.99). The Children's University was perceived as a 'classic example 
of policy transfer, conferences working at their best' (CityLearning, 22.3.99). 
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The Children's University is effectively an after school club, run by volunteers from local 
companies, by parents and by university students. Its objective is to make up for a lack of out of 
school facilities available to deprived children (CityVision, 12.1.98: 14). The funding came from 
SRB4 in the sum of E40,000 and from the National Lottery in the sum of El million. On the 
employer side, it was driven by Smith & Nephew, which contributed 40 volunteers, and by Reckitt 
& Colman, which allocated E150,000 (Smith & Nephew, undated b), indicating a relatively 
substantial added value resource commitment from business. The scheme, which began in 
November 1997, was in the process of expanding to a further 29 primary schools in Hull when the 
research concluded (Hull Daily Mail, 4.2.99a). The proj ect is managed by a partnership consisting 
of KHCC, representatives from two primary schools, the University of Hull and Business in the 
Community, acting as a 'broker' for the two companies (Smith & Nephew, undated b; BiTC, 
2.7.99). It had no formal links, either with the now defunct EBP, or with CityLearning, though 
the latter body took credit for the 'strategic' thinking which led to the idea being adopted and for 
suggesting it to the two companies involved. The Children's University was perceived by 
CityLearning as a partnership which, on one hand indicated that KHCC wanted strong education 
business links, but on the other indicated that it wanted these on its own terms, rather than through 
the medium of the Humberside EBP. In this sense it was, like the Education Business Forum, 
perceived to have undermined the credibility and effectiveness ofthe EBP as a co-ordinating body, 
contributing to its downfall (CityLeaming, 22.3.99). 
Added Value in Education Business Links 
In a very general sense, it was felt that schools are now paying more attention to the world of 
work than they did 20 years ago. This change may, in part, be attributable to local education 
business links, but it was also believed to have arisen from changing approaches in central 
government (Northern Foods, 20.8.99). The Humberside EBP worked in its earlier incarnation 
as an informal body, based on collaboration between organisations situated at the sub-regional 
level. However, it failed as agovernment driven partnership attempting to manage different geo- 
strategic priorities. CityLearning was due to undergo changes when the research took place, so 
claims for added value were qualified. However, it was considered that in addition to the 
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procurement of SRB money, CityLearning had driven Learning up the policy agenda in Hull, when 
it 'wasn't on anyone's mind five years ago'. It was questioned though, whether the profile of 
learning had been raised with those who needed it most, living on Hull's 'sink' estates (Northern 
Foods, 22.7.99). The Deputy Director of Education questioned the doctrine that lifelong learning 
produces prosperity, cautioning that people would only believe that learning is good for you, if 
it related to a job market. He felt that the economic difficulties experienced in Japan, whose 
leaming culture was once held up as a paragon of virtue, undermined the contention that learning 
necessarily enhances economic regeneration (KHCC, 27.7.99b). Like other parts of the 
regeneration agenda, the culture of lifetime learning was perceived as a long term objective and 
2020 was identified as a likely yardstick of progress (CityLearning, 22.3.99). 
The Children's University is a new initiative. Smith & Nephew regarded the project as part of its 
overall objective to enhance the learning culture at an early age (Smith & Nephew, 15.3.99). It 
was perceived as a 'key development tool for its employees' in terms of motivation, self esteem 
and enhancement ofwork related skills, such as listening and coaching. Longer term benefits were 
perceived to be the development of employees who were confident learners with better core skills 
and an improved impact on the local community for the companies concerned. However, it was 
felt that it will be 'very difficult to measure impact and attribute success in the pilot period" and 
evidence, such as it is, is anecdotal in nature (Smith & Nephew, undated a), based, for example 
on the reporting of positive comments by teachers in the local press (Hull Daily Mail, 3.3.99a). 
Case Summary 
Hull, with the economy of a city rather than a town, though blighted by the decimation of the 
fishing industry, had sufficient strength in depth to avoid the kind of structural economic failure 
witnessed in Rotherharn and Barnsley. Its social problems seem more acute, however, ifludged 
by standards of educational achievement and by the exclusion from city life of people living on 
peripheral, dilapidated estates. Its strategy for economic regeneration is founded on the expansion 
ofbusiness opportunities for companies already operating in Hull, particularly those ofport related 
businesses, since the city does not have the capacity to sustain large scale inward investments. 
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Hull's approach to partnership has been laggardly, generated solely by the need to win external 
resources for its regeneration effort. There remains substantial cynicism among both Council and 
businesses about the strength and efficacy of partnership working. CityVision, Hull's flagship 
partnership, has been dogged by conflict and many feel strongly that it has not succeeded beyond 
the narrow aim of winning government funds. The potential for a strategic focus is compromised, 
both by perceived government dominance and internal conflict. 
The City/Port partnership and CityImage have been more successful in terms of generating a 
combined, public-private sector approach to place marketing. There are elements who are cynical 
about the credibility of Hull's image building project, but some leading businesses have proved 
willing to put money into it. The scope of partnership working in Hull is much wider than in the 
other cases, notwithstanding dissatisfaction with CityVision. This breadth is visible in Hull's 
education business links and the variety of partnership forms involved in promoting the learning 
agenda. Much ofthis local activity was stimulated by the establishment ofthe Council as a unitary 
authority, lending it a sense of focus and local purpose. Levels of business activity are generally 
low, the core business contributions coming from three large companies with local roots. In 
general, financial contributions from business to partnership activities are low, though 
contributions have been forthcoming through CityVision Bond and subscription schemes 
associated with promotional partnerships, which have proved most successful in generating 
business interest. Business thinking has enhanced aspirations among Council elites, influence 
visible in Hull's flagship project, Me Deep'. It is hard to identify concrete added value in 
CityVision beyond the success it has had in generating government funds. It is, however, felt to 
have generated partnership activity in other arenas through the culture of partnership practice. 
It is in City/Port and City1mage that it is easiest to identify governance outputs which could not 
occur without partnership. Promotional activities are believed to be much more effective, both 
as economy of scale and in terms of credibility with the target audience, if carried out by a 
partnership comprising the key public and private sector players in the area. These claims are 
tentative, however, and it will take many years before it can be said whether regeneration activities 
have succeeded and whether success or failure can be attributed to partnership working. 
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Chapter 8. North East Lincolnshire -A Port Economy 
The Economic and Political Context for Partnership 
North East Lincolnshire Council was constituted as a unitary authority on 1 April 1996. The new 
Council merged the former Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes districts and took over responsibilities 
from Humberside County Council, which was abolished (www. lgce. gov. uk). The population of 
North East Lincolnshire was estimated to be 159,900 at the end of 1996, of whom 90,000 lived 
in Grimsby (HTEC, September 1998a: 10 1). North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) is Labour 
controlled. Of 42 seats, Labour holds 32, the Liberal Democrats providing the main opposition 
with 7 seats. NELC is the biggest single employer in the area, with around 7,000 staff 
(www. nelincs. gov. uk). North East Lincolnshire (NEL) has suffered from economic decline, 
especially in the fishing industry which, since the 1970s, has contracted to nothing. 
Unemployment reached a high of over 20% in the mid 1980s standing at 8.1 % in August 1998, 
compared with a national rate in October 1998 of 4.4% (NELC, 29.9.98; RMBC, 16.11.98). NEL 
has obtained funds from SRB rounds 1 to 4, totalling f 17.5 million and a further f 10 million from 
European programmes in the same period (NELC, 2.6.98a). However, The Council's view was 
that deprivation in the area is far worse than is recognised by Government (NELC, 12.6.98a). 'The 
Council decided that a major lobby on the social and economic problems facing the area is needed, 
on the scale of the Coalfields Community Campaign, due to the severity of local conditions 
(NELC, 2.6.98a). These conditions include: the highest unemployment rate in the region; the 
sharpest predicted population decline over the next 20 years in the country; and the "least 
improvement" in unemployment of areas in the region between 1993 and 1998. NELC described 
these figures as 'chilling' (cited in GET, 24.2.99a), especially since government had reduced 
mainstream funding to the area in accordance with projections for population decline. ' 
' According to HTEC, the population of NEL declined by 2% in the period 1991-1996 
(1998a: 101). 
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There was a strong feeling of 'peripherality' within North East Lincolnshire (NELC, 8.4.99a). 
According to the Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 'when your address is North East Lincolnshire, it 
is very hard to convince people we have the same problems as Doncaster, Barnsley and 
Rotherham' (GET, 28.4.98). The Council was very concerned that the Regional Development 
Agency (RDA) would pay insufficient attention to the problems ofthe area. The decision to name 
it 'Yorkshire Forward' further exacerbated the fear of isolation (NELC, 8.4-99b). The fear, 
expressed by the Leader, was that the identity of North East Lincolnshire would be 'swamped' 
by Hull, which is part of Yorkshire (quoted in GET, 2.4.99). Humberside TEC acknowledged 
this sense of peripherality, recognising that the closure of its office in Grimsby had caused 
resentment locally (HTEC, 5.3.99). A feature of the local economy which caused particular 
concern in the Council is the contrast between the profitability of business and poverty within the 
local community (NELC, 12.6.98a). In 1995, North East Lincolnshire topped the Dun & 
Bradsheet profitability league with 89.5% of businesses showing a positive return. At the same 
time, Grimsby was thelO' poorest authority in the UK in terms of low wages, giving rise to 
headlines such as 'Boomtown that lives on the dole' in the Yorkshire Post (14.3.95). 
North East Lincolnshire's Strategy for Regeneration 
The mainstays of NEL's economy are the food, chemicals and port industries employing 
respectively 12%, 5% and up to 50% of the workforce (HTEC, September 1998a: 104; NELC, 
8.4-99b). The Financial Times described this economy as 'diverse', citing diversity as a 
characteristic of all top 10 places in the profitability league (Financial Times, 14.3.95). This view 
was not necessarily shared locally. Recent redundancies in the area were blarned on over 
dependence on food and chemicals (GET, 28.4.98; Birds Eye, 15.3.99). 
Inward Investment Strategy 
As a consequence of these problems, NELC's growth strategy is oriented towards new inward 
investment. It seeks to build on attempts since the 1980s to repackage Grimsby, the fishing town, 
as 'Europe's Food Town'. This branding exercise did not have the confidence of all concerned. 
There was uncertainty about the sustainability of the food sector, exacerbated by the decision to 
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relocate the University of Lincoln 'Food School' from Grimsby to Lincoln. This decision was 
taken, notwithstanding protests from businesses, because the supply of students from the food 
sector in Grimsby had fallen to a level considered 'unviable' by the University (NELC, 12.6.98a; 
PPD, July 1998: 24). Recent redundancies compounded the view that the local food economy is 
6very fragile' (GET, 26.3.98) and concern was expressed that the continued marketing of Grimsby 
as'Europe's Food Town commits NELC to promoting an industry in decline (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). 
The Council was uncertain of its capacity to influence major inward investment decisions which 
would promote diversity (NELC, 8.6.98b). Birds Eye perceived this uncertainty as a dilemma. 
'Do they have realistic chance of developing the economy, or do they manage economic decline. 
The jury is still out' (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). Tioxide, on the other hand, felt that the only chance 
NEL has for achieving economic regeneration is to concentrate its efforts on the manufacturing 
sector (Tioxide, 27.9.99). 
The choice of strategy is recognised as a problem in NELC's Inward Investment Strategy, which 
notes that since much inward investment is capital intensive, producing low job growth, 
continuous investment is necessary even for employment levels to be maintained (NELC, October 
1997: 2). Over E3 billion has been invested in NEL in the past 8 years (GIPP, undated). But this 
investment has been described as 'job fee growth' (NELC, 8.4.99a), re-inforcing the perception 
of a prosperous business area co-existing with local poverty. As a low employment economy, it 
was felt that the future of NEL is dependent on the success of initiatives, such as the RDA's 
promotion of Yorkshire and Humberside within the EU. But, as noted above, the Council already 
feels peripheral to this body fearing that it will turn out to be no more than a Leeds based quango 
(NELC, 12.6.98b). 
Economic Globalization 
Within the overall culture of pessimism and uncertainty pervading NEL, economic globalization 
was perceived, on balance, to be a threatening phenomenon, while generating some opportunities 
(NELC, 8.6.98b). Estimates over an indeterminate period suggested that 39% of recent inward 
investment in NIEL came from overseas and 61% from the UK; 26% of inquiries came from widiin 
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North East Lincolnshire itself The USA, with 14%, provided the highest proportion of overseas 
investment, followed by Europe with 9%. German investment in particular was on an upward 
trend due, it was felt, to recovery from economic problems associated with reunification. It was 
predicted that most investment in future would come from within the UK and a large proportion 
from companies already based in the area (NELC, 8.4.99a). 
The main explanation offered for the failure to attract new inward investors was not 
'globalization', but competition with other regions within the UK (NELC, 30.6.98). Theabsence 
of a favourable grant regime in North East Lincolnshire was considered to have cost the area at 
least two major investments in recent years (NELC, 8.4.99a; ABP, 12.3.99). Competition from 
grant favoured regions in the UK was identified as a particular 'threat' in a local SWOT analysis 
(NELC, October 1997: 8). It was perceived by the Council that a number of companies had 
located in nearby Scunthorpe in preference to Grimsby because Scunthorpe had full Development 
Area and Enterprize Zone status. South Yorkshire, with Objective I status, was also viewed as 
a threat (NELC, October 1997: 12; NELC, 8.6.98b). An investor, it was argued, would be likely 
to choose a grant favoured location like South Yorkshire in preference Grimsby. US companies 
have a very different perception of space from those used to the confined environment of the UK 
and immediate proximity to a port is not always important for export businesses. Hence, 'you get 
nice little anecdotes' from US companies like 'we went to Cambridge because it is close to 
Plymouth' (NEL, 8.6.99a). Grimsby's poor image was considered to have contributed to the 
sense of isolation in the area, negatively influencing business location decisions (GET, 11.4.97). 
The Council also perceived that poor image contributed to a lack of recognition of NEL's 
industrial capacities. The Council believed that inward investment bodies like IIB, automatically 
directed enquiries to grant favoured areas (NELC, October, 1997: 15). While economic 
globalization was not perceived as the main problem for the area, it felt 'more like a threat than 
an opportunity' due to the branch plant nature of the big business economy. With HQs based 
either elsewhere in the UK or abroad, decisions about where to place future rounds of investment 
were made by people without a direct connection with the area. This problem is compounded, 
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it was argued, by the fact that some factories 'look rather dated', making them less attractive for 
re-investment (NELC, 8.6.98b). 
The textile firm Courtaulds, employing more than 800 people in NEL, was recently purchased by 
the Dutch company, Akzo Nobel. Like Courtaulds, Akzo had a fibre production operation and 
it was decided, following the buyout, to demerge fibre activities into a wholly owned subsidiary, 
Acordis (Azko Nobel, 27.11.98). It was feared locally that this demerger placed the future of 
productive capacity in the Grimsby plant in danger (GET, 20.7.98). The company accepted that 
the plant may be at risk, but denied that the process of buy-out and demerger had caused this risk. 
Rather, said the site director, normal processes of competition would be to blame if it were to 
close. De-merger was therefore viewed as a measure to re-organise production in light of global 
competitive pressures (Acordis, 20.5.99). The globalization issue for ABP was expressed in the 
same way as it was in Hull. The company explained that it was dependent on the investments and 
successes of companies importing and exporting from the UK. Similarly, it highlighted 
competition from smaller ports in the UK and bigger ports in Europe. Rotterdam, for example, 
is much cheaper for large cargoes, and smaller ports and wharves for small cargoes in the UK 
(ABP, 12.3.99). 
Local Dependence of Business in North East Lincolnshire 
The evidence suggests that while productive capital may be relatively 'immobile' in North East 
Lincolnshire, major companies rely to a variable extent on local labour, supplies and markets. 
Novartis, a large employer with 900 staff, mostly from the local area, is not dependent on the local 
area for materials or for markets. However, as it exports 90% of its products to Switzerland, its 
proximity to the port was considered very important. Birdseye, employing 800 staff, operates the 
largest pea processing plant in the world. It obtains a large proportion of its peas from farms in 
the East Anglia area. Despite 450 job losses in Hull and Grimsby in the past year, Birds Eye 
regards itself as committed to the area with little likelihood of locating pea processing elsewhere 
(Birds Eye, 15.3.99). 
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Neither Birds Eye nor Novartis saw the inability to recruit specialist staff locally as a problem. 
Both recruit nationally and run schemes for training and developing their own staff, particularly 
those recruited at graduate level (Birds Eye, 15.3.99; Novartis, 18.3.99). Any activities which 
were out-sourced would be contracted locally, rather than to cheap labour abroad (Novartis, 
18.3.99). Figures provided by Humberside TEC suggest that the bulk of materials in NIEL are 
supplied and sold locally: 78.6% of firms sell goods locally compared with 70.3% in Hull; 11.3% 
of firms sell outside the UK compared with 14% in Hull (HTEC, September 1998a: 109). 2 
The Development of Partnership in North East Lincolnshire 
It was broadly agreed that the partnership agenda in North East Lincolnshire has developed over 
the past 15 years (ABP, 12.3.99; NELC, 12.6-98b). During this period, the Council claimed that 
it has tried to 'win the confidence of industry' in order to survive in a more co M*Petitive 
environment (NELC, 8.6.98b, 8.6.98c). It claimed that it has been (pro active' since the mid- 
1980s, when an Economic Development Unit (EDU) was established in Grimsby (Independent, 
15.3.95). Collaboration was considered to be a function of the economic development brief in 
Grimsby, established to address the severe economic decline in the area associated with the fishing 
industry (NELC, 12.6-98a). 
Prior to the establishment ofthe EDU, relations were, according to ABP, characterised by hostility 
toward the Port by the district council. 'We were the Aunt Sally ... there was always something 
wrong in the docks, we were the Rachman driving the industry down' (ABP, 12.3.99). From 
NELC's standpoint, the private sector had a 'what's Local Govertunent got to do with us 
attitude', proving suspicious when the EDU initiated trade exhibitions (12.6.98a). By 1989, the 
business sector was perceived more favourably. NELC's Leader, then Chairman of Grimsby 
District Council's Economic Development Committee, described aj oint dock regeneration proj ect 
as 4a very happy partnership'. She was quoted as saying that business attitudes had changed 
toward the Labour Council because of successful regeneration projects and because of a 
This statistic does not indicate the volume of product sold locally or internationally. 
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transformation of Grimsby's image from that of an ailing fishing town to that of 'Food Town of 
Europe'. This optimism was reflected in the headline 'Grimsby sails on tide of prosperity', a 
perspective in sharp contrast to the pessimism and uncertainty characterising the debate today 
(GET, 17.3.8 9). The change in attitude within the local authority involved an 'appreciation of the 
role which wealth creators play', reflected in a more positive attitude toward potential investors 
(NELC, 8.6.98c; 12.6.98a). It was claimed that Labour in Grimsby, and later in NEL, had thus 
become 'very pragmatic' (ABP, 12.3.99) and that it had adopted a partnership approach long 
before it was fashionable within Labour Councils. Said the Chief Executive of NELC: 
This has always been an entrepreneurial council. When I came to Grimsby 14 year ago, 
there was such a high level of economic decline, it became the overriding issue and the 
Council came to decide that the best way to deal with it was through the private sector ... We were well ahead of the game, and we were in partnership with the private sector well 
before the others (12.6.98b). 
The relationship between the Council and key private sector players was considered very positive 
by both parties (NELC, 8.6.98b; ABP, 12.3.99; Novartis, 18.3.99). NELC perceived a feeling of 
confidence within the private sector, which Novartis described as a strong relation oftrust (NELC, 
8.6.98b; Novartis, 18.3.99). The Chamber perceived the agenda for collaboration to have 
developed over a slightly shorter time frame than NELC, but agreed that relationships were now 
characterised by greater understanding than they had been in the early 1990s (HHCCS, 25.8.99). 
It was felt that now there is a strong 'tradition' of working well with the private sector and that 
the relationship has become 'wider and deeper' (NELC, 8.6.98a). Within this positive 
relationship, the Council saw itself as the community leader, embracing partnership without 
reneging on the leadership role which local authorities, with their democratic mandates, should 
exercise (NELC, 8.6.98b). One business leader, operating at a sub-regional level, compared NEL 
favourably with Hull, where he said the process of building relationships had been much more 
difficult (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). A positive picture was also painted ofrelationships between NELC 
and HTEC, despite the sense of peripherality from TEC activities (HTEC, 5.3.99; NELC, 
8.4.99a). Both NELC and ABP were agreed that ABP is the main private sector partner locally 
(NELC, 16.2.99, ABRp 12.3.99). ABP identified a special 'synergy' with NELC because, like the 
Council, it has diverse interests and responsibilities, not only as a trading company, but as a 
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landlord and as a company with a high level of responsibility for the general economic well-being 
of the area (ABP, 12.3.99). 
The Council took a broad view of partnership and governance, defining 'every organisation with 
a resource to bear on our problems' as 'governance resources'. The Chief Executive's view was 
that partnership working is 'easy' and that NELC has developed a 'mature and sophisticated 
approach' to it (NELC, 12.6.98b). Unitary status, it was felt, had clarified things, pulled together 
a natural community divided between three authorities, generating stronger relationships in terms 
of openness, building links and networking (NELC, 12.6.98b; HTEC, 18.3.99; Novartis, 18.3.99). 
Both Council and business perceived a culture of partnership in the sense that 'people are not 
backward in picking up phones'. Informal networks were considered very important and it was 
felt that by some that networking and more informal partnerships would survive, were formal and 
funded partnership initiatives to come to an end (Birds Eye, 15.3.99, NELC, 8.6.98c). Novartis 
appeared to agree with this assessment, citing the instance of a visit to the Grimsby site by the 
Company's Swiss bosses: 
The Mayor came out with all his chains and took them around the Heritage Centre. Very 
impressive. It demonstrated to People instrumental in new capital investment that there is 
this strong partnership. I found it very helpful. In some areas, there isn't strong partnership. 
I know that it did have a good impact. It made a difference. Networking is vital (Novartis, 
18.3.99). 
Notwithstanding this positive perspective on the relationship between Council and key private 
sector players, partnership activity was perceived by some within the Council, notably the Leader, 
to be very limited. She said that there were very few partnership players, and that these were not 
as active as would be desirable(NELC, 12.6.98a). There was also resentment that much of the 
private sector appeared to have misconceptions about the role of the Council, expecting it, for 
example, to keep their premises safe from burglars, despite efforts to get them to take security 
measures of their own. It was felt that there is a dependency culture to be tackled, not only within 
the wider community, but within the business sector (NELC, 12.6.98a). The Leader considered 
that business had let local people down: 
Our gripe is that the profit centre of the UK could not sustain its community ... profits were 
not going back into the community. Business didn't say that it was taking a lot out and 
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therefore that it would put a lot back in - not like Rowntree's in York. Your multinationals 
are here as long as it suits them. ... But in terms of putting tangible inputs in, there is 
nothing there. ' (12.6.98a). 
Birds Eye Walls agreed that business involvement in partnership was often symbolic. It felt that 
while the quality ofrelationships between NELC and business was good, businesses were suffering 
from partnership fatigue, and that 'Partnership' had become an 'overworked phrase and facility' 
(Birds Eye, 15.3.99). The theme of Partnership overload was also raised by NELC. 'We have 
partnerships coming out of our ears ... I don't know where the government is coming from' 
(NELC, 8.6.98a). 
NELC maintained that key decision makers are located elsewhere and that the area was of little 
significance to multi-national corporations (NELC, 8.6.98a). It was felt that firms needed to see 
immediate benefits and real control over resources if key players were to be attracted to 
partnership work (NELC, 12.6.9 8a). There was also a feeling within NELC that the private sector 
was unable to make sound judgements about social issues, having no understanding of matters 
they don't need to know about in their day jobs and placing no value on the public sector ethos: 
I think local government is better at understanding the economic dimensions of running a 
business than business has of understanding the social context in which local govemment 
works and in which these partnerships have to work (NELC, 8.6.98b). 
HTEC, which was critical ofthe Council's domination ofpartnerships, implied that responsibility 
for the absence of multi-national corporations from the partnership table may lie with NELC for 
not building a strong enough relationship with them. It highlighted the Leader's cynicism about 
'footloose multinationals" in support of this argument (HTEC, 5.3.99). 
Despite these issues, there was no sense of tension or conflict between partners. HTEC sensed 
an environment in which everyone knew that they had to collaborate and, therefore, accepted that 
they have to 'get on with things' in a pragmatic spirit (HTEC, 5.3.99). ABP felt that since all 
were agreed that partnership is a sensible strategy, 'you only get winning players ... it is a case of 
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use and get used' (ABP, 12.3 . 99). 
3 With NEL's issue and sector based approach to partnership, 
there was no specific forum in which the private sector was able to exercise direct influence over 
the area's political strategy. Such influence as existed seemed to be exercised through processes 
of consultation on council policy documents, such as NELC's Economic Development Strategy 
(Birds Eye, 15.3.99). However, as in Hull, the maintenance of land for industrial development was 
cited as a success, against pressures on the Council to build housing (ABP, 12.3-99; Novartis, 
18.3.99). ABP argued that without the imperative to build partnership bodies in order to procure 
regeneration funds, housing might have been built on development land 'for political gain', a 
theme echoed by the Chamber. Partnership funding regimes were felt to have forced NELC to 
consider a broader agenda, not just votes (ABP, 12.3.99; HHCCS, 25.8.99). 
Added Value in the Partnership Approach 
There was broad consensus that partnership working is a good thing. Birds Eye felt that while 
things 'could have happened anyway', it was doubtful 'whether it would have been so successful'. 
In particular, the appearance ofpartnership, token or otherwise, lent 'credibility, having an impact 
with Government if business was associated with it' (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). NELC viewed added 
value in general terms: 
Partnership gives you a great deal of extra influence and more soldiers. It is about a 
community tackling its own problems, the bottom up approach to communities solving their 
own problems, rather than the dependency culture (NELC, 12.6.98b). 
Partnership 'enables us to do more with less, creates better understanding of us by the private 
sector, and makes the Council aware of changes which the private sector face' (NELC, 12.6.98a). 
Furthermore, it has facilitated the co-ordination of activities and the avoidance of duplication 
(HHCCS, 25.8.99). 
3 HTEC was criticised both by NELC and by ABP for not spending enough on business 
development and inward investment. It was felt that the TEC trains people forjobs which aren't 
there, because they are 'ticking boxes ... driven by machinery rather than by what is right' (ABP, 
12.3.99 NELC, 8.4.99a). 
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It was also felt that business offered I more creative solutions', but also that 'the private sector is 
not as creative as we are sometimes led to believe. They have a big block about public funding, 
a much narrower focus than people would expect' (NELC, 8.6.98a). It was suggested that 
'genuine' partnerships could generate added value, but doubted whether most partnerships are 
genuine. Rather, they were perceived as grant led, needing greater involvement from participants, 
notjust signatures on a piece of paper (NELC, 8-6.98b). This view was supported by Birds Eye, 
which viewed many partnerships as symbolic (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). The Leader, wanting to see 
ftirther research, felt that there had been very little serious study on the rationale for local 
authorities working with business 'if you really got to the bottom of it, it may turn out that the 
whole idea of partnership is bad. I don't think it is, but it might be' (NELC, 12.6.98a). 
Business in Partnership 
It was felt, given that HTEC is a sub-regional body, that the Chamber is the main mechanism for 
representation of the private sector (HTEC, 5.3.99). But, the Chamber was felt to be very weak, 
run by retired members without the input of the most important business actors. It was felt that 
the key input ofthe private sector was through sectoral. initiatives (NELC, 8.6.98a; ABP, 12.3.99). 
Only the larger firms in NEL were considered able to get involved in partnerships by virtue ofthe 
time commitment necessary for activities beyond informal networking arrangements (HHCCS, 
25.8.99). Within this context, it was felt that there is little business activism in partnership and that 
the private sector is not as active as it might be (HHCCS, 25.8.99). The Council identified a 
potential pool of 10 to 12 business partners among large corporations, which places additional 
pressure on the few people who participate (NELC, 8.6.98b). This state of affairs was considered 
to arise partly from business culture and partly because firms have limited capacity for partnership 
activity (NELC, 12.6.98a; Novartis, 18.3.99; Acordis, 20.5.99; HHCCS, 25.8.99). Tioxide was 
critical of the majority of business which 'still hides its head in the sand', when a co-ordinated 
business input to community affairs could, it said, reap benefits for all employers. But at the same 
time, the company was discouraged by what it perceived as an unreasonable level of demand on 
its resources and by the lack of greater input from industrial colleagues (Tioxide, 27.9.99). 
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Novartis explained the process through which it decided to become involved in community work 
and in partnerships. It said that 'for years and years, we had a profile lower than this table. We 
would get on with our own business and keep our nose clean. The world out there could do what 
it liked' (Novartis, 18.3.99). Now, it was claimed, the company is strongly supportive of 
community work for example holding an annual worldwide community partnership day for 
charitable works (Novartis, December 1998; 18.3-99). Within this company philosophy, it is up 
to the Site Director to determine priorities, as was also the case for Acordis (20.5-99), Birds Eye 
(12.3.99) and Synthomer (21.5.99). The Chief Executive of Novartis Grimsby identified 
partnership as a big priority for him. 
I'm conscious that this is a chemical factory, ... we work with potential hazards. So we 
need a good understanding with the Local Authority in the area and with local people 
because ultimately, they give me the licence to operate. ... So we have lots of open days 
etc to keep people aware. But the other side of it is, is the company a faceless entity? Or 
are there real people here, real concerns. Of course the answer is yes and so I believe as 
a company we need to participate and show the real face of the real people. We are not 
wicked scientists, we are real people doing much needed and importantj obs ... we are here long term, not just to make a fast buck and pull out. So we need to be accepted in the 
community (Novartis, 18.3 . 99). 
4 
Tioxide was more instrumental in its motivations for becoming involved, having decided to launch 
what was described as a propaganda offensive against envirommentalists. These people were, it 
was argued, giving the company an unreasonably bad press which Tioxide believed had proved 
influential in local schools. Later, the company came to view the principle of partnership more 
positively, viewing the community as a 'part of our licence to operate'. It felt it has no right to 
complain about local politics unless it is willing to get involved. To this end, it has a small 
community budget, but perceives the input of 18 to 20 of its staff into local schools, together with 
curriculum aids and donated second hand computers as the most important contributions it makes 
to the partnership process. Ultimately, Tioxide viewed its commitment to partnership as an 
'investment issue', a means in the long term of gaining a better return (Tioxide, 27.9.99). 
4 An Observer report placed Novartis Grimsby eighth in a list of the worst 'solid toxic 
and other special waste' pollutants in Britain (The Observer, 30.5.99: 7). 
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ABP too puts money into community, the objective being to raise the profile of the company and 
show that: 
we') re not such bad people ... 
Wej ustify that byj udging how we've changed the perception 
of the local authority and other people toward our company in order to do better business 
in future. It results in less interference and more support. So we've got an equation, 
subjective, but its there (ABP, 12.3-99). 
The regional manager of ABP, as well as being involved on the Grimsby and Immingham. Ports 
Partnership and being Deputy Chairman ofthe North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership, 
was also a Director of HTEC and a past President of the Chamber (ABP, 12.3-99). ABP, 
Novartis and Birds Eye are the core business activists in North East Lincolnshire, forming the 
mainstay of business participation in the range of local partnership activities. 
The North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership 
The case of North East Lincolnshire differs from the first three cases in that it has no 'strategic' 
vision for the area, no strategy document encompassing all facets of the regeneration agenda, and 
no flagship partnership claiming to provide a holistic approach to the development and 
implementation ofregeneration policy. Instead, partnerships are organised around specific issues 
or sectors (NELC, 12.6.98b). This state of affairs partly arises from the history of the area as a 
small town, fragmented into two district authorities and Humberside County Council, and partly 
from a feeling within NELC that issue specific partnerships work better (NELC, 8.4.98a; ABP, 
12.3.99). NEL's four SRB projects are managed by the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration 
Partnership (NELRP), on which the main partners are NELC, HTEC and ABP. The Council is 
Al- - 
die accountable body for the funds and for the day to day management of the SRB through a 
Strategy Group consisting of NELC officers (NELRP, 1996). 
The question of partnership strategies for the new authority has been subject to a debate in which 
there were very different views about the way forward. The debate has been influenced by two 
external factors. First, the establishment of the RDA has resulted in a discussion about whether 
an overarching regeneration strategy would enhance NEL's profile. Since strategy and partnership 
C run side by side', any strategic development would naturally result in changes to partnership 
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structures (NELC, 16.2.99). The second, related, factor was that NELC has recently come in for 
severe criticism from Government Office for the way in which its SRB partnership operated, 
criticism described as 'torrid' (NELC, 17.5.99a), as a 'big smack' and as 'an 'absolute tirade' 
(HTEC, 5.3.99). ' Yorkshire Forward, successor to GOYH in running the SRB, claimed that the 
partnership lacked focus and common purpose and that it doesn't involve people from different 
organisations, nor mobilise resources. It was perceived to be driven by Council officers, with the 
private sector, in the guise ofABP, having little or no involvement, a perspective shared by HTEC 
which described it as a model of consultation rather than partnership (HTEC, 5.3.99). ' Yorkshire 
Forward argued that a much broader, inclusive agenda needed to be established to encourage 
business participation. The bulk of the criticism was levelled at NELC as accountable body for 
SRB resources and because it ran the partnership. However, it was recognised that other partners, 
especially HTEC, should have been more pro active and critical, arguing that things could be done 
differently (Yorkshire Forward, 6.5.99). The RDA view has gained qualified acceptance from the 
Council (NELC, 14.5.99). Neither HTEC, nor ABP offered to share blame for the criticism. The 
'-smack' delivered to NELC from Government Office (HTEC, 5.3.99) was anticipated in delivery 
plans for the SRB going back three years, which recognised a 'low base of community 
involvement and activity' (NELRP, 1996,1997). ABP, as Deputy Chair and the only business 
on the partnership Board acknowledged that it had not really been involved, participating only in 
decisions concerning port related projects. It said that it had not attended a meeting for 'months 
and months' instead identifying its contribution to the partnership as the development activities 
within the port which counted as leverage in SRB Round 2 (ABP, 12.3.99). Within NELC, it was 
also acknowledged that the partnership was not operating inclusively, or 'effectively (NELC, 
17.5.99a). However, it was felt by the partnership manager that critics had failed to recognise the 
quality of networking between Council, business and other sectors (NELC, 14.5.99). 
The problem is related because the RDA is now responsible for administration of the 
SRB. 
ThougI4 unlike GOYR, HTEC did not intend its comment to be critical. 
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Control and Bureaucracy in the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership 
The criticism by the Government Office has generated a debate in North East Lincolnshire about 
regeneration policy and partnership strategies. If there was acceptance that the partnership could 
be improved, there was also a feeling within NELC that the Government was responsible for its 
problems 'Pulling down edicts from everywhere, telling us how much we can and can't spend' 
(NELC, 8.6.98c). It was considered 'very patronising for central government to legislate, telling 
us what to do in local government'. They should 'get off the kick ... that unless people are told 
exactly what to do, they can't do it. We have more partnership experience than the Government', 
said the Chief Executive (NELC, 12.6.98b). The SRB process was perceived as highly 
bureaucratic and it was argued that the RDA will have to devolve more responsibility locally 
(NELC, 8.6.98c, 17.5.99a). ABP's views of the SRB were also very negative. It suggested that 
'Funding initiatives generate a hunt for something to spend it on'. It argued that criticism of the 
partnership was unfair and that Government office was too concerned with ticks in boxes, 
presentation and ground rules, 'manipulation rather than what is really appropriate' (ABP, 
12.3.99). 
The debate on strategy andpartnership in North East Lincolnshire 
According to Yorkshire Forward, North East Lincolnshire needs to develop a more holistic, 
strategic approach to regeneration. It argued that the establishment of the RDA is an important 
factor, generating the need for a common agenda among local stakeholders and for a local vision 
of where NEL wants to be in five years and how it proposes to get there. Such an approach 
would, it suggested, require a partnership linking together a range of funding streams. Without 
this approach, it warned, in the current policy environment, bids for external resources would be 
much less convincing (Yorkshire Forward, 6.5.99). 
Despite the pressures associated with the RDA and the SRB, key players remained unclear about 
which direction to take. It was recognised, in light of the criticisms discussed above, that North 
East Lincolnshire might have to adopt a more 'cohesive strategy' and that there were a number 
ofissues which needed linkage (NELC, 14.5-99). The Deputy Chief Executive, however, felt that 
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the economic position of the area is unlikely to change very much for the better and, if so, the 
Council needs to address the question of social regeneration independently. 
Broadly speaking, our position will stay the same. Does that mean that our social 
conditions and quality of life similarly have to reflect our economic position? I don't see 
why it should and from that position stems my view that you can't tackle social ills 
through an economic route (NELC, 8.6.98b). 
He believed, in light of local experience, that the benefits of economic regeneration don't 
necessarily feed through into social regeneration and therefore that integration of these streams 
could be counter-productive (NELC, 8.6.98b). But the Head of Economic Development viewed 
the organisational split in NELC between economic regeneration as 'infrastructure' and 
community regeneration as 6people' as misguided, hindering councillors from identifying overlaps. 
From the point of view of regeneration and partnership, though, she felt that an inclusive strategy 
statement would be too general (NELC, 8.6.98a). 
As suggested above, the debate about partnership strategies was viewed as inseparable from the 
debate about partnership structures. The Chief Executive of NELC was critical of what he 
described as the 'big bang' approach to policy and partnership and he criticised the LGA's New 
Commitment to Regeneration iratiative for 'bureaucracy', arguing that NEL's selective approach 
to partnership was better (NELC, 12.6.98b). Concern was expressed as to whether the Council 
would be able to find a leadership role within the context of a flagship partnership and flagship 
partnerships were viewed as undemocratic because they are 'exclusive'. Ifone business is invited 
in, it was suggested, another will be excluded (NELC, 8.6.98b, c, 12.6.98b). There was a common 
view within the Council that these partnerships are very bureaucratic and wasteful. This route 
could, it was argued, j eopardizethepartnership systems which workwell inNEL (NELC, 8.6.98a, 
12.6-98b). ABP agreed, perceiving a risk of tokenism: Me danger is that you end up in some 
trendy way producing words, but does it impact in the real worldT (ABP, 12.3.99). Part of the 
unease about establishing a strategic partnership came from negative views about CityVision itself 
It was felt by one senior officer that, as chapter 7 suggests, the partnership in Hull is beset by 
tensions and that it has no real power. The partnership had not, it was felt, achieved genuine 
integration, particularly in relation to the separation of powers between the Economic 
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Development Agency and CityVision (NELC, 8.6.98a). The Leader, however, disagreed with 
most of her colleagues, believing that strategic partnerships are good for democracy, provided that 
the roles of stakeholders are clear. 'My feeling is that we should be aiming for that kind of 
partnership' (NELC, 12.6.98a). The problem she identified was getting it off the ground in a new 
unitary setting. 
It was considered on balance within NELC that political opposition made the prospects for a 
flagship partnership, underpinned by a holistic regeneration strategy, unlikely, unless it were 
imposed from outside. However, the overall impression is that some move in this direction is 
likely (NELC, 17.5.99a). Whatever choice is made, the problem upon which all were agreed is 
that the same people get involved in NELC's two or three partnerships and that a flagship 
partnership would be simply unsustainable, notwithstanding political arguments for and against. 
Given that the same people are 'recycled' on partnerships under different names, it was felt that 
there is no point in having another (NELC, 8.6.98a, 8.6.98b; 8.4.99a; Novartis, 18.3.99). 
Sector and Issue-based Partnerships in North East Lincolnshire 
The following sections, following the same structure as the other cases, examine three 
implementation oriented partnership initiatives: the Humber Chemicals Focus, the Grimsby and 
Imminghain Ports Partnership and Lifelong Learning in North East Lincolnshire. 
The Grimsby and Immingham Port Partnership 
There is no broad economic development partnership in North East Lincolnshire. General inward 
investment issues and company specific inward investment requirements are discussed as and when 
required with local companies and suppliers respectively (NELC, 30.6.98) NELC's Inward 
Investment Strategy, discussed above, was not compiled in partnership, but through a consultation 
process similar to that undertaken for its Economic Development Strategy. NELC opposed the 
establishment of a formalised Inward Investment Partnership or of an Economic Development 
Agency comparable with the Barnsley model. Barnsley's approach was criticised as 
'bureaucratising', seen as a 'static' response to the RDA. It was argued that local flexibility is 
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the most important asset in NEL and that if partnerships are needed on specific issues, they are 
established for as long, and no longer, than is necessary for the job in hand (NELC, 12.6.98b). 
The Grimsby and Immingharn Port Partnership was held to represent an example ofthis approach. 
The combined ports of Grimsby and Immingham are the largest in the UK (NELC, 8.4.99b). 
Throughput grew from 26.05m tonnes in 1986 to 46m tonnes in 1997 (ABP, 1998). Encouraged 
by this growth, ABP is developing a new Humber International Terminal with a capacity for 
vessels laden with up to 100,000 tonnes. The development will, it was anticipated, enable the Port 
to compete more effectively with the European ports ofRotterdam and Antwerp. It was estimated 
that it will create 300 construction jobs and 100 permanentjobs in ABP (GET, 30.6.98). Despite 
the relative importance of Immingham as the busiest port in the UK, it was felt to be unknown 
outside the shipping world as a major international facility. The poor image of the area was 
identified as a major weakness for the Port (MDS, January 1998: 69). Like the Hull City/Port 
Partnership, the Grimsby and Immingham Ports Partnership is concerned with promoting the ports 
to potential customers and with attempting to draw in new inward investment through marketing. 
Promotional activities were carried out by Humberside County Council prior to its abolition, but 
ABP was not involved with these due to disputes with smaller wharves in the sub-region (NELC, 
8.4.99b). 
Notwithstanding the focus which unitary status may have brought to partnership activities, it was 
felt to have caused complications in Council relationships with ABP. Prior to unitary status, 
Cleethorpes and Grimsby district councils were characterised by different political approaches, the 
former a hung council, the latter Labour controlled. The Council officer managing the partnership 
felt that Cleethorpes District Council had a much more positive approach to relationships with 
ABP, hosting dinners and other events for'the movers and shakers' in the area. Grimsby, she felt, 
didn't believe in this approach and had comparatively poor relations with ABP. Now NELC was 
controlled by Labour, relationships weren't as close, she said, as they had been in Cleethorpes. 
She suggested that some senior officers had carried over the 'old culture' of Grimsby into the new 
authority (NELC, 8.4.98b). ABP shared this perspective up to a point, acknowledging the 
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different political perspectives in the old authorities and the problems which had existed with 
Grimsby, but on balance felt that unitary status has simplified things (ABP, 12.3.99). 
The partnership was launched in August 1997 with the support of around 20 companies. Based 
principally on subscriptions from NELC and from ABP it was described as an informal, non 
bureaucratic grouping (NELC, 30.9.97), a programme based partnership with a loose structure 
and few meetings (NELC8.4.99b; ABP, 12.3.99). Formally, the partnership is run by a small 
steering group, but day-to-day decisions are made by the Council. The Council chairs both the 
steering group and a wider partnership group comprising all subscribers, which meets infrequently 
(NELC, 8.4.8 8b). The partnership was perceived by ABP as part of a commitment by the Council 
to the economic development of the area and to providing support for potential inward investors 
(ABP, 1998: 72). At present, the partnership focusses its efforts on promotional events in North 
Western Europe. It recognised a need, when the Humber International Terminal is complete, to 
market the Port globally (NELC, 8.4.99b). The anticipated costs and benefits of the partnership 
have been identified byNELC. Box 5 identifies these respectively for NELC and ABP, as the key 
players in the partnership (source: NELC, 2.9.97). 
ii 
I Costs I Benefits ------------- 4 --------------------------------------- 4 -------------------------------------- II 
Commitment of staff and resources, I NEW i Jobs, improved local economy, 
data and information about economy, I inward investment inquiries, 
contacts and influence safeguarding existing jobs 
------------- 4 --------------------------------------- 4-- ---------- 
ABP Information about the port, pays own Trade, port awareness,, potential 
expenses when attending events I clients and contacts 
Box 5: The Costs and Benefits of the Grimsby and Immingham Ports Partnership 
NELC claimed that the partnership had generated 67 jobs in the preceding 12 months through 
increased trade, though there had been no evaluation of whether the partnership itself had been 
responsible for this success, or for raised awareness of the ports and the area (NELC, 8.4.99b). 
It was also claimed that there had been some interest expressed in establishing new shipping lines 
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to Grimsby and Immingharn at the first promotional event. However, audiences at the promotions 
were perceived to be small, for which NELC could find no explanation (NELC, 30.6.98). 
Added Value in the Grintsby and Immingham Ports Partnership 
In terms of added value, the partnership was perceived to bring 'credibility' to the promotional 
operation. ABP's main influence on the partnership amounted to advising on where to target 
promotions through providing access to it's national marketing network, estimated to be worth 
f 80,000 per year to the partnership. NELC's view was that the sum of the partnership is greater 
than its parts. While some ofthe companies involved are competitors, the partnership has brought 
them together to market the area, and they can compete with each other for the trade benefits this 
approach brings (NELC, 8.4.99b). ABP felt that it is difficult to quantify added value within the 
partnership. It re-iterated the point that success has not been forthcoming in the field of inward 
investment, and that this is the benchmark of success and failure for the partnership 'if we could 
see more businesses coming in - big businesses - you'd have something to hang your hat on' 
(ABP, 12.3.99). 
The Humber Chemicals Focus 
The Chemicals industry is concentrated within the Humber area, particularly on the south bank 
in the North East Lincolnshire area (NELC, 8.6.98b). The Humber Chemicals Focus (HCF), 
another sector initiative, seeks to draw together strands in the development of this industry, 
inc luding inward investment, training, lobbying and business development (NELC, June 1997; 
NELC, 29.9.98). Like the ports partnership, the Humber Chemicals Focus (HCF) was originally 
a Humberside County Council initiative, lacking private sector participation. It's objective was 
to attract inward investment and it did promotional work, according to NELC, without much 
success (NELC, 8.4.99a). Following the establishment of the four unitary authorities in 
Humberside, it was decided to continue with a sub-regional partnership under the leadership of 
NELC, because ofthe particular concentration ofchemicals in that area. Research commissioned 
by NELC suggested that a new approach was needed to promoting the chemicals industry and that 
the HCF had to be private sector driven and led, if it were to succeed (PPD, June 1998: 3). Initial 
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approaches by the Council did not generate much support within the industry, which expressed 
concerns that the partnership would become a bureaucratic talking shop, arguing that it didn't 
wish to contribute money, or lose more time from core businesses (NELC, 8.4.99a; Acordis, 
20.5.99). Synthomer, representing the most cynical element of the local chemicals industry, 
argued that the partnership was a waste of time and more generally, that partnership efforts 
involving the local authority would have no positive effect on the decisions of potential multi- 
national investors. The Site Director's view was that business had no need of local authority 
assistance beyond that associated with statutory planning processes and that local authorities still 
had no real understanding of business needs (Synthomer, 21.5.99). 
Despite negative feedback of this kind, NELC pursued the issue. It highlighted the positive role 
it had played in this partnership process, arguing that it had refuted the stereotype of a 
bureaucratic, slow moving local authority. The Council had been, it claimed, imaginative, positive, 
enthusiastic and ambitious, whereas the chemicals industry had 'dragged their feet' (NELC, 
8.4.99a). On the basis of positive examples from other areas and with a warning that without a 
collective voice at regional, national and international levels, NEL and Humberside would lose out, 
the Council began to draw in representatives from the private sector. Leading for business was 
Acordis, participating in joint presentations which helped to bring other companies on board. 
Initially reluctant because of uncertainty about added value, the site director had been convinced 
to become involved on the understanding that the partnership would 'add value' to the activities 
already in place, that it would involve a minimal administrative structure; and that it would be 
objective, not funding driven (Acordis, 20.5.99). Hence, according to NELC, the partnership will 
not be a'bureaucratic talking shop demanding excessive staffor financial resources' (NELC, June 
1997). 
As of May 1999, there were 12 companies involved, plus HTEC, each contributing f. 1,000 per 
year (NELC, 8.4.99a). The partnership had yet to decide how it would be constituted and 
managed. If the new partnership were to be successful in a bid for f. 250,000 from ERDF funds, 
a full time chief executive would be employed to run it. The big chemical companies, including 
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Novartis, BP, Tioxide and Acordis had acted as an informal steering group up to this point, but 
they needed the legitimacy of formal authority from other parties to continue (NELC, 8.4.99a). 
The HCF was perceived as a response to an ad hoc and individualistic approach to problems in 
the chemical industry, including skills training, promotion and investment. NELC argued that if 
agreement could be reached on these issues and the industry brought together, it would co- 
ordinate and rationalise activities, improving efficiency and reducing costs and labour time (NELC, 
8.4.99a). The main partnership objective was to be the establishment of an 'effective focus' for 
training in the chemicals industry, bringing together a partnership which, it said, HTEC had so far 
failed to achieve, leading to a 'vacuum'. Tioxide went so far as to argue that the HCF was only 
necessary because the TEC had &iled to do its job properly (27.9.99). It was argued that there 
had been a serious lack of definition and communication of training needs between suppliers and 
clients, between suppliers and suppliers and between clients and clients, leading to a failure to 
develop adequate training concepts or courses with industry-wide applicability. Competition 
between training providers had, it was argued, mitigated against the long term supply of a 
comprehensive training capability. The HCF was identified as the mechanism to catalyse 
discussions about these issues at the 'strategic' and 'tactical' levels (PPD, July 1998: 30). The 
disappearance oftraditional training routes has been compounded, according to Novartis, by aging 
of the workforce. Itestimated that in no more than 10 years, most of its skilled workers will have 
retired. The fact that many skilled tasks are outsourced means that the company has no control 
over training, which smaller contractors had proved unable, or unwilling, to address (Novartis, 
18.3.99). Even Synthomer was less cynical about the training element of the partnership, 
recognising that co-ordination of skills training must be a high priority for the industry over the 
next few years (Synthomer, 21.5.99). 
Future Added Value in the Humber Chemicals Focus 
Clearly, none of the above objectives could be carried out without the full participation and 
leadership of the private sector. But since the partnership had not commenced operations, 
discussion of added value is speculative. However, the potential gains from the partnership have 
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been analysed by consultants, PPD Technical. Their report argues that co-ordinating initiatives 
for training, inward investment and the local supply chain would not be undertaken by the 
chemicals sector without outside help. On the other hand, the public sector could not undertake 
these tasks alone. Consequently, a partnership is required to fill the gap (PPD, June 1998: 38). 
NELC identified the example of new health and safety legislation, requiring one day of training 
per person in certain chemical companies. These firms had, hitherto, been undertaking this 
training on an individual basis. The HCF should, it was argued, be able to arrange a training 
package for all Humberside chemical companies, producing considerable savings (NELC, 8.4.99a). 
Both NELC and Novartis saw the initiative as helping to provide a better skilled workforce, 
enhanced awareness of the area and better access to governmental decision makers (NELC, June 
1997; Novartis, 18.3.99). Acordis suggested three questions which, if answered positively, would 
indicate that the partnership was working: 'have you heard of it, do you know what it does, has 
it been usefalT (Acordis, 20.5.99). Funding was also regarded as important to the future work 
of the HCF, though as noted above, it wanted to avoid being grant driven. However, it was hoped 
that external grants, particularly from Europe, would assist in meeting the objective ofpromoting 
the industry and of attracting new supply chain investment (Novartis, 18.3.99, NELC, 8.4.99a). 
The Business Services Manager of Tioxide was less impressed with the potential in the Humber 
ChemicalsFocus. VAiile the company hasjoined the initiative, it perceives that it will be a talking 
shop 'enough to satisfy the report writers, but it means bugger all on the ground' (Tioxide, 
27.9.99). 
Education and Business in Partnership 
According to NELC, the role of education in regeneration is only 'now beginning to be 
understood' and the focus on job creation is treating the symptom of economic problems, not the 
cause (NELC, 12.6.98b). NELC has been slow to integrate the learning agenda into its objectives, 
only adding 'learning' to its list of priorities in 1998 (www. nelincs. gov. uk). ' In the LEA's view, 
raising aspirations and achievements is the motor of achievement, in other words, the learning 
This hesitancy might reflect uncertainty as to whether it is worthwhile to link social 
and economic issues 
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agenda underpins the economic agenda (NELC, 17.5.99b). It was felt that little value is placed 
on education in a community where little education or training had been necessary when 
generation followed generation into the fishing industry (NELC, 12-6.98a). NEL is in the bottom 
quarter of schools for its GCSE performance. In 1994,29.9% of pupils obtained GCSE passes 
at grades A to C. In 1996, this figure had improved to 32.4%, declining to 30.7% in 1997 and 
jumping to 33.3% in 1998 (HTEC, September 1998a: 44; The Guardian, 1.12.98). Pass rates in 
1998 varied between schools from 8% to 88.8% (The Guardian, 1.12-98). NELC's strategy for 
education business links is oriented on addressing these problems (NELC, December 1998). 
Education Business Links 
The demise of Humberside EBP was discussed in the case of Hull and it is not repeated here. It 
is worth noting, however, that Tioxide, which was represented on the Board of the Humberside 
EBP, cited its collapse as an example of why the company does not believe that a culture of 
partnership exists in North East Lincolnshire. The company's representative on the Board 
recounted that he had no inkling that the partnership was about to founder and that when it did, 
he received no explanation and was never aware of why the collapse had occurred (Tioxide, 
27.9.99). It is also worth noting that under the Humberside EBP arrangement, North East 
Lincolnshire firms were the least likely to seek support from organisational. sources like the EBP 
(HTEC, September 1998a: 8 1). HTEC explained this fact by virtue of the strain which a 
commitment to offer every school child a placement placed on local businesses. The culture, it 
was suggested, is different in Hull, where more firms are involved and there are stronger bilateral 
relationships between schools and business (HTEC, 18.3 . 99). 
8 
It became apparent, however, in NELC's Education Development Plan (December 1998) that 
there is truth in the claim by HTEC, noted in chapter 7, that local authorities are obsessed with 
targets and outputs and that this approach to education, whatever its merits, does not sit 
comfortably alongside that of people who argue that 'vision' is more important as a starting point 
Notwithstanding the fact that partnerships in Hull developed later than in North East 
Lincolnshire. 
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than outputs (NELC, 17.5.99b). Despite problems with the EBP and a recognition that business 
contributions in school may be 'too promotional' at times, NELC claimed to be committed to 
education business links and it now organises projects from within the LEA, supported by a TEC 
funded officer (NELC, 17.5.99c). Under this arrangement, a two week placement has been 
promised to every child in local schools who wants work experience. There is no partnership 
element in the organisation ofeducation business links, but a contract relationship between HTEC 
and NELC called 'Raising Aspirations and Achievements', regarded as a potential 'sub-set' of 
lifelong learning, discussed below (HTEC, 18.3.99). Tioxide viewed the collapse ofthe EBP with 
concern, perceiving the need for a new agency to coordinate where those responsible for company 
recruitment can link up in a systematic way with education providers to ensure that industrial input 
to schools is maximised. It viewed its input to education as its most important contribution to 
partnership and perceived that business input has declined since the EBP wound down, saying 'its 
all gone to hell on a handcart' (Tioxide, 27.9.99). 
Tioxide was presented by HTEC as a blueprint for education business links in practice (HTEC, 
undated). The company, which manufactures pigment and has been in Grimsby since 1949, feels 
that it has a 'social responsibility for putting something back' into education (Tioxide, 27.9.99). 
It claimed that it supports schools and colleges to produce individuals who are better prepared for 
theworldofwork. Education links give the company an opportunity to 'enthuse' to young people 
about career opportunities it has to offer. They also serve as a means of self development for 
graduates and other young employees. HTEC's case study of Tioxide highlighted the example 
of an exchange placement between a young female engineer and a teacher from a local school. 
The engineer prepared a lesson pack linking into geography and mathematics, incorporating work 
on weights and measurements, the packaging ofpigments as well as a map of Tioxide sites around 
the world and export destinations. As well as developing her presentational and communication 
skills, the exchange helped her to attack the stereotype ofa male dominated engineering profession 
which, it was felt, exists among school students. The benefits to the company of these links were 
listed as: improvements to employee presentation, communication and time management, the 
breaking down of career stereotypes, and 'immeasurable goodwill', strengthening the company's 
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standing in the local community and creating 'pride' in the workforce (Tioxide, cited in HTEC, 
undated). Tioxide viewed education as the most important facet of the regeneration agenda, 
saying that ifyoung people are not 'enthused' about wealth creation, then manufacturing industry, 
North East Lincolnshire's only hope for jobs, cannot be resurrected. It felt that there is a greater 
responsibility on the business sector to get involved in this process than has currently been realised 
(Tioxide, 27.9-99). 
North East Lincolnshire and Lifelong Learning 
Until recently, North East Lincolnshire had no fonnal education partnership beyond its 
involvement in the Humberside Partnership (see chapter 7). NEL's SRB4 bid, based on the 
concept of 'lifelong learning', sought to tackle the undervaluing of education which, it says, leads 
to low aspiration, expectation and achievement (NELC, 2.6.98b: 186). According to NELC, the 
project is important if the area is to meet government targets for literacy and numeracy. Business 
was identified as a key partner, 'vital' if the project is to succeed (NELC cited in GET, 21.11.97). 
To these ends, following the Goverment's Lifelong Learning initiative, a 'Strategic Steering 
Group'. a 'shadow' Lifelong Learning Partnership, has been established and 'approved' in 
principle by Government Office. But important decisions were awaited on the final form the 
partnership will take and on related governinent proposals on FE funding, announced within the 
White Paper Learning to Succeed A New Frameworkfor Post-] 6 Learning (DfEE, June 1999; 
HTEC, 18.3.99; NELC, 17.5.99c). 
The partnership Steering Group had been established for the North East Lincolnshire area. But 
NELC predicted that Government Office will insist that it is finally constituted on a sub-regional 
basis, due to the fact that the local authority area lacks higher education facilities, the nearest being 
in Lincoln and Hull (NELC, 17.5.99b, c). 9 The lead'Lifelong Learning' officer in NELC was very 
cynical about the Govermment's agenda for Lifelong Learning. She argued that government 
messages about local priorities reflecting local needs were rhetorical. Her perception was that 
9 If the partnership does become sub-regional, it is envisaged that it would be South 
Bank based, involving Lincoln. 
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government has been prescriptive in the education planning process, indicative of 'local 
administration, not governance'. Proposals for lifelong learning have added to the debate within 
NELC about future partnership strategies. One issue concerns the ftiture management of SRB4, 
a lifelong learning project, and the relationship of lifelong learning to the wider regeneration 
process. A senior officer in the LEA argued that the 'political rules of regionalisation' have 
produced a situation in which North East Lincolnshire has no choice but to integrate different 
agendas within an area partnership and, as such, there should be an organisational relationship 
established between the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership and the Lifelong 
Learning Partnership (NELC, 17.5.99b). 
The view of the NELC officer co-ordinating the Steering Group was that business input will be 
very important in explaining the changing needs of a major employer and in explaining whether 
schools are 'churning out' the kind of people they need. Business was perceived to have a role 
not only in identifying employment needs, but also in promoting the learning process in schools 
and in relating it to employment opportunities (NELC, 17.5.99c). However, business has not 
played a major role in the process so far. Birds Eye, sits on the Strategic Steering Group and, 
while it demonstrated only a vague idea of what the process is about, it felt the partnership would 
be instrumental to learning processes and relevant to its employees (Birds Eye, 15.3.99). The 
perception that business is marginal to this process was confirmed by Tioxide, which had only the 
vaguest notion of what Lifelong learning partnerships are about, despite its comparatively high 
profile contribution to education business links. This absence of information contributed to a 
feeling that the company is 'disenfranchised' and that it has 'no ownership of these things at all' 
(Tioxide, 27.9.99). 
Added Value in Education Business Links 
It was acknowledged that the question of added value had yet to be addressed in relation to 
Lifelong learning partnerships, beyond the attainment of objectives stipulated by government. 
NELC argued that given education business links are now purely operational in character, Lifelong 
Learning would have to take more of a strategic overview of post-16 education. However, 
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strategic input was considered unlikely to come from the business community which, it was 
suggested, was interested not in strategic educational matters, but in doing 'worthy things and 
raising awareness of their business within schools'. This tendency was perceived by NELC as a 
problem felt, in part, to arise from the international character ofbusiness managers in locally based 
multi-nationals, who, while they are interested in links with education had little interest in 
partnership management and governance (NELC, 17.5.99b). Tioxide felt that the real value of 
education business links over the past decade had been the level of understanding gained between 
schools and businesses in an environment where local authority influence over education policy 
has continually diminished. It felt that school leavers are more 'employable' than they were, and 
that education is now a better 'preparation for life in commercial endeavour'. However, it would 
not speculate on how far these effects derive form local efforts or from changes in the environment 
in which education takes place, deriving from the national curriculum and GNVQs (Tioxide, 
27.9.99). 
Case Summary 
North East Lincolnshire is a small, relatively isolated local authority area, which has suffered badly 
from the demise of its fishing industry. It is a capital rich area, but local companies do not provide 
enough jobs for the large numbers of unemployed. North East Lincolnshire is uncertain about 
how to address its problems, an uncertainty underpinned by pessimism about its prospects for 
achieving regeneration. Partnership between business and the local authority is viewed as a 
phenomenon which has developed since the late 1980s, based on the Council's decision to play 
an active role in facilitating economic growth and its recognition that the private sector had to play 
the key role in this process. North East Lincolnshire partnerships are project, rather than strategy, 
driven. As such, its challenge fund partnership, the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration 
Partnership has no wider strategic purpose. It is a local authority driven partnership in which 
business plays a symbolic role, one reason for the criticisms made by GOYH. The ensuing debate 
about what kind of partnership strategy to adopt had not concluded at the end of the research 
period, but it was being driven by considerations about how to relate to Yorkshire Forward and 
about how far to move in the direction of a joined up partnership model of the kind represented 
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by the Barnsley Regeneration Forum, the Rotherham Economic Partnership and Hull CityVision. 
The debate is underpinned by philosophical differences within the Council about the prospects for 
economic regeneration in North East Lincolnshire and the relationship, consequent on the position 
taken in this debate, between economic and social aspects of regeneration. 
North East Lincolnshire is more confident about the role of its sector partnerships, the Grimsby 
and Immingham Ports Partnership and the Humber Chemicals Focus. These partnerships have a 
clear rationale and, after initial difficulties, have gained significant, if not universal, support from 
the business sector. With the demise of the Humberside Partnership, education business links in 
North East Lincolnshire ceased to be partnership based, except through the bi-lateral links existing 
between individual schools and businesses. The Council is uncertain as yet about which direction 
Lifelong Learning will take them in, but it is perceived by some as an additional government 
control mechanism. The role of business in the partnership steering group has been peripheral, 
but the views of employers on the relationship between schools and the world of work are 
perceived to be important. On the whole, private sector participation in partnerships is low, at 
its strongest in commercially oriented sector partnerships. There has been a change in culture 
among some larger businesses, predisposing them toward partnership working, but many firms 
lack the capacity or the inclination to get involved in partnerships. The added value in partnership 
is based more on speculation than in the other cases, given that key initiatives are just getting off 
the ground. The absence of a genuine partnership makes the question rather redundant in relation 
to the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership, while concrete added value in the sector 
partnerships is more anticipated than it is realised. In principle, partnership was perceived to 
enable partners to do more with less, to give North East Lincolnshire credibility with government, 
to generate bottom up solutions and to engender a culture of understanding between sectors. The 
case of North East Lincolnshire concludes the empirical phase of the study. Chapter 9 moves on 
to provide a detailed comparative analysis of the findings reported in the four case studies. 
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Chapter 9. The Emergence and Characteristics of Local 
Partnerships: A Comparative Analysis 
Introduction 
The two final chapters comprise the third part of the thesis in which the case study findings are 
analysed and linked to the theoretical discussions set out in chapters I to 3. This chapter provides 
a summary of the key themes occurring in the case studies on a comparative basis. The findings 
are examined thematically, identifying factors which can be generalised and those which cannot. 
They are summarised in boxes 6 to I L' The core argument advanced is that there are a range of 
economic and political reasons why local authorities and businesses are pursuing partnerships, but 
that a global-local dialectic is not visible except potentially in promotional and image building 
initiatives associated with 'place marketing'. Challenge partnerships tend to be symbolic in 
character, lacking local autonomy and significant business involvement. However, in specific 
implementation oriented initiatives, there is greater business input and evidence of some, limited, 
local govemance capacity. 
The chapter is structured into four main parts. The first part evaluates the local context for 
partnership working in the four cases and the second compares the different backgrounds to the 
emergence of partnership approaches. The third and fourth parts examine the practice of 
partnership in the present day, looking first at the objectives and capabilities ofthe main challenge 
partnerships in each area and second at operational, or implementation oriented partnerships? The 
I Box 6 summarises the economic context for partnership and Box 7 the process of 
partnership development. Boxes 8,9 and 10 summarise the different partnership types identified 
in the case studies, while Box II provides an overview of the partnership types discussed, both 
within and between the four cases. 
2 The distinction between challenge partnership and isnplementation partnership is based 
on Skelcher's distinction between policy oriented mechanisms and programme oriented 
mechanisms (Skelcher et al, 1996: 5). 
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chapter concludes with an overview of partnership activities, comparing the practices found at 
different levels within and between the four case studies. 
The Local Context for Partnership 
This part of the chapter compares the different contexts for partnership identified in the case 
studies. It is divided into three sections: inward investment and local growth; mobile capital and 
the global-local dialectic; and global-localisation, local dependence and secondary investment. 
Box 6 summarises and compares the key elements found in the case studies. 
Inward Investment and Local Growth 
Each of the four case study areas can be characterised as 'deprived'. Barnsley and Rotherharn 
suffered the total closure of their coal industries, Rotherham. also losing most of its steel industry. 
Hull and North East Lincolnshire find themselves in a different position, where although economic 
decline has had serious effects, it has been more gradual. The capacity within the local economies 
to respond to these difficulties varied. Barnsley was almost wholly dependent on the coal industry, 
meaning that it has no industrial base upon which to rebuild. Barnsley's economic strategy is 
focused, therefore, on attracting new inward investment to the extensive brown field sites in and 
around the area. HulL at the other extreme, has a more diverse industrial and manufacturing base, 
cushioning against and providing for a different response to the demise of its fishing industry. 
Hull's main strategy for growth is to facilitate growth within its existing industrial base. Between 
these extremes sit Rotherham, with a residual manufacturing base enabling it to pursue a twin 
inward investment and indigenous growth strategy, and North East Lincolnshire which is 
dependent for jobs primarily on the port and food related industries. NEL's main emphasis, 
however, is the pursuit of labour intensive inward investment because the chemicals industry, a 
major local investor, is capital intensive and the food industry, a major source of work, seems to 
be in decline. 
The findings show that responses to economic decline have varied and that the pursuit of mobile 
capital is not a constant across the four cases. An area, like Barnsley, with little local industry left 
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and with large expanses of derelict land nearby, is under a stronger economic compulsion to 
pursue inward investment, than is Hull, which has a continuing industrial base to nurture and 
which lacks the sites and cash incentives available in South Yorkshire to attract large scale 
newcomers. Local approaches to new inward investment vary, but each area had little choice 
about the direction it has pursued due to inherited socioeconomic and geographical factors. The 
evidence from Barnsley, Rotherham. and North East Lincolnshire, those areas actively pursuing 
new inward investment, shows that overseas capital is of variable importance. It was of most 
significance in Barnsley, least so in North East Lincolnshire. The bulk of new jobs have come 
from domestic sources including local growth and the evidence suggests, in all areas except 
Barnsley, that they will continue to do so. Limited evidence from Rotherham suggests that 
overseas investment may be of growing importance, but apart from Barnsley, all agreed that 
regeneration depends more on local and national capital than on overseas capital. 
Mobile Capital and the Global-Local 'Dialectic"? 
All areas agreed that locality is important only in the last instance in overseas inward investment 
decisions. Companies, particularly from beyond Europe, focus first and foremost on broad 
geographical areas, looking at the political, legal and economic landscapes. Distant corporations 
may be unaware of sub-national areas until-a range of suitable sites are presented to them through 
Al- - die Inward Investment Bureau and its -agent in Yorkshire, the Yorkshire and Humberside 
Development Agency? With the exception of Hull, seeking to re-invent itself as a'Top Ten'. city, 
the regional and sub-regional levels were perceived as the key to promoting economic 
development, confirming the view expressed by the Minister for the Regions, Regeneration and 
Planning, that the regional interface with global markets is of greater strategic importance for 
economic growth than the local (DETR, 7.7.99). North East Lincolnshire perceived the new 
RDA, 'Yorkshire Forward' as its only hope for success, while Barnsley, as part of the South 
Now part of Yorkshire Forward, the Regional Development Agency for Yorkshire and 
Humberside. 
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Yorkshire coalfields, perceived the sub-region as a useful supplementary brand. 4 Again, with the 
exception of Hull, the regional brand was viewed as the key to future success, though NEL did 
not feel confident of its position within Yorkshire and Humberside. 
In terms of the attractions offered to investors by specific localities, the main incentive to firms, 
both those investing for the first time and those expanding existing operations, was financial 
assistance. Hull and North East Lincolnshire, for example, both feared that Objective I funding 
for South Yorkshire will impede their own growth. This feeling was especially strong in North 
East Lincolnshire, which felt that it had lost investment opportunities to areas with more 
favourable grant regimes, partly because, all things being equal, they are favoured by investors, 
and partly because of the perception that as an area without grant opportunities, NEL is 
automatically 'filtered out' by IIB/YHDA at the enquiry stage. Insofar as localities are able to 
compete,, competition from other areas within the UK with public subsidy was seen as a greater 
problem than competition from abroad. In short, the evidence suggests that localities have only 
a marginal capacity to compete for inward investment and that the characteristics of particular 
localities become important only in the last instance. Economic globalization therefore appears 
to 'bite' at a higher geographical scale than the locality, undermining the notion that global- 
localisation is a key 'dialectic' in the state-capital interface (Harding and Le Gales, 1997). One 
possible counterfactual, identified by North East Lincolnshire, is the potential growth of the 
European Union, particularly Germany, as a source of investment. Ignorance of the internal 
geography of the UK is less likely to be a factor for EU nations, which could result an enhanced 
role for place marketing, if Europe were to become more important as a source of investment. 
In summary, it can be argued that investment from distant parts of the world, like Asia, has not 
directly enhanced the importance of locality for attracting mobile capital. Localities have little 
capacity to influence the competitive playing field. These findings do not necessarily undermine 
the possibility of a global-local dialectic existing in relation to larger, or 'global' cities (Sassen, 
199 1, Fisher and Kling, 1993). London and New York, as 'brands', may be as accessible to an 
4 There was a 'turf war' in Rotherham over inward investment between RC CTE and 
RiDO. This was articulated as a dispute between local and sub-regional approaches. 
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Asian investor as are the UK or the USA. The relevance of global-localisation to larger and 
smaller cities and towns respectively is unclear. Why, if the nation state is declining in relation to 
a new global capital-global cities interface, does it not seem to be declining in relation to smaller 
places? In other words, is it only in relation to global cities that the nation state is losing 
influence? Harding's research findings (1996a, c, 1997), discussed further in chapter 10, 
undermine his research hypotheses concerning global-localisation outlined in chapter 3 (Harding, 
1994ý 1996b), but the findings in this study beg the question of whether place is a mediating 
factor, or whether supposed changes in the economic capacities of the nation state are constant 
in relation to different sub-national units. 
Global-localisation: Local Dependence and Secondary Investment 
While global-localisation may not be a key factor in the struggle for new investment, it is more 
relevant to global companies with existing operations in an area. Both Rotherharn and Barnsley 
host multi-national corporations, but these comprised a comparatively small segment of their 
economies. Branch plants comprised a much more important theme in discussions with Hull and 
North East Lincolnshire. Site directors at these branch plants revealed variable levels of 
dependence on and commitment to local areas. Outsourcing ofproduction to countries with cheap 
labour was identified as a problem for 'low-tech', labour intensive industries such as tennis ball 
production in Barnsley, but among the profitable and capital intensive Humberside chemicals 
companies, none indicated that relocation or outsourcing of production to low wage economies 
is feasible. Local skills deficits and the fact that supplies and markets are often found either 
elsewhere in the UK or abroad made little difference to this evaluation. Export companies require 
access to a port and, for this reason, proximity has helped to entrench long term commitments to 
the area. On balance, the message was that the productive capital ofthe multi-national companies 
is not footloose,, particularly in capital intensive industries. But what about investment capital? 
Secondary Investments, Buyouts and De-mergers 
None of the above is to suggest that economic globalization and capital mobility was not 
everywhere perceived as an important factor. It appeared most important in relation to secondary 
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investments, buyouts and de-mergers, activities which require a more immediate interface between 
locality and corporation. In terms of a developing dynamic between global capital and locality, 
secondary investments were more important than new capital investments. On one hand, the 
company looking to re-invest already knows about the potential for investment in an area. On the 
other hand, secondary investment is more likely to go to an existing plant with appropriate infra- 
structural support than to brand new or substantially new operations, for reasons of economy of 
scale. For branch plants in all areas, internal competition with 'sister' plants in other countries was 
perceived as threatening. North East Lincolnshire and Hull in particular complained ofremote HQ 
operations making investment decisions. However, there was no evidence, or reason to think, that 
the proximity or otherwise of an investment decision maker to a potential investment opportunity 
makes any difference to her decision. Secondary investments in Rotherham and in Barnsley were 
influenced by economic factors and by the availability of land for expansion. The major investment 
in Smith & Nephew's Hull plant was agreed in London, said the company, without any sentiment 
for its local roots. The investment was courted by smaller operations in France and in the USA, 
whose place marketing was viewed as superior to that in Hull but whose plant infrastructure was 
felt to be inferior. The investment went to Hull because of the local skill base and because 
production was already taking place there. Both Hull and North East Lincolnshire viewed buyouts 
and de-mergers as potential threats, although the representative of a company involved in this 
process denied that the process had any negative effect on the viability ofproduction in particular 
plants. This was an ideologically charged account, but it suggested that competitive pressures, 
not globalizing tendencies in company structures themselves, produce job losses and 
rationalization. 
Summary 
The partnership process cannot be a straightforward response to competition for new inward 
investment by globally mobile capital. This particular global-local dialectic was not visible, except 
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investment decision. Inward investment need not be a priority in every area and, indeed, it cannot 
be. The capacity of smaller urban areas to compete directly for mobile investment is limited 
because oftheir anonymity. Even were they not anonymous, the key factors of competition which 
influence investors appear to be outside local control. Overseas capital, while it may be growing 
in importance, is still perceived as a secondary source of growth in all areas but Barnsley. 
Competitive place marketing is oriented more towards impressing grant making bodies than 
courting overseas firms, a finding which undermines Mayer's (1994) perspective, discussed in 
Chapter 3. Box 6 summarises the economic factors which form the backdrop to partnership 
development in the four case studies. The following sections discuss the processes and rationale 
for partnership building in the four cases. 
The Development of Partnership Approaches 
This part of the chapter examines the reasons why partnerships have developed in the way they 
have. It begins by looking at the history of partnership working, showing that while partnership 
is now broadly accepted by officer and member elites, commitment diminishes further down the 
hierarchy. The third section identifies networking as an important, but secondary, theme in 
partnership processes and the final section considers the nature of different motivations for 
business activity in partnerships. 
The History of Local Partnership 
The evidence suggests different starting points, pathways and trajectories, and also different end 
points in the partnership building process. However, there is also evidence of similarities between 
all the cases. This chapter examines the reasons why partnership working has come to exist in its 
present form before moving on to examine its impact on policy and its implementation. 
Partnership was perceived to have developed within different time frames. Rotherham. felt that 
there had been a positive relationship between the council and the business sector, if not fonnal 
partnership, going back to the 1970s. Rotherham, however, distinguished between fonnal 
partnerships and co-operation, the latter a feature of government programmes and of measures 
resulting in the fragmentation of local government. Structured partnerships, stimulated by the 
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failure of a City Challenge bid, were viewed by RCCTE to have changed the character of co- 
operation with business from paternalism, to 'real' understanding. The case of Rotherham shows 
a Labour authority willing to co-operate with business without precipitous economic decline and 
without government incentives and penalties. In this sense, it was exceptional, making the point 
that conflict with the business sector was not endemic in Labour local authorities during the 1980s. 
Barnsley, Hull and North East Lincolnshire, on the other hand, were initially characterised by a 
negative, or a non-relationship between the Council and the business sector beyond statutory 
interfaces. An agenda for co-operation developed over a period of between five years in the case 
of Hull and 15 years in the other cases. A clear association can be made between severe economic 
conditions and the move by the local authorities toward a more co-operative relationship with the 
private sector. ' A common characteristic in all the cases, leading to the partnership road, is that 
of political 'pragmatism' which produced the 'logic' of partnership, a recognition that the private 
sector, as wealth creator in a market economy,, has to be central to the economic development 
process. For Hull, this road was the coercive logic of financial penalties represented in the failure 
of its City Challenge bid; for Rotherham it was long term political pragmatism, given impetus by 
economic collapse and, later, by the failure of its City Challenge bid, which provided the incentive 
for a more formal partnership; for Barnsley, it was the logic of economic collapse combined with 
financial incentives which later provided the oppoftunity for institutionalised co-operation; and for 
North East Lincolnshire, it was the logic of economic collapse, leading to an economic 
development agenda and co-operation with ABP, which provided the basis for more positive 
relationships today. 
The parlous state of the local economies, and the evolution of an economic development agenda 
appear to be the dominant explanations for the emergence ofpartnerships. Hull shows, however, 
that economic problems had no 'necessary' or immediate effects on political ideology, it being 
5 Hull, which was much slower on the partnership uptake, found itself in a better 
economic position than the other areas, though it cannot be stated with certainty that this is the 
reason why the Council did not develop a partnership agenda earlier. 
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coerced down the partnership road. However, in Barnsley and in North East Lincolnshire, where 
relationships were previously poor, the decline of the economy had a direct effect on the thinking 
of local councillors who felt compelled to establish links with the private sector. In Rotherham, 
it is difficult to assess the effect of economic conditions on a partnership process going back to 
the early 1970s. What can be said is that the ideology of co-operation, if not of formal 
partnership, preceded the complete demise of the coal and the steel industries. Local politics were 
an important mediating factor in interpreting local economic conditions. Hull showed the 
importance of government policy instruments in bringing recalcitrant authorities to heel, but 
political changes in the other cases preceded the central government partnership agenda, discussed 
in chapter 4. In the cases of Hull, Barnsley and Rotherharn, the competition for extra-local 
resources, initially through City Challenge, pushed partnership processes toward fonnalization. 
There is no uniform 'logic' driving local authorities into partnership arrangements. The cases 
indicate politically mediated responses to local economic circumstances. From different starting 
points, and through different processes, the local authority elites now share the view that the 
contribution of business to wealth creation must be a key factor in their strategies for economic 
development. This ideology, which produces a 'logic' of co-operation for any local authority 
active in economic development, provides a rationale for partnership working. But as the cases 
of Rotherham and Hull show, the process was also influenced by govemment incentives and 
penalties. Partnership approaches are 'necessary' in the four areas to the extent that local 
politicians view the free market economy as the key to generating wealth, not wishing, or not 
believing any alternative approach to be feasible. This situation is not a necessary response to the 
market, but the logic of a belief in the permanence of the market. 
Local Authority Heterogeneity 
Differences of emphasis, if not differences in view, concerning the nature and quality of the 
relationship with business can be discerned between senior officers and senior members, between 
council departments and between elite managers and middle ranking managers. The scope of the 
research did not permit systematic exploration of this issue with 'backbench' councillors or with 
251 
lower ranking officers, but comments from within the elites highlighted the reluctance of some 
labour councillors to commit themselves to partnership with the private sector. Evidence from 
Rotherham and from Barnsley suggested that among officers beneath the corporate management 
team, there is a cynicism about the partnership process. The Chief Executives in Rotherham and 
North East Lincolnshire were more positive about and committed to partnership than their political 
counterparts in the Council leadership, who in turn were more committed than some oftheir senior 
colleagues. In Barnsley and Hull, the Chief Executives and Leaders appeared to share similar 
views. However, in Hull, the Leader was viewed as being particularly isolated from his colleagues 
in his pursuit of the partnership agenda. 
Networks or partnerships? 
A constant theme throughout the four cases was that of networking between sectors. Networking 
processes were viewed as having developed recently, alongside partnerships. There was a 
tendency to counterpose networking favourably to the formal partnership process which was 
especially salient in Rotherham. and in North East Lincolnshire. Emphases differed between those 
who felt that networking facilitated the more formal processes of partnership, (see Skelcher et al, 
1996), and those who felt that the partnership process had facilitated informal networking. In 
Hull, where it was felt that strong partnerships would take longer to develop fully, the emergence 
of good networking was perceived as a positive result of the CityVision process. 6 Rotherham, on 
the other hand, viewed this as a two way process. The theme of networking was most prominent 
in North East Lincolnshire, whose small size, small business base and geogaphical isolation it was 
felt, if nothing else, promoted good relationships with business. A similar view was taken in 
Barnsley, also a small town with a small business base, where networking through good personal 
relationships was perceived to be a glue to the partnership process. Given the continuity of 
membership across the borough's partnerships, each core actor had to make a strategic estimation 
ofthe costs and benefits of involvement at a general level and compromise in particular situations. 
This suggestion was not followed up empirically, but it indicated a set of strategic interests in 
6 This point is discussed further in relation to the question of added value produced 
through the CityVision partnership. 
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collaboration which are not fully expressed in any institutionalised partnership setting, a supra- 
institutional dynamic between the core actors which could be described as networking. 7 It was 
not possible to measure the significance of networking, or to make strong generalizations about 
the relationship between networking and partnership processes. It is clear, however, that the 
respondents believed that insofar as key decisions were made in partnership, they were made 
through institutionalised processes. Networking processes can, therefore, be described as 
essentially supplementary to the process ofpartnership decision making and there is evidence that 
these processes have facilitated one another. On balance, as might be expected, the business 
sector was most vocal in its pleas for a reduction in the bureaucracy associated with formal 
partnerships, but formal decision making was viewed within the local authorities particularly as 
critical for the maintenance of accountability, both to local community and to funding bodies. 
There was broad agreement that something needs to be done to limit bureaucracy in the Challenge 
partnerships, discussed further below, but there was also concern that a clear focus is harder to 
maintain in less structured partnership arrangements. 
Business and Partnership 
A dominant theme in all four cases was that a very small proportion of local businesses involve 
themselves in partnership. The private sector as a whole is inactive, particularly SMEs, and the 
capacity for partnership resides almost entirely in larger companies. Even where large companies 
are involved, 'big hitters' are not. This point was reinforced by the universal opinion that levels 
of participation by firms in the representative work of chambers of commerce are small. TECs 
were perceived to have boosted business involvement in partnership and TECs and chambers were 
identified as the main vehicles promoting business involvement in partnership. This factor was less 
important in North East Lincolnshire, which felt isolated from HTEC, and where a strong bilateral 
relationship exists with ABP, its principal partner. Local business networks are not strong, even 
where an obvious common interest can be identified over an issue like training. The Humber 
7 However, given the scale of government influence, discussed below and in chapter 10, 
it cannot be described as governance, where this term refers to autonomous, self-organising 
networks (Rhodes, 1996). 
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Chemicals Focus, discussed below, shows how North East Lincolnshire Council has had to 
struggle to bring businesses into collaboration, not only with it, but with each other. 
The most obvious constraint on business activity in partnerships is that of time, a commitment 
which only larger corporations can give. Some people saw their time commitment in terms of 
hours spent in meetings, so a related de-motivating factor is what the private sector widely saw 
as bureaucracy in partnership working, associated with a local authority culture and public sector 
domination of the partnership agenda. ' There was also a general view that government and local 
authorities expect too much of the business community. The tenns 'initiativitis' and 'partnership 
fatigue' were used frequently by private sector participants to describe a feeling that among 
business activists, a limit to their capacity for partnership activity has been reached, if not 
surpassed. Government would do well to heed these warnings, notwithstanding its capacity 
building initiatives (DETR, 7.7.99). 
Among those companies declining to get involved in partnership, there was a perception that there 
is no added value in partnership work. Partnership activity was felt to require effort 
disproportional to the potential gain and neither company perceived significant ties with the 
locality which could make working with the local authority relevant to it. Synthomer was 
particularly negative, suggesting that NELC has no idea about private sector needs and that it 
cannot influence the inward investment decisions ofmaj or companies. These negative views could 
be representative of the reasons why a wider segment of the private sector has not become 
involved in partnership. Companies with low levels of local dependence have no incentive to 
engage with their local communities, thereby making business less likely to engage in partnership. 
Dependence on local factors may not be the key issue determining the mobility of productive 
capital, but it was important in relation to whether companies were interested in partnership. 
Negativity could also be indicative of what Hull and North East Lincolnshire councils described 
8 This criticism was most salient in discussions about the dominance of SRB related 
activities in partnerships discussed below. It should be noted that this criticism is shared by the 
local authorities, which blame government and its regional offices for the bureaucracy. 
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as a 'dependency culture, within business, depicted as expecting the local authority to do things 
which it should do itself, such as safeguard its premises against crime, in which an old fashioned 
attitude toward the role of local government as service provider remained. If we are living in an 
era of local governance, the cases suggest that the wider business community has not realised its 
responsibility as local stakeholder. 
However, there was no evidence, even in the companies who expressed a negative attitude about 
partnership working, that multi-nationals have impeded community work or representation by their 
branches on partnership bodies. Indeed, there were instances where site directors reported 
positive encouragement from their HQs. At the level of community projects, representation on 
partnership boards, and limited fmancial contributions, local managers had discretion to determine 
their contribution or non-contribution. It was in terms of making a major contribution to the 
locality in terms of investment and job creation that multi-national corporations were viewed as 
remote by NELC, though as noted above, there is no reason to think that the proximity of 
investment decision makers influences investment locations in any way. 
On the positive side, there were major business players involved with partnership who believe that 
a community profile is good for their businesses. In the case of education partnerships, discussed 
below, a company may influence a child's development and interest her in future employment. In 
the case of potentially dangerous chemicals, a community profile may ease local fears and show 
that the company is committed to enhancing quality of life. ' At a more general level, there was 
evidence that some business leaders have travelled a similar ideological road to that travelled by 
local authorities in developing a favourable stance toward partnership working. Novartis and 
Smith& Nephewboth identified aperiod inthe'selfish' 1980s whentheyhad been inward looking 
whereas now, they perceive a moral responsibility to the community as well as the benefits of 
partnership for their business. If any explanation can be attributed to this change of attitude, it is 
a sense of difference by these companies concerning the respective priorities of the 1980s and the 
9 Though, as The Observer report referred to in chapter 8 shows, the rhetoric is better 
than the reality in the case of Novartis. 
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1990s. The cases also suggest, as noted above, that companies with local roots are more likely 
to become involved in partnership because the local director is more likely to feel a sense of civic 
responsibility. All the business activists interviewed were British and the companies they 
represented also tended to be British, or British in origin. The remoteness of multi-nationals did 
not influence investment decisions, but it did influence business amenability to partnerships. 
Unsurprisingly, an important motivation for business involvement in partnership was the prospect 
of gaining leverage over resource expenditure. Challenge funds have provided an important 
strategic incentive, even where participants did not stand to benefit directly. 
There was a degree of uncertainty in the answers to the question of what it is that the business 
community brings to partnership. The most common answers were time, expertise and a different 
view, followed by access to wider private sector networks, for example, through local companies 
'championing' the area to prospective investors. There was also evidence ofprivate sector leaders 
trying to convince others of the benefits that involvement in partnership schemes could bring. In 
Barnsley, it was suggested that partnership represents an avenue by which 'checks and balances' 
can be achieved on Labour councils which comprise few direct business interests. Material 
resource commitments tended to be marginal, though they were of greater importance in the 
implementation oriented partnerships than in the challenge partnerships. 
In summary, business participation in local authority partnerships is weak. However, as it is the 
larger businesses which have time and the inclination to become involved, half a dozen activists 
may represent a significant segment of the local economy. There was evidence, albeit limited, of 
a shift by some companies toward partnership with local authorities based on the view that 
partnership is necessary for regeneration, and that community work is good for bvsiness. Among 
those who are involved, the commitment to providing 'soft resources' outweighs the willingness 
or the ability of local managers to commit 'hard resources' to the regeneration process. Expertise 
represents an important added value input, but it may not translate into an added value output in 
relation to the implementation of policy objectives. These issues are considered ftuther below in 
256 
III1 '10 cI V) II +ý 
II 
011, II -a- I 101ýI pu= 4- > uII 
ol Cý 0 Eý 2ýEII Co .0 1 73 101 011 It co o 1,9-- III. -ZI rA I I. - II (L) = I C- Ic, 0 uI ý' I o0 4-4 tP 0 
ltý I C13 4) 
4.0 1 4- 1 -0 W 4) =I %n, 0110; 1 I r_ I cq I10 .0 aj .-. - "Cl I, 
4-- V) 1011> "a I 
cc I=I= '1- 0. ) ,II U) 210 (4-4 
cis If C14 101 -a > 
0-0 0 II 





II. -0 0 di 1 -0 1u. I V) II sI10 (L) I OD I=III I rn I U) I U; r4 <=) I] 00 cc m0 
IwII 
Ou cl 01 
t8 
0 
ýý 4QI C13 all $. 4 
1 
I 
-., 1 . 5, 
'1 0.4, J-. E1 
(4-4 
(7ý 101ý &0 
Iý20pI ý' 11 I1 -0 C -ý as IZ cd I U IIQiC. ) "o Cd 
u 1. r. - =01 4-b i Cd I1 
9-0 
1 ý: 2 V5 $ý .s -0 1 -IV I I 19111-10 1 "0 50 
4- IM4 C) 
"Cl I 





I O-S I 4i 0 E IM-4 I U, 00 En I*I $- vs 10Q V u U. M 1EU10 0-IQ 1 ------------- 41 vi . - >01 
00 tb rA 00 
.2 --( .2Z .5 .0V 
I1 
.5 
I Eý co V Cd w rA 4-4 0 r. 0EIgo caI 11 w 
>-, 
190r. 44 
11 u01b, 9b 11 
1 
E 11 .011-5r: j 0 11 1WIIII 
11 i5 I v S 
I IIII 1 4ý 1 1- fý. .0 e" L- 
u 




ý4 E -0 >00.2 4) > 





-20. 'ro" I i: I 1) E01 -4ý 
iý 41 
0 '40 .41 
ro 1 
.00 cd 
cia o con o0 
00, 






















Cd -; ý C $. 11 11 Gm 0 
IýI=0011 






+. A 91.4 1101b1 
(1) 100 
E0 "Z P.. u "o 
10E '1 0 ,,, 0 Io cz 
4. ) E 4) U. 9 z 1, mu 
112, 
IýI It Iý t2 
C4 42 P, 
6-4 a Az 









A- - the evaluation of specific partnership practices. Box 7 summarises the factors which proved 
relevant in influencing the development of partnerships in the four cases. 
The Characteristics of Challenge Partnerships and Regeneration Strategies 
This part of the chapter is organised into five sections, examining the characteristics of the 
challenge partnerships, the influence of the SRB in determining the form and agenda of the 
partnerships, partnership and area regeneration strategies, the influences and the relationships 
within partnerships and, finally, the question of added value. " 
Partnership Characteristics 
Barnsley, Rotherham. and Hull are characterised by partnerships tied to the development and 
implementation of 'holistic' regeneration strategies, comprising economic and social elements. 
These partnerships are characterised as flagship partnerships by virtue oftheir concern with linking 
a series of policy agendas to an overall vision for the regeneration of the locality. North East 
Lincolnshire is exceptional among the cases, having neither a flagship partnership, nor an area 
strategy. Its challenge partnership is concerned only with the bidding and project management 
processes. 
The Barnsley Regeneration Forum and the Rotherham Economic Partnership both drew on the 
inspiration of the Deame Valley Partnership (DVP). However, they are very different structures. 
The BRF is a semi-autonomous, council led organisation. It is managed by BMEBC within Council 
offices, and it is chaired by the Leader. The REP, on the other hand, is organisationally 
autonomous from the Council, although it is not a limited company. It has separate offices, it is 
managed by a DfEE secondee with a private sector background, and its Board has a private sector 
majority. As was noted above, Rotherham's move to a more formal partnership was prompted 
partly by its failure to win City Challenge funds. A similar failure in Hull, stimulated a process of 
change from scepticism about partnership toward recognition that without a formal partnership 
10 See chapter 4 for a discussion ofthe problems associated with identiPjing added value. 
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arrangement, further resources would be lost to the area. CityVision has in common with the REP 
an executive manager and separate offices. It is, formally, fully independent of its constituent 
members, established as a limited company in 1995. However, it is chaired by the Council leader 
and its staff comprise public sector secondees from HTEC and from KHCC. The North East 
Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership exists exclusively to bid for and to manage SRB funds. It 
is a product of the new unitary authority, for which reason it post-dates the other partnership 
bodies. Differing from Barnsley in its narrow remit, it is similar in being managed by a Council 
officer within Council premises. It stands out from Barnsley, however, as less of a partnership by 
virtue of the Council's domination of the partnership process. 
It was suggested above that economic factors and political interpretations combined, over differing 
time scales, to produce a local authority commitment to the partnership agenda. This agenda has 
been moved, through government incentives and penalties toward the institutionalisation of 
partnerships. This is not to say that without government intervention, partnership formalisation 
would not have occurred, but this process does not appear to have been driven locally. However, 
the cases show that the process of institutionalisation has taken a different form in each area. The 
forces combined to bring flagship partnerships into being do not act uniformly across the case 
study areas, as North East Lincolnshire showed. " There is considerable variation in form within 
the partnership models. There is a continuum from full institutional integration with the local 
authority to full institutional independence. However, formal autonomy and independence do not 
in themselves indicate the internal dynamics of the partnership. The REP, an autonomous 
partnership, is private sector managed and led while CityVision, an independent limited company, 
is public sector managed and led. Box 8 illustrates this diversity, from which it may be concluded 
that local politics influence the form which partnerships take. 
11 Although as suggested below, they may tend to produce similar institutional outcomes 
through time. 
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The Influence of the SRB on Partnership Form and Agenda 
The SRB was held to be the most influential factor in all four case study areas affecting partnership 
structure, partnership objectives, partnership projects and the nature of partnership relationships. 
Box 8 presents a face-value picture of the institutional form and characteristics of the main 
partnership bodies. But this picture obscures a series of underlying factors. )While partnership 
agendas are similar, partnership forms differ in their management and in their composition. Each 
of the flagship partnerships have moved from an economic to a more inclusive agenda. These 
changes are responses to the SRB, the key funding regime with which each partnership works. 
Rotherham's changes were voluntary in character, a response to the Government's social 
exclusion agenda, articulated in new SRB guidelines issued by 'New Labour' since May 1997. " 
In North East Lincolnshire, change is being driven by government office coercion, a response to 
fierce criticisms about the absence of direction and of genuine collaboration in its challenge 
partnership. These developments illustrate the importance of central government in shaping local 
challenge partnerships. A question for further research, then, is whether areas which have never 
bid for or never succeeded in obtaining challenge funds have developed similar partnership 
structures, which would be indicative of locally driven governance processes. What this study 
shows is that rather than acting as a disincentive, failure to procure challenge funds acted as a 
strong incentive to improve partnerships and to do better next time. 
There were differing views concerning the role of the SRB in sustaining partnership work. In 
Rotherham. and in Hull, it was felt to represent a glue to partnership working, providing an element 
of control over resources which stimulates business involvement. The SRB was a stimulus to 
formal partnership processes in all areas and a continuing glue to those processes. If the SRB 
played an important role in relation to the structure and scope of these partnerships, it was 
universally criticised for its prescriptiveness and for its bureaucracy. This criticism had a particular 
edge in the flagship partnerships, whose role the SRB was felt to diminish by preventing them 
from developing locally driven strategic agendas, tying them up instead in complex bids for 
12 See discussion in chapter 4. 
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projects which do not always meet local aspirations and in evaluation criteria which dominate 
partnership discussions. The influence of the SRB is therefore contradictory. It was held 
responsible for maintaining partnership focus and for sustaining partnership activity. At the same 
time, it has left little room for local autonomy in developing local strategies and project objectives. 
It has pushed local authorities into structured partnerships and it has offered business an incentive 
to participate. But it has also disempowered local politicians and visionary businessmen, 
hampering attempts to develop and implement local strategic visions. While the resources from 
the SRB may be vital to local regeneration projects, it has impeded the development of governance 
capacity in the partnerships it has shaped. This situation may be better described as 'the local 
administration of national objectives', than as 'local governance'. 
The situation in North East Lincolnshire emphasises the point. The attack by Government Office 
on the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership, together with the establishment of 
Yorkshire Forward, has stimulated a debate about local strategies for partnership, which is leading 
toward a broader partnership aligned to some form of inclusive vision statement. To the extent 
that these developments occur, they will do so in spite of unease and opposition by key actors 
based on the perception that networking and issue/sector based partnership working is more 
effective than a flagship symbol ofpartnership commitment. The debate highlights how far central 
prescriptions can push local. authorities to take symbolic measures for fear of losing resources, a 
point made in Hull, where government was also blamed for encouraging lip service and tokenism 
in partnerships. If there is political opposition in an area, symbolism may be a deliberate strategy 
for minimal compliance. But the case ofNorth East Lincolnshire suggests that political opposition 
is based as much on local factors as on 'Old Labour' principles. There was a view within NELC 
that flagship partnerships are undemocratic and that CityVision has not been a success in Hull. 
But pessimism concerning the potential in North East Lincolnshire for economic regeneration 
suggests a key reason why there is opposition to a flagship partnership and an area regeneration 
strategy. If economic regeneration cannot be achieved in NEL, then it makes sense to keep the 
two agendas separate, rather than to make untenable links between them. If NELC does not have 
the capacity to sustain a flagship partnership, then it is better off without one. If these arguments 
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have merit, Yorkshire Forward's (6.5.99) insistence that more people can be brought into its 
partnerships and that partnerships can take on a more ambitious and inclusive agenda, could put 
additional pressure on a process which, in NEL and in other areas, may already be overloaded. 
If, on the other hand, Yorkshire Forward is right, a new approach born of necessity could, as 
David Curry argued of the SRB (3.4.98), win local people over, taking on a virtuous dynamic of 
its own. But there was no sign of such an endgame in North East Lincolnshire and the danger is 
that such demands act as an impediment, not as a stimulus, to the generation of internal 
governance capacity. 
Partnership and Area Regeneration Strategies 
The three flagship partnerships are responsible for the development of and for ensuring the 
delivery of area regeneration strategies. Each of these strategies has a set of economic and social 
objectives, ranging from economic development through to education and learning. In each case, 
there was wide agreement about the general direction and content of the strategy documents, 
which are similar in each area. Given that the three local authorities involved in flagship 
partnerships are broadly agreed about the key role of the business sector in wealth creation, and 
that central government has a major influence on the composition of strategy documents, 
-I- agreement aDout aims and objectives is not surprising. It was argued above that the SRB has 
curtailed the strategic capabilities in local partnerships. A concrete example of this problem was 
highlighted in relation to the Barnsley Integrated Regeneration Strategy, described as a set of non- 
conflicting agendas which have been 'stitched together', rather than as a strategic agreement 
interrelating priorities and capacities across all the regeneration themes. 
Influence within partnerships 
It was broadly agreed in the flagship partnerships and also within the NEL Regeneration 
Partnership that the local authority plays the senior role in policy development and partnership 
management. This latter partnership is effectively a local authority led consultative forum, a 
perception driven by partner responses to Government office criticism. Neither HTEC, nor ABP 
offered to accept any responsibility for allegations of partnership failure. NELC was singled out 
262 
for criticism and it was on its own in dealing with these criticisms. Ifrelationships between NELC 
and business are cordial, the response to this problem by HTEC and ABP shows that in this arena 
at least, they cannot be described as participants in a full and equal partnership. 
In each of the three strategic partnerships, business appeared peripheral to partnership processes, 
in an environment where public sector cultures and public sector agendas predominate. Council 
leadership was viewed positively in Barnsley, Hull and North East Lincolnshire by virtue of the 
democratic mandate held by the local authorities, but business was viewed as peripheral to the 
decision making process. This was equally true in Rotherham, where, despite the private sector 
majority on the Board of the Rotherham Economic Partnership and the positive view of private 
sector leadership, business did not have a strong influence on the partnership's direction. In Hull, 
CityVision has become more exclusive, not less so, due to the failure of business and wider 
community activism. Insofar as business participation is concerned, the rhetoric of governance 
by partnership is currently more powerful than the reality. 
The problem of identifying influence in partnerships, be it visible or not, is that people may not be 
aware of influences and if they are, they may wish to discount them, instead claiming ownership 
of the game. " Insofar as participants were willing and able to discuss respective influences, they 
were not attributed to partnership processes. The manager of the Barnsley Regeneration Forum 
was unique in suggesting that the Council had learned from the private sector that its strategies 
should focus more on wealth creation than onjobs. Again, this was a general comment which was 
not attributed directly to processes within the BRF. ABP in Grimsby felt that it has been 
instrumental in preventing NELC from building homes, for'political gain' on land earmarked for 
development. Similarly, Smith & Nephew and Northern Foods claimed that they had been 
instrumental in convincing KHCC to take a more ambitious approach to regeneration, articulated 
in the flagship regeneration project 'The Deep'. The evidence is not strong enough to evaluate 
13 This was clearly true in relation to the Grimsby and Immingham Ports Partnership, 
whose manager was quite offended by the suggestion, made to the researcher by ABP, that the 
partnership may have been based on the Hull model. 
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these claims in relation to the specific mechanisms through which this influence occurred, but 
KHCC recognised that business had played a role in raising local aspirations. Whether this 
influence was exercised through the structures of CityVision or not, it can be attributed to an 
environment ofmutual understanding in which business views are taken seriously, engendered by 
the imperatives of economic development and by partnership thinking among elites in Hull. 
Interorganisational relations 
There were two distinct perspectives on the quality of relationships within the partnerships. In 
Barnsley, despite criticisms of the partnership process, there was no evidence of open tensions or 
disagreements either over policy objectives, or over organisational responsibility within the 
Regeneration Forum. While there is cynicism about partnerships and while practical partnership 
processes are weak, interorganisational. relationships are positive at this level. This situation in 
Barnsley shows that abstract statements in regeneration strategies are easy to agree, but that the 
practicalities engender disagreement. When it comes to deciding whether to put money into 
deprived communities, or into town centre regeneration, it is much more difficult to get 
agreement, as the comment from the TEC, that the strategy is stitched together, would suggest. 
However, disagreements of this kind have not proved disabling to the partnership process. This 
characterisation is also true in North East Lincolnshire where, although there is debate about 
which course of action to pursue, the situation cannot be described as. conflict, 'but rather as 
uncertainty. 
The situation in Rotherham and Hull is different. There is no evidence of bi-lateral conflicts 
between Council and business sector, but there is evidence ofinter-organisational conflict between 
local authority and TEC over domains of responsibility. In Rotherham, there have been tensions 
between RMBC and RCCTE since the establishment of Rotherham. TEC. The partnership has not 
succeeded in overcoming these difficulties, but it is perceived by the Chairman as a key mechanism 
for mediating conflicts, providing a collaborative forum in which disagreements can be aired 
publicly. RMBC recognises, formally at least, that it cannot lead on all initiatives. But this has 
not prevented it from competing for territory which it regards as 'the old training arm of the 
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Council' (RMBC, 21.4.98a). CityVision was also characterised by organisational rivalries in the 
sphere ofeconomic regeneration between HTEC, CityVision and KHCC- At this level, CityVision 
plays a similar role to that of the REP as a mediator of tensions, though in this case, it is one of 
the protagonists. In CityVision, as in the REP, agreement on policy issues at an abstract level has 
not produced a corresponding willingness to give up control of territory. Conflict over 
responsibilities cannot, logically, produce governance synergy. If co-operation is supposed to 
engender additional governance capacity, conflict over governance territory will reduce, not 
enhance, it. 
Added Value within Challenge Partnerships 
The main concrete perception of added value from challenge partnerships was the procurement 
of external governmental funds. In each case, challenge funds were perceived as an indicator of 
partnership success. But challenge funds do not represent governance as self organising networks 
(Rhodes, 1996). 14 There remain senior figures within Hull and Rotherham councils who believe 
that monies allocated through challenge fund processes would be better spent by the local 
authority. For them, formal partnerships remain necessary rather than virtuous. " There remains 
uncertainty about the nature of added value in CityVision and in the REP. It was argued that 
neither has really addressed the question of what they achieve. The difficulty in demonstrating 
added value was highlighted in the CityVision stakeholder survey (Davidson, 1998), few ofWhose 
respondents felt that it has generated new governance capacity, defined as outcomes which could 
not otherwise have been achieved. It is easy to assume that partnership generates added value in 
apolitical-ideological culture which assumes that it will, just as the CityVision stakeholder survey 
pointed out in saying that hopes and practices become intertwined where added value is 
concerned. There exists a tendency to 
14 As the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership is not, effectively, a 
partnership, there can be no partnership effects and none were, in any case, claimed for it. 
t 
15 The researcher did not seek to establish the precise amounts of leverage, defined as 
seed capital' in chapter 4, generated from business. Such an exercise would have taken up a great 
deal of time, only to establish the point already made, that financial and other material resources 
have been very limited. 
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view partnerships as a good thing without positive evidence, as the Leader of NELC recognised. 
In Rotherham, RCCTE ascribed to itself the positive role of challenger to the institutional inertia 
of local government and facilitator of better links with business which may not otherwise have 
occurred. 16 To the extent better links themselves constitute added value, it is as added value input, 
rather than as governance output. The main indicators of added value upon which all of the cases 
were agreed, beyond the procurement of funds, tended to be either vague or soft in nature. These 
claims have to be accepted or rejected at face value, depending simply on whether partnership is 
perceived as a positive route to regeneration or not. 'Synergy' may be added value in itself 
(Cropper, 1996; Hastings, 1996), but it is governance potential rather than governance capacity. 
Barnsley identified a 'feel good factor' in partnership, associated with a belief that the Forum 
represents the correct approach. The consensus in NEL, notwithstanding problems with the SRB 
partnership, is that in general, partnership is a good thing. It provides for added influence and for 
the capacity to do more with less. Rotherharn agreed that partnerships are good for the town and 
that common aims help in competition for resources with other towns. It identified added value 
through the import of flair, imagination, business acumen and synergy to the partnership process. 
As noted above, networking was a recurring theme throughout the cases and there was a sense 
that. fo, rrnal partnership activities have generated local networking, just as Skelcher et al suggested 
that networking generated more partnership (1996: 2). " Again, whether this process itself 
produces added value is debatable, depending on the importance attached to open and democratic 
decision making processes, on whether networking delivers tangible governance outputs and 
whether these outputs are viewed as good or bad. CityVision highlighted one final important 
point concerning added value. Partnership, particularly in Hull and in NEL, is still at an early stage 
ofdevelopment and, in keeping with scholarly views (Sabatier, 1986ab; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) 
the manager of CityVision argued for a ten year evaluation period, at which time it may also be 
possible to evaluate SRB outputs as partnership effects. The characteristics of the challenge 
partnerships, including added value inputs and outputs, are summarised in Box 8. 
16 It is unlikely, however, that the Council shares this view, given the difficulties 
between the two parties. 
17 The example of CityImage, discussed below, enhances this conclusion. 
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Implementation Partnerships 
The first part of this chapter examined the development and the ideology of partnership work. 
The second part examined partnership at the level of policy, strategy and the procurement of 
funds. This, third and final, part which looks at the way in which implementation oriented 
partnerships operate, is organised into five main sections. It begins by looking at broad 
approaches to economic development, moving onto examine the highly. specific venture companies 
and sector based partnerships. It treats City1mage as a unique place marketing proj ect and, finally, 
it analyses education and business links. The conclusion to the chapter summarises the key themes 
developed in the preceding analysis. Box 9 summarises the findings within partnerships which, 
for the sake of convenience, have been labelled 'economic development'. These include all the 
following partnership activities except education and business partnerships which are summarised 
in Box 10. Box II provides an overall comparison of the different partnership types examined, 
within and between the four case studies. 
Broad Approaches to Economic Development 
The Barnsley Development Agency was unique among economic development partnerships in 
being established as a business-led limited company into which parts of its constituent bodies, 
BMBC and BDTEC have been integrated. The Council described the BDA as the implementation 
arm of the economic element ofthe IRS, which would give Barnsley a'voice' with the RDA. The 
BDA is interesting at two levels. First, unlike its 'parent, ' it is at arms length from BMBC; and 
second, it is the only example of an economic development partnership established specifically to 
mirror the RDA. The emphasis in Barnsley was that institutional capacity is critical to 
implementation of the economic elements of the IRS, implying that partnership arrangements 
require further engineering to realise the funding potential embodied in the RDA. The BDA is, 
in part, Barnsley's interpretation at a time of uncertainty of what the new RDA will expect from 
its constituents. But it was also recognised both by Council and TEC that the BDA represents a 
move by the Council to defend its inward investment territory against proposals originating from 
RCCTE to establish a sub-regional inward investment body. This issue also caused problems in 
Rotherham, where disagreements over investment strategy caused RCCTE to withdraw from what 
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was then an economic development partnership in the shape of the Rotherharn Industrial 
Development Office (RiDO). RiDO, originally a partnership organisation reporting to the 
Rotherham Economic Partnership, reverted to Council control when the Chamber-TEC withdrew, 
accusing RMBC of trying to service the entire process itself. RiDO accepted that there was an 
element of defensiveness in its relations with RCCTE over inward investment. These 'turf wars' 
articulate the absence of strategic thinking, beyond abstract principles, ofwhich both the BRF and 
the REP were accused. 
This comparison shows how the same problem can drive partnership processes in opposite 
directions. Both Barnsley and Rotherham have in common a wish to 'win' with the RDA. They 
also have in common a turf war over control of inward investment. In Barnsley, this backdrop has 
resulted in further partnership formalisation and autonomy. In Rotherharn, it has resulted in 
partnership fragmentation and the re-absorption by RMBC of hitherto shared industrial 
development activities. But in both cases, the local authority appears to have gained more control 
over the process; by regaining sole management of RiDO in Rotherham, and more subtly, by 
undermining the TEC's sub-regional agenda for, inward investment in Barnsley, resulting in TEC 
claims that the BDA is a manoeuver by the Council to take effective control of economic 
development. Whatever inter-organisational tensions may have led to these divergent outcomes, 
the BDA has presented business with a key role in the chair; a role, like that of the Chairman of 
the REP, perceived as a means to mediate conflict between TEC and Council. The BDA was 
perceived by business as the key partnership in Barnsley, driving the practical process ofeconomic 
regeneration. In RiDO, on the other hand, business plays a less visible role, 'championing' 
Rotherham at promotional events, a situation which the manager of RiDO believes to be more 
effective than the previous partnership arrangement with RCCTE. 
Like the Rotherham, Economic Partnership, the BDA is perceived as a mechanism which could 
facilitate understanding between BDTEC and B MBC, thereby eliminating duplication and 
clarifying responsibility. It is significant that two agencies have voluntarily ceded functions to a 
semi-autonomous organisation. But the partnership was born. out of a strategic response by 
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BMBC to conflict with the TEC and it remains to be seen whether autonomy will result in 
6 synergy', leading to complete independence for the BDA. At a concrete level, the potential added 
value identified for the BDA was a single, more powerful 'voice' for Barnsley in a competitive 
regional environment. This view was the opposite ofthat taken by RiDO, which perceived the exit 
of RCCTE as a positive step, facilitating better co-operation on an informal basis. For RiDO, 
networking was counterposed to the REP which was perceived as a failure in terms of genuine 
added value. " 
Hull and North East Lincolnshire differ from Rotherham and Barnsley in that their economic 
development agencies have never been partnerships, either in total or in part. VAlile CityVision 
wants HEDA to integrate more of its activities, the committee Chairman will not permit it, due 
to his own negative perceptions of CityVision. The Council views itself as a facilitator of specific 
initiatives in which it likes to take a back seat to the private sector, once they are well established. 
HEDA takes a leading role in CityVision and it adheres to the CRS in its literature. But in terms 
of partnership practice, it operates around specific initiatives. Similarly, partners in NEL viewed 
flexibility as the key to partnership success in economic development and NELC is even more 
strongly committed in practice to issue and sector specific partnerships than is Hull. 
The point made in Barnsley, that the IRS is more a list of compatible priorities than it is a 
governing strategy document, is lent weight by debates about priorities and organisational 
responsibilities for economic development activities. Conflicting projects on the ground in Hull 
further support this view, showing that the strategic capacity within the CRS to produce 
compatible development projects is limited. What this conflict suggests is that CityVision is not 
a body in which such problems are identified and addressed and, moreover, that it lacks the 
authority to address them. There is a gap between the sustainable economic development agenda 
in the CRS and the reality of competing projects on the ground. This problem illustrates both the 
problem of competing power centres within the Council, which seems to be supporting both 
18 Of course, RiDO's opinion may reflect the biased view of a Council based employee. 
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projects, and the extent to which problems within the Council can disable CityVision. CityVision 
obviously cannot adjudicate planning applications, but it could, in principle, put its weight behind 
one project, rather than the other. This situation, a polarisation between economic development 
and planning, is analogous to that identified by Di Gaetano (1997) in Bristol. 
The Venture Companies 
The study examined two venture companies, one each in Barnsley and in Rotherham. The 
Barnsley Miller Partnership was concerned with commercial development, while the Rotherharn 
Housing Partnership sought to build and sell 'affordable' homes to first time buyers. TheBarnsley 
Miller Partnership was, unusually, able to identify a clear example of concrete 'added value' in 
respect of a difficult project which could have collapsed without the joint commitment brought 
about by the partnership agreement. But the potential downside of the arrangement is in market 
pressures on the developer to deliver high yield schemes which do not comply with the Council's 
preference for job intensive schemes. Nonetheless, the partnership showed evidence of 
developments and of jobs which might not otherwise have occurred. In this sense, it has 
contributed to the governance of Barnsley. 
The Rotherham Housing Partnership, however, appears to have been more of a zero sum game. 
One of RMBC's objectives was profit, which it achieved. But the objective to build 'affordable' 
housing was compromised by the inability to fix a meaning to the concept 'affordable' which, 
instead, was market driven. Ultimately, the project can bejudged successful in that the majority 
of new residences went to first time buyers from within the Borough. However, the consequent 
depression of the second hand housing market in Rotherham was cited as an unintended outcome 
of the project, resulting in the dereliction of unoccupied housing stock. This venture highlights 
the need for strategic thinking in relation to housing as a social need, which the imperatives 
governing the partnership undennined. 
The most interesting issue arising from both these examples concerns the potential for conflict 
between principles of partnership and of best value. Both local authorities have been made wary 
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as a consequence of corruption in a similar partnership in Doncaster. The controversy led to 
intense auditing of the partnership in Barnsley and to suspension of the partnership in Rotherharn. 
The specific problem, highlighted in both partnerships, was that development agreements, to a 
greater extent (Barnsley) or a lesser extent (Rotherharn), give the developer an 'inside track', 
protecting them from competition from other, perhaps local, companies. It was acknowledged 
in both cases that the partnership approach had caused resentment locally and soured relationships 
with elements of the business community. The conflict between partnership and best value was 
perceived as inevitable, an obvious solution being to allow local authorities to assume the role of 
developer. This issue highlights a specific angle on the added value question. It may be possible 
to demonstrate local governance capacity within partnerships of this kind, but there is no 
guarantee, in a broader sense, that the community will be enhanced, or that an alternative 
arrangement, partnership based or not, could not have delivered similar results more equitably or 
at a lower cost. 
The Sector Partnerships: Ports and Chemicals 
ABP in Hull and in North East Lincolnshire was the only business identified as a key governance 
player in any of the four cases. The ports partnerships in Hull and in North East Lincolnshire are 
similar in their objective: the promotion of the port to maximise trade and to increase business. 
The main difference is that NEL emphasises new inward investment whereas Hull does not. There 
is also a difference in scale between the partnerships. The Ports of Grimsby and Immingham, are 
five times as big as the Port of Hull and the new supertanker terminal at Immingham. will 
necessitate a global focus on promotions as opposed to the Northern European focus of Hull. 
Beyond these objectives, the two partnerships differ. The Hull partnership is perceived as part of 
the general improvement in council-business relationships engendered by the challenge fund 
regime, before which the only interface between Council and business was the Chamber's annual . 
dinner. The development of the two port partnerships was initially complicated by the two tier 
system of governance, under which Humberside County Council organised promotional events. 
The problem with the county-wide approach in both areas was that ABP felt its position 
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compromised by a strategy which promoted competitors. Competition between district and 
county -a turn-off to business - further undermined partnership potential. Unitary status 
therefore facilitated partnerships, where the geo-strategic, public sector led approach of 
Humberside County Council failed. 19 The City/Port Partnership in Hull is now private sector led 
after a period of facilitation by KHCC. NEL's partnership, on the other hand, is public sector led 
and managed from within Council offices. The partnership in NEL was viewed positively by ABP 
as a commitment by the Council to economic development in the area. 
The Humber Chemicals Focus shares a heritage with the ports partnerships as a public, County 
Council led initiative. After unitary status, it was agreed between the Humber authorities that a 
sub-regional chemicals initiative should be maintained, under the leadership of North East 
Lincolnshire. The Council has struggled for two years to convince key business leaders in the 
chemicals sector to become involved in an initiative to promote the industry and to address 
deficiencies in the sub-regional skills and training base. Having succeeded in convincing a business 
leader to front the partnership, which in turn convinced others to join up, NELC now believes that 
it can take a light touch approach, facilitating private sector led activity through its diligence and 
entrepreneurship. The Humber Chemicals Focus and City/Port in Hull have both proved 
successftd in bringing the private sector forward into positions of leadership, where this did not 
seem to be a priority within the Grimsby and Immingharn Ports Partnership. 
The key added value themes in these three partnerships were economy of scale and credibility with 
potential customers. Added value gained from the Humber Chemicals Focus cannot be identified 
at present as it is a new initiative. But there was general agreement that the industry would benefit 
from the economy offered by a unified training agenda. A consultant's report argued that the 
Council couldn't establish an initiative of this nature on its own, and that the chemicals sector 
wouldn't. Even if, as Synthomer argued, the only potential added value from the partnership is 
the skills development and training agenda, this case would be an example of governance capacity, 
19 Although one officer from Cleethorpes suggested that the political culture in Grimsby 
undermined certain approaches to networking. 
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which would not otherwise have occurred. The deficit in training may in part, however, be the 
responsibility of HTEC for failing to do itsjob properly, adding weight to NELC's perception of 
peripherality in relation to TEC activities. 
Without ABP on board, it was felt in both ports partnerships that promotional activities would 
lack credibility with potential customers. It was also suggested in both cases that newjobs may 
have come through promotional events. ABP in North East Lincolnshire took a broader 
perspective on added value, suggesting that the indicator of success was not the capacity to 
undertake promotional events, regarded essentially as an input, but the arrival of substantial inward 
investment to the area. In this regard, it was pessimistic about the prospects of success. The 
problem for NELC in relation to added value from inward investment is that, if the past 8 years 
are anything to go by, this investment is likely to be capital intensive, achieving high profits for 
businesses, but delivering fewj obs. Each ofthese three partnerships is involved in place marketing 
(Griffiths, 1998), if not to mobile capital, then at least to potential customers overseas. 
City1mage and Place Marketing 
There is no partnership activity in the other cases- comparable to that of City1mage. This project 
is indicative of the difference in scope and ambition between a city and a town. Rather than 
relying purely on sectoral partnerships for promotional work, Hull is seeking a marketing hook 
which will differentiate it from other places, convincing potential investors and traders that. Hull 
and its people have the ambition and the drive to make business succeed. The most innovative 
element of this partnership is the CityVision Bond. This is a scheme, unlike any other in the four 
cases, resembling the Bond system described by Elkin, used to fund capital schemes in American 
cities(1987a). It was openly recognised that this scheme allows businesses to buy influence with 
policy makers in Hull. It was unique in this sense too, particularly in relation to the open 
admission that this process was taking place. The key feature of the private sector contribution 
to this scheme is that it is an open ended commitment without short term bottom line gain, beyond 




,> ÖD ý 
gf 








, c 9. L> 1 1 i s. 0 1E=, le u Q, r_ 0. £ . - u , rA 
U, . > 
( ý c- s- , 00 1 0 * 




r. "' ý_, r-- '-" 9) . - 
GO c2. 1 c) 0 , Co = u s. 
cu 00 u N. > 
< J CA :, 1 00 Z JD $. 1 c: k. 1 1 0 la , r v , , r. 'u 9 r- 4; 
0 
Co JD E- , >, , > 
_ 0 
Q 
v , .-02, (= , 103 u Gn > 10 9Q 
. 6-: 







cn 1 8-. M-- 10 0 .- 9-. . CJ 1 1 0 
0U0 
0 , r. Z5 0 
1 1 1 
r-- 
Q0 






ä 1 0 9 1 - ý4 0 , 1 .. ý - r- ýD 0.4 
0, 
1 ýU1 Im. 92. u w 5: 
------------ ------------------------- -------------- 
-ci i .; -_ ý: i GO i6ii -ý-- i Goi 0 tu 4ý 1 ci 1C Z 
rA r. g -0 ý Ici 
il ÖL- -ý5- ,E0 -- 
sý 
,0A, -0 :ü0. r- , t2 tu cz > >0 lul 0. - tu) 




tl J-- t) g) IL) 11 
0 




c) 1 t) 0Z, b 0 n4 
jc 09,2 11 2t, (L) Z -, 2 0 u, 0.4 , fi - i C) 1 u. , h. -4 
Co z 11 cu ------------ ------- ------ 4.4 EAEr.. ' --11. -. 1 10110 01 
10 r- 
10 r4: -3 :'0 .2 .2 0 , ýg E r- U im Ici gj c; 2g, ug 
0u&. gm0uum. ' >-1, uý1u ýZ, tz.; 2 ri =M, -2.2 Ici - 7E A 
:5r. 1 :1 
to =t5E iý 9. ;=2 
Z$ 92. 
u2 
EE f) 00eEu8. 1 rA 010E, ei 0 4) 0>, vi 'lee = ;e, . Z: +ý ,=1 *Z .'2: 9) 0u0 0 Co ý0, .-0 pý -o 5 g. re c2. t) 0 10 th , r. A- ci E r4-. -6 1 (L) -U t) 11 E 
11 
Q1 ýý s. 4) r. > > 
0U1 OU -i ý% GZ>, *r_ -8 20 :11Z10Z»n. u -6 im-4 "0 00 iz < bý M cz - --, 1 c- 







QQ1 >% 11r. 
10 0 
-E (L) tun .iiu -E U=, -;, - 2 ö« -:, ý> 4- 0 40 5t 
1 ce 
.i>, e, Sý 2 ei ým « 4. ) CD. i (U , 
lý 









CL. 5 15 r_ 
: ^ý ,65cE 





; >Ib 0 
0- 1> ýa 11 u 01) 
11 -B 4) -0 06 ýs .0 't "o iý m0 0 0 C: II "Cl 0.2 o e5, I *ý, *4 61108pI= k) 1 .59 cz coý c -0 -I cc 'ES 0 4ý 41 1 . ý: 0rZ: 4) cq 
.0VRII r- 4) 00mI 
r. c 4ý 
b-4 
9RUI 
.ý0m ý- I 
CQ a0 110 
.u 
" -Z A) IQ, ; ý, Z, 11 
L. "! , ý) I C-ý 11 212 R 
lz 
', 





The main achievement attributed to City1mage, beyond its marketing of the Bond scheme, is the 
theme of Hull as a 'pioneering' city, perceived as vital to the City's pretensions as a 'Top Ten' 
city. This objective encapsulates something about Hull's view of the future, differentiating it as 
a city from the towns in the other three cases, where such a grand project would lack credibility. 
There were mixed feelings among the Bond holders about the value of the image project. ABP 
felt that it was a waste of money, that the 'pioneering' theme will mean little to anyone in Hull. 
it claimed, furthermore, that this view was representative of the general reaction at the launch. 
Smith & Nephew, on the other hand, viewed the appointment of a Marketing Director for 
City1mage, funded partly from Bond income, as a good thing in itself. It further described 'The 
Deep' as an added value project, which would not have been so ambitious in scope, but for 
business influence. VVhile no direct link was made, this influence may have been attributable to 
the authority which Smith & Nephew and Northern Foods gained through their f5,000 
contributions to CityVision Bond. The scale of the 'The Deep', if not the project idea itself, is 
clearly an output of local governance processes, possibly of the networking facilities engendered 
through the Bond scheme. In this case, governance as networking has been produced through 
formal partnership procedures (Rhodes, 1996). City1mage has succeeded in generating 
measurable, if limited, governance capacity in relation to the goal of image building in Hull 
through the financial commitments embodied in the Bond scheme. Private sector leadership was 
viewed as central to the credibility of the Bond scheme and the image project as a whole, and, in 
this case, key businesses have proved willing and able to play an important role. Box 9 
summarises the findings in relation to implementation oriented economic development 
partnerships. 
Education and Business Partnerships 
The context for education and business partnerships in all four case studies is underachievement 
and alienation among local children from traditional academic concerns. All four areas produced 
statistics for GCSE pass rates well below the national average, with Barnsley and Hull among the 
worst in the country. Each area identified an absence of commitment to learning, attributed to a 
culture of low expectation associated with economic decline. Within the variable set ofobjectives 
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for learning identified in the above discussion of regeneration strategy, there was a general 
commitment to building education business links. However, education business partnerships, the 
main vehicle for education business links have failed, or are failing. " This failure can be attributed 
broadly to the relationship between Council and TEC and the corresponding absence of 
commitment by the local authority to partnership objectives, not to a failure of the bi-lateral 
relationship between LEA and business. The problem is also related to pressures on local 
authorities to deliver targets for education standards. This is the way it was perceived in 
Humberside, where the abolition of the County Council removed the geo-strategic focus for the 
partnership and created a clash between the objectives of HTEC and the new unitary authorities. 
The failure of EBPs can be perceived as an important element in continuing tensions between local 
authorities and TECs. The absence of genuine strategic capacity, with the onset of unitary 
authority status, was also identified as a key reason for partnership failure. For Rotherharn, the 
technocratic language used in proceedings dominated by education professionals was perceived 
as a turn-off for businesses. But whatever the reasons for partnership failure, the collapse of the 
EBPs has resulted in a situation where education business links are managed almost exclusively 
by the TECs, as they were when EBPs were first conceived in the early 90s. Education business 
links have ceased to represent a partnership activity, except in the operational relationship between 
school and business. Despite its survival, the Barnsley Business Education Partnership is also 
under threat due to an absence of commitment and an LEA perception that it has outlived its 
usefulness. If the LEA is coffect, the partnership's projects will eventually be re-absorbed within 
one of the parent bodies, or another partnership. " 
Hull, unique in relation to City1mage, also proved unique in relation to partnerships in education. 
While Hull was laggardly in picking up the partnership agenda, it has done so with greater success 
in relation to education than has been achieved in the other cases. As a group of educationalists, 
CityLearning prided itself in taking a 'strategic' view of learning in the City, made possible with 
20 The Humberside Partnership incorporated a sub-regional EBP. 
21 See commentary on lifelong learning partnerships in Chapter 4. 
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unitary authority status. CityLeaming was also instrumental in engaging business in the Childrenis 
University, another initiative currently unique to Hull among the four cases, drawing in private 
sector funds and personnel to assist with the project. Business viewed this initiative, along with 
the Business Education Forum, as an enhancement of bi-lateral links with schools, a development 
tool for its employees, a public relations bonus for the company and as an investment in the human 
capital of the future. However, business investment in this kind of project may produce zero sum 
outcomes in terms of regeneration, if it is an example ofwhat KHCC described as 'cherry-picking' 
the best school leavers, further entrenching the social exclusion of the previous generation, 
unemployed people from the fishing industry. 
As with the SRB, central government was perceived to be very powerful in the domain of 
education policy, particularly in Hull and in North East Lincolnshire which were beginning to deal 
with the implications of Lifelong Learning partnerships as the research concluded. It was feared 
in both cases that central government proposals, however worthy, can distort local objectives. In 
Hull, it has been agreed that CityLearning will become the vehicle for lifelong learning and it was 
feared that as an organisation resPonsible for government money, CityLearning could lose its 
strategic vision and its lifelong focus. In this sense, there was a worry that the problems 
associated in all cases with SRB bureaucracy could be replicated in the strictures of the Lifelong 
Learning agenda. North East Lincolnshire similarly feels that it will have little control over the 
form which the local Lifelong Learning partnership will eventually take, one officer describing the 
process as 'local administration, not local governance' (NELC, 17.5.99b). This instance highlights 
the extent to which NELC remains at best uncertain of the direction in which it sees itself as being 
pushed, and Lifelong Learning was interpreted as another pressure toward integrating the 
economic and social regeneration agendas. It is in areas where there are doubts about compliance 
that the coercive capacity in government initiatives becomes visible. Hull, with some misgivmigs, 
appeared ready to address the Lifelong Learning agenda, whereas North East Lincolnshire did not. 
Hull can be perceived as a leader in relation to education partnerships, whereas Hull, Barnsley and 
North East Lincolnshire are comparative laggards. In Hull, business has been much more active 
in developing business oriented curriculum activities than it has elsewhere. In Rotherharn, the 
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business Chairman of BEAG may have helped induce the Council to accept Education Action 
Zones. The role of business in education partnerships appeared weakest in Barnsley and in North 
East Lincolnshire, where one or two businesses are valued for articulating employee needs, but 
where otherwise, the main links are between schools and employers. Hull's partnership activities 
were far more extensive than those to be found elsewhere. Again, this fact may be attributable to 
the size of Hull and the capacity of its businesses to take a leading role in the implementation of 
projects like the Children's University and the Business Education Forum. The conclusion which 
can be drawn from the Children's University and from the Business Education Forum is that while 
partnership at geo-strategic level has failed with the abolition of Humberside County Council, 
there are strong bilateral education business links in Hull, which were not visible elsewhere. 
Added Value in Education Business Links 
It is not possible at this stage to consider the benefits which may derive from Lifelong Learning 
22 
partnerships, since they are in a very early stage of development. Similarly, it is too early to 
evaluate the Children's University as 4 business education link, though it has been received 
positively in schools. As far as EBPs are concerned, they must be regarded as having failed as 
strategic and as managerial bodies, showing that partnerships can result in bureaucratic inertia and 
in fi-ustration. In general, parties to the former EBPs were happy with the new, non-partnership 
arrangements for the delivery of education business link projects. All parties continue to be 
positive about education business links in principle and it was suggested in Rotherham that they 
have had a positive effect on the reliability and attitude of work experience pupils. CityLearning 
believed that it has moved learning up the agenda in Hull, though it was questioned whether it had 
done so with the people who need it most, or whether learning will itself generate new jobs for 
better qualified locals. The characteristics and processes involved in education business links are 
summarised in Box 10. 
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The three flagship partnerships have developed broadly the same approach to regeneration 
strategy, in contrast with the situation in North East Lincolnshire where, under Government Office 
pressure, there is uncertainty about whether and how to link economic and social objectives into 
a broader vision for the area. Locally, the local authority and, to a lesser extent the TEC drive the 
regeneration agenda to which the private sector is by and large marginal. Ifpartnerships represent 
4governance', they do so in a symbolic fashion in which the partnership structure is more 
impressive than the interactions within it. Rotherham and Hull in particular are some way from 
generating co-ordinated governance at the strategic level due to 'turf wars', though it was felt that 
the establishment of cabinet government in Hull, about to happen at the conclusion of the study, 
could ease the problem of co-ordination within the departments of KHCC. Furthermore, if 
practical conflicts are not addressed, then co-ordinated governance cannot be delivered at the level 
of project implementation either. None of the four challenge partnerships revealed a strong 
internal governance dynamic and the role of business within them was largely symbolic. The 
evidence isn't sufficient to state whether there is a tendency toward the development of an internal 
governance dynamic in challenge partnerships at this time. There are elements in place for such 
a dynamic in that there is commitment from within each local authority and from some businesses 
to a partnership agenda, a vague but widespread feeling that partnership is a good thing, though 
the scope and depth of business commitment would have to increase significantly. There is also 
agreement, with the exception of NEL, over general policy statements and directions. But this 
agreement has not translated into a fusion of resources, intellectual or material. An ideological 
commitment to partnership now exists to a greater or a lesser extent in all areas. However, the 
more detailed the examination ofthe leading partnership structures, the less substantial partnership 
appears to be. 
Economic and extra-local political pressures, combined with local ideological imperatives have 
generated local authority commitment to partnership working with businesses in a range of 
activities and policy areas. But the dynamics ofbusiness participation are often weak. The private 
sector is not under the same compulsion to adopt the partnership agenda, and across the range of 
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partnership activities in each area, a handful of core activists could be identified. The glue to 
partnership varied. At the strategic level, it was the incentive of extra-local resources, combined 
with local networking capacities. At the implementation level by comparison, the partnerships 
were sustainable through internally generated ideas and internal resources, although more 
ambitious strategies relied on successful bids for extra-local funds. " 
In relation to the first part ofthis chapter, which examined economic strategies, inward investment 
patterns and local business dependence, three things can be said. First, the underlying economic 
dynamics associated with economic globalization have not created an environment in which local 
authorities are obliged to compete, either alone or in partnership, for mobile capital resources. 
Second,, to the extent that local authorities and businesses do perceive a need to pull together for 
regeneration, this is about enhancing local capacity to compete for governmental resources rather 
than for mobile capital. The port partnerships represent a challenge to this broad conclusion, 
suggesting that promotional activities have gained credibility with potential customers and 
investors which they would not have had without the appearance of unity between port and host 
authority. Flagship partnerships have not been generated by local responses to perceived supra 
local economic pressures, but by political engineering, including financial instruments and 
institutional fragmentation. Third, the, proximity to the locality of the decision makers within a 
multi-national corporation seemed to make no difference, either to inward investment decisions, 
or to decisions about local partnership activity, which are left to the discretion ofthe site manager. 
There was, however, a greater pre-disposition for partnership activity among longstanding local 
firms and firms with British roots and management. 
The evidence suggests that the strategic partnership process, rather than creating local governance 
capacity, has created new instruments for central government to implement its objectives in the 
locality, tying both local authority and business partners into a policy agenda of its choosing. " 
23 Lifelong Learning partnerships will be dependent on government funds. 
24 This point is followed up in more depth in chapter 10. 
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Partnership formalisation has generated visible links between local government and business, but 
these are shallow in character, lacking an internal glue in the form of local interorganisational 
dependence, to bind in either the local authority or the business sector. There is, therefore, a 
contradictory effect in government policy, from the standpoint of generating local governance 
capacity. The SRB, undoubtedly helps to sustain expensive structures like CityVision, but its 
prescriptions and rigours have prevented them from developing a dynamic of their own. 
The first thing which needs to be emphasised in relation to implementation partnerships is that 
their existence across a range of economic development and education activities shows that the 
ideology ofpartnership, is entrenched within a range of economic development activities and within 
education. If the challenge fund culture of the strategic partnership inhibits governance capacity 
at the strategy and policy level, the ideology of partnership has developed at the implementation 
level, where the demands ofgovemment are less immediate. Government measures, together with 
ideological changes, have helped to produce examples of local governance at the operational level, 
where they have not at the strategic and political levels. These implementation partnership 
activities, particularly in economic development, tend to be generated locally for local purposes 
and they are variable in form and in scope demonstrating, in the case of Barnsley and Rotherharn, 
the capacity for diverse responses to the same problem. In both cases, the implementation of 
economic development objectives contrasted with the flagship approach. The BRF is Council 
managed and led; the BDA independent and business led. The REP is independent and business 
led; RiDO is under full council control. Yet in both cases, the Council is felt to be pre-eminent 
in the economic development process. 
This example illustrates two things: that areas adopt different approaches to partnership at 
different levels of policy and implementation; and that institutional form is not, itself, indicative 
of the balance of power between different actors. Hull demonstrated another interesting contrast 
showing, as a reluctant late comer to the partnership game, the broadest range of partnership 
activities. Whatever the weaknesses ofthe parent CityVision partnership, two of its Issue Groups, 
City1mage and CityLearning, have generated impressive and innovative projects, together with 
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visible private sector commitment to them. So, while CityVision, at the broad policy and strategy 
level, may be viewed as a failure, its more practical 'spokes' can viewed as a relative success. 
Another contrast, visible within CityVision and within the NEL Regeneration Partnership, was the 
way in which local authority pre-eminence in the challenge partnerships co-existed with an 
emerging private sector role, in some cases private sector leadership, at the implementation level. 
This contrast is suggestive of a greater enthusiasm within both local authority and business and 
a greater capacity within business, for project oriented partnerships, calling into question the 
necessity of symbolic forms of partnership in policy development and the necessity of challenge 
funds for sustaining project oriented partnerships. But there are risks in displays of autonomy 
from government. NEL incurred the threat of financial penalties for running things the way it 
wanted to, rather than complying with the national agenda. 
A key element of the explanation for different approaches lies in the political and inter- 
organisational history of each area. Local politics are clearly important in relation to the 
characteristics of economic development. But specific political choices are made possible by the 
economic and geographical landscapes. Businesses in Humberside are big enough and vibrant 
enough to engage with sector and issue based partnerships. Sector specific partnerships would 
be very difficult to maintain in Rotherham. and Barnsley where industry is weak showing, by 
contrast, why it was easier in both instances to take a more generic approach. Furthen-nore, 
neither has the weight of Hull as a city, able to engage in promotional activities on the scale of 
CityImage. 
The sector partnerships were perceived much more positively than the flagship partnerships both 
by local authorities and by businesses. In each case, it was apparent that the partnership activity 
could not credibly be carried out without both public and private sector involvement. The sector 
partnerships generated private sector commitment through subscriptions and managerial 
responsibility for partnership activities. Notably, each partnership could boast between 12 and 20 
subscribers, a comparatively high level of involvement. Interestingly, and in contrast with the 
flagship partnerships discussed above, none of these partnerships described funding from the SRB 
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or from the EU as 'added value'. Funding was strictly seen as a means to an end, and the added 
value was expressed in terms of actual or potential project outcomes, rather than in terms of 
income generated from elsewhere. These 'voluntary' partnerships further illustrate the ideological 
commitment to the partnership principle within local authorities. They also illustrate that it is 
possible to generate a commitment to medium and long term collaborative ventures within certain 
businesses, if they can be convinced that the expense will eventually generate bottom line results. 
It is possible that a momentum is being generated, particularly within the Humberside chemicals 
industry, where major companies feel that if a competitor is in they too have to sign up, and in 
City1mage where the Bond scheme has attracted several major companies. The sector 
partnerships and City1mage represent examples ofplace-marketing initiatives which, ifnot directly 
concerned with attracting mobile capital, nonetheless seek to present their businesses and their 
areas in a positive light to a European and, potentially, a global audience. 
The research into education partnerships shows an agenda heavily influenced by government 
initiatives in the form of EBPs and, in future, Lifelong Learning partnerships. Only in Hull, host 
to strong education partnerships, was there evidence of locally generated partnership activity. 
Business participation was perceived as weaker than in the economic development partnerships 
but Hull proved to be an exception, generating strong bi-lateral links between LEA and multi- 
national companies in curriculum development projects for primary and secondary schools. 
Beyond these bi-lateral links, the scope for formal partnerships on the EBP model seems small. 
The collapse of the EBPs in Rotherharn and in Humberside illustrates a broader conclusion, that 
partnerships can have negative sum effects on governance, as well as zero sum and positive sum 
effects. Sometimes, fragmentation is necessary for effective governance. TEC management of 
education business link projects is more effective than a moribund partnership. Governance 
capacity may be enhanced by partnership failure if it enables the parties concerned to get on with 
doing their jobs without the distraction of partnership obligations, or if it liberates the potential 
for productive networking arrangements as exhibited in the semi-formal Business Education 
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between partnership and best value on one hand and between partnership and stakeholding on the 
other. Partnership may not produce optimum outputs and it can be exclusive, generating 
discontent among outsiders and generating the potential for conflict between a local authority and 
elements of its business sector. Implementation partnerships can be viewed as more 'genuine' than 
strategic partnerships, because they are voluntary in character and because they are oriented 
toward specific local objectives. 
Overall, there were four important examples of business input into partnership projects: the 
Barnsley Miller Partnership provided the most concrete illustration ofpositive governance output; 
CityImage, the only significant cash input to a non-Profit initiative; 'The Deep' represented a 
visible example ofbusiness influence in the partnership process; and the Children's University and 
the Business Education Forum represented examples of how business can play a key role in 
developing bottom-up strategic education business links. Bi lateral relationships between local 
authority and business in these partnership ventures showed how good relationships with the 
private sector at the level of ideals can be produced in practice. 
In Hull and in North East Lincolnshire, the impression was that unitary authority status has been 
a stimulus to partnership development, particularly at the operational level. Responsibility for 
education gave CityVision a 'strategic' view of learning, enabling it more effectively to be 
incorporated within the City Regeneration Strategy; and it simplified matters for businesses. The 
ports partnerships benefited through the development of a local focus to its activities, which 
proved unsustainable at the sub-regional level. The downside has been the emergence oftensions 
between the new authorities and HTEC over local and sub-regional priorities which never arose 
when education was a County Council responsibility. In short, it facilitated the development of 
local functional-strategic approaches, but it inhibited geo-strategic approaches. 
The over-riding impression from the partnerships is that added value is something for the future. 
Partnership working is still young. Ultimately, as has been argued above, it is difficult to judge 
added value on the basis of relatively new partnership projects. Implementation partnerships are 
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very new, even by comparison with recent flagship initiatives like CityVision. Added value was 
most commonly expressed as potential or as a series of soft inputs and outputs. At the margins, 
however, particularly within the implementation partnerships, examples suggested that a harder, 
more concrete form of added value may be beginning to emerge. Stone's (1989) analysis of 
Atlanta takes place over a period of 42 years and when set in this context, it is inappropriate to 
make hasty judgements about the absence of concrete outputs, or the future direction in which 
nascent partnership processes might lead. Box 11 provides a general overview of the partnership 
processes discussed in this chapter, both within and between cases. Chapter 10 concludes the 
study, returning to consider the theoretical implications of these findings for scholars using urban 
regime theory and for the concept of 'governance' as a characterisation of local partnership 
processes. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion: Urban 
Partnerships Revisited 
Introduction 
Regime Theory and Local 
This concluding chapter reprises the core themes raised in the study. It begins by contrasting the 
dynamics identified in bringing about urban partnerships with those found in urban regime theory, 
addressing the question of how far the variables it predicts account for and describe relationships 
between local government and business in the case studies. With qualifications, it rejects 
comparisons between urban partnerships and regime governance, identifying the former as 
instruments of state policy. These findings are then represented as a set of variables, whose 
potential efficacy in producing regime governance is considered. The conclusion drawn from this 
discussion is that while regime theory is of little value in explaining local partnership processes or 
in characterising local partnership practices as they stand, it is invaluable in raising questions about 
how the relationship between local government and the business sector may be developing and in 
providing'for a contrast to be made between local political processes in Britain and in the USA. 
The findings are then used to draw a distinction between partnership as a mode of governance and 
governance as autonomous, self-organizing networks. It is concluded that state restructuring, 
rather than reducing the centre's capacity to steer, has enhanced its steering ability and broadened 
the scope of its influence in local politics. Finally, in examining the implications of these 
conclusions for the study of local governance, it is emphasised that the state remains the key to 
analysing local political processes. If the central state is seeking to create a form of local 
governance which resembles the ideal type depicted by Rhodes (1996), then the instruments it is 
using inhibit rather than facilitate this outcome. 
The chapter is organised into five main sections. First, local partnership dynamics are contrasted 
with those identified in regime theory. Second, consideration is given to how local partnerships 
should be characterised as modes of governance. The third section expresses the influences on 
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partnership as a set of independent variables and provides a final evaluation ofregime theory from 
the standpoint of the findings in this study. The fourth section shows how the study contributes 
to the study of local governance. Finally, the concluding section considers the implications ofthis 
project for future research into local political processes. 
Local Partnership Dynamics and Urban Regime Theory 
The following discussion compares and contrasts the key themes identified in the case studies with 
those identified in urban regime theory. It considers three broad dynamics affecting partnership 
development: the philosophy of market led growth, government initiatives and economic 
globalization. 
The Philosophy of Market Led Growth 
The first independent variable which can be identified is the logic of collaboration engendered in 
local authorities which, in response to economic problems, have embraced a private sector led 
economic development agenda. According to Elkin, this response is the 'rational' response of 
public officials to whoever controls productive assets (1994: 122). The basis of this rationality 
differs in this study. In Atlanta and in Dallas, it is based on the interdependence of resources and 
on ideological commitment, whereas here it is based primarily on an ideological commitment to 
market led development. Chapter 9 showed how the case study areas arrived at this conclusion 
at different times as a result of differing combinations of local and extra-local pressures, but also 
that this ideological position is a point of convergence among local authority elites. The ubiquity 
ofthis variable is contingent on three factors: the existence ofeconomic problems; local authority 
engagement in economic development intended to address them; and a corresponding local 
authority commitment to market driven wealth creation. 
The logic of wealth creation has not, however, produced a corresponding dynamic for 
collaboration within the business sector. The great majority of local businesses, including business 
elites, have no interface with the local authority and there remains an element of cynicism about 
partnership within the business sector, even among those who are key participants. The sources 
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of influence on the business sector are more difficult to discern than for the local authority. A 
small number of larger businesses have engaged in partnerships, believing that they can enhance 
their competitive positions. A more positive view of the local authorities courting business 
involvement, together with the new representative capacity engendered through TECs, have also 
been influential factors in bringing businesses to the table. A local authority seeking to enhance 
the business environment is also, logically, likely to be viewed more positively by business than 
one which does not. Ideology within some corporations also seems to have changed, resulting in 
a more outward looking perspective on community matters constituting, as Bassett suggested, 
6enlightened self-interest' (1996: 540). The dynamics shaping positive business attitudes toward 
partnership are weak and diff-use. It remains to be seen whether the Government's agenda for 
modernisation changes this dynamic through measures such as the partial re-introduction of local 
business rates (DETR, 30.7.98). 
The private sector in these case studies differs in two obvious ways from that described in regime 
theory. It is not divided into active interests, such as pro or anti-development, locally dependent 
or non-dependent; and it is not active through representative mechanisms such as chambers of 
commerce, which remain weak notwithstanding the arrival ofthe TECs on the institutional scene. 
The reasons for this position have to be inferred, but the findings tend to support Offe's (1985) 
view that the collective representation of capital in market societies is weak because its privileged 
structural position makes representation unnecessary. However, according to Peck and Tickell, 
business interests are not uni-dimensional and the interests ofcapital cannot be met unequivocally 
by the state (1995: 59/60). This perspective implies that there is a rationale for business 
organising itself, a point borne out in Atlanta where the organisation of business is as much about 
the prosecution of factional business interests as it is about the representation of capital to the 
government. If Offe is right in his view, the USA must be an exceptional case. ' Either way, the 
obvious factors which undermine business activism in the UK are the absence of material 
interdependence at the local scale and a weak culture of civic engagement. Without these factors, 
I Strom also highlights the 'extreme' weakness of the private sector as an organised 
force in Germany (1996: 476). 
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it is unlikely that a collaborative dynamic between local government and business in Britain will 
ever be as powerftil as it is in the USA. 
These dynamics differ from those discussed in urban regime theory. The difference is that 
collaboration is not necessary to support the core activities of local govenu-nent as it is in regime 
theory (Harding, 1996c, 1997). Rather, collaboration depends on the local authority's perception 
that it relies on private sector growth for economic regeneration. This perception is compelli g 
as a logic of collaboration and it is embedded in the growth ideologies of local government elites. 
Thus, as in regime theory there exists a dynamic to collaboration, but it is one sided and it is 
ideologically, not materially, driven. In regime theory, the dynamic of interdependence motivates 
both business and local authority around a growth agenda, unless power is pre-empted by other 
groups. Together with the absence of strong incentives to engender business activism, the 
potential for business activity in partnership is dependent on inherited socioeconomic factors such 
as the composition of the local economy. The scope for business activity in a city like Hull is 
greater than it is in Barnsley simply because the pool of potential business partners is greater. The 
potential for local regime governance involving the business sector is thus greater in a city hosting 
a diverse range of large companies, than in a town where major private sector actors are marginal. 
This conclusion tends to unden-nine Elkin's perspective, outlined in chapter 1, on the 
generalizability of his model. to smaller places (I 987a: 8). 
As was noted in chapter I there are no empirical claims in this study concerning the manner in 
which business interests and local authorities might exert influence on government at the supra- 
local level. However, it is evident that movement within local authorities toward an economic 
development agenda was not engendered by a local interface with business, but by a wider 
ideological process. The tension identified by Elkin (1985b) between popular control of 
government and business control of the economy is not found at the local scale in these cases due 
to the absence of direct financial interdependence between local authority and business sector. 
Rather, there has been an ideological synthesis of economic and social objectives in local policies 
which tends to characterise social regeneration in economic terms. In other words, rather than 
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seeing a process driven by the private sector, 'we have witnessed the transformation of the public 
sector through the incorporation of many of the tenets, practices and procedures of the enterprise 
culture' (Bailey et al, 1995: 23 1). The fieldwork did not examine the extent of popular pressure 
on the local authorities, but there was no immediate evidence of what Sam Brittan characterises 
as 'democratic overload', which could have been visible as citizen protests (Brittan, 1975). 
Anecdotal evidence suggested disgruntlement among backbench Labour councillors at partnership 
approaches, but economic and social regeneration were rarely counterposed ideologically? In 
practice, economic projects have, on occasion, displaced home building, though it was not 
established whether these decisions were contested, or even known of, beyond discussions 
between local elites. 
What is the nature of the power relations at work here? Stone (1980: 98 1) describes systemic 
power as situational and indirect, where the superordinate exercises influence over the 
subordinate without either party necessarily being aware of the process, whose outcome is 
predictable, but not inevitable. In this study, the influence ofthe development agenda is predicated 
on a deduction by the local authority that it has no choice but to pursue market led growth if it 
wants to achieve economic regeneration. In this case, the power relation is situational and direct. 
Here, the subordinate (the local authority agenda for economic development) has consciously 
evaluated its position in relation to the superordinate (private sector as wealth creator), but the 
latter has not exercised direct influence and need not be aware of its position in relation to the 
subordinate. ' There is a difference here with Stone's scheme in that 'subordination' is the logic 
of the local authority's political and ideological position, rather than of its economic position. It 
is, therefore, purely purposive in character. The situational power of business in this case is 
2 One senior office in NELC was pessimistic about the level of community goods to be 
derived from economic regeneration. There was also scepticism in Hull and Rotherharn about 
whether the emphasis on employability in education will generate new employment opportunities 
for local people. 
3 For Stone (1980), situational anddirectpower is an'anticipated reaction' relationship 
where the subordinate party seeks to interpret the wishes of the superordinate. The subordinate 
therefore recognises the position of the superordinate party, whether or not this position is 
recognised. by the superordinate. 
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exercised in relation to policy orientation rather than finance. To re-iterate, this variable, along 
with the other variables discussed below, is tendential in its realisation. Hull, for example, was 
very late in arriving at this market oriented policy Position and there are still elements within the 
local authority elites who are resistant to partnership strategies. The ideology of partnership in 
these cases is much less ubiquitous and less compelling than is material interdependence in regime 
theory. 
The Influence of Central Government 
The second major influence on the establishment of local partnerships is central government as a 
source of incentives and penalties. Government is accorded secondary status as an independent 
variable by virtue of the fact that collaboration often precedes City Challenge, the landmark 
government initiative launching the present era of collaboration. The development ofpartnership 
approaches is here argued to have had as much to do with political and ideological processes 
occurring within Labour councils and the Labour Party more widely, as with the Conservative 
Government's agenda. ' In this sense, power is both situationally and intentionally direct, 
depending on whether the local authority anticipates the position of government, or is coerced 
through the use of government penalties. 
Central government has played a much more direct role in relation to the process of partnership 
institutionalisation through the use of challenge funds as policy instruments and through a range 
of specific partnership schemes, such as Education Business Partnerships. The role may be 
characterised both as coercive and as regulatory. It takes on a coercive character in relation to 
partnership laggards. Hull was a partnership laggard, pushed by financial penalties from non- 
partnership to institutional Partnership during a two year period. Rotherham, on the other hand, 
is a partnership innovator. But while it endorsed the ideology of co-operation early on, its 
approach did not satisfy the Government in relation to City Challenge. The process of 
institutionalisation in Rotherham was built on a pre-existing partnership agenda in relation to 
which City Challenge played a regulatory role, a milder form of coercion. nie metaphorical 
See chapter 4. 
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equivalent is that of pushing a cyclist who is stationary and one who is moving. The process of 
partnership institutionalisation, then, is to varying degrees, the exercise of intentional and direct 
power, that of A over B. In the case of Barnsley, the cyclist was, if success in City Challenge is 
an indicator, moving faster than in Rotherham. The Barnsley Regeneration Forum was established 
through its perception of incentives, not penalties. Barnsley anticipated the need for partnership 
institutionalisation, indicating asituational anddirectpower relation between centre and locality. 
Hull did not, showing an intentional and direct power relation between centre and locality. 
Different facets ofpower were exercised in differing situations. This conclusion shows that claims 
suggesting City Challenge schemes are the forerunner of contemporary regeneration partnerships 
are true, but that they oversimplify matters (Atkinson, 1999: 63). As far as business is concerned, 
the mechanism ofchallenge funds represents an indirect incentive to companies which, iftheyj oin 
partnership boards, cannot benefit directly from project funds. The prospect ofresources in ected 
into the local economy, however, was unsurprisingly viewed as a good thing by business. Yet this 
indirect incentive did not prove sufficient to draw large scale private sector involvement into the 
partnership process. 
This aspect of partnership development is not amenable to explanation by urban regime theory 
either. Local governance in regime theory is produced by an internal dynamic for co-operation 
ie 'power to'. It is true that the internal governance dynamic in regime theory is a product of the 
way in which the political-institutional environment mediates the state-market interface,. but, 
according to Elkin and Stone, this environment produces a pre-disposition for the parties to co- 
operate without command structures around a growth agenda. Partnership institutionalisation, 
and in some cases partnership development, was in these four case studies a response to external 
incentives and penalties bestowed by central government. ' Where collaboration was not 
established voluntarily, external pressure was applied. Where business involvement was judged 
insufficient in North East Lincolnshire by Government Office, the local authority shouldered the 
blame, not the inactive partners. The process of partnership institutionalisation produced formal 
' This is not to say that institutional partnership structures did not occur in other places 
before external incentives and penalty systems were introduced. 
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decision making structures. in such structures, the exercise ofpower is decisional, but it involves 
deliberation and argument rather than command power. There are two possible effects of this 
mechanism of partnership regulation. One is that it substitutes for an absence of internal 
governance capacity; the other is that it is superimposed on a preceding internal governance 
dynamic operating through networking arrangements. The former proposition is most plausible 
given the case study findings, but either way, partnership institutionalisation exhibits intentional 
and direct power forms, which the dynamics in regime theory do not predict. To answer the 
question of whether partnership institutionalisation has undermined the development of local 
networks, comparator cases would need to be identified where Government has not been in a 
position to influence and regulate partnership development, for example, in a Labour authority 
area which has not been reliant on regeneration programmes. If government constraints were 
reduced in their potency, would local commitment to collaboration be enhanced or reduced? To 
answer this question would be to help determine how far the local partnership process is now 
driven by a ubiquitous or widespread ideological commitment to collaboration. Such a study 
could also evaluate whether institutionalised partnership formation can be driven locally, whether 
powerfid networks exist side by side with locally driven institutionalised partnerships, and whether 
in areas where institutionalised partnerships do not exist, collaboration is carried out through 
networking processes - or not at all. 
Partnerships and Globalization 
Local dependence and capital mobility are key variables regulating regime governance in Elkin's 
work (1987a, 1994). Similarly, chapter 3 identifies economic globalization as a potential 
explanation for the process of coalition formation in Britain and in Europe (Harding, 1994,1996b; 
Mayer, 1994). It is important, therefore, to evaluate the kind of impact processes of economic 
globalization have on the locality and the political responses they generate. If, as Andrew and 
Goldsmith argue (1998: 103), economic globalization undermines corporate loyalty to place, there 
is likely to be a growing distinction between the characteristics, interests and conduct of locally 
dependent capital and non-dependent capital in the UK. Evidence from the case studies suggests 
that locally dependent productive capital is, as Elkin (1987a) argues, most likely to become 
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involved in collaborative endeavoUrS. The questions of whether the distinction between locally 
dependent and non-dependent capital is growing and of just how useful this distinction is in 
predicting business attitudes toward collaboration, are, however, matters which require fta-ther 
research. Nevertheless, the scale of business involvement in these projects is much smaller than 
that envisaged in regime theory and the national state and its regional agencies remain the key sites 
for filtering inward investment inquiries by mobile capital. Whatever the nature and effects of 
economic globalization, the evidence tends to undermine the idea of an unmediated global-local 
dialectic between mobile capital on one hand and local government and locally dependent capital 
on the other. The hypothesis of Harding and Le Gales (1995) and Cox (1995), that unmediated 
economic factors drive local actors into investment seeking, place-marketing coalitions is not 
representative of the facts as Harding's empirical findings, discussed below, also show. This is 
not to say that economic globalization has had no impact on ideology and politics but that its 
impact on localities is of marginal relevance to the establishment of partnerships. In this sense, 
there is truth in the claim by Hall and Hubbard (1996: 160) that literature on the 'new urban 
politics overwhelmingly exhibits a crude conception of the relations of local and global'. 
There are, however, qualifications to this conclusion. Most examples of place marketing were 
attempts to gain the ear and the finance of regional, national and European governments. But in 
Hull and in North East Lincolnshire, there was also evidence ofbusiness oriented place marketing. 
Hull particularly, through the City1mage project, views collaboration between public and private 
sector as central to the credibility of its attempts to reinvent itself locally, nationally and 
internationally. Whether this process is driven ideologically, as Hall and Hubbard (1996) suggest, 
or economically based on the imperatives ofaccumulation and competition, cannot be determined 
from the information gleaned in the case studies. In all probability, local government is influenced 
by the ideology of globalization, the business sector by its competitive implications. It remains 
to be seen whether Hull is successful in establishing a direct interface with global actors and what 
this might look like, but the project involves what Griffiths describes as the commodification of 
place (Griffiths, 1998: 41). City1mage is also about a 'social control logic' in which image 
building is not only about making the city attractive for business, but about convincing local 
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people about the benevolence ofentrepreneurial strategies, such as those embodied in 'The Deep' 
6 (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 162). Harding (1997) identifies ten trends which, he says, should be 
visible in entrepreneurial cities seeking to compete in a global environment. Box 12 compares 
these trends with the findings in the case studies. His findings suggest that the conclusions in this 
study may have wider applicability. Harding concludes that there has been no unambiguous shift 
in governance capacities from centre to locality or from welfare state to productive state. Rather, 
the current period is perceived as the 'search for a fix' which falls short of a decisive shift or 
resolution (1997: 3 10). 
Trends in Entrepreneurial Cities I Case Study Findings 
---------- ------- -------------------- 
Demand to Supply Management Governmental concern with performance 
enhancement. 
---------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------- 
Vertical to Horizontal Integration Local Governance compromised by vertical (state) 
dominance. 
---------------------------------------------- j --------------------------------------------- 
Downgrade Regional Initiatives (Those Concerned I I 
The opposite is happening. New RDAs are part of a 
with Equity and Balanced Development) Govenunent initiative aimed at levelling up the 
performance of disadvantaged regions. 
---------------------------------------------- j ----------------- ---------- I 
SanctionslIncentives to Enhance Local Mobilisation I Visible in many government initiatives. 
----------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------- 
Decentralizing Responsibilities, Encouraging Local The opposite is happening in practice. Responsibility 
Institutional Capacity is not the same as empowerment. 
------------------------- 4 ---------- ----------------------------------- I Oriented on Achievement, More Than Process Challenge funds create the opposite effect. 
Bureaucracy rules. 
-------------------------------------------- 4 ----- ------------------------------- 
Local Design and Delivery ofPolicy Initiatives The opposite is true. Government initiatives are very 
influential. 
--------------------------------------------- 4 --------------------------------------------- I Greater Interest in Urban Affairs by Business, Generally untrue. Increased activity at the margins. 
Including Lobbying by Locally Dependent Capital Some participants are cynical about partnership. 
Formal andInformalActivity Concernedwith Gaining Mostly concerned with external funds, not local 
the Capacity to Act capacity. Local capacity is visible at the margins. 
--------------------------------- J----- ---------- 
Input of Material Nonlinaterial Resources to Local I Few material sources except challenge funds. I Production Processes andConsumption Goods Which Intellectual resources more significant. Size of place 
SupDort Them is important in the scale of resource commitment. 
Box 12: Competitive Trends in the Case Studies (Adaptedfrom Harding, 1997) 
6 The case ofManchester suggests that conclusions about the capacity for private sector 
activity in larger cities drawn from Hull may be true more widely. While still characterised as a 
4grant' coalition, Manchester's Olympic bid was supported by an active business elite. The 
presence of 'big hitters' in Manchester made for a more dynamic partnership (Cochrane et al, 
1996: 1331/2). 
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There are, therefore, two reasons for scepticism about the diminution of national state influence 
on local economic development and partnership processes: the legal, geographical, social and 
economic characteristics of the national state remain key considerations for inward investors and 
it is the institutions of the state which field their inquiries; and second, to the extent that 
responsibilities for economic development have been delegated to local partnerships, it is on terms 
set by the national state, a point developed further below. There is plenty of support within the 
literature for these conclusions. Painter's research suggests that British local governance is not 
becoming 'post-Fordist' because the state retains a crucial role in retaining regulatory capacity and 
agencies of local governance often lack authority (Painter, 1996). For Harding, the State is 
playing a much greater role in relation to the way in which cities and regions respond to 
globalizing forces than it did before (1997: 308). Harding and Le Gales (1998: 200) conclude that 
political change at the national level remains critical in mediating between global pressures and 
local responses, while Strom argues of Berlin that even with the internationalization of the 
economy, the nation state remains the critical determinant of the local policy process (1996: 476- 
477). 
Partnerships as a Mode of Local Governance 
So, what kind ofphenomena do these dynamics produce? A distinction has been made throughout 
between goal or policy oriented partnerships, and programme or implementation oriented 
partnerships. Chapter 9 shows how the distinction has proved useful in identifying differing 
degrees of interdependence between local authority and business sector. This part of the chapter 
therefore considers further the question of whether partnerships exhibit the qualities of regime 
governance in terms of generating local governance capacity, or 'power to'. 
Synergy in Challenge Partnership Structures? 
The basic property ofElkin's and Stone's regime politics, that collaboration will generally involve 
both public and private sectors, is visible to an extent in all the cases studies. But to re-iterate, the 
level ofstrategic autonomy within flagship partnerships is inhibited by extra-local political forces. 
Local policy agendas and institutional forms are regulated by a range of government policy 
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7 instruments, the latest of which is the Regional Development Agency. The combination of 
business and local authority within this partnership type has not generated significant business 
input, or local governance capacity. These partnerships are symbolic, they are not driven by local 
economic and social imperatives and they have not produced visible governance outputs. Neither 
do they, at present, exhibit a tendency toward the development ofan internal governance dynamic. 
Rather, both institutional form and strategic objectives are attributable to external imperatives. 
Local governance through the pooling of local authority and business resources is not occurring 
and it has been inhibited from developing. The external dynamic at work here, in the shape of 
policy instruments which have produced similar institutional partnerships and virtually identical 
area strategies, prevents any internal partnership dynamic from developing. Project realisation 
thus tends not to be dependent on co-operation within the partnership. These partnerships are 
contrasted with regime governance in which an internal dynamic drives the process. 
Synergy in Policy Development? 
The purpose of the flagship partnership, underpinned by an area regeneration strategy, is to 
generate a co-ordinated approach to regeneration across policy arenas. The analysis of education 
business links and the wider learning agenda shows how this policy arena has been linked to 
regeneration agendas, normally with learning in support of economic objectives. Employability 
is a key dimension in these strategies, emphasising the role of learning in the realm of necessity, 
but not in the realm of freedom, ie arts, cultural pursuits and learning for its own sake. But again, 
there is little evidence of local business influence on these priorities. While there is a good bi- 
lateral relationship between LEA and key local businesses in Hull, it is about producing curriculum 
aids rather than a strategic agenda. Education business link projects are structured by government 
initiatives such as EBPs, the soon-to-be Lifelong Learning partnerships and by the imperative of 
private sector led wealth creation applied to learning, and it is this logic which in turn opens the 
way for business to influence the education agenda in schools through business education links. 
7 It remains to be seen whether the RDAs have sufficient autonomy from government 
for business leaders to exercise influence over regional economic strategies (Yorkshire Forward, 
July 1999). 
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It is interesting, however, that a recurring relationship can be identified between each local 
authority and key business actors across different policy arenas. It is arguable that this situation 
represents the potential for a local elite consisting of local authority, TEC, Chamber and one or 
two key businesses to exercise a 'hegemonic' influence throughout a broad cross-section of local 
policy arenas. In Barnsley, for example, the involvement of one or two business activists in many 
partnerships was perceived to have given rise to sUPra-institutional dynamics in the form of 
strategic considerations about how an action in one partnership will affect standing in another. 
Were these partnerships empowered and empowering, and were they based on relationships of 
trust and reciprocity rather than on 'turf wars', they would represent a form ofregime governance. 
But limited local autonomy instead suggests that local governance processes are weak or symbolic 
in character. 
Synergy in Implementation Oriented Partnerhsips? 
If challenge partnerships do not possess the characteristics ofregime governance, have they helped 
to stimulate regime governance in implementation oriented partnerships? The practice of 
partnership has spread well beyond the challenge process into a range ofpolicy and service arenas, 
including education and housing. Whether this development is attributable to the stimulus of 
challenge partnerships is debatable. The evidence suggests that some effect has occurred, if only 
because they tended to precede implementation oriented partnerships. The depth of partnership 
penetration varies and the picture of unevenness makes it difficult to give a single label to the 
range of partnership practices in each area. The ideology of partnership is strong in Rotherham, 
but the practice is weaker. In Hull, the opposite is true, particularly in education. What can be 
said is that there is more evidence of local governance capacity and of a trend toward business 
participation, commitment and leadership at the operational level than there is at the policy level. 
It is certainly plausible that the culture and practice of co-operation engendered in challenge 
partnerships, however symbolic, has re-enforced the ideology of partnership leading to the 
proliferation of other partnership activities. There is evidence that the process of partnership 
building now has its own dynamic locally and that it does not require extra-local incentives and 
penalties. There is also weaker evidence that this partnership dynamic can produce local 
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governance capacity. A handful ofbusiness activists are influential across the range ofpartnership 
activities and have had a visible impact on the output of partnership activities. As suggested 
above, this tendency is stronger in Hull and NEL than in Barnsley and in Rotherham where 
business capacity is weakest. The processes inhibiting local governance in relation to challenge 
partnerships may be beginning to produce local governance capacity in relation to practice. 
On these criteria, there is evidence, at the margins, that the conditions for regime governance may 
be starting to develop in isolated initiatives but that it has not generalized to encompass the 
hegemonic influence within or throughout a broad cross-section of local policy arenas associated 
with regime theory. The fact, for example, that local authorities may be predisposed toward 
private sector wealth creation does not mean that they support economic growth at any cost. The 
study did not focus on local authority planning processes and the evidence gathered was weak in 
this respect. But the exercise of growth control in Hull with respect to the 'Lord Line' building 
where wider community interests were at stake, is indicative ofthe fact that in the absence of fiscal 
pressures local authorities sometimes reject growth options without a direct impact on core service 
provision (Harding, 1996c, 1997). The ideology of market led growth is not the same as an 
instrumental subordination to the development principle! This perception is shared by Di 
Gaetano, who identifies competing pro-growth and growth management 'regimes' in Bristol 
(1997). The case of Hull, particularly, highlights the heterogeneity of perspective within the 
Council and the potential for conflict between objectives. To this extent, local politics matter. 
Outputs from Partnership Initiatives 
In a limited sense, then, the characteristics of regime governance are visible in specific initiatives 
pursued within the case study areas. Yet the evidence suggests that partnerships have not been 
instrumental in achieving thýir visionary ambitions for regeneration. Partnership working has 
generated business activism at the micro level in North East Lincolnshire, but it has not generated 
community benefits from the D billion ofcapital investment into the area over the past eight years. 
8 Although the DETR can overturn planning refusals. Two such reffisals were awaiting 
adjudication by the DETR as the fieldwork concluded. 
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There was little optimism either that the decline of Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East 
Lincolnshire is likely to be reversed relative to the region, to the UK or to Europe by means of 
partnership governance or by any other means. Stone (1989,1993) claims that regime governance 
is about small opportunities, small purposes and achievements, and regime theory shows that 
collaborative projects need not be very ambitious. But they should make a difference (Stone, 
1997: 22). There remain grounds for scepticism that collaboration, to the extent that it involved 
the interdependence of local resources, does make a difference to outcomes. Perhaps is it not the 
achievements of local partnerships which would disappoint Elkin and Stone, but the symbolism 
of local interactions, the difficulty in mobilising local capacity and the way in which central 
government continues to limit local autonomy. 
Trends in Collaborative Structures 
Though the emphasis remains on formal, or semi-formal co-operation in partnerships, there is 
evidence that local partners are seeking a balance between the bureaucratic rigours imposed by 
central government and the unaccountability and potential corruptibility of informal networks. 
Local elites are not, therefore, passive recipients for this agenda. But local resistance was not 
evident and, while this process concerns local elites, government policy announcements in relation 
to lifelong learning suggest that New Labour is driving the process of partnership 
institutionalisation still ftu-ther, notwithstanding Richard Caborn's wishes to the contrary. It is 
feared that the further institutionalisation of partnership activities, for example, the management 
of Government funds will kill off what little local autonomy exists. 
The Role of Urban Partnerships in the Production of Local Governance 
If regime governance is understood as synergism in collaborations across a wide range of 
governance activities, how do urban partnerships match this conception? With exceptions at the 
margin, these partnerships are, unlike regime governance, epiphenomenal to most ofthe decisions 
affecting the locality, that is, local politics don't matter very much. The conclusions drawn here 
concerning the impact of central government controls on local governance capacity are shared by 
Morgan et al, suggesting that they may be relevant on a wider scale: 
303 
... the presence ofregional institutions in Wales presents us with an uncomfortable paradox, 
namely that the Welsh Office, by virtue of its power and resources, tends to foster vertical 
networks which have the effect of disempowering local actors from building effective 
horizontal networks (Morgan et al, 1999: 194). 
As was noted above, ftniher research would be necessary to determine whether sufficient local 
synergy exists to produce local governance in places, if such exist, which do not fall under the 
influence of governmental incentives and penalties. However, the evidence presented here shows 
that local governance capacity is inhibited in those arenas where extra-local influence is strong. 
Governance activities in the locality are subordinate to the policies and the resources determined 
and allocated at higher levels of government. All political power is instantiated through the 
actions of agents (Callinicos, 1987: 86) and local actors interpret structural pressures upon them. 
But it is also true that local politics face powerful extra-local political and economic constraints 
and that partnerships are marginal in terms of governance outputs. Other levels of decision 
making, from the sub-regional upward, matter more in terms of policy decisions, resource 
generation and allocation, and in terms of new capital investment decisions by business. A focus 
on the relationships between actors within the locality does not encompass the key dynamics of 
governance. Stone argues that policy setting coalitions (urban regimes) fulfil a policy setting 
function which arises from the needs and aspirations of a community (1988: 89-90). In Atlanta, 
this is ajob that needs to be done locally. The evidence presented in this study suggests that the 
local policy setting function has not engendered and does not require a strong, locally based, 
policy coalition in the current political-institutional environment. Stoker argues that the 'new 
management' is prone to producing perverse effects which overwhelm or contradict the ambitions 
of reformers (I 997b: 8). Whether intentional or not, whether good or bad, limitations on the local 
governance capacity within challenge partnerships is predictable if they are analysed in terms of 
institutional design. 
This conclusion corresponds with Ward's speculation that SRB processes show spatial variation 
between 'regimes' to be 'impossible' (I 997b: 1503). Intuitively, as Lowndes et al (1998: 327) 
and Morgan et al (1999: 194) suggest, vertical networks are inimical to horizontal networks. In 
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1995, the CBI commented that private sector contributions to SRB partnerships had been poor 
throughout the country (CBI, 21.8.95). Ironically, the very structure of the SRB is one reason 
why that finding is replicated in this study four years on. Unsurprisingly, then, local governance 
capacity is most visible in initiatives which are furthest removed from central government 
influence. One answer, therefore, to Ward's quest for the abstract pre-conditions for regime 
governance (Ward, 1997b: 1494) is the rolling back of central government's influence on local 
political processes and the reconstitution of local institutions to facilitate local governance. 9 Elkin, 
elaborating his constitutive approach to political institutions, wams that too much central control 
over the finances of local government will inhibit the vital, deliberative city (I 987a: 177). Given 
that the institutions we build must in a sense contain the outcomes we wish to see, if the desired 
outcome is local stakeholder governance and local governance capacity, current institutional 
structures will have to be redesigned to facilitate local innovation and autonomous action. It is 
interesting, for example, that in the USA, while local governments are creatures of the state, they 
enjoy a great deal of practical autonomy, a point made by Stone in relation to education policy 
(Stone, 1998b: 2). 
Local institutional restructuring, as in regime theory, can only achieve so much. Sustainable, 
equitable local governance is also conditional on the sustainability ofthe market economy and on 
the capacity for local governance to unlock such potential as there may be for regeneration from 
within the locality. On the former point, however, as in regime theory, there are grounds for 
scepticism. Stakeholder partnerships may not be capable ofproducing equitable, sustainable, local 
governance, however well designed they are because 'the very workings of the political economy 
that serve to prompt the concern for reform will substantially impede it' (Elkin, 1987a: 181). 
Ultimately, if liberalism and democracy tend to undermine each other in the USA, rather than each 
standing in dynamic tension to the other, is the UK likely to be any different? 10 
9 See chapter 2. 
10 See chapter 2 for an evaluation of the way regime theory treats the question of liberal 
democracy. 
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Finally, there are empirical grounds to challenge the central logic of regime theory, that co- 
operation necessarily produces synergy. Stone (1988: 99) points to the potential for problems of 
this kind, commenting that in Atlanta, co-operation has given rise to controversy over conflicts 
of interest involving councillors and developers. Partnership can also produce negative synergy, 
thereby reducing governance capacity. It can be disabling as well as enabling and may not be 
instrumental in generating optimum outputs. In other words, there is a risk that partnership drives 
objectives instead of objectives driving partnership (Corry et al, 1997: 45). The evidence 
highlights the weakness of local partnership dynamics and practices, but it also provides a 
reminder that some things are done better by one organisation than by many, to use an old proverb 
'too many cooks spoil the broth'. Partnership can produce inertia, conflict and non-governance, 
which Stone (1989: 23 1) says, can occur in the absence of regime governance. Furthermore, 
partnerships not only engender resources, they require resources to sustain them (Huxham, 1996: 
177). Oatley and Lambert confirm the findings in this study, warning that there is a danger of 
'bidding fatigue' setting in as regeneration teams engage in endless and exhausting rounds of 
competitive bidding (1998: 121). Models, such as that developed by Stoker (Stoker and 
Mossberger, 1994) and by Bassett (1996) show that local governance is not necessarily a 
harmonious process. But the local governance debate, while recognising the potential for 
governance failure (Stoker, 1998b; Rhodes, 1999b), has underplayed the extent to which local 
governance itselfmay generate centrifugal, or fragmentary tendencies. Stone (1989: 236) pointed 
out that regime governance in the USA is difficult to build from scratch. The study shows that 
while partnership processes are common, local governance by partnership is not. The processes 
identified in this study support Stone's cautionary note, suggesting that typologies of regime 
governance in the UK may be premature, prescriptive or predictive rather than descriptive. As 
Harding observes: 
Urban studies ... might wittingly or unwittingly 
be conspiring in the representation of 
current events, trends and policies as if they were in some way natural and unavoidable, 
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Morgan et al go so far as to argue that extra-local influences are so powerful that the governing 
without govenunent thesis is a 'fatal conceit' (1999: 196). Stoker (I 998b: 24) argues, following 
his co-authored study of Detroit (Orr and Stoker, 1994) that governance failure is crucial to 
understanding the new world of governing. Scepticism about the quality and efficacy of local 
partnerships is similarly crucial. The characterisation of 'governance' developed by Rhodes 
(1996) is set out in chapter 3. This study advises caution in attributing the status of regime to 
local partnerships and, in doing so, it also suggests that 'governance' as characterised by Rhodes 
does not adequately capture the processes at work in local partnerships. " if governance is self- 
organizing autonomous networks which are able to resist central guidance (Rhodes, 1996: 667), 
the partnerships depicted in the case studies are not governance. As a contribution to the 
governance debate, therefore, this study throws doubt on just how far local governance beyond 
the world of contracts, boards and committees has developed. At the very least, it suggests that 
local governance is under-theorised, an issue addressed in the concluding sections of the chapter. 
The properties ofregime governance are compared with the findings in the case studies in Box 13. 
Explaining Urban Partnerships 
Thus, urban partnerships exhibit the characteristics of regime governance only at the margins, as 
Box 13 shows. But what is the nature ofthe explanation for these partnerships highlighted in this 
study? It remains to express the above conclusions as a set of independent variables and to 
compare the explanation with the hypotheses set out in Box 4 in chapter 3, although in doing this, 
the strength and generalizability of the claims made here are qualified. This approach represents 
a contribution at the intermediate level of theory building. It is a structure and agency approach 
in which it is assumed that social structures possess generative capacities (Wendt, 1987; 
Callinicos, 1987; Bhaskar, 1989; Hay, 1995; 1997). These structures are not considered to be 
static or unchanging, but the way that they are produced, sustained and changed lies beyond the 
scope of this study. The first step in identifying this explanation as a theory of local partnerships 
11 See chapter 3. 
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is to identify the variables involved and, where possible, to identify the relationship between them. 
A final evaluation of the contribution by regime theory to this study is then made. 
Explanatory Variables and Local Partnerships 
Whatever the external influences on local ideological development, the evidence suggests that 
local economic problems themselves stimulated partnership ideologies among local authority elites. 
Whereas economic decline is treated as an exogenous variable, the ideology of market 
development is characterised both as exogenous and endogenous. The study shows a greater pre- 
disposition toward this ideology in the areas where economic decline was most severe. The 
ideology of market led growth is thus an independent variable, (M). It is, in part, a response to 
local perceptions of economic decline (IVI). 12 Economic decline is a contextual variable having 
predictable, but not certain, effects. On balance, it precedes the ideology of market development. 
The ideology of market development, once developed, produced a logic of collaboration. 
However, the case of recalcitrant authorities shows how the development of this ideology did not 
necessarily precede partnerships. Partnership can be coerced externally and, where this occurs, 
the influence of government is independent variable 3 (IV3). Govenunent can also be IV4, 
exercising a more gentle regulatory role, influencing the trajectory ofpartnership practices through 
the incentive offunding and also through the raft ofpolicy initiatives emanating from the DETR- " 
So far as influence on business is concerned, IV2 and IV3 are marginal, whereas IV I and IV4 are 
more likely to be influential. Locally dependent businesses have an interest in reversing economic 
decline and governmental ideas and incentives can generate a commitment to partnership,, if it is 
seen to work. It has been suggested that the influence of economic globalization in the production 
of a global-local dialectic which in turn generates partnership activity was marginal, most salient 
in Hull. This variable, IV5, is weak but the supporting evidence suggests that it may be stronger 
12 Or the social effects commonly associated with economic decline. 
13 For the sake of simplicity, TECs are here characterised as government influence. 
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in larger places which are capable, pro-actively, of attempting to generate a global-local 
interface. 14 
At the operational level of partnership, the influence of government as IVs 3 and 4 diminishes. 
These partnerships tend to be driven by local objectives, established through often difficult 
negotiations among local actors. IV's I and 2 are, however, salient at the operational level in 
explaining the context, perceptions and actions of local agents in initiatives as diverse as venture 
companies and education business links. Three further independent variables can be identified at 
this level, which could have an impact on both local government and the business sector. The 
evidence suggests that the practice of partnership in challenge fund initiatives generates a deeper 
ideological commitment to collaboration, facilitating partnership penetration into broader areas 
of local governance activity. This factor, while lacking much evidence to support the claim, is 
characterised as independent variable 6. IV6, partnership practice, results in the diflusion and the 
penetration of partnership ideologies throughout organisations and within the consciousness of 
individual elite actors. This variable might also be characterised as 'social capital' in accordance 
with Stone's definition which suggests that small scale instances of co-operative action can nurture 
habits of reciprocity and trust (I 998d: 267). " Operational partnerships themselves can take on 
the characteristic of an independent variable (IV7) in relation to the generation of project 
initiatives and outcomes. They are indicative of local autonomy and of local governance capacity 
in relation to small opportunities and achievements, such as port promotions, image building and 
curriculum development, which could not be attained without collaboration. Partnership activity 
therefore has a generative effect at two levels, IV6 as partnership practice (inputs) and IV7 as 
14 The variable was weak both in relation to the practice of Partnership and evidence of 
a local ideology of global-localisation Only one participant conceptualised relationships in this 
way (HERCCS,, 22.1.99). 
15 Where social capital is defined as the ability to gain social ends by co-operation, with 
minimal reliance on direct Payments or coercion (Stone, 1998c: 268). Stone further notes that 
interpersonal social capital - good personal relationships - does not necessarily translate into group 
social capital - civic capacity (1998c: 268). The claim by the Leader of NELC (12.6.98a) that, 
while relationships with business are good, business puts little into the local community is a good 
illustration of this point. 
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governance outputs from those initiatives. Finally, independent variable 8 (IV8) represents 
interdependence analogous to that in regime theory, which may arise from the process of 
partnership. IV8 is therefore an outcome of partnership processes, a stimulus to new or continued 
partnership processes. New partnership activities may become core governance activities, 
requiring the sustenance of co-operation if they are to continue. Image building in Hull may be 
an example of a core governance activity which could not proceed further without sustained 
collaboration between business and local authority. 
It remains to account for factors preventing partnership development, or the development of 
governance capacity with partnerships. The ninth independent variable (M) is that of 
endogenous conflict. It is a counterfactual to partnership dynamics, showing how the structural 
dynamics operating in the locality do not have a determinate, or a necessary impact on local 
agents. The process of partnership itself (IV6) may augment this counterfactual. by 
institutionalising conflicts and inertia, with governance enabled only by partnership fragmentation. 
The final negative variables preventing partnerships from generating governance capacity are 
IV3/4, the government programme in its guise as an inhibiting influence on partnership agendas 
and institutions. IV9 is the negative synergy in collaboration. Cropper (1996: 82) argues that the 
survival of alliances depends on their ability to create and to command value and the case studies 
illustrate the wisdom in this simple point. Negative synergy produces fragmentation. This 
perspective goes further than the claim made in regime theory, that collaboration is hard to build 
and sustain, arguing in addition that collaboration, once achieved, can be a cause of governance 
failure. 
As stated above, this is a theory of structure and agency which shows the extent to which actors 
have the capacity to mediate structural pressures and, through the practices they adopt, to 
generate new structures whose effects have also to be mediated in the action of agents. Stone's 
argument (1989) was that agents and structures have a reciprocal action on one another. In this 
study, the evidence suggested that although the impact of supra-local structures on each locality 
is different, the supra-local structures themselves are relatively constant. The question of how far 
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localities in combination affect these structures, through media such as the LGA and the CBI, is 
beyond the scope of this project but as was noted in chapter 1, extra-local influences may not be 
constant or immutable. Stone's assumption that local agents can change structures at the margins 
makes more sense applied to IVs 6 to 8. These variables do not exist in any determinate 
relationship to one another, they can co-exist in a process of 'structuring'. But they can be 
perceived as the outcome of independent variables I to 5 and the different ways in which these 
factors are realised in the locality. Factors such as economic decline, government influence and 
local political interpretations of local problems cannot be assumed to be permanent. In their 
absence, IVs 6 to 8 may, themselves, prove capable of sustaining partnership working. They are 
endogenous in character, dependent on the local agents through which they are constituted. IV9 
is also a local variable, indicating that whatever the exogenous and endogenous factors explaining 
positive moves toward partnership, fragmentary pressures are still capable of manifesting 
themselves. 
This is not, strictly speaking, a process of structuration, where supra-local structures are altered 
by the local structures they generate, but of structural mediation, where, in Bhaskar's terms, 
explanatory factors are tendencies in things (social structures) which may be 'possessed 
unexercised and exercised unrealised' as well as 'realized unperceived by people'. Hence, to 
attribute structural capacity, or 'transfactual activity' to a social mechanism is not to make a claim 
about the outcome of processes, just as gravity may not be realized given the counterforpe of 
momentum (Bhaskar, 1989: 9-10). One can add to this point that structural capacities vary. 
Hence, in relation to local politics, variables I to 5 are 'hard' non-malleable supra-local structures, 
where as variables 6 to 9 are '-soft', in the sense that they are constituted locally. The situation 
described here bears out Stone's argument that changes occur at the margins of enduring 
relationships (1989: 10). However, the endogenous structures exhibited no obvious influence on 
the exogenous structures. Hence,, the question of whether a new dynamic or process of 
structuration will emerge in the relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables, 
resulting in greater autonomy for local partnerships, is an issue for future studies. 
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It is accepted, then, that independent variables do not have an invariant impact. Is it possible, 
though, to make any further generalizations about the relationship between the extra-local 
variables themselves from the empirical material presented in this study? The problem of 
apprehending the relationship between different structures is described by Wendt as the 'structure- 
structure problem' (1987: 368). As Becker puts it, what is the 'conjunctural' relationship between 
the variables (1992: 206)? The anatomy of the extra-local variables has not, to emphasise the 
point, been explored. However, it is taken for granted here that independent variables produce 
one another. Thus, variable X only has an effect if variable Y is present. Otherwise, X will have 
no effect. If, for example, variable X is economic decline, this will have no effect if variable Y, 
an ideology of partnership, is not present. Finally, the isolation and ordering of explanatory 
variables is not intended to convey the impression that this analysis is intentionally exclusive, or 
that it claims to be 'forensic' in character. To re-emphasise the point made in chapter I in 
conclusion, the relationship between variables is fluid, the realisation of variables is uncertain and 
the findings made here do not preclude the existence of other variables which either support or 
contradict them. Box 14 summarises the explanation for urban partnerships offered in this study. 
Local Governance and Regime Theory Re-visited 
Where, then, do these findings stand in relation to regime theory? It was argued in chapter 3 that 
a test of regime theory in the very different conditions of the UK would be a futile exercise and 
consequently no attempt has been made to make regime theory fit the facts. The findings tend to 
justify this approach in themselves. Even if regime theory were abridged to the claim that 
collaboration between local organisations is necessary for the production of governance, many of 
the facts presented here would contradict it. There are three levels at which regime theory does 
not work for the analysis of local partnerships. First, the nature of the explanation is itself very 
different. As Boxes 13 and 14 show, there are similarities between the independent variables 
generating regime governance and those generating partnerships, but the process tends to be 
driven by extra-local factors rather than by an internal dynamic. Second, local partnerships cannot, 
by and large, be characterised as regime governance. Hence, and third, this explanation is not only 
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very different from the regime theory, it is not a regime theory either. The explanation is also very 
limited in ways which regime theory is not. It is conceptually sparse, given the richness of the 
regime theory outlined in chapter 2. It does not, for example, offer an alternative paradigm 
statement concerning the nature of liberal democratic societies and it does not theorise the 
motivations driving human behaviour. Furthermore, the applicability of the variables identified 
will vary much more dramatically from place to place than do those found in regime theory. Given 
that different findings can be expected in places of different sizes with different political and 
economic characteristics, this study is more robust in analysing Labour authorities beset with 
economic problems than in determining the universal relevance of particular variables to British 
local governance. It is not possible to say that any of the independent variables will be realised 
in every local authority area in the UK and nor is it possible to say that alternative variables do not 
influence local tendencies to produce, or not to produce, partnerships. Whether, for example, this 
explanation works in regional centres like Leeds (John and Cole, 1998) and Manchester (Cochrane 
et al, 1996), or in global cities such as London, New York and Tokyo (Sassen, 199 1), cannot be 
determined from this study, though the contrasts between Hull and the other cases is indicative 
of potential differences based on size. It is likely, for example, given the constant political and 
fiscal environment in which local authorities operate, that central government will still be a key 
influence through its many local initiatives (see Appendix 3), but the dynamics of global- 
localisation may be very different, given the potential in cities for image building programmes 
internationally and for integrating 'big-hitters' from multi-national corporations into local 
governance activities. 
Yet, it will be apparent that the study has been strongly influenced by regime theory, interpreted 
as a theory of public-private collaboration. Without the ideas expressed in regime theory the 
questions of why, in what ways and with what effect local government and business collaborate 
would not have been formulated in the same way. Without the conceptual lens offered by regime 
theory, it would have been much more difficult to develop an alternative framework which 
contrasts the partnerships found in the case studies with the mode of governance in Dallas and 
Atlanta. Without the notion in regime theory that regime governance is difficult to build, it would 
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have proved more difficult to get across the point that sustained governing networks comprising 
public and private actors within and across broad policy arenas are likely to remain a rarity in 
British local governance. It is useful simply because it facilitates understanding of how 
partnerships represent a different mode of governance from regimes and why, in the absence of 
local interdependence, partnership working does not produce regime governance. At the same 
time, without regime theory, the question would not now be asked about whether the fragmentary 
governance processes identified in the study might represent a trend, which could grow and 
generalise within and across local policy arenas and, if they do, what the public-private sector 
dynamic might be like in such a situation. Regime theory, therefore, is useful merely because it 
necessitates comparison between different systems of local governance and because this 
comparison shows that British local governance is still not very much like that in America. If its 
explanatory capacity is limited here, its capacity to generate contrasts, theoretical and empirical, 
is immense. It is possible, therefore, to learn as much from challenging an approach as from 
substantiating it. 
Reconceptualizing Local Governance: Decentralization as A Policy Instrument 
It is all very well to highlight what an explanation is not, but more difficult to identify what it is. 
This section locates the account developed in this chapter within the 'governance' debate, using 
it to question the relevance of the governance thesis as characterised by Rhodes. " The fmal 
section concludes the study by evaluating the implications of this debate for the ftu-ther study of 
local governance in the UK. 
It has been found that certain government initiatives, notably challenge schemes, inhibit local 
governance capacity, a conclusion also drawn by other scholars (Lowndes et al, 1998, Morgan 
et al, 1999). Expressed simply, this finding is suggestive of a situation in which there is a 
contradiction, or a 'dialectic', between partnership as one mode of governance and the 
autonomous self-governing network as another. How, then, can the role of central government 
16 See chapter 3. 
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be assessed in the production of this contradiction? Stoker (1 998c: 49) asks whether it is possible 
for elected officials to exercise some control over the 'Partnership networks' constituting local 
governance. To the extent that central government policy is developed by elected politicians, the 
answer must be 'yes' because local flagship partnerships and area strategies tend to reflect central 
political influences, sometimes down to the level of individual projects. If the influence of the 
centre is indeed as strong as the case studies suggest it is, it can be contended that its influence is 
expanding, not contracting, vis a vis the locality. In this environment, it seems reasonable to 
characterise these partnerships as implementation agencies for central government. " These local 
partnerships are powerful implementation tools, responsible for 'bending' central government 
initiatives to local circumstances (see Brookes, 1999: 46). This interpretation is supported by the 
government's wish that SRB Round 5 bids must work with the 'grain' of a plethora of regional 
and national policies and programmes (DETR, September 1998: 7) and by the LGA's New 
Commitment to Regeneration initiative, which seeks to ensure that central government funding 
streams are sensitised better to local circumstances through strong central-local and local-local 
partnerships (LGA, 2 April 1998). 
This process, while it is not a partnership of equals, cannot be dismissed as the domination of one 
level of government over another. It is more subtle than that. It is not only about bringing local 
government and business together to engender local entrepreneurialism (DoE, 13.6.95), it is about 
drawing local stakeholders, including business, into supporting and carrying out the government's 
agenda for regeneration in the locality. " It could prove, for example, to be a subtle way for 
government to gain influence over the market through winning the private sector to its view of 
regeneration, as well as being a means to marketize local politics. As was suggested in chapter 
3, government advice plays an important role by incorporating partnership activists into the 
'linguistic market and products which dominate urban regeneration, creating an appreciation of 
17 Although this designation is not intended to rule out the possibility that they may fulfil 
other roles too. 
18 This point is given implicit support by John and Cole (1998: 3 84), who argue of Leeds 
that due to new interdependencies, local business is 'more subject to the balance of public 
decisions than before'. 
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what is appropriate and likely to be valued' (Atkinson, 1999: 67). Partnership, therefore, is as 
much about bringing other groups into partnership with the state as it is about bringing local 
'stakeholders' into partnership with each other. In a sense, this process is the institutionalisation 
of civil society, blurring the edges between state and non-state institutions (see Stoker, 1998c: 
46). '9 Partnerships are not, strictly speaking, organs of the state, they are policy instruments 
(Peters, 1998; Pierre, 1998b). Rhodes' concept of the 'hollowing out of the state' identifies one 
aspect of governance as the loss of functions by the centre to alternative delivery systems, often 
involving a distinction between policy and administration; and another as the reduced capacity of 
the centre to steer (I 999a: xxiii). The processes discussed here represent a form of 'hollowing 
out' insofar as central government has, since the early 1990s, delegated responsibilities for 
economic regeneration to the locality. 20 But this is a very particular form of hollowing out, in 
which the state effectively retains its institutional capacity, though this is disseminated within 
hundreds of different institutions in the locality. There is a paradoxical process ofdecentralization 
and centralization going on in which the delegation of new responsibilities to the locality for 
regeneration simultaneously acts as a regulatory mechanism on the local policy agenda and on the 
range of local institutions involved with it. The state therefore has increased rather than reduced 
its capacity to steer. It may be relinquishing direct control to a limited extent, but in doing so, it 
is purchasing wider effective control, an ability to manage, influence and manipulate policy arenas 
and institutions more effectively. In short, it is purchasing new institutional capacity in the 
locality. 
19 Where civil societY is defined as that which exists outside the formal-legal institutions 
of the state. 
20 The 'hollowing out of the state' refers to: privatization and limiting the scope and 
forms of public intervention; loss of functions by central and local government departments to 
alternative delivery systems, the loss of functions by Britain to the European Union; and limits to 
the discretion of public servants through the new public management with its emphasis on 
accountability and clearer political control through a distinction between politics and 
administration (Rhodes, 1996: 661). 
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This account is agnostic as to how far this process has gone, to whether it is intentional and as to 
its likely outcomes. " It is, therefore, partly hypothetical and partly descriptive. These processes 
may be accidental, they may be part of a cohesive strategy, or they may be the preferred direction 
of individuals within government. But, given the limitations ofbusiness involvement in challenge 
partnerships, if attempts are being made to mobilise non-state actors to implement a state agenda, 
the process has not so far been very successful in this regard. The harmonization of local policy 
agendas with those of government and the incorporation of local stakeholders who agree with 
these agendas as abstract statements is not, as has been argued, the same as the agreement of more 
concrete priorities or of interorganisational responsibilities for particular activities. It does not, 
furthermore, guarantee the desired regeneration outputs. 
In summary, this exposition has generated two propositions: that the decentralising or regulatory 
state is also an acquisitive state; and that the hollowing out of the state does not necessarily result 
in governance, understood as networks. " The core theoretical statement of this study, therefore, 
is that the mode of governance we are currently seeing is the re-distribution and the enhancement, 
not the surrender, of the institutional capacities of the state. It is therefore a challenge to the 'fatal 
conceit' of governance theory (Morgan et al, 1999: 196) and it represents a contribution to the 
diverse body of literature produced by scholars who can be categorized as 'governance sceptics'. ' 
Conclusion: Implications for the Further Study of Local Governance 
What, then, are the implications of these conclusions for the study of local governance? This 
study has identified key processes which have led local authority elites to pursue a collaborative 
agenda with the business sector in their quest for resources and for the successful regeneration of 
21 Richard Caborn accepted that there may be an element of this intent in Government 
policy (DETR, 7.7.99). 
22 The first proposition is lent added credibility by Harding's perception that the state 
now plays an enhanced role in relation to the response by cities and regions to globalizing forces 
(1997: 308). 
23 See Painter, (1996), Harding (1997), Harding and Le Gales (1998) and Strom (1996). 
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their communities. It also suggested an element of discontent within Labour elites and 
backbenchers. This discontent may be passive and relatively inarticulate at present, but changes, 
including renewed economic difficulties or dissatisfaction with 'New Labour' among its 
backbenchers and within local communities, could act as a counter-weight against business 
involvement in local governance. As was noted in chapter 1, there may be a tendency for local 
actors to exaggerate the extent of partnership to appease central govenunent (Stoker, 1999) and 
it is plausible that even this sceptical study could overestimate the embeddedness of partnership 
practices. Unlike the more extreme post-Fordist analyses (Mayer, 1994), 'governance' is not 
considered to be an irreversible element ofthe local institutional landscape, particularly given the 
questionable added value of the approach and the absence of collaborative commitment from the 
business sector. Partnership is the buzz word of the 1990s, first as an ideology of market driven 
growth (Bailey et al, 1995; Oatley, 1998), and latterly as a broader ideology of community 
governance (DETR, 25.3.99). Harding (1998: 87) believes that the 'partnership movement' will 
continue to 'gain strength' in the 'coming period. But there is no compelling reason why his 
prediction will come true unless partnerships succeed in generating higher levels of 'stakeholder' 
activism and in delivering clear and sustainable improvements in the lives of local people. 
A key conclusion from this study, then, is not just that partnerships as a mode of governance are 
distinctive from regime governance as self-governing networks, but also that the dynamics which 
produce partnerships can undermine local potential for regime governance. In this sense, elements 
of the two processes are mutually exclusive. The processes described here do not seem to be 
adequately captured either by the traditional use of the term 'government', or by the narrow 
characterisation of governance as autonomous,, self-governing networks. They are suggestive of 
the need for a better distinction between different kinds of governance in future studies. 
Governance, particularly, does not adequately express the possibility that the abandonment of 
formal control by state institutions can result in increased effective control of sub-national political 
processes, impeding local networking. " Since governance by partnership and governance by 
24 Peters recognises this possibility, arguing that partnerships might result in the 
subversion ofprivate sector goals 'in the name of achieving broad public sector goals' (1998: 29). 
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regime partly contradict one another, the following distinction between types made in Box 15 
cannot be viewed as a continuum in which 'partnership governance' is, necessarily, a step toward 
4 regime governance'. In fact, the logic of the preceding arguments is that the partnership mode 
of governance is more an aspect of government than it is an aspect of regime, or network, 
governance. This too is a perspective that future studies of governance could consider. 
i 
(Government Partnership Governance Regime Governance 
----------------------------- -------- 4- - ------------------ 
High level of decisional autonomy Local collaborative institutions as Local political autonomy and I- 
for the legal institutions of bearers of government agenda. collaborative syner generated in 
ovemment. Few interfaces Little local autonomy or coherent, su 
ley, 
seI f- 
etween local 'stakeholders'. collaborative synergy. organising networks of local 
'stakeholders'. 
Box 15: Distinguishing Between Government, Partnership and Regime 
These conclusions show that research which looks for 'Stonean' regimes is likely to be just as 
fruitless as the characterisation of any partnership as 'regime' or as 'governance'. Such 
approaches to research are likely to obscure more than they reveal about different influences, 
trends and processes on and within the locality. Second, the conclusions suggest that locally 
centred studies in the UK, more than in the USA where local governance processes are stronger,, 
will be distorted if they do not take account of extra-local factors. The fact that partnerships are 
epiphenomenal as governance capacity does not mean that local studies are not valid, or 
potentially fruitful in identifying interesting processes and phenomena. But it does mean that 
extra-local processes, particularly the role of central government, remain critical to a rounded 
understanding of local politics. The closer local government is to being a 'district of central 
government', says Daland, the more trivial it will be in explaining local political outcomes 
(Daland, 1969: 20). Hence, locally based research into the partnership mode of governance needs 
to be embedded in a set of problematized or a priori assumptions about the influence of extra- 
local factors on the local processes concerned (Wendt, 1987). 
It is far from certain that the partnership agenda is beneficial to local people or efficacious in 
mobilising local stakeholders. This factor in itself is suggestive of another empirical route for 
research into the perception and impact of partnerships beneath institutional elites. Is it credible 
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to suggest that the raft of initiatives designed to modernise local government (DETR, 30.7.98) and 
to bring about community governance (DETF, 25.3.99) will do more than institutionalise a 
different kind of elite governance, unless the process of modernisation delivers tangible results, 
measurable against the ambitious strategic objectives in local regeneration agendas? Isitnottrue 
that participation in governance processes requires optimism, not only that elites will implement 
the popular will, but that participation will actually serve to bring about a better future? 
Finally, this study has tried to steer clear of normative questions, but there are normative agendas 
which follow from these conclusions and from questioning the credibility of the present 
government's strategy for community governance (DETR, 25.3.99). At the end of the 1990s, the 
question remains unanswered as to whether we want governance by autonomous networks of elite 
politicians, businessmen and other community and voluntary sector leaders. Ifwe do, the question 
has yet to be answered as to how these networks can be brought into being and made accountable 
to local people. Furthermore, does the finding that the potential for regime governance is visible 
only in fragmentary initiatives suggest that the government agenda for partnerships is too 
ambitious? Perhaps government ought then to draw lessons from Stone's perception that 
collaboration is about small opportunities. For those of us who see this kind of governance as 
undesirable, the question equally remains as to what the alternatives might be for generating 
active, democratic participation by a majority of local people, and what means can be found to 
achieve it. Iftraditional representative mechanisms do not work and we do not want partnerships 
and networks, then what do we want, and how can we bring it about? 
In a policy environment where localities are bombarded with new initiatives from government and 
where change still proceeds apace after twenty years, this study probably serves better as an 
evaluation of the legacy of Conservative govenunent than as a pointer to the institutional 
landscape post-Blair. It is highly likely, therefore, that the issues this study addresses and the 
questions it poses will remain on the agenda of scholars, politicians and activists well into the next 
century. 
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Appendix 1. A List of Interviews Undertaken in the Course 
of the Study 
13.6.95 Andrew Lean, Regeneration Policy Branch, Department of the Environment 
21.8.95 Benjamin Seyd, Adviser, Industrial Policy Group, Confederation of British Industry 
31.3-98 Alan Carruthers, Chief Executive, Rotherharn Metropolitan Borough Council 
31.3.98 Tony Preston, Research and Design Unit Manager, Culture and Leisure Services, 
Rotherharn Metropolitan Borough Council 
2.4.98 Alison Biddulph, Team Leader, South Yorkshire Regeneration Team, Government 
Office for Yorkshire and the Humber 
3.4.98 David Curry MP, fonner Minister for Local Govemment, Housing and Urban 
Regeneration (July 1994 - May 1997) 
16.4.98 Councillor Pat Doyle, Leader, Kingston upon Hull City Council 
21.4.98 Councillor Keith Billington, Leader, Rotherharn Metropolitan Borough Council 
21.4.98 Steve Wright, Head of Economic Development, Rotherham Metropolitan Borough 
Council 
28.4.98 Barrie Matterson, Regeneration Manager, Hull CityVision 
28.4.98 Mark Jones, Business Initiatives Manager, Hull Economic Development Agency, 
Kingston upon Hull City Council 
28.4.98 Denise Anderton, Challenge Fund 2 Programme Manager, Hull CityVision 
6.5.98 Rachel Heatley, Director, Development Programme Area, Barnsley Metropolitan 
Borough Council 
12.5.98 Tony Clarke, Partnership Manager, Rotherham Economic Partnership 
8.6.98 Helen Wilson, Head ofEconomic Development and Tourism, North East Lincolnshire 
Council 
8.6.98 Ian Bolton, Deputy Chief Executive, North East Lincolnshire Council 
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8.6.98 Councillor Peter Wheatley, Chair of Development Services Programme Area 
Committee 
9.6.98 Peter Johnson, Director, Deame Valley Partnership 
9.6.98 Peter Nettleton, Community Regeneration Programme Director5 Rotherham 
Metropolitan Borough Council 
10.6.98 John Woodside, Head of Special Programmes, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough 
Council 
10.6.98 Councillor Steve Houghton, Leader, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
12.6.98 Councillor Muriel Barker, Leader of North East Lincolnshire Council 
12.6.98 Roy Bentham, Chief Executive, North East Lincolnshire Council 
22.7.98 John Shaddock, Head of Strategic Management, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough 
Council 
4.9.98 Hector Birdwisa, Executive Vice President, Koyo Bearings (Europe) Ltd 
15.9.98 Jeff Pickering, Economic Development Manager, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough 
Council 
29.9.98 Kevin Bennett, Regeneration Manager, Barnsley and Doncaster Training and 
Enterprise Council 
21.10.98 (Barnsley Miller Partnership), Nigel Cunis, General Manager, Barnsley Miller 
Partnership Ltd 
22.10.98 Alistair Petrie, Managing Director, Kostal UK Ltd 
22.10.98 Frank Carter, Chairman and Managing Director, Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd 
26.10.98 Alan Sheriff, Chairman, Barnsley Business Education Partnership 
26.10.98 Linda Smith, Manager, Barnsley Business Education Partnership 
25.11.98 Richard Poundford, Director, 
7.12.98 Steve Hanstock, Team Manager, Rotherharn Education Business Links 
7.12.98 Yolande Tose, Work Experience Coordinator, Rotherham Education Business Links 
7.12.98 Rex Carter, Housing Area Programme Director, Rotherham Metropolitan Borough 
Council 
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15.12-98 Martin Liddament, Head of Corporate Affairs, Yorkshire and Humberside 
Development Agency 
17-12-98 Ian Fisher, Chairman of Rotherham Economic Partnership 
6.1.99 Dr Giles Bloomer, Chairman, Aizlewoods Building Materials 
19.1.99 Graham Fisher, Head of Contracts and Education, Rotherham Chamber of Commerce, Training and Enterprise 
22.1.99 John Lewis, Head of Economic Regeneration, Rotherharn Chamber of Commerce, 
Training and Enterprise 
22.1.99 Ian Kelly, ChiefExecutive, Hull and East Riding Chamber of Connnerce and Shipping 
22.1.99 Councillor Terry Sharman, Chairman of Education Committee, Rotherham 
Metropolitan Borough Council 
12.2.99 Don Turner, Managing Director of British Steel Engineering Steels 
16.2.99 Peter Roberts, Regeneration Manager, North East Lincolnshire Council 
17.2.99 Julian Wild, Company Secretary, Northern Foods 
5.3.99 John Perkins, Head ofEconomic Development, Humberside Training and Enterprise 
Council 
10.3.99 George Robinson, Deputy Port Manager and with Ingrid Davies, Business and 
Development Manager, Port of Hull, Associated British Ports 
12.3.99 Dennis Dunn, Regional Ports Manager, Associated British Ports East Coast 
15.3.99 Roger Norrington, Regional Manager, Birds Eye Walls 
15.3.99 David Hawkins, Site Director, Smith & Nephew Wound Management Division 
18.3.99 Trevor Barningham, Executive Director, Humberside Training and Enterprise Council 
18.3.99 Keith Saveal, Chief Executive, Novartis Grimsby 
22.3.99 Professor Graham Chesters, Chairman of -CityLearning and Director of the Institute 
of Learning, University of Hull 
22.3.99 Neil English, UK Sales Manager, Sumitomo Heavy Industries Cyclo Drive (Europe) 
8.4.99 Ivan Hinchliffe, Inward Investment and Marketing Manager, North East Lincolnshire 
Council 
8.4.99 Kate Walker, Sector Initiatives Officer,, North East Lincolnshire Council 
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6.5.99 Telephone John Miller, SRB Team Leader, Yorkshire Forward (Regional 
Development Agency for Yorkshire and Humberside) 
14.5.99 Peter Roberts, Regeneration Manager, North East Lincolnshire Council 
17.5.99 Ian Bolton, Deputy Chief Executive, North East Lincolnshire Council 
17.5.99 Peter Lacey, Deputy Director of Education, North East Lincolnshire Council 
17.5.99 Angie Butler, Principal Education Officer, Continuing Education and Training, North 
East Lincolnshire Council 
20.5.99 Robert Smith, Site Director, 
21.5.99 Peter Aukett, Site Director, Synthomer Ltd 
2.7.99 Deborah Law, Business in the Community 
5.7.99 Jane Ritchie, Secretary, National EBP Network 
7.7.99 Richard Cabom MP,, Minister of State for the Regions, Regeneration and Planning 
20.7.99 Scott Wood, Manager, Manufacturing Systems, H&W Systems 
21.7.99 Gordon Firth, President, Bamsley Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
22.7.99 Ellen Cockburn, Personnel Executive, Northern Foods 
22.7.99 Mike Smith, Head of Customer Services, South Yorkshire Transport (Chairman of 
Rotherharn Business Education Advisory Group) 
27.7.99 Jon Till, Marketing Director, Hull City1mage 
27.7.99 Simon Gardner, Deputy Director of Education, Kingston upon Hull City Council 
27.7.99 Eric Reed, Assistant Director of Learning Services, Kingston upon Hull City Council 
3.8.99 Graham Sinclair, Principal Education Office for Policy Development and Planning, 
Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council 
5.8.99 John Edwards OBE, Chief Executive, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
5.8.99 Mr R Watson, Managing Director, Keepmoat Holdings plc 
6.8.99 Ian Crookharn, Chief Executive, Kingston upon Hull City Council 
12.8.99 Jeff Catterick, Office Manager, Eimskip UK 
13.8.99 Heather Scott, Chief Education Adviser, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
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20.8.99 Telephone Tony Clarke, fonner Training Manager, Northern Foods 
20.8-99 Councillor Jim Mulgrove, Cabinet Member for Regeneration and Sustainability, 
Kingston upon Hull City Council 
25.8.99 Pauline Harness, President, Hull and Humber Chamber of Commerce and Shipping 
3.9-99 Allan Gray, Heads of Work Related Learning, Barnsley Metropolitan Borough 
Council 
27.9.99 Martin Hinnegan, Business Services Manager, Huntsman Tioxide 
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Appendix 2. Sample Questionnaires 
This Appendix contains four representative sample questionnaires, one each for central 
government, local government, local business and local TEC. The samples chosen are indicative 
of the questions asked in all interviews, but sometimes questionnaires differed according to prior 
knowledge gained from other sources and according to the expertise each individual was known 
to possess. Attached are the questions asked of Richard Cabom MP, Alan Carruthers, Chief 
Executive of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, Don Turner, Managing Director of 
British Steel Engineering Steels, and Trevor Barningham, Executive Director of Humberside TEC. 
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Questions for Richard Caborn MP, Minister of State for the Regions, 
Regeneration and Planning, Wednesday 7 July at 17: 30 
How would you sum up the difference in approach to local partnerships between this government 
and the last? 
Is there a preferred model for local regeneration partnerships, for example, arms length flagship 
partnerships linked to holistic area regeneration strategies? 
Do you feel that relatively formal partnerships with visible decision making processes are better 
than informal co-operation and networking procedures? 
What kind of relationship do you perceive between economic and social regeneration initiatives? 
For example, some participants in my research feel that their prospects for economic regeneration 
are remote and, for that reason, that linking the social agenda to economic regeneration could be 
counterproductive. Do you agree? 
To what extent do you think that we are living in an era where the capacity of central government 
to make a difference in economic development is diminishing, with a direct relationship emerging 
between cities and towns on one hand and 'global' capital on the other? 
Do you think, to the extent they exist, that national government may be compensating for these 
tendencies by using local partnerships as policy instruments or as implementation agencies, 
through which it can continue to exercise influence it may otherwise lose? 
How much influence does/should government exercise on the locality through various funding 
streams, incentives and penalties? 
And how much autonomy do you think that local partnerships have/should have to develop 
regeneration strategies and objectives which may not accord with those of central government? 
At a practical level, my research suggests that local synergy in regeneration partnerships is 
sometimes inhibited due to the prescriptive and bureaucratic nature ofthe SRB and other funding 
mechanisms. Do you accept criticism of this nature and, if so, can the problems it highlights be 
overcome? 
What is the ideal role for the business sector in the process of local governance and in local policy 
development? 
Why do you think it has been difficult in some areas to draw business into partnership? 
Do you think that local partnerships have brought added value to the regeneration process? 
Are there some areas in which partnerships have not been conducive to good local governance? 
Do you perceive a potential conflict between the concepts of best value and partnership? 
Are there other questions which you feel that this kind of research could usefully address? 
Do you have any other comments you would like to make? 
329 
Questions for Alan Carruthers, Chief Executive, Rotherham Metropolitan 
Council, 31 March 1998 at 10: 00 
Who are the key actors in the governance of Rotherham? 
What do you understand 'partnership' to mean in the context ofpublic-private relationships at the 
local scale? 
What factors - individuals, institutions or events - have influenced your attitude to working with 
the private sector? 
In what kinds of partnerships is Rotherharn involved with the private sector? 
How important is networking compared with formal partnership structures? 
Are there special or local factors which affect the Council's relationship with the private sector? 
Do you know how long Rotherham has been involved in partnership initiatives? 
What are the oldest/most recent partnership initiatives of which you are aware? 
What are the key factors motivating Rotherharn (and local authorities more generally) to 
participate in public-private partnerships? 
What role does business play in partnerships with this authority? 
Have relationships with the private sector changed for better or worse in the time you have been 
working with the Authority? 
What does the private sector bring to the partnership table? 
What factors encourage businesses to participate in partnerships with local authorities? 
What discourages them? 
Are there any businesses with which the Council has Proved unable to secure partnerships? 
Is partnership in Rotherharn dependent on governmental initiatives? 
What has partnership achieved which could not otherwise have been achieved with adequate 
resources for local government. 
Can you identify partnership effects in Rotherham? 
Have you developed any indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of partnerships? 
Are there tensions or conflicts between partners in Rotherham? 
Are partnerships more important in some policy arenas than in others? 
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Will the Regional Development Agency require Rotherharn to change its approach to partnership 
working? 
Can partnership succeed in bringing about the regeneration of Rotherharn? 
What is the key to successful regeneration in Rotherham? 
Are there other questions which you would like to see academic research of this nature address? 
Which other people should I speak to and which documents should I look at in relation to any of 
these questions? 
Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
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Questions for Don Turner, Managing Director, British Steels Engineering 
Steels, Friday 12 February 1999 at 11: 00 
Does the concept of globalization mean anything for your business? 
How far is your company dependent on the resources available to you in Rotherham - for 
supplies, for labour and for markets? 
How would you describe relationships between the Council and the business sector in Rotherham? 
What do you understand the term public-private partnership to mean? 
How and why did you become involved in partnership working? 
In what kind of relationships with the Council are you involved? 
How important is networking compared with formal partnership structures? 
Is it possible to detect a change or a trend in local authority relationships with the private sector 
since you have been working in Rotherham? 
Is there a 'culture' of partnership working in Rotherham? 
Would partnerships survive if external funding such as the SRB were allocated directly to the 
Council? 
What role do you play in partnerships? 
What do you and your business bring to the table? 
Does your company have a policy toward partnership working? 
What factors encourage business participation in partnership? 
What factors discourage business participation in partnership? 
Has partnership increased the level of influence enjoyed by the private sector over the local 
government policy agenda? 
What do you see as the role of the Rotherham Economic Partnership? 
Is it effective? 
What has the partnership achieved for Rotherham which could not otherwise have been achieved? 
Can you identify 'partnership effects' in Rotherham? 
Are there tensions or conflicts between partners in Rotherham? 
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Will the Regional Development Agency require Rotherham to change its approach to partnership 
working? 
Did the establishment ofthe National Non Domestic Rate help the process ofpartnership building? 
Do you think that re-localisation of the business rate would affect partnership working? 
Can local partnership succeed in bringing about the regeneration of Rotherharn? 
What is the key to successful regeneration in Rotherharn? 
Are there other questions which you would like to see academic research of this nature address? 
VVhich other people should I speak to and which documents should I look at in relation to any of 
these questions? 
Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
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Questions for Trevor Barningham, Executive Director, Humberside Training 
and Enterprise Council, 18 March 1999 at 13: 00 
What is your role with Humberside TEC? 
In which Partnerships with North East Lincolnshire are you involved? 
Do you think that Humberside TEC has been successful in drawing the private sector in to public- 
private partnerships? 
Can you give me an example? 
How would you describe quality of partnerships between the Council and the business sector in 
North East Lincolnshire? 
How important is networking as opposed to more formal partnership processes? 
The North East Lincolnshire Partnership was recently subjected to criticism by the Government 
Office for Yorkshire and Humberside. What do you think was behind this criticism and how will 
it be addressed? 
Does North East Lincolnshire benefit or lose out from the absence of a CityVision type 
partnership? 
Will they be forced down this route? 
Has unitary status affected working relationships between the TEC and the Council? 
How is the Humberside Partnership funded and governed? 
How do education business partnerships organised at the sub regional level work in the locality? 
How does the EBP/Humberside Partnership relate to CityVision and to CityLearning in Hull? 
What are the current difficulties you are experiencing with the partnership and how can these be 
resolved? 
Does the private sector have any input into determining the aims, objectives and strategies for 
education business links? 
Who are the main employers involved at this level? 
How willing are businesses to participate in EBP programmes within schools? 
The TEC's Economic Assessment states that businesses in Hull are more likely to be involved in 
the 'soft infi-astruture' associated with education business links than in North East Lincolnshire. 
Why might this be the case? 
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Do you think it is harder to involve business in education partnerships than in economic 
development partnerships? 
Can you identify 'added value' or 'partnership effects' from education business links? 
For example, have business education links had any obvious impact on the employability of 
Hull/Grimsby school leavers? 
Can partnership succeed in bringing about the regeneration of Hull and North East Lincolnshire? 
What is the key to successful regeneration in these areas? 
Are there other questions which you would like to see academic research of this nature address? 
Which other people should I speak to and which documents should I look at in relation to any of 
these questions? 
Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
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Appendix 3. Central Government Initiatives Currently 
Affecting Local Regeneration Activities 
Government Area-based Initiatives 
Community Legal Service Partnerships 
Crime Reduction Programme - Burglary Initiative 
Crime Reduction Programme - Targeted Policing Initiative 
Education Action Zones 
Employment Zones 
Health Action Zones 
LGA New Commitment to Regeneration 
New Deal for Communities 
New Start 
Single Regeneration Budget 
Sure Start 
Government Regeneration Related Initiatives 
Local Authority Best Value Pilots 
Better Government for Older People Pilots 
Coalfields 
Crime Reduction Programme 
Drug Action Teams 
Drug Treatment and Testing Order Pilots 
Early Excellence Centres 
Early Years Development and Childcare Partnerships 
European Regional Development Fund 
Excellence in Cities 
Healthy Schools Initiative 
Lifelong Learning Partnerships 
Local Transport Plans 
New Deal for Disabled People Pilots 
New Deal for Lone Parents 
New Deal for Long Term Unemployed Pilot for Those Aged 25 Years and Over (12-18 Months 
Unemployed) 
New Deal for Long Term Unemployed for Those Aged 25 Years and Over (Over 2 Years 
Unemployed) 
New Deal for Musicians 
New Deal for Partners (Compulsory Scheme) 
New Deal for Partners (Voluntary Scheme) 
New Deal for Young People (18-24) 
New Deal for 50 Plus 
The Provision of 190,000 Extra Free Early Education Places for 3 Year Olds 
Personal Medical Services Pilots - Established Under the Nhs (Primary Care) Act 1997 
ONE 
Territorial Employment Pacts 
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